中国股民投资收益结构分析

本文利用中国A股上市公司股利分配现状及相关政策对股民投资收益的结构进行分析,研究发现中国股民投资收益以资本利得为主,现金股利和股票股利为辅。其中股利分配以现金股利和现金股利加转增股为主。中国虽然实施强制分红的股利政策,但是,上市公司整体盈利能力不强,公司治理有待完善以及股民的"投机行为"使得股民获得的股息红利较少。随着股息红利差别化征收政策的出台,现金股利在股民利润中所占比例会逐渐增加。本文对于培育高水平、持续稳定分红的上市公司也有一定的启示作用。     

高管过度自信与现金股利相关性研究——基于融资约束的视角

〗以股改后2007~2011年A股上市公司为样本,考察融资约束对高管过度自信与现金股利支付关系的影响。结果发现：高管过度自信与上市公司现金股利支付之间具有负相关关系,但这种负向关系只有在非国有上市公司较为显著。进一步研究表明,高管过度自信与现金股利支付关系在不同股权性质下存在差异的主要原因来自于外源融资约束的影响,较强的外源融资约束加剧了高管过度自信对现金股利支付的降低效应,而外源融资环境的改善可以在一定程度上抑制高管过度自信对现金股利支付的降低效应。     

上市公司现金股利的信号传递效应实证

本文采用事件研究法对2009年至2014年间沪深两市A股上市公司现金股利支付水平较上一年度变化引起的股价波动进行实证分析,证明我国上市公司的现金股利具有信号传递效应。同时,上市公司现金股利变化导致的市场反应均显著为负,说明了我国投资者并不重视现金股利这一上市公司分红方式。     

A股税收客户群效应及除息日税负效应实证研究

本文分析了2002—2007年A股市场的纯现金红利分红数据,检验了这一期间在除息日套利的可能性,证实该期间市场存在除息日股价的税负效应,以及税收客户群效应。说明A股市场不同类的投资者对分红具有不同的偏好,上市公司应制定合适的股利政策以最大化股东财富。早期的关于国内市场的研究得到市场不存在税收客户群效应的结论,前后对比说明随着国内证券市场的发展,投资者更趋于理性。     

A股税收客户群效应及除息日税负效应实证研究

本文分析了2002-2007年A股市场的纯现金红利分红数据,检验了这一期间在除息日套利的可能性,证实该期间市场存在除息日股价的税负效应,以及税收客户群效应.说明A股市场不同类的投资者对分红具有不同的偏好,上市公司应制定合适的股利政策以最大化股东财富.早期的关于国内市场的研究得到市场不存在税收客户群效应的结论,前后对比说明随着国内证券市场的发展,投资者更趋于理性.     

交叉上市、股权性质与企业现金股利政策——基于倾向得分匹配法(PSM)的分析

基于捆绑效应的视角,结合我国交叉上市公司发展前景优良但境外融资困难的特殊背景,本文分析了交叉上市对企业现金股利政策的影响,并运用倾向得分匹配法(PSM)实证检验了在不同市场交叉上市与企业现金股利政策间的关系。结果表明:我国交叉上市公司分配的现金股利更少,表现为与非交叉上市公司相比,A+B股与A+H股交叉上市公司的股利发放水平更低;而与其他A+H股交叉上市公司相比,A+H+N股交叉上市公司亦倾向于发放更少的现金股利。进一步研究表明,国有股权性质能显著弱化交叉上市与现金股利政策间的负向关系。本文的研究结论为进一步提升我国上市公司的股利政策合理性提供了理论与经验依据。     

双重迎合与现金股利平稳性——基于中国A股上市公司的实证研究

市场机制与监管机制的共同作用为中国上市公司的现金股利决策带来了特殊的双重迎合动机。本文以1998-2017年中国A股上市公司为样本,以资本市场自发的投资者迎合和外部监管压力下的政策迎合对上市公司现金股利决策跨期动态调整的叠加作用为视角,实证检验了双重迎合对现金股利平稳性的影响。研究发现,半强制分红政策实施前,投资者偏好和预期的迎合对我国上市公司股利平稳性的作用明显,而监管政策作为新的强迎合对象,不同程度的削弱了原有市场机制的作用。其中,国有企业的政策迎合动机远高于非国有企业,达标型分红作为国有上市公司逐渐"理性"的策略性迎合手段帮助股利监管政策在实施后期实现了预期效果。     

新金融催生新财技

我国金融市场中,货币市场、股票市场、债券市场构成新金融的主流,进而成为公司新财技的动力源与催化剂。融资方面,当公司有多种融资方式可供选择,如面对贷款、票据贴现、企业债券、短期融资券与权益融资时,便存在一个取舍与配置的问题。而在其决策过程中,资金成本成为最终确定融资方式的重要考量因素。投资方面,资本市场的发展,不仅为投资于有价证券提供了良好的契机,也使企业的并购方式多样化,支付对价的手段更加灵活。尽管受股票发行方式的限制,股票支付手段在企业购并交易中广泛盛行尚需时日,但一些企业早已成功试水。分配方面,我国上市公司2005年以前的股利分配存在三方面问题：一是现金分红少,二是股利政策缺乏连续性,三是股利分配形式上盲目迎合市场需要,从众行为明显。不过,目前的情况似乎正在改善。阶段性统计显示,现金分红多,送、转比例高,将成为2006年上市公司利润分配预案的一大特点。营运资本管理方面,金融市场的发展更多地影响着企业应收票据、应收账款以及资产抵押等方面,具体表现在由贴现、保理到抵押的发展。[编者按]     

机构投资者持股与中国上市公司现金股利政策

本文基于上市公司现金股利政策的视角,深入考察机构投资者的监督治理效应、投资行为偏好,以及不同类型的机构投资者之间是否存在异质性。以中国A股上市公司为样本,实证发现:(1)机构投资者持股比例较高的上市公司具有显著更高的现金股利支付意愿和支付水平,表明机构投资者对上市公司现金股利政策发挥了积极的监督效应;(2)高派现上市公司吸引了更高的机构投资者持股比例,显示机构投资者将现金股利视为其构建投资组合的关键要素,遵循了"谨慎人规则";(3)不同类型的机构投资者在现金股利的监督效应、股利偏好方面并没有呈现出明显的异质性,揭示着我国各类机构投资者可能存在趋同的投资风格;(4)我国机构投资者倾向于将现金股利政策视为上市公司传递的一种"信号"而非解决传统代理冲突的治理机制。     

上市公司股利政策对盈余管理的影响及相应的市场反应

本文基于私有信息传递的视角,以2003-2010年上海证券交易所A股市场上的上市公司为研究样本,检验了上市公司现金股利政策对盈余管理的影响及其相应的市场反应。统计结果显示,与其他公司相比,现金分红的公司倾向于上调应计利润即有正向盈余管理的偏好,并且市场能够识别出这类上市公司的盈余管理行为,分红预案公布期间现金分红公司股票的累积异常收益率与盈余管理变量是正相关的。     

The Dividend Puzzle: An Australian Solution?

In the latter half of the 1980s, Australia made changes to its taxation law which affected the economics of asset ownership, particularly share ownership. The first of these changes was the introduction in September 1985 of a general tax on capital gains. The second was the virtual abolition of company tax through the introduction of tax imputation. In this changed tax environment it is argued that where the payment of franked dividends is concerned, there is an optimal dividend policy: companies should pay dividends to the limit of their franking account balances. In the case of unfranked dividends it is argued that there is no optimal policy and that Miller and Modigliani's clientele theory applies. The paper describes an analysis of the dividend payout ratios of the top 422 listed Australian companies from 1982 to 1990.     

The Dividend Substitution Hypothesis: Australian Evidence

In a perfect capital market firms are indifferent to either dividends or repurchases as payout mechanisms, suggesting that the two payout methods should be perfect substitutes. Empirical research at the single country level, as well as cross country studies, provide evidence that dividends and repurchases act as substitutes (the dividend substitution hypothesis), and that the tax treatment of dividends versus capital gains affects this relation. Australia, which operates under a full dividend imputation system, has two types of repurchases: on‐ and off‐market. On‐market repurchases are taxed as capital gains while off‐market repurchases comprise a large dividend component carrying valuable tax credits. Australia thus provides a natural setting to investigate how the tax treatment of proceeds affects the dividend substitution hypothesis. Dividend substitution is found to exist for on‐market repurchases but not for off‐market repurchases, thus providing further support for the idea that the tax treatment of proceeds affects the substitutability of repurchases and dividends.     

Family control,institutional environment and cash dividend policy: Evidence from China

Using a sample of 1486 Chinese A-share listed companies for the period 2004–2008, this study empirically tests the impact of family control, institutional environment and their interaction on the cash dividend policy of listed companies. Our results indicate that (1) family firms have a lower cash dividend payout ratio and propensity to pay dividends than non-family firms; (2) a favorable regional institutional environment has a significant positive impact on the cash dividend payout ratio and propensity to pay dividends of listed companies; and (3) the impact of the regional institutional environment on cash dividends is stronger in family firms than in non-family firms. Somewhat surprisingly, we find that controlling family shareholders in China may intensify Agency Problem I (the owner–manager conflict) rather than Agency Problem II (the controlling shareholder–minority shareholder conflict), and thus have a significant negative impact on cash dividend policy. In contrast, a favorable regional institutional environment plays a positive corporate governance role in mitigating Agency Problem I and encouraging family firms to pay cash dividends.     

The evolving relation between dividends and flexible payouts: A different evolution

We study payout by UK listed companies during 1993–2018. Regular dividends remain the dominant channel, but flexible payouts (special dividends and repurchases) have grown, and they make total payout more responsive to earnings. Flexible payouts are used to augment regular dividends: few companies pay out by flexible means only, and tests indicate that they augment rather than replace regular dividends. Comparison with US evidence shows that UK companies make greater use of dividends (including specials) in relation to repurchases, and have a greater willingness to change regular dividend per share.     

Dividend Policies of Privately Held Companies: Stand‐Alone and Group Companies in Belgium

This study examines the dividend policies of privately held Belgian companies, differentiating between stand‐alone companies and those affiliated with a business group. We find that privately held companies typically do not pay dividends. Compared to public companies, they are less likely to pay dividends and they have lower dividend payouts. Our results also suggest that group companies pay more dividends than stand‐alone companies, consistent with the hypothesis that tax‐exempt group firms redistribute dividend payments on the group's internal capital market. Group companies pay higher dividends if they have minority shareholders.     

半强制股利政策与股权融资成本

在一些国家,强制股利支付是改善公司治理和弥补法律保护不足的重要手段,我国自2001年起陆续出台了类似的半强制股利系列政策。然而现有部分研究却发现,半强制股利政策可能会产生监管“悖论”。那么,事实是否如此？以往这些研究主要从监管成本角度来分析,可能忽视了监管带来的收益,我们认为虽然半强制股利政策提高了融资门槛,但也可能实现股东之间的利益共享,并有利于投资者形成稳定的股利预期,从而实现治理的“溢价”。本文利用2008年监管政策提供的良好自然实验机会,主要从半强制股利政策的治理效应角度来评估政策产生的经济后果。研究发现,从总体平均意义上看,半强制股利政策有助于降低受影响公司的股权融资成本。进一步研究发现,在代理成本高的公司,半强制股利政策的治理作用更为明显,存在一定的治理“溢价”。当然,半强制股利政策也存在一定的局限性,在公司的信息披露质量差和外部融资约束较大的公司,半强制股利政策的治理效应被削弱。     

Reputation as a governance mechanism? Evidence from payout policy of insider‐controlled firms in Taiwan

This paper examines the effect of entrenched insiders’ reputational concerns on corporate payout policy in Taiwan, a market in which typical public firms are controlled by a single dominant shareholder who is subject to weak takeover threats and has incentives and abilities to extract private benefits by oppressing minority equity holders. The reputation‐building hypothesis predicts that firms with higher expropriation risk by a controlling shareholder make more payouts to credibly commit not to expropriate minority shareholders, thereby establishing reputation in the capital market for risk diversification and low‐cost external financing. I show that corporate payout intensity is significantly and positively correlated with measures related to the moral hazard of dominant owners. The reputation effect manifests in firms that most value it; the interaction analyses indicate that younger, smaller, or growth firms with higher controlling shareholder expropriation risk pay more cash dividends. Moreover, firms are less likely to omit dividends and more likely to resume dividends when their controlling shareholders are more entrenched. Finally, I show that the value of cash dividends is higher for firms with higher controlling shareholder expropriation risk and that expected dividend increases in these firms are value enhancing.     

市场行情影响投资者的股利偏好吗?

基于2005-2017年A股上市公司的数据,研究了在不同的市场行情中,投资者对于股利政策的偏好差别。研究发现：对于现金股利而言,在上涨和下跌的市场行情中,投资者更偏好不发放现金股利的上市公司;在平稳行情中,投资者更偏好发放现金股利的上市公司。对于股票股利而言,在上涨行情中,投资者更偏好发放股票股利的上市公司;在下跌行情中,投资者更偏好不发放股票股利的上市公司;在平稳行情中,投资者对于是否发放股票股利没有显著的偏好差异。在上涨和下跌的市场行情中,超能力派现和高送转不会改变投资者的偏好;在平稳行情中,只有正常派现和正常送转才能赢得投资者的青睐,超能力派现行为无益于上市公司,高送转还会损害公司价值。     

Does political economy reduce agency costs? Some evidence from dividend policies around the world

This study shows that firms in proportional-electoral countries pay out lower dividends and that the correlation between a firm's growth potential and dividend payout ratio is weaker in proportional-electoral countries. However, firms in proportional-electoral countries that cross-list in majoritarian system countries, tend to pay out higher dividends and the negative relation between growth potential and dividend payout tend to be stronger than their peers that do not cross-list. For a few countries that changed their electoral system towards a more proportional system, we observe a decrease in dividend payout ratio and a weaker relation between growth and dividends after the change. Overall these results indicate that a country's political system affects the severity of agency problems. Further, the effect of legal origin on dividend policy reverses once we include the political economy variables in the regressions. We also document that the electoral system not only affects the amount of dividends paid by a firm but also the form of payment.