独立董事薪酬对盈余管理影响的实证研究

本文以沪深两市2007-2011年的A股上市公司为研究样本,考察了独立董事薪酬对盈余管理的影响。结果表明:独立董事薪酬与盈余管理程度显著正相关;进一步地,相比负向盈余管理,独立董事薪酬对正向盈余管理的影响更加显著;最后,发现业绩好的公司中,独董薪酬与盈余管理程度的正相关关系更为显著。本研究表明,尽管独立董事在一定程度上有能力发现公司盈余管理行为,但因无法有效抑制该行为的发生,所以会要求不同程度的薪酬水平为其违规隐瞒行为寻求风险补偿,而高公司业绩给独立董事的高薪要求创造了条件,从而进一步加剧公司盈余管理水平。     

我国上市公司独立董事薪酬现状及其改进

独立董事的薪酬问题关系到上市公司治理结构的效率高低。现阶段我国独立董事薪酬制度安排存在一些问题，不可避免地会影响独立董事的独立性。因此有必要做出进一步的改进。     

上市银行CEO薪酬与董事薪酬的影响因素

本文利用沪深两市14家上市银行2005～2009年面板数据，以广义最小二乘法分析了上市银行CEO薪酬、董事薪酬的影响因素。研究发现，CEO薪酬与公司治理变量及代表股东权益的EPS显著相关，这表明CEO薪酬已经与企业绩效初步关联；独立董事薪酬与银行规模、股权结构、公司治理、CEO薪酬以及ROA及其滞后变量显著相关，而关联...     

我国独立董事薪酬研究文献综述

文章对与独立董事薪酬相关文献从研究方法和内容上进行综述,内容上主要从是否应支付薪酬、有谁支付薪酬、薪酬标准问题、结构设计四个方面进行综述。得出,国内学者普遍认为,我国独立董事的独立性问题并没有得到很好的解决,薪酬激励不够充分。     

我国独立董事薪酬研究文献综述

文章对与独立董事薪酬相关文献从研究方法和内容上进行综述,内容上主要从是否应支付薪酬、有谁支付薪酬、薪酬标准问题、结构设计四个方面进行综述。得出,国内学者普遍认为,我国独立董事的独立性问题并没有得到很好的解决,薪酬激励不够充分。     

独立董事薪酬与公司治理效率

利用2003～2013年上市公司数据,本文基于独立董事薪酬视角对其治理效用的发挥进行了考察。研究发现,当独立董事的薪酬过低时,存在激励不足问题,不利于调动独立董事履职的积极性,由此造成公司高管变更与经营业绩间敏感性的降低及公司盈余管理程度的提高。与此相仿,当独立董事的薪酬过高时,存在激励过度问题,削弱了独立董事的独立性,也将导致较低的高管变更与经营业绩的敏感性及更高程度的公司盈余管理。最后,我们对独立董事薪酬影响其治理效用发挥的路径进行了考察,结果显示,过低的薪酬降低了独立董事参加董事会会议的意愿,而过高的薪酬造成独立董事更不会对董事会议案提出异议。     

我国独立董事的行为会受到薪酬的影响吗?——来自上市公司兼职独立董事的研究

独立董事制度作为公司治理制度的重要组成部分,受到了实务界和理论界人士的广泛关注,但是却鲜少有研究关注独立董事的行为。以兼职独立董事在不同公司的薪酬和行为为研究样本,分析薪酬和声誉对独立董事的行为的影响,结果发现,在控制了个人特征之后,与Yermack(2004)、Srinivasan(2005)以及Fich and Shivdasani(2007)的研究结果一致,薪酬对独立董事的行为并没有显著的影响,表明独立董事在进行行为决策的时候,还会受到声誉、社会关系等因素的制约。     

从独立董事的薪酬制度设计透析其独立性

独立董事制度作为改善公司内部治理结构的有力措施 ,已被正式引入到我国上市公司中。独立性作为独立董事制度的灵魂 ,直接关系着独立董事能否在公司治理机制中真正起到制衡的作用。在对国内外独立董事的薪酬制度现状进行比较分析的基础上 ,进一步探讨了薪酬制度与独立性之间的关系 ,并对如何合理地设置我国上市公司独立董事的薪酬制度提出一些建议     

独立董事托管制可让独立董事“独立”

我国的独立董事制度建立不久，还存在诸多问题。独立董事区别于其他董事最根本的特征是“独立”，其独立与否、独立性高低对独立董事制度能否发挥作用至关重要。目前我国上市公司在独立董事的管理、提名聘任、薪酬发放等诸多方面都存在不独立的情况，     

金融机构高管薪酬存在风险敏感性吗？——基于中国上市金融机构的经验证据

基于中国上市金融机构2008-2016年的非平衡面板数据,研究金融机构高管薪酬风险敏感性问题.结果表明:金融机构的风险承担与高管薪酬呈显著的正相关关系,意味着金融机构高管薪酬契约存在风险敏感性;相较于非国有金融机构,国有金融机构高管薪酬风险敏感性较低;以监事会人数、监事会会议次数、独立董事占比与第一大股东持股比例作为代理变量,管理层权力在一定程度上影响风险承担与高管薪酬之间的关系.     

独立董事对报酬与风险的取向--基于深交所的实证研究

尽管独立董事在主业中拥有较高的社会地位和财富,但仍需要报酬的激励;高认知能力的独立董事,不仅获得了更高的报酬,也更具有回避风险的能力;与低学历高职务独立董事相比,高学历低职务独立董事的报酬具有高风险高报酬的特征.这些结果表明,在实施独立董事制度中独立董事不可能是免费的代理人,因此,应从独立董事辞职、报酬机制和降低风险的角度加以改进.     

Are bonds blind? Board-CEO social networks and firm risk

We examine the impact of social networks between independent directors and the CEO on firm risk. Employing the deaths and retirements of socially connected independent directors and the passage of the 2002 Sarbanes-Oxley Act for two identifications, we find that board-CEO social networks have a positive impact on firm risk. Specifically, CEOs who are socially connected to their independent directors are motivated to adopt riskier investment, operating and financing strategies. This positive influence is more pronounced for prior under-performing firms and for CEOs with low power or overconfidence, indicating that board-CEO social networks act as career insurance and a power-enhancing mechanism to encourage managerial risk-taking.     

Securities litigation risk and board gender diversity

We investigate the effect of board gender diversity on the risk of securities litigation. We find that this risk is inversely related to the fraction of female independent directors on a firm's board. Additionally, the effectiveness of these directors in reducing securities litigation risk is negatively related to the firm's monitoring costs and positively related to its complexity. We further investigate the channels through which female independent directors may reduce the risk of securities litigation and attribute the reduction to improvements in conditional accounting conservatism and corporate social responsibility policy.     

The Non-monotonic Effect of Board Independence on Credit Ratings

Using the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 as a natural experiment, we document a non-monotonic relation between board independence and credit ratings. Ratings are upgraded with an exogenous increase of board independence only when independence is low, which is consistent with the costs as well as benefits of having independent directors. Further analysis suggests that these costs may include the deficiency of the industrial expertise of independent directors, the cost of information acquisition for independent directors to become informed to monitor management, and the risk-taking incentive of these directors that may adversely affect the credit risk of a financially distressed firm.     

Analysing the determinants of narrative risk information in UK FTSE 100 annual reports

We investigate the relationship between the quantity of narrative risk information in corporate annual reports and ownership, governance, and US listing characteristics. We find that corporate risk reporting is negatively related to share ownership by long-term institutions, and thus the results of this study put forth that this important class of institutional investor has investment preferences for firms with a lower level of risk disclosure. Concerning governance, we find that different types of board director fulfil different functions, with both the number of executive and the number of independent directors positively related to the level of corporate risk reporting, but not the number of dependent non-executive directors. This supports a recent emphasis in the UK on the independent aspects of non-executive directors for good corporate governance. Separate investigation of business, financial, and internal control aspects of risk reporting that correspond to the three classes of risk-reporting guidance in the UK reveals that the pattern of risk information in the annual report may be dependent upon the form that reporting regulation takes.     

Independent director reputation incentives,accruals quality and audit fees

While prior research provides abundant evidence that independent directors are associated with favorable outcomes, researchers have only recently started to investigate the impact of independent director reputation incentives. This study examines whether the reputation incentives of independent directors are associated with accruals quality and audit fees. The results reveal a negative relationship between the proportion of independent directors with relatively low reputation incentives and accruals quality. Further, the proportion of independent directors with relatively low reputation incentives is positively associated with audit fees, suggesting that auditors view lower reputation incentives as increasing risk. We also find that Big 4/5 auditor office size moderates the relationship between independent director reputation incentives and audit fees. Specifically, our results indicate that audit fees increase less in response to lower reputation incentives as office size increases, suggesting that larger offices respond to the risks associated with lower reputation incentives more efficiently than smaller offices.     

Women in power with power: The influence of meaningful board representation on default risk

This paper examines the relationship between the presence of female board members and firms' corporate default risk. We find an inverted “U-shaped” relationship for a sample of 917 firms in 19 emerging markets for the period 2005–2019. We also show that, consistent with critical mass theory, boards need to have three or more female directors to significantly reduce default risk. Furthermore, having female directors with an independent role on the board in countries with less familial dominance, or having female directors with a leadership position, significantly reduces default risk. Finally, we find a positive effect of the interaction between a country's gender inequality and board gender diversity on default risk.     

Gender-diverse boards and audit fees: What difference does gender quota legislation make?

We investigate the effect of board (audit committee) gender diversity on audit fees in the French context. We also examine whether the relationship between the proportion of female directors and audit fees is moderated by the enactment of the gender quota law in 2011. We use the system GMM estimation approach on a matched sample of French firms listed in the SBF 120 index between 2002 and 2017. Consistent with the supply-side perspective, we contend that female independent directors and female audit committee members, by improving board monitoring effectiveness, affect the auditor's assessment of audit risk, resulting in lower audit fees. Our findings also document that, by breaking the glass ceiling, the effectiveness of the gender quota law lies not in increasing the proportion of female insider directors, but in boosting the appointment of female independent directors and female audit committee members. Using the difference-in-difference approach, our results reveal that female independent directors and female audit committee members are more willing to assert their monitoring skills after the quota law, leading to lower audit fees. Moving beyond tokenism, we show that, after the quota law, the negative impact on non-audit fees is strengthened only for female independent directors.     

Effectiveness of independent boards of UCITS funds

In order to protect fund investors against conflicts of interest with fund management companies, US funds have mandatory independent directors, but this obligation is not required under the European Union Undertakings for Collective Investment in Transferable Securities (UCITS) Directive. Nevertheless, a considerable number of UCITS funds do have independent directors. Whether independent directors should also be mandatory in Europe has been a topic of ongoing debate. Using a sample of Luxembourg UCITS, we test the hypothesis that more independent boards add value for investors through lower costs and/or better investment performance, but we fail to find supporting evidence, even for funds with a higher risk of conflicts of interest. Oversight by independent depositaries and institutional shareholders does not seem to be effective either. It appears that board attitude and the sponsor distribution model are more important since we find evidence that boards that prioritise cost monitoring have lower costs and that independent sponsor funds have better performance. These results question the effectiveness of self-regulation or formal regulation requiring independent board members.     

行为财务视角下公司财务决策研究

企业财务决策主要包括投融资决策、股利政策等。行为财务学放松了传统财务理论的非理性人假说,认为投资者和管理者都可能因为一些非标准偏好和主观偏好而表现非理性的决策行为。本文从行为财务学的视角分析了非理性的投资者和非理性的管理者对公司财务决策的干扰和影响,并且说明了认识到这些影响因素有利于管理者做出正确的财务决策。