The only game in town: Stock-price consequences of local bias

Theory suggests that, in the presence of local bias, the price of a stock should be decreasing in the ratio of the aggregate book value of firms in its region to the aggregate risk tolerance of investors in its region. Using data on U.S. states and Census regions, we find clear-cut support for this proposition. Most of the variation in the ratio of interest comes from differences across regions in aggregate book value per capita. Regions with low population density—e.g., the Deep South—are home to relatively few firms per capita, which leads to higher stock prices via an “only-game-in-town” effect.     

殳价操纵与反操纵监管

监管应该有能力发现操纵行为，并建立多样性的操纵行为监测手段，实施有效的反操纵监管(anti-manipulation regulation)。对操纵行为泛滥的中国股市而言，打击股价操纵行为更具有特嗣的迫切性和制度建设意义。     

The manipulation of basel risk-weights

In this paper, we examine the relationship between banks’ approval for the internal ratings-based (IRB) approaches of Basel II and the ratio of risk-weighted assets to total assets. Analysing a panel of 115 banks from 21 OECD countries that were eventually approved for applying the IRB to their credit portfolio, we find that risk-weight density becomes lower once regulatory approval is granted. The effect persists when we control for asset structure, and we provide evidence showing that this phenomenon cannot be explained by modelling choices, or improved risk-measurement alone. Consistent with theories of risk-weight manipulation, we find the decline in risk-weights to be particularly pronounced among weakly capitalised banks, where the legal framework for supervision is weak, and in countries where supervisors are overseeing many IRB banks. We conclude that part of the decline in reported riskiness under the IRB results from banks’ strategic risk-modelling.     

Earnings co-movements and earnings manipulation

This study develops a theory that predicts the lower the degree to which firms’ earnings are correlated with the industry the greater the probability a firm will issue a biased signal of firm performance. The theory provides for causal predictions in our empirical tests in which we examine the probability a firm will be subject to an Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Release (AAER). The empirical findings provide support for the theory, even after controlling for various predictive variables from the literature, indicating the degree of earnings co-movements with the industry is in fact a causal factor in managers decisions to bias earnings reports. We further illustrate that low co-movement firms are less conservative than high co-movement firms, which provides an application of our theory to a broader setting. Overall, we provide both a theory and an empirical validation of the theory helping to discipline the thinking about earnings management and allowing for causal relations to be uncovered.     

The manipulation of closing prices

Before the introduction of a call auction at the close, the last minute of trading at the Paris Bourse was the most active of the whole day. Even though the bid–ask spread increased substantially, the probability of large and aggressive orders increased, as did price volatility. In addition, both the one-minute returns and the proportion of partially hidden orders increased. In this paper, we develop an agency-based model of closing price manipulation, which can account for these phenomena. In addition, we discuss the optimal closing price mechanism under manipulation.     

Real activities manipulation and firm valuation

In this paper, we study the link between real earnings management and firm value. Consistent with prior studies, we expect the ability of a firm to generate future cash flows to be significantly impaired by its use of real activities manipulations. Using a cross-section of companies from the Standard & Poor’s Compustat database from 1990 to 2013, we find that firms with higher real earnings management are associated with lower industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q and firm-specific misvaluation measure. Our results are consistent under several regression techniques addressing potential endogeneity issues and alternative proxies for real earnings management after controlling for known factors to affect firm market values.     

对遏制利润操纵行为的一些思考

监管部门与上市公司之间围绕利润操纵的博弈一直在不断地进行,而关联交易一直是上市公司实施利润操纵的一件法宝.有些上市公司不断利用关联交易来操纵"每股收益"和"净资产收益率"等指标,在各种指标的"排行榜"中先把水搅浑,再混水摸鱼,企图在证券市场中不断地"圈钱".     

Portfolio performance manipulation in collateralized loan obligations

We examine the discretionary activities that CLO managers engage in to pass monthly overcollateralization (OC) tests. These tests require a CLO's loan portfolio value, scaled by the CLO notes’ principal balance, to be above a certain threshold. Using CLOs’ granular disclosures, we develop model-free estimates for discretionary loan fair valuation and transaction-based proxies for strategic loan trading. We find a positive association between these discretionary activities and the probability of avoiding an OC test violation. This association varies predictably with junior noteholders’ influence and CLO market conditions. Strategic trading—but not discretionary fair valuation—relates to worse future CLO performance.     

Performance measurement manipulation: cherry-picking what to correct

A common feature of managerial and financial reporting is an iterative process wherein various parties selectively correct particular measurements by challenging them and subjecting them to increased scrutiny. We model this feature by adding an agent appeal stage to the standard moral hazard model and show that it can be optimal to allow the agent to decide which performance measures to appeal, despite the agent’s incentive to cherry-pick. In the presence of measurement errors, the agent is incentivized by increased opportunities for cherry-picking that arise if he chooses the “right” vs. the “wrong” acts.

Information manipulation and rational investment booms and busts

A model of endogenous investment booms and busts with rational agents is presented where outside investors are uncertain about both industry (aggregate) and firm-specific capital productivity, and insiders manipulate information through strategic productivity disclosures. For intermediate and high levels of agency conflict, there are aggregate investment distortions along the equilibrium path, investment dynamics are history-dependent, and depict patterns of persistent investment booms or investment busts even though investors design optimal incentive contracts based on Bayes-rational beliefs. Moreover, the aggregate uncertainty may not be resolved in the limit, as the number of firms and disclosures gets arbitrarily large.