Cost Uncertainty and Taxpayer Compliance

The existence of a private cost borne by audited taxpayers affects the tax enforcement policy. This is so because tax auditors will face now two sources of uncertainty, namely, the typical one associated with taxpayers’ income and that associated with the taxpayers’ idiosyncratic attitude towards tax compliance. Moreover, the inspection policy can be exposed to some randomness from the taxpayers’ viewpoint due to the uncertainty about the audit cost borne by the tax authority. In this paper we provide an unified framework to analyze the effects of all these sources of uncertainty in a model of tax compliance with strategic interaction between auditors and taxpayers. We show that more variance in the distribution of the taxpayers’ private cost of evading raises both tax compliance and the ex-ante welfare of taxpayers. The effects of the uncertainty about the audit cost faced by the tax authority are generally ambiguous. We also discuss the implications of our model for the regressive (or progressive) bias of the effective tax system.     

欧共体法院判例对成员国个人所得税扣除制度的推进

《欧共体条约》中没有对直接税的具体规定,欧共体①立法机关也没有对直接税进行立法。但是,欧共体法院②通过案例判决,间接地发展了个人所得税的扣除制度,明确了相关的税收处理办法:应退还临时居民纳税人超额缴纳的工薪所得税;对非居民应按扣除商业费用后的净所得征税;"狭隘"归集抵免制因阻碍成员国间的资本自由流动而被废止。     

Compliance costs for personal income tax in a transition country: the case of Slovenia

The evaluation of taxpayers' compliance costs has grown in significance within tax system research over the last 15 years. In 2001, two surveys of VAT and personal income taxpayers were conducted in Slovenia to evaluate compliance costs for the 2000 fiscal year. This paper presents the results of research into compliance costs for personal income tax in Slovenia. The results show that compliance costs for personal income tax are relatively low, primarily because most taxpayers consider filing their tax declaration to be a simple procedure, which means that consultancy costs are low.     

新个人所得税法对扣纳双方的影响及应对——基于扣缴人义务及纳税人行为视角

新个人所得税法在实践中的运行效果取决于征纳双方在税收征管过程中的耦合作用。一方面,作为联系税务机关与纳税人的中介与桥梁,扣缴人在个税预扣预缴及汇算清缴方面发挥着重要作用;另一方面,税制结构变化与缴税申报模式转变对纳税人影响深远。在新个人所得税下,扣缴人的扣缴清缴合规、沟通保密及判定审查等义务均有不同程度的增加、拓展或提升。而纳税人的缴税申报、现金管理及税收规避等行为更易于引致税务管控及稽查。落实应对建议有助于促使扣纳双方在税务合规的框架内发挥正向合力作用,凭借税收法治助力个税财政收入的实现。     

Tax Responses at Low Taxable Incomes: Evidence from Germany*

The desirability of a particular tax system depends on how different taxpayers react to it. Exploiting the personal allowance threshold and detailed German tax administration data, this paper examines responses at low taxable incomes to extend previous findings. Taxpayers bunch at the allowance threshold, and more so with non-wage income. Unlike in other studies, wage earners also bunch, at least if they file a tax return, while incomes gross of deductions do not. Deductions account for a sizeable share of the sharp bunching mass of taxpayers with non-wage income. A machine learning analysis identifies which deduction items predict such sharp bunching. The pattern of results suggests that local intensive-margin real responses induce moderate deadweight loss.     

提高企业所得税征管质量和效率的探讨

目前在企业所得税征管方面还存在许多问题.提高企业所得税征管质量和效率的措施包括:加强企业所得税日常管理工作;加大对税务人员的培训力度;加大对纳税人关联企业交易往来的监控;严格审核纳税人申报的财产损失;提高税务稽查选案的准确率;保证税务稽查有的放矢,提高税务稽查的质量和效率.     

Taxpayers' Behavioural Responses and Measures of Tax Compliance ‘Gaps’: A Critique and a New Measure

The work of Feldstein (1995 and 1999) has stimulated substantial conceptual and empirical advances in economists' approaches to analysing taxpayers' behavioural responses to changes in tax rates. Meanwhile, a largely independent literature proposing and applying alternative measures of tax compliance has also developed in recent years, which has sought to provide tax agencies with tools to identify the extent of tax non‐compliance as a first step to designing policies to improve compliance. In this context, measures of ‘tax gaps’ – the difference between actual tax collected and the potential tax collection under full compliance with the tax code – have become the primary measures of tax non‐compliance via (legal) avoidance and/or (illegal) evasion. In this paper, we argue that the tax gap as conventionally defined is conceptually flawed because it fails to incorporate behavioural responses by taxpayers. We show that conventional tax gap measures, which ignore the presence of behavioural responses, exaggerate the degree of non‐compliance. This potentially applies both to indirect taxes (such as the ‘VAT gap’) and direct (income) taxes. Further, where these conventional tax gap measures motivate reforms designed to increase the tax compliance rate, they will likely have a tax‐base‐reducing effect and hence generate a smaller increase in realised tax revenues than would be anticipated from the tax gap estimate.     

Income Shifting in the Spanish Dual Income Tax*

Based on a model of behavioural response to taxes, and using the Taxpayers Panel from the Instituto de Estudios Fiscales for the period 1999–2009, we analyse whether the dual nature of the Spanish personal income tax (PIT), reinforced by the 2007 reform, has influenced taxpayers’ behaviour, causing them to convert part of their ‘general income’ (from labour, real estate or economic activities) into ‘savings income’ (from movable capital or capital gains). We also extend the analysis of income shifting and study whether Spanish taxpayers also responded to the different tax treatments given to the two types of savings income (from movable capital and capital gains) until 2007, transforming savings income from one type to the other. The results of our study demonstrate three facts. First, Spanish taxpayers did respond to the different tax rates, shifting income from the general base to different forms of savings, especially capital gains. The highest‐income individuals and the self‐employed and business owners are the groups where this behaviour was most marked. Second, the self‐employed and business owners also turned income from movable assets into capital gains, guided by their different tax rates. And third, we find signs of ‘anticipation’ and ‘learning’ effects caused by the 2007 tax reform. We believe that the results obtained will enrich the growing literature on income shifting.     

Simplifying the personal income tax system: lessons from the 1998 Spanish reform

Governments often try to reduce the complexity of personal income tax systems by decreasing the number of tax filings. The 1998 reform of the Spanish income tax system has followed this approach by adjusting withholding on earned income to the income tax liability. In this paper, we assess to what extent the reform has fulfilled its purposes, making use of a micro‐simulation tax‐benefit model for Spain, ESPASIM. The number of individuals exempt from filing a tax return has been reduced to around half of the total number of taxpayers. However, the quantity of tax returns sent to the tax administration has not changed so much because the new withholding system adjusts taxes for only 29 per cent of those exempt. Moreover, the new system increases the overall excess of tax withholding by 1.5 billion euro. We also study alternative reforms that could achieve better results than the one implemented.     

Thinking and Learning in the Tax Evasion Game

Equilibrium behaviour is one of the fundamental concepts of economics: that each player's strategy is a best response to their beliefs about other players' strategies (and that these beliefs are realised). It is therefore striking that one of the most utilised economic models of tax compliance (Allingham and Sandmo, 1972) lacks this property as random audit selection is not a best response for the tax administration. The game theory literature of tax compliance has solved the equilibrium under assumptions of perfect information, full rationality and representative agents (Reinganum and Wilde, 1986; Erard and Feinstein, 1994). The recent application of behavioural economics to tax compliance (Hashimzade et al., 2014) allows richer assumptions such as heterogeneity and asymmetric information to be included in agent‐based models. This paper investigates the tax administration's best‐response audit strategy with heterogeneous taxpayers, imperfect information and evolutionary survival of taxpayers. It finds that, under these conditions, the tax administration's best‐response audit strategy is an adaptive learning approach and not a well‐defined audit function. This fits with actual practice of ‘predictive analytics’ by OECD tax administrations. Behavioural game theory also predicts that when actors are information rich, adaptive learning will dominate abstract thinking.