操纵证券交易价格行为及其治理对策

操纵证券交易价格的行为是资本市场的客观现象,不必禁止此类行为,只需将其限制在资本市场能承受的限度之内。治理证券价格操纵行为必须借助刑法;彰显其及时性、严厉性、确定性;完善前置刑法制度;基于信托责任、民事责任与行政责任等层面,构筑治理证券价格操纵行为的预防体系。     

An approach for the identification of cross-sell and up-sell opportunities using a financial services customer database

The collection, management and manipulation of customer data are key to the successful operation of many relationship marketing and customer relationship management endeavours. To make effective use of the data, however, requires that organisations know how to analyse it in order to generate valuable information for marketing purposes. One of the key challenges to maintaining an ongoing relationship with customers is to be able to predict what products customers will need to buy next and at what point so that appropriate marketing offers can be made. This paper illustrates an analytical approach that can be used in such a situation. Using actual customer data from a financial institution, the paper illustrates the application of segmentation analysis, purchase acquisition trees and survival analysis. While the results are of particular interest to financial institutions, the methodology has applicability in a number of contexts where customer data are available.     

股权结构与上市公司应计和真实盈余管理行为

过高的股权集中度会导致显著更高的应计盈余操控行为,而对真实盈余管理行为的影响总体上不显著;无论对于应计盈余操控还是真实盈余操控,机构持股均具有较好的抑制作用;国有控股会导致显著更高的应计盈余操控,但在真实盈余操控方面,更多地体现在异常酌量费用方面;国有控股上市公司管理层持股越高,其应计盈余管理行为越显著,而在真实盈余管理行为方面,显著影响更多体现在异常现金流和异常生产成本方面.     

Arbitraging Arbitrageurs

This paper develops a theory of strategic trading in markets with large arbitrageurs. If arbitrageurs are not well capitalized, capital constraints make their trades predictable. Other market participants can exploit this by trading against them. Competitors may find it optimal to lend to arbitrageurs that are financially fragile; additional capital makes the arbitrageurs more viable, and lenders can reap profits from trading against them for a longer time. The strategic behavior of these market participants has implications for the functioning of financial markets. Strategic trading may produce significant price distortions, increase price manipulation, and trigger forced liquidations of large traders.     

股指期货市场操纵与价格发现功能的关系研究

股指期货市场操纵会影响股指期货市场的价格发现功能,同样地,股指期货市场的价格发现功能也会影响股指期货市场的操纵行为。本文在理论探讨的基础上,利用股指期货主力合约及对应的沪深300指数高频数据对市场操纵行为进行实证分析。研究结果表明,当操纵嫌疑只存在于期货市场时,股指期货市场的价格发现功能将会减弱;当操纵嫌疑存在于期货、现货两个市场时,股指期货市场的价格发现功能相对会增强。而且,当股指期货市场价格发现功能较强时,市场操纵的难度和成本都将下降。当前中国股指期货市场的操纵行为可能主要局限于某些个别的、离散的交易日内,系统地通过操纵现货指数来操纵期货市场的可能性较低。     

Data analytic approach for manipulation detection in stock market

The term “price manipulation” is used to describe the actions of “rogue” traders who employ carefully designed trading tactics to incur equity prices up or down to make profit. Such activities damage the proper functioning, integrity, and stability of the financial markets. In response to that, the regulators proposed new regulatory guidance to prohibit such activities on the financial markets. However, due to the lack of existing research and the implementation complexity, the application of those regulatory guidance, i.e. MiFID II in EU, is postponed to 2018. The existing studies exploring this issue either focus on empirical analysis of such cases, or propose detection models based on certain assumptions. The effective methods, based on analysing trading behaviour data, are not yet studied. This paper seeks to address that gap, and provides two data analytics based models. The first one, static model, detects manipulative behaviours through identifying abnormal patterns of trading activities. The activities are represented by transformed limit orders, in which the transformation method is proposed for partially reducing the non-stationarity nature of the financial data. The second one is hidden Markov model based dynamic model, which identifies the sequential and contextual changes in trading behaviours. Both models are evaluated using real stock tick data, which demonstrate their effectiveness on identifying a range of price manipulation scenarios, and outperforming the selected benchmarks. Thus, both models are shown to make a substantial contribution to the literature, and to offer a practical and effective approach to the identification of market manipulation.     

Classifications Manipulation and Nash Accounting Standards

This paper studies a model of "classifications manipulation" in which accounting reports consist of one of two binary classifications, preparers of accounting reports prefer one classification over the other, an accounting standard designates the official requirements that have to be met to receive the preferred classification, and preparers may engage in "classifications manipulation" in order to receive their preferred accounting classification. The possibility of classifications manipulation creates a distinction between the official classification described in the statement of the accounting standard and the de facto classification, determined by the "shadow standard" actually adopted by preparers. The paper studies the selection and evolution of accounting standards in this context. Among other things, the paper evaluates "efficient" accounting standards, it determines when there will be "standards creep," it introduces and analyzes the notion of a Nash accounting standard, and it compares the standards set by sophisticated standard–setters to those set with less knowledge of firms' financial reporting environments.     

Split-share reform and earnings management: Evidence from China

This paper investigates the impact of split-share structure reform on earnings management in China. A unique institutional feature of China was the co-existence of two types of share that endowed all shareholders with equal voting and cash flow rights but different tradability. This split-share structure significantly constrained the tradability of shares that led the Chinese Securities Regulatory Commission to make it mandatory for the conversion of non-tradable shares into tradable shares from 2006 onwards. We investigate whether such a conversion has any effect on information quality through reduced earnings manipulation. We specifically examine the incentives for earnings management during the reform-transition period. A unique feature of the split-share reform has been the requirement for non-tradable share holders to compensate the tradable share holders. We argue that the rational response from the non-tradable share holders would be to pay a lower consideration to tradable share holders by portraying a favorable picture through income-increasing earnings management. We also test for the effect of an increase in tradable shares on earnings management during the reform-transition and post-reform period.     

Product Market Competition,Information and Earnings Management

We study theoretically the effect of product market competition on the incentives to engage in earnings manipulation, and we show how manipulating earnings is particularly rewarding in more competitive markets since the boost in market value of reporting good earnings is especially important. Using a panel dataset of about 70,000 observations spanning the period 1989–2011, we document that the competitive environment is an important determinant of Jones type discretionary accruals and it also affects real earnings management. In additional analysis, we find that the effect of competition on earnings manipulation is particularly important for companies that seem to be underperforming their competitors and that the competition‐earnings management linkage is moderated by the degree of information visibility at the industry level.     

Managerial Incentives and Stock Price Manipulation

We present a rational expectations model of optimal executive compensation in a setting where managers are in a position to manipulate short‐term stock prices and the manipulation propensity is uncertain. We analyze the tradeoffs involved in conditioning pay on long‐ versus short‐term performance and show how manipulation, and investors' uncertainty about it, affects the equilibrium pay contract and the informativeness of prices. Firm and manager characteristics determine the optimal compensation scheme: the strength of incentives, the pay horizon, and the use of options. We consider how corporate governance and disclosure regulations can help create an environment that enables better contracting.