DO INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS IN THE UK ADOPT A DUAL STRATEGY FOR MANAGING FOREIGN EXCHANGE RISK?

In recent years, the gradual increase in international portfolio diversification within the UK institutional investment community has led to a growing need to manage foreign exchange (FX) risk. This paper reports on the findings of a postal questionnaire survey relating to FX risk management practices in UK institutional investment organisations. The findings demonstrate an increasing awareness of the FX risk management problem and indicate that UK investment institutions actively manage FX risk within their investment portfolios. The paper also focuses on the interesting question of whether UK institutional investors manage their own portfolio's FX risk, simultaneously concerning themselves with their investee companies’ FX risk management practices. Overall, the findings indicate that institutional investors adopt adual strategyfor managing FX risk; not only managing their own FX risk, but also requiring that their investee companies manage FX risk. There is also evidence to suggest that the institutional investors require their investee companies to disclose information relating to their FX risk management policies.     

Disclosure of Proxy Voting Information by Australian Managed Investment Schemes

The US Securities and Exchange Commission requires registered management investment companies to disclose how they vote proxies relating to portfolio securities they hold. The primary purpose of this rule is to enable fund investors to monitor the role of institutional shareholders in the corporate governance practices of public companies. In Australia, despite reform proposals, there are no regulations requiring institutional investors to report proxy voting procedures and practices. There is little evidence of voluntary disclosure of proxy voting by Australian managed investment schemes in equities, indicating that there are costs involved in such disclosure.     

内部控制缺陷信息披露对个人投资者风险认知的影响:一项实验研究

研究个人投资者对内部控制信息披露的反应机理具有重要的与内部控制披露管制相关的政策含义。本文运用实验研究方法,研究了内部控制缺陷信息披露对个人投资者风险认知的影响。研究发现,内部控制缺陷的严重程度对个人投资者的风险认知具有显著影响,但投资者对不披露任何缺陷与披露重要缺陷并没有进行差异化的风险认知反应;管理层对内部控制缺陷的描述程度对个人投资者的风险认知无显著影响。本文研究还发现,对管理者的信任是内部控制缺陷对个人投资者风险认知影响的一个重要中介变量;注册会计师的内部控制审计报告对个人投资者风险认知具有显著影响,在披露内部控制缺陷的情况下,对内部控制审计报告的使用程度越高,越能强化内部控制缺陷对个人投资者风险认知的消极影响。     

Heterogeneity in asset allocation decisions: Empirical evidence from Switzerland

We analyze the heterogeneity in asset allocation decisions of different investor groups in response to changes in the macroeconomic environment. Using a new data set that includes the monthly portfolio holdings of private, commercial, and institutional investors deposited with Swiss banks, we estimate the relationship between equity and bond holdings and common business cycle indicators. Regression analysis indicates that private investors do not systematically move from stocks into bonds by selling stocks to institutional investors and purchasing bonds from them in adverse macroeconomic states. A VAR-error correction framework including cointegration and error correction restrictions suggests that the investment behavior of commercial investors leads and private investors follow in their investment decisions only slowly over time. The asset allocation decisions of institutional investors are not affected by the actions of private and commercial investors. Our results refute a principle of “institutional irrelevance”.     

Investor biases in Japan: Another pathology of Keiretsu

We examine how keiretsu-related institutional investors behave in the Japanese stock market relative to other investor categories for the period from 1985–1998. Based on the agency problem hypothesis for the general bias of institutional investors and the relational distance hypothesis for the unusual bias of keiretsu-affiliated money managers, this paper finds that keiretsu-affiliated money managers over-invest not only in large firms, but also in imprudent firms. The group affiliation of Japanese domestic money managers may drive their portfolio decisions towards financially weak group member firms at the expense of their client investors. Identifying the conditions for this rescue type of investment, we illustrate a rather weak corporate governance foundation of institutional money management in Japan.     

Do site visits mitigate corporate fraudulence? Evidence from China

Corporate site visits emerge as an increasingly important means of information acquisition process for analysts and institutional investors. In this study, we test whether and how site visits mitigate corporate fraud risk using a unique dataset of site visits to Chinese listed firms. We find that corporate site visits can substantially reduce the incidence of corporate fraud, which is robust to adding a series of control variables, alternative model specifications and alternative measures of corporate fraud, as well as accounting for endogeneity issue and controlling for firm and time fixed effects. This negative effect is more pronounced for firms with poorer information environment and for firms with weaker corporate governance. Furthermore, we examine the mechanisms underlying the negative association between site visits and corporate fraud. Overall, this paper contributes to the literature by providing complementary evidence that site visits are important venues for analysts and institutional investors to collect firm-specific information and monitor the management of firms in China. Our findings also provide significant practical and policy implications for investors and regulators who seek to promote corporate information disclosure and mitigate the risk of corporate fraud.     

Crossing boundaries beyond the investment grade: Induced trading by rating-contingent investment constraints

Institutional portfolio managers face rating-based constraints established by investment policy statements (IPS) in their delegated management which, similar to formal regulations, restrict investment in bonds below certain rating levels. We analyze how prices and liquidity of corporate bonds traded by institutional investors react to downgrades crossing these internal limits. Consistent with the existence of a non-regulatory transmission channel, downgrades through regular IPS ratings have a greater impact on the market than downgrades crossing regulatory boundaries, such as the investment-speculative frontier and the NAIC's risk-based capital system thresholds. Our results reveal the existence of other source of rating-related frictions that should be considered.     

Do long‐term institutional investors foster corporate innovation?

This article examines the effect of institutional investors’ investment horizons on firms’ innovation activities. We conjecture that the presence of long‐term institutional investors mitigates managerial myopia, prompting firms to generate greater corporate innovation outputs. Using data on patents and patent citations for US firms, we find that institutions’ investment horizons are positively related to the number of patents and patent citations. We also document that long‐term (short‐term) institutional ownership is positively (negatively) related to the innovation outputs. This article makes an additional contribution to the corporate innovation literature by addressing the positive role of long‐term institutional investors.     

Institutional investors and corporate environmental and financial performance

We propose a conceptual framework to illustrate that when three conditions hold, institutional investors moderate a positive relation between corporate financial performance and corporate environmental performance. We explore heterogeneities across institution types to demonstrate the importance of each condition. The moderating effect works through the channels of expert consulting and effective monitoring. Our results have important policy and practical implications given the global trend of ownership concentration in institutional investors and the projection that by 2025, one out of three dollars under professional management will be invested in corporate social responsibility assets.     

Does operating risk affect portfolio risk? Evidence from insurers' securities holding

This study empirically examines, in the setting of insurance companies, the hypothesis that investors facing more operating risk may behave as if they were more risk averse in investment decisions. Specifically, we study how operating risk from underwriting insurance policies affects insurers' risk taking behavior in their portfolio investments. We find that insurers with higher volatilities in underwriting incomes and cash flows are more conservative in their financial investment risk taking – they have lower credit risk exposure in their bond investments, as well as lower portfolio weights on risky bonds and equities. Further, insurers' portfolio risk exposure is sensitive to the risk of permanent underwriting income shocks but insensitive to the risk of transitory shocks. Transitory operating risk, however, is significantly related to portfolio risk when insurers face tight financing constraints. Our findings suggest a substitutive effect of operating risk on investment decisions by financial institutions.     

OPTIMUM CORPORATE LEVERAGE WITH RISKY DEBT: A DEMAND APPROACH

Traditional models of corporate interior optimum leverage rely on institutional schemes such as taxes, bankruptcy, and agency costs. Theories of leverage indifference in the presence of risky debt depend on various features of perfect and complete markets and on the assumption that all investors hold a uniform portfolio. In the model developed here, corporate interior optimum leverage is obtained as a result of a fundamental risk-return trade-off for investors who hold nonuniform portfolios of risky equity and debt claims in the absence of market mechanisms, forcing leverage indifference. The dynamic optimization solution accommodates bankruptcy costs and specialized institutional factors but does not rely on their presence.     

内部控制与异质机构持股的治理效应

本文实证检验了不同内部控制水平下,异质机构持股在抑制管理层盈余操纵方面的公司治理效应。研究发现,相比外地或短期机构持股,本地或长期机构持股更有助于提升应计质量和降低盈余噪音;当公司存在实质性内部控制缺陷时,本地或长期机构持股在抑制管理层盈余操纵方面的治理效应显著降低;相比国有控股,异质机构持股治理效应的发挥在非国有控股公司中受内部控制的影响更大;当公司存在财务报告实质性内控缺陷时,异质机构持股发挥的治理效应明显更弱。这些结果表明,异质机构持股治理效应的发挥离不开公司内部控制机制,二者之间是互补而非替代关系,这种互补关系主要由财务报告内部控制缺陷驱动。本研究有助于深化理解异质机构持股影响公司治理的具体作用机理,为实务界和监管机构改善公司治理、加强投资者保护提供经验参考。     

Time Diversification: Empirical Tests

This paper investigates the relationship between the performance of equity and the length of the investment horizon used by investors. We examine optimal portfolio time diversification and two definitions of ex ante time diversification. Using almost two centuries of US and UK data we find some support for the hypothesis that equity represents a significantly better investment over long investment horizons than over short investment horizons. Where this result holds, the likely explanation is mean-aversion in fixed-income asset returns. However, these results are sensitive to changes in investor risk preference, changes in utility function specification, changes in the sample period used, changes in investor constraints, and the definition of time diversification adopted. They also differ between the US and UK markets.     

Identifying and Attracting the "right" Investors: Evidence on the Behavior of Institutional Investors

This article summarizes the findings of research the author has conducted over the past seven years that aims to answer a number of questions about institutional investors: Are there significant differences among institutional investors in time horizon and other trading practices that would enable such investors to be classified into types on the basis of their observable behavior? Assuming the answer to the first is yes, do corporate managers respond differently to the pressures created by different types of investors– and, by implication, are certain kinds of investors more desirable from corporate management's point of view? What kinds of companies tend to attract each type of investor, and how does a company's disclosure policy affect that process? The author's approach identifies three categories of institutional investors: (1) “transient” institutions, which exhibit high portfolio turnover and own small stakes in portfolio companies; (2) “dedicated” holders, which provide stable ownership and take large positions in individual firms; and (3) “quasi‐indexers,” which also trade infrequently but own small stakes (similar to an index strategy). As might be expected, the disproportionate presence of transient institutions in a company's investor base appears to intensify pressure for short‐term performance while also resulting in excess volatility in the stock price. Also not surprising, transient investors are attracted to companies with investor relations activities geared toward forward‐looking information and “news events,” like management earnings forecasts, that constitute trading opportunities for such investors. By contrast, quasi‐indexers and dedicated institutions are largely insensitive to shortterm performance and their presence is associated with lower stock price volatility. The research also suggests that companies that focus their disclosure activities on historical information as opposed to earnings forecasts tend to attract quasi‐indexers instead of transient investors. In sum, the author's research suggests that changes in disclosure practices have the potential to shift the composition of a firm's investor base away from transient investors and toward more patient capital. By removing some of the external pressures for short‐term performance, such a shift could encourage managers to establish a culture based on long‐run value maximization.     

Analysing the determinants of narrative risk information in UK FTSE 100 annual reports

We investigate the relationship between the quantity of narrative risk information in corporate annual reports and ownership, governance, and US listing characteristics. We find that corporate risk reporting is negatively related to share ownership by long-term institutions, and thus the results of this study put forth that this important class of institutional investor has investment preferences for firms with a lower level of risk disclosure. Concerning governance, we find that different types of board director fulfil different functions, with both the number of executive and the number of independent directors positively related to the level of corporate risk reporting, but not the number of dependent non-executive directors. This supports a recent emphasis in the UK on the independent aspects of non-executive directors for good corporate governance. Separate investigation of business, financial, and internal control aspects of risk reporting that correspond to the three classes of risk-reporting guidance in the UK reveals that the pattern of risk information in the annual report may be dependent upon the form that reporting regulation takes.     

Does governance travel around the world? Evidence from institutional investors

We examine whether institutional investors affect corporate governance by analyzing portfolio holdings of institutions in companies from 23 countries during the period 2003–2008. We find that firm-level governance is positively associated with international institutional investment. Changes in institutional ownership over time positively affect subsequent changes in firm-level governance, but the opposite is not true. Foreign institutions and institutions from countries with strong shareholder protection play a role in promoting governance improvements outside of the U.S. Institutional investors affect not only which corporate governance mechanisms are in place, but also outcomes. Firms with higher institutional ownership are more likely to terminate poorly performing Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) and exhibit improvements in valuation over time. Our results suggest that international portfolio investment by institutional investors promotes good corporate governance practices around the world.     

Institutional investor type,earnings management and benchmark beaters

This paper classifies institutional investors into transient or long-term by their investment horizons to examine the association between institutional investor type and firms’ discretionary earnings management strategies in two mutually exclusive settings – firms that (do not) use accruals to meet/beat earnings targets. The results support the view that long-term institutional investors constrain accruals management among firms that manage earnings to meet/beat earnings benchmarks. This suggests long-term institutional investors can mitigate aggressive earnings management among these firms. Transient institutional ownership is not systematically associated with aggressive earnings management and is evident only among firms that manage earnings to meet/beat their earnings benchmarks. This indicates transient institution-associated managerial myopia may not be as prevalent as posited by critics. This study highlights the importance of explicitly considering the type of institutional investor and the specific setting when investigating the association between institutional ownership and corporate earnings management.     

Institutional investment horizon and investment–cash flow sensitivity

This paper examines the relevance of institutional investors’ investment horizon, as reflected in the response of firm investment to internal cash flows. We argue that institutional investors with longer investment horizons have greater incentives and efficiencies to engage in effective monitoring. This improved monitoring mitigates asymmetric information and agency problems, and in turn reduces the wedge between the costs of internal and external funds. As a result, the sensitivity of firms’ investment outlays to internal cash flows decreases in the presence of institutional investors with long-term investment horizons. Using a sample of 8402 US firms over the period 1981–2008, we provide empirical evidence consistent with these arguments.     

A METHOD FOR ESTIMATING GLOBAL CORPORATE CAPITAL COSTS: THE CASE OF BESTFOODS

The financial management practices of many multinational corporations are at odds with both financial theory and the strategic case for global expansion. Despite the weight of academic literature, many financial executives still cling to ad hoc rules of thumb that discourage value-enhancing global growth. In particular, they tend to require large risk premiums for making foreign investments while ignoring the diversification benefits of such investments for their shareholders.
This article presents a practical method for estimating the cost of capital for use by multinationals both in evaluating foreign investment opportunities and in measuring the ongoing performance of overseas business units. The method represents a kind of "hybrid" version of the global CAPM—one that attempts to reconcile some of corporate executives' concerns about the distinctive risks of foreign investment with the finance theorist's portfolio perspective and reliance on capital market information. More specifically, the framework uses information from capital markets to determine the appropriate risk premiums for currency and sovereign risks associated with each country in an MNC's portfolio. But, at the same time, these risk premiums are partly offset by taking account of any diversification benefits that foreign investment provides for the firm's shareholders.
The method is illustrated using the case of Bestfoods, a Fortune 200 company with extensive overseas operations that recently adopted the method. For the purpose of evaluating new projects, Bestfoods produces quarterly updates of its cost-of-capital estimates for each country in which it has (or expects to have) major operations. For evaluating the ongoing performance of each country business unit, the relevant cost of capital is calculated annually (at the beginning of each fiscal year).     

Financial advice and gender: Wealthy individual investors in the UK

We examine how gender differences in investment risk tolerance, knowledge, confidence and portfolio cash allocations relate to the gender mix of investors and financial advisors among a sample of wealthy individuals in the UK. Our results demonstrate that gender effects are more nuanced than previously assumed. First, while even wealthy women consider themselves more conservative and allocate a higher proportion of their investable assets to cash than men, previous findings of lower investment knowledge and confidence do not extend to our sample. Second, having an advisor matters. Advised investors perceive themselves to have a higher risk tolerance and invest 10.6%-points more than self-directed investors. Finally, the investor-advisor gender combination matters, but only for female investors. Women with male advisors are more risk averse, feel less knowledgeable and less confident about their investment decisions. They also invest 11%-points less than women with female advisors. Indeed, female investors advised by women report the highest risk tolerance and make the lowest portfolio allocation to risk-free assets across the full sample, including men.