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1.
This paper compares the performance of alternative cost-based transfer pricing methods. We adopt an incomplete contracting framework with asymmetric information at the trading stage. Transfer pricing guides intra-company trade and provides incentives for value-enhancing specific investments. We compare actual-cost transfer prices that include a markup over marginal costs with standard-cost transfer prices that are determined either by the central office ex ante (centralized standard-cost transfer pricing) or by the supplying division at the trading stage (reported standard-cost transfer pricing). For the actual-cost methods, we show that markups based on the joint contribution margin (contribution-margin transfer pricing) dominate purely additive markups (cost-plus transfer pricing). We obtain the following results. (1) Centralized standard-cost transfer pricing dominates the other methods if the central office and the divisions ex ante face low cost uncertainty. (2) The actual-cost methods dominate the other methods if the central office and the divisions ex ante face high cost uncertainty and later, at the trading stage, the buying division receives sufficient cost information. (3) Reported standard-cost transfer pricing dominates the other methods if the central office and the divisions ex ante face high cost uncertainty, and the buyer has insufficient cost information at the trading stage.  相似文献   

2.
A model of cost-based transfer pricing   总被引:12,自引:1,他引:12  
In most decentralized organizations, goods and services are transferred between divisions. These transfers are frequently recorded in the accounting books of the divisions; the term transfer price refers to the dollar amount of the interdivisional exchange. This study considers two main issues: (i) the costs and the benefits of delegating decisions through a system of transfer pricing and divisional performance evaluation, and (ii) the performance of one common method of pricing intrafirm transactions: cost-based transfer pricing.The study analyzes a firm in which each divisional manager has better information about the divisional environment than what is known by the firm's top management. The first half of the paper demonstrates that the firm can attain the optimal level of profits with a compensation system utilizing (i) reports by divisional managers describing in complete detail each manager's private information, and (ii) divisional performance evaluation with cost-based transfer pricing. Next, a situation is considered in which divisional managers are not able to communicate their private information to the firm's top management because of complexity of divisional environments or managers' specialized expertise. In this bounded-rationality setting, a managerial-compensation system employing cost-based transfer pricing allows the firm to earn strictly higher expected profits than if all decisions are made by the firm's top management relying on divisional managers' reports.Financial support from the Unisys Corporation is gratefully acknowledged.  相似文献   

3.
资金转移定价系统是商业银行进行利率风险管理、产品定价、资源配置、利润核算、绩效评价、优化决策和提高运营效率的重要工具.实施资金转移定价对商业银行经营管理水平的提高以及竞争力的提升具有很大的促进作用,对提高商业银行产品利率敏感性、完善货币政策传导机制具有不可忽视的影响.本文介绍了资金转移定价的模式和方法,比较了各自的优劣,并结合我国商业银行目前面临的内外部环境特征,指出我国商业银行实行资金转移定价必须注意的几个问题.  相似文献   

4.
商业银行推行成本管理会计的思考   总被引:3,自引:0,他引:3  
杨德怀 《金融论坛》2005,10(8):35-40
我国商业银行对成本管理会计不够重视,信息系统基础薄弱,成本资料欠缺,高素质的成本管理会计人才稀缺,内部资金的转移价格难以确定,业绩评价体系的合理性与有效性难以平衡。商业银行要推行成本管理会计就要提高各商业银行职工对成本管理会计重要性和复杂性的认识;尽快建立专门的组织机构,着力培养或引进高素质的专门人才,制定或完善规章制度;实行全面成本管理,实现分部门、分产品、分客户的管理;运用计算机技术,实现业务流程再造;强化利率——产品定价机制,合理确定内部资金转移价格;提高数据质量,建立和完善相关信息系统。  相似文献   

5.
窦超  翟进步 《金融研究》2020,486(12):189-206
业绩承诺已成为我国上市公司并购重组的基本特征,但在这一热潮下,违约现象也屡有发生,促使人们思考业绩承诺背后的真实动机。本文基于我国资本市场的高频交易数据,从财富转移与信号传递两个视角辨析了并购重组中业绩承诺对机构和个人投资者在资金流向与投资收益方面的影响。研究发现,业绩承诺信息公告后,小投资者会更多买入并购企业股票,其投资收益为负并遭受了较大损失;而大投资者则显著降低其持仓,投资收益显著为正,财富效应在大小投资者之间转移明显。进一步的研究还发现,财富转移效应在业绩承诺违约、自愿性业绩承诺的并购重组中的差异更大,这表明业绩承诺更多以保护机制之名行信息优势之实。而深层次的分析发现,信息透明度较高、对投资者利益保护较好的公司,其财富转移效应差异程度会得到较好抑制,大投资者的信息优势和知情交易行为有所收敛。本文的研究发现佐证了业绩承诺机制背后财富转移效应的存在,其结论启示我们,不断提高公司信息透明度、合理设定业绩承诺发生违约时的赔偿额和加大对业绩承诺违约的处罚力度仍是业绩承诺发挥真正保护机制的重中之重。  相似文献   

6.
窦超  翟进步 《金融研究》2021,486(12):189-206
互联网降低了中小股东获取和使用信息的成本,也方便其借助网络进行投票表决。本文借助2008—2018年深交所上市公司的股东大会网络投票数据,基于公司债券持有人视角,理论分析和实证检验了中小股东积极主义的溢出效应。实证结果表明:中小股东主观上基于自身利益的积极主义行为,客观上能够显著增加所在公司的债券持有人财富,即存在正向溢出效应,并且该正向效应在统计和经济意义上均具有高度显著性。在控制内生性影响后,该作用依然存在。进一步探究其内在机理发现,中小股东积极主义通过提升公司业绩和增强财务稳健性,进而增加其所在公司的债券持有人财富。该溢出效应在较差的内部治理环境、投资者学习效应和畅通的外部信息渠道下更为显著。  相似文献   

7.
This study examines the association between when an airline sells its passenger seats and the pricing method (marginal cost or full cost) it employs. Prior literature suggests that when firms are able to change prices during the selling period, the optimality of full cost pricing or marginal cost pricing depends on when demand information is revealed during the period between capacity commitment decisions and time of sale. Full cost‐based pricing is appropriate in determining capacity commitment and prices simultaneously, while marginal cost provides more relevant information for pricing when capacity has been committed. Using the price and cost data from a sample of four U.S. domestic airlines, we find that full cost explains price variations of first‐day sales robustly. The adjusted R2 of the marginal cost pricing model is larger in the sample of sales two days prior to departure than in the sample of first‐day sales. In the analysis of the sample of sales two days prior to departure, we find that, based on the adjusted R2 of the full cost pricing and marginal cost pricing models, the explanatory power of marginal cost pricing is relatively weaker than full cost pricing. Our results document the use of different cost information along the dynamic change of price and provide implications in understanding the role of cost information in setting prices.  相似文献   

8.
We show how information technology affects transfer pricing. With coarse information technology, negotiated transfer pricing has an informational advantage: managers agree to prices that approximate the firm's cost of internal trade more precisely than cost-based transfer prices. With sufficiently rapid offers, this advantage outweighs opportunity costs of managers’ bargaining time, and negotiated transfer pricing generates higher profits than the cost-based method. However, as information technology improves, the informational advantage diminishes; the opportunity costs of managers’ bargaining eventually dominate, and cost-based methods generate higher profits. Our results explain why firms generally prefer cost-based methods, and when negotiated methods are preferable.  相似文献   

9.
This paper examines a transfer pricing problem between two divisions of a decentralized firm. The selling division is privately informed about its own costs and produces a good that is sold both externally in an intermediate market and internally within the firm. Unlike most previous work, we focus on dual transfer pricing systems that allow the selling division to be credited for an amount that differs from the amount charged to the buying division. We identify conditions under which efficient decentralized trade and external price setting incentives can be provided with a properly chosen set of dual transfer prices that do not rely on direct communication. Instead, the optimal dual transfer prices will depend only on public information about the market price charged by the upstream division in the external market, which indirectly communicates information about production costs to the downstream division. For a variety of well-known demand functions, the optimal transfer prices will be linear functions of the market price. Our main results hold when the upstream division faces multiple internal buyers or faces a binding capacity constraint.  相似文献   

10.
This article examines the relation between transfer pricing and production incentives using a model of a vertically integrated firm with divisions located in different tax jurisdictions. We show that if divisional profits are taxed at the same marginal rate, the transfer price should be set to minimize the compensation risk faced by the manager of the buying division. For the case where divisional profits are taxed at different marginal rates, we are able to characterize the trade-off between the tax savings from setting transfer prices to reduce profitability in the high tax jurisdication and the loss of effort attributable to the impact of tax avoidance on the incentive compensation system. Further, we show that if it is feasible to compensate the division managers using multiple performance measures, the transfer price should be used to minimize the firm's overall tax liability. Finally, we show that when authority to determine the transfer price must be delegated to one of the division managers, it is optimal to assign responsibility for setting the transfer price to the manager of the division with the most production uncertainty.  相似文献   

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