上市证券公司内部治理与公司经营绩效的实证分析

本文以18家已上市证券公司为样本,对其内部治理与公司经营绩效之间的关系进行了实证分析。结果表明:中国上市证券公司股权集中度与公司经营绩效呈负相关关系;股权制衡度对公司经营绩效的影响不显著;国有控股性质有助于提高公司经营绩效;董事会规模对公司经营绩效呈正相关关系,但影响不显著;独立董事比例与公司经营绩效呈显著正相关关系;董事长与总经理的职位分离有利于提高公司经营绩效,但在统计上不显著;监事会规模与公司经营绩效呈显著负相关关系;管理层报酬与公司经营绩效呈显著正相关关系,管理层规模与公司经营绩效呈正相关关系,但影响不显著。     

股权集中度、董事会治理特征与银行综合绩效——基于我国上市银行的实证研究

文章以2007-2010年我国上市满一年的14家银行为样本,实证分析了股权集中度和董事会治理特征对银行综合绩效的影响。研究结果表明：就股权集中度而言,第一大股东持股比例与综合绩效负相关,而前五大股东及前十大股东持股比例与综合绩效显著正相关;就董事会治理而言,董事会规模与综合绩效之间存在非线性的倒U型关系,董事会会议次数和董事薪酬与综合绩效显著正相关,但独立董事比例对综合绩效的影响不显著。     

高校上市公司公司治理结构与经营绩效关系研究

本文以高校上市公司2005-2009年的面板数据为基础进行实证分析,以探讨高校上市公司公司治理三个主要方面即董事会特征、股权结构及管理层薪酬与其经营绩效之间的关系,并探究影响我国高校上市公司绩效的重要公司治理成分。研究发现：董事会规模与公司绩效（ROE,EPS）呈负相关关系;独立董事比例与公司绩效（Tob in＇s Q）呈正相关关系;两职合一对公司绩效（EPS）有正面作用;Z指数和公司绩效（ROE）呈正相关关系;高校持股比例与公司绩效（Tob in＇s Q）呈负相关关系;高管薪酬与公司绩效（Tob in＇s Q）呈显著的正相关关系,与公司绩效（EPS）呈显著的负相关关系。     

股权集中度、股权制衡度与公司绩效——来自深市创业板块的经验证据

本文以2010年创业板上市公司数据检验了股权结构与公司绩效的关系,发现公司绩效与股权集中度之间呈正U型关系,而股权制衡度与公司绩效之间存在正相关关系,但未通过显著性检验,说明创业板上市公司中股权制衡度的公司治理作用尚未得到有效发挥。     

浅析上市公司资本结构与股权结构对公司绩效的影响

本文以公司绩效为研究中心,通过现代公司治理理论分析,发现公司的资本结构和股权结构通过对公司治理机制的影响,最终影响到公司的绩效。本文通过对2006年至2015年间1407家上市公司的面板数据进行回归分析,分析了上市公司,资本结构与股权结构对公司绩效的影响。发现公司的资产负债率与资产收益率呈负相关关系,流动性负债比率与资产收益率呈正相关,股权集中度与资产收益率呈正相关关系。因此,上市公司适当降低资产负债率,提高负债中流动性负债的比率和提高股权集中度可能更有利于公司绩效的提高。最后本文对构建合理的资本结构和股权结构提出了相关的政策建议。     

股权性质、连锁董事与公司绩效

以2005~2012年中国上市公司为样本构建面板数据,研究在不同股权结构的公司中连锁董事对公司绩效的影响,结果发现：连锁董事在董事会中所占比例与公司绩效呈正相关;具有丰富社会资源与经验的连锁董事在国有股权比例高的企业可带来较高的边际效应;国有股权所占比例高的企业,连锁董事在董事会中所占比例越高。     

IT企业股权集中度对公司绩效影响的实证分析

本文通过公司治理机制对我国IT企业的股权集中度与公司绩效进行了理论分析并以CR指数、HHI指数、Z指数为解释变量，对两者的关系进行了进一步的实证分析。结果表明CR指数、HHI指数与公司绩效呈正相关关系。这说明保持股权的适度集中有利于提高IT企业整体绩效。     

IT企业股权集中度对公司绩效影响的实证分析

本文通过公司治理机制对我国IT企业的股权集中度与公司绩效进行了理论分析并以CR指数、HHI指数、Z指数为解释变量,对两者的关系进行了进一步的实证分析.结果表明CR指数、HHI指数与公司绩效呈正相关关系.这说明保持股权的适度集中有利于提高IT企业整体绩效.     

战略投资者、公司治理与银行绩效——对中国城市商业银行的实证研究

基于中国8家城市商业银行的数据,采用截面数据和序列数据相结合的方法,对战略投资者参与中国城市商业银行治理的理论机理及其影响城市商业银行绩效的途径进行的分析表明:境外战略投资者可以促进城市商业银行改善公司治理,从而提升中国城市商业银行的绩效;国有股权比例与银行盈利性、第一大股东持股比例与银行资本充足率、董事会规模与银行盈利性均成负相关关系;股权集中度对银行盈利性和安全性均成正相关关系;管理层介入董事会比例对银行的盈利性和安全性的影响都不显著;独立董事比例对银行的盈利性有很强的正面影响。     

创业板上市公司董事会规模、稳定性与公司绩效关系研究

董事会作为现在公司法人治理的核心,其专有特征会影响到其职能的发挥,进而影响公司的绩效。文章根据创业板上市公司的特点,利用创业板上市公司2009-2012年的最新数据,研究其董事会规模与稳定性对公司绩效的影响。研究发现,当以每股收益来衡量公司绩效时,董事会规模与公司绩效之间并不存在显著的相关关系;当以净资产收益率来衡量公司绩效时,董事会规模与公司绩效存在着显著的倒“U”型关系,并证实了董事会稳定性与公司以前年度的绩效具有显著的正相关关系,以及以前年度董事会稳定性低的公司在后续年度内其绩效会越来越差。为此建议公司在选择合适的董事会规模的同时要尽量保持董事会的稳定性。     

高管股权激励动机差异对公司绩效的影响研究

以股权激励动机为视角,研究了两类动机下高管股权激励与公司绩效之间的关系。研究结果表明,两类动机下的高管股权激励与公司绩效之间的关系显著不同:相比于非激励型股权激励与公司业绩呈不显著的负相关关系,激励型高管股权激励却能显著提高公司业绩。     

Executive compensation and corporate governance in China

We investigate executive compensation and corporate governance in China's publicly traded firms. We also compare executive pay in China to the USA. Consistent with agency theory, we find that executive compensation is positively correlated to firm performance. The study shows that executive pay and CEO incentives are lower in State controlled firms and firms with concentrated ownership structures. Boardroom governance is important. We find that firms with more independent directors on the board have a higher pay-for-performance link. Non-State (private) controlled firms and firms with more independent directors on the board are more likely to replace the CEO for poor performance. Finally, we document that US executive pay (salary and bonus) is about seventeen times higher than in China. Significant differences in US-China pay persist even after controlling for economic and governance factors.     

Corporate governance and firm value during a financial crisis

The main purpose of this paper is to evaluate the effects of management ownership and other corporate governance variables on Hong Kong firms’ stock performance following the onset of the Asian Financial Crisis (1997–98). Our results show that Hong Kong firms with a more concentrated management (executive board) ownership displayed better capital market performance during the 13-month period of the Crisis. We also find that firms with more equity ownership by non-executive directors, and in which the positions of CEO and board chairperson were occupied by the same individual experienced a smaller stock price decline. Our findings are consistent with the notion that there is a greater alignment of insiders with outside owners, rather than the expropriation by insiders who have the opportunity to divert value, for firms with higher levels of management ownership during an unexpected capital market crisis.     

Corporate governance and firm performance

How is corporate governance measured? What is the relationship between corporate governance and performance? This paper sheds light on these questions while taking into account the endogeneity of the relationships among corporate governance, corporate performance, corporate capital structure, and corporate ownership structure. We make three additional contributions to the literature:First, we find that better governance as measured by the Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick [Gompers, P.A., Ishii, J.L., and Metrick, A., 2003, Corporate governance and equity prices, Quarterly Journal of Economics 118(1), 107–155.] and Bebchuk, Cohen and Ferrell [Bebchuk, L., Cohen, A., and Ferrell, A., 2004, What matters in corporate governance?, Working paper, Harvard Law School] indices, stock ownership of board members, and CEO-Chair separation is significantly positively correlated with better contemporaneous and subsequent operating performance.Second, contrary to claims in GIM and BCF, none of the governance measures are correlated with future stock market performance. In several instances inferences regarding the (stock market) performance and governance relationship do depend on whether or not one takes into account the endogenous nature of the relationship between governance and (stock market) performance.Third, given poor firm performance, the probability of disciplinary management turnover is positively correlated with stock ownership of board members, and board independence. However, better governed firms as measured by the GIM and BCF indices are less likely to experience disciplinary management turnover in spite of their poor performance.     

中国期货经纪公司治理有效性研究

中国期货经纪公司在内部治理方面存在着股权结构不合理、管理层独立性不强、监督机制不完善、独立董事制度尚未完全建立、相关利益主体对公司监控作用较小等问题;在外部治理方面存在信息披露制度落后和市场竞争不充分造成的经理人市场缺失等问题;期货经纪公司的经营业绩与其第一大股东持股比重、期货经纪公司的董事会和监事会规模、外部债权人质量、营业部数量等因素正相关,而期货经纪公司董事长兼任总经理现象则对公司业绩产生负面影响。     

The effects of board characteristics and sustainable compensation policy on carbon performance of UK firms

This study examines the effects of board characteristics and sustainable compensation policy on carbon reduction initiatives and greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions of a firm. We use firm fixed effect model to analyse data from 256 non-financial UK firms covering a period of 13 years (2002–2014). Our estimation results suggest that board independence and board gender diversity have positive associations with carbon reduction initiatives. In addition, environment-social-governance based compensation policy is found to be positively associated with carbon reduction initiatives. However, we do not find any relationship between corporate governance variables and GHG emissions of a firm. Overall, our evidence suggests that corporate boards and executive management tend to focus on a firm's process-oriented carbon performance, without improving actual carbon performance in the form of reduced GHG emissions. The findings have important implications for practitioners and policymakers with respect to the effectiveness of internal corporate governance mechanisms in addressing climate change risks, and possible linkage between corporate governance reform and carbon related policies.     

Board size and corporate performance: evidence from European countries

This paper examines the effects of board size on corporate performance across a number of European economies. Agency models suggest that large boards may destroy corporate value. Our fixed effects econometric evidence demonstrates that the effect of board size on corporate performance is generally negative. A negative effect is isolated for all five European countries in question when performance is measured as return on equity; this inverse relationship is more difficult to isolate using market-based measures of performance.     

The effect of conference calls on equity incentives: An empirical investigation

Conference calls have become increasingly common in recent years, yet there is little empirical evidence regarding the effect of conference calls on executive compensation. In this study, we examine the effect of voluntary disclosures on equity incentives. We hypothesize that voluntary disclosures, as measured by conference calls, affect executive compensation contracts. Using a dataset of 6263 firm-year observations from both conference call and non-conference call firms, our results are consistent with the argument that the board of directors substitutes voluntary disclosures for more costly corporate governance mechanisms. Alternatively, in firms where CEOs have less equity incentives, the owners demand more voluntary disclosures. The results of this study should be of great importance to executives and capital market participants internationally, such as investors and analysts, since we provide evidence that conference calls affect incentive based compensation contracts, which were shown in prior studies to be value relevant.     

The Effect of the Mandatory Adoption of Corporate Governance Mechanisms on Executive Compensation

This study investigates empirically the effect of corporate governance principles on executive compensation and firm performance prior to and after the adoption of the first Greek Law on corporate governance. Prior to the adoption of the law, managers were not compensated in line with their performance. Since its introduction, a significant link has been observed between executive compensation and company performance as measured by accounting measures of performance. Following the adoption of corporate governance principles by law, the main mechanism that controls executive compensation is the election of independent non-executive board members. The results are robust to alternative accounting measures of performance.     

An Analysis of Changes in Board Structure during Corporate Governance Reforms

This study examines the evolution of company board structure during a period of corporate governance reform. Using data over a time period following the publication of the Cadbury Report (1992) we present evidence of an increase in the independence of UK boards, as measured by an increased willingness to employ independent non‐executive directors, and to separate the positions of the CEO and the Chairman of the Board. In examining the determinants of these changes, we find that boards change more readily in response to changes in managerial control, equity issuance and corporate performance than changes in the firm‐specific operating environment of companies.