The Real Effects of Credit Ratings: The Sovereign Ceiling Channel

We show that sovereign debt impairments can have a significant effect on financial markets and real economies through a credit ratings channel. Specifically, we find that firms reduce their investment and reliance on credit markets due to a rising cost of debt capital following a sovereign rating downgrade. We identify these effects by exploiting exogenous variation in corporate ratings due to rating agencies' sovereign ceiling policies, which require that firms' ratings remain at or below the sovereign rating of their country of domicile.     

债券评级机构变更——基于评级选购与评级迎合视角

本文以2008年至2017年的公司债券为样本,研究了发行人变更评级机构的影响,以此来解释评级市场上发行人频繁变更评级机构的现象。本文发现发行人变更评级机构后,其信用等级得到显著提升。发行人变更评级机构的行为对信用等级的影响在以下两种情形中更显著:一是当发行人所处行业或评级机构所在的评级市场竞争激烈时;二是当发行人主体评级位于AA信用等级的临界点时。进一步研究发现,考虑到评级机构变更与信用等级之间的交互影响,变更评级机构的发行人整体上可实现发债成本的降低。但该类发行人未来的违约风险增加、经营业绩下降。最后,本文发现债券发行规模较大以及非国有发行人更倾向于变更评级机构来提高信用等级。本文通过分析发行人更换信用评级机构的动机和后果,为监管部门构建以评级质量为导向的良性竞争环境提供借鉴参考。     

The sovereign-bank rating channel and rating agencies' downgrades during the European debt crisis

We investigate the rating channel for the transmission of changes in sovereign risk to the banking sector, analysing data from Moody's, S&P and Fitch before and during the European debt crisis. Sovereign rating downgrades and negative watch signals have strong effects on bank rating downgrades in the crisis period. The impact is stronger for multiple-notch sovereign rating downgrades, and more pronounced in PIIGS countries. Secondly, we investigate rating agencies' competition in the banking sector during the same periods, finding significant differences in rating policies across the agencies. S&P credit actions tend to be the more independent ones, while Moody's appears to be more cautious, although it is by far the most likely to assign multiple-notch downgrades. In the pre-crisis period, we find no evidence that bank rating actions are linked to sovereign rating signals (nor vice versa) nor to prior bank rating changes by a competing agency.     

Firms' Off-Balance Sheet and Hybrid Debt Financing: Evidence from Their Book-Tax Reporting Differences

We match large U.S. corporations' tax returns during 1989–2001 to their financial statements to construct a firm‐level proxy of firms' use of off‐balance sheet and hybrid debt financing. We find that firms with less favorable prior‐period Standard & Poor's (S&P) bond ratings or higher leverage ratios in comparison to their industry report greater amounts of interest expense on their tax returns than to investors and creditors on their financial statements. These between‐firm results are consistent with credit‐constrained firms using more structured financing arrangements. Our within‐firm tests also suggest that firms use more structured financing arrangements when they enter into contractual loan agreements that provide incentives to manage debt ratings. Specifically, we find that after controlling for S&P bond rating and industry‐adjusted leverage, our sample firms report greater amounts of interest expenses for tax than for financial statement purposes when they enter into performance pricing contracts that use senior debt rating covenants to set interest rates. Furthermore, we find that the greatest book‐tax reporting changes occur when firms become closer to violating these debt rating covenants. These latter findings are consistent with firms' contractual debt covenants influencing their use of off‐balance sheet and hybrid debt financing.     

Rating shopping and rating inflation in Israel

Firms may exploit the option of choosing among different rating agencies in order to pick the highest rating offered. This possibility, known as rating shopping, is relatively limited on the US corporate bond market because the two main rating agencies (S&P and Moody's) rate virtually all large bond issuers. In this study, we use the data on corporate bond ratings assigned by two Israeli rating agencies affiliated with S&P and Moody's during the period 2004–2012. We show that while one agency (Midroog) systematically assigned higher ratings, the ratings of the other agency (S&P-Maalot) were inflated due to rating shopping. However, despite the many features that encourage rating inflation, the resulting distortion was relatively small (one notch). This may be a fair price for maintaining a competitive rating industry.     

A Theoretical and Empirical Review of the EU Regulation on Credit Rating Agencies: In Search of Truth,Not Scapegoats

The undergoing financial turbulence has raised significant concerns over the role that credit rating agencies (CRAs) played in the inception, magnification and expansion of the crisis. In response, the EU legislature has adopted Regulation 1060/2009, which, for the first time, set out a legally binding pan‐European authorization regime for CRAs, which issue ratings that have been used by EU‐based financial institutions. As the turmoil turned into an unprecedented Eurozone debt crisis, EU politicians have been calling for tighter regulation of the credit rating industry. Drawing on the relevant empirical and theoretical research and building upon a comparative study of the corresponding US framework, the paper discusses critically the principles underlying EU Regulation 1060/2009 and the most recent suggestions for its reform. The paper argues that although, overall, the EU Regulation seems to be a well‐balanced instrument in the sense that it introduces the essential checks upon CRAs’ behavior while avoiding excessive regulatory intervention, more fine‐tuning is needed in certain fields, including, rating shopping, financial ties with rated entities, abuse of inside information, transparency and CRAs’ accountability.     

Rating agencies and the role of rating publication rights

While credit rating agencies disclose all public ratings as a matter of policy, a firm can choose whether to make a so called private rating public or to keep it confidential. This paper analyzes the economic role of such rating publication rights. In particular, the paper tries to answer the following two questions: (1) If firms have scope to disclose agency ratings at their own discretion, can they use this discretion strategically and conceal low-quality ratings?, and (2), if this is the case, what are the economic implications for rated firms, unrated firms and the rating agency, resulting from strategically motivated selective rating disclosures? Using a theoretical model, it is shown that an equilibrium with partial nondisclosure of low-quality ratings can emerge whenever investors cannot be sure whether rating nondisclosure is due to the firm being not rated, or due to the rating’s adverse content. Moreover, since from an investors’ perspective, strategically acting rated firms and unrated firms are pooled, unrated firms’ debt is always under-valued (compared to a situation in which investors know that the firm is not rated), and the debt of firms concealing their rating is always over-valued.     

信用评级业的专家责任问题

传统上,美国信用评级机构主张评级报告属于涉及公共利益的意见,援引宪法第一修正案进行抗辩。作为金融征信的重要内容,信用评级业在未来可能引发一系列专家责任案件,而现今中国法律体系对于专家责任的规定不健全。虽然专家责任的法律属性还需要进一步讨论,但是目前更重要的是先处理专家责任。中国法院在处理信用评级引发的案件时,可以借鉴美国的司法判例,以信用评级报告在商事交易中的作用认定专家责任的大小。     

私有信息、评级偏差和中国评级机构的市场声誉

考虑到评级机构拥有市场声誉的本质在于其可以通过扭曲评级从而对市场产生影响,本文分两步研究中国发行人付费评级机构的市场声誉:第一步,将信用评级对各种基本面因素进行回归,并以实际评级与回归预测值的差值作为评级偏差的量度。与既有文献相比,本文的重要改进是在基本面因素中引入了发债企业与各评级机构(分支机构)最短距离的均值和方差,这能较好地控制因发债企业私有信息可能造成的选择偏误。第二步,考察评级偏差和机构特征如何影响企业的发债成本。研究表明,中国评级机构作为一个整体具有显著的市场声誉,但各评级机构之间存在很大的差异性。最后,考虑到评级机构与发债企业在选址上可能会有集聚效应,我们基于高铁开通事件进行双重差分检验,研究表明本文结论是稳健的。     

信用评级变动能反映企业真实财务信息吗?——基于财务重述的视角

本文以2007-2018年拥有主体信用评级的A股上市公司为研究对象,利用企业财务错报在未来被重述这一场景,检验主体信用评级变动能否反映企业真实财务信息。研究发现,评级机构在发债企业财务错报年显著下调了主体信用评级,而在重述公告发布年没有上述现象,这表明主体信用评级下调反映了企业的真实财务信息。在控制内生性影响后,结论仍然成立。进一步研究发现,发债企业当期财务错报涉及盈余时,主体信用评级被下调的幅度更大,说明评级机构更加关注与盈余相关的财务信息。机制分析表明,评级机构维护自身声誉是主体信用评级变动能够反映企业真实财务信息的主要机制。此外,主体信用评级被下调还导致了资本市场投资者的负面反应。本文的研究结果为主体信用评级变动反映企业真实财务信息提供了直接的证据支持,揭示了主体信用评级的信息含量,也对理解中国情境下评级机构调整主体信用评级的行为动机提供参考。     

Do Rating Agencies Benefit from Providing Higher Ratings? Evidence from the Consequences of Municipal Bond Ratings Recalibration

We ask whether credit rating agencies receive higher fees and gain greater market share when they provide more favorable ratings. To investigate this question, we use the 2010 rating scale recalibration by Moody's and Fitch, which increased ratings absent any underlying change in issuer credit quality. Consistent with prior research, we find that the recalibration allowed the clients of Moody's and Fitch to receive better ratings and lower yields. We add to this evidence by showing that the recalibration also led to larger fees and to increases in the market shares of Moody's and Fitch. These results are consistent with critics’ concerns about the effects of the issuer‐pay model on the credit ratings market.     

Who benefits from capital account liberalization? Evidence from firm-level credit ratings data

Using a novel panel data set on corporate foreign-currency credit ratings and capital account restrictions in advanced and emerging economies during 1995–2004, we find a strong positive effect of capital account liberalization on firms' credit risk, as measured by corporate credit ratings. As an identification strategy, we exploit within-country variation in firms' ability to obtain foreign currency and, thus, their ability to repay foreign currency debt. We find that liberalizing the capital account benefits significantly more those firms with more limited foreign currency access, namely, those producing nontradables. Our findings demonstrate a novel channel through which capital account restrictions affect economic outcomes, and they are robust to a broad range of alternative specifications.     

A public good approach to credit ratings – From concept to reality

From the onset of the 2008–2009 financial crisis to the subsequent European sovereign debt crisis, credit rating agencies have been assigned considerable blame. Reforming the credit rating industry has hence become an important policy issue. In addition to the regulatory efforts in the context of accepting the for-profit business model of ratings, there is a growing realization that credit ratings bear the characteristics of a public good. Financial market participants need reliable, transparent and independent assessment of credit risks. Credit ratings are therefore better viewed as an infrastructure matter. However, the proposed regulations seem to have missed this point. This paper introduces a new approach to credit ratings undertaken by the Risk Management Institute at the National University of Singapore that is predicated on the provision of credit ratings as a public good. With a public good alternative in place, the currently predominant for-profit business model may be counterbalanced.     

评级膨胀、双评级规范的网络效应与美国信用评级霸权

与通货膨胀一样,评级膨胀具有持久的、螺旋上升的和影响深远的危害性。信用评级在本质上只是一个相对风险措施,典型的信用评级并不能完全反映宏观经济周期。对国家和投资者来说,信用评级所导致的风险与威胁主要来自于＂信用评级膨胀＂。而究其根本,评级膨胀的大规模泛滥最终得益于美国两大评级机构的双评级规范霸权,以及由美国评级机构所垄断的国际评级网络。由于存在激励促使他们逃避基于评级的监管,因此道德风险在所难免,并一定会催生评级膨胀。因此,评级膨胀只是表象和媒介,双评级规范和网络效应才是美国评级霸权的最终顶点。     

Ratings Competition in the CMBS Market

We consider the relationship between competition among credit rating agencies and the ratings of commercial mortgage‐backed securities (CMBS) using data from 2002 to 2007. We characterize competition using Fitch's aggregate share of CMBS ratings and a measure of Fitch's deal‐specific market share constructed as the probability of Fitch being hired for a specific transaction. Controlling for deal characteristics, we find that subordination levels were lower when Fitch's aggregate and deal‐specific market shares were higher, which suggests that ratings competition yielded less stringent ratings when Fitch was a more significant competitor, although this effect dissipates when Fitch's market shares were high.     

Financial Distress in the Great Depression

We use firm‐level data to study corporate performance during the Great Depression era for all industrial firms on the NYSE. Our goal is to identify the factors that contribute to business insolvency and valuation changes during the period 1928‐1938. We find that firms with more debt and lower bond ratings in 1928 became financially distressed more frequently during the Depression, consistent with the trade‐off theory of leverage and the information production role of credit rating agencies. We also document for the first time that firms responded to tax incentives to use debt during the Depression era but that the extra debt used in response to this tax‐driven “debt bias” did not contribute significantly to the occurrence of distress. Finally, we conduct an out‐of‐sample test during the recent 2008‐2009 Recession and find that higher leverage and lower bond ratings also increased the occurrence of financial distress during this period.     

What Drives the Consequences of Intentional Misstatements? Evidence from Rating Analysts’ Reactions

This paper aims to identify the mechanisms through which intentional misstatements adversely affect firms by analyzing rating analysts’ reaction to misstatements. In order to identify the mechanisms through which the misstatement affects firms’ credit ratings, we analyze the content of rating reports. Rating analysts are concerned about seven different mechanisms. They are most concerned about misstatement‐related violations of debt covenants that increase a firm's liquidity risk. We find that, subsequent to an intentional misstatement becoming publicly known, credit ratings of misreporting firms are adversely affected for up to seven years. The adverse impact of an intentional misstatement on a firm's credit rating is most pronounced in cases in which rating analysts mention concerns about misstatement‐related violations of covenants. Our results suggest that these covenant violations are the most severe mechanism through which misstatements adversely affect firms’ creditworthiness.     

Credit Rating Inflation and Firms' Investments

We analyze credit rating effects on firm investments in a rational bond financing game that features a feedback loop. The credit rating agency (CRA) inflates the rating, providing a biased but informative signal to creditors. Creditors' response to the rating affects the firm's investment decision and thus its credit quality, which is reflected in the rating. The CRA might reduce ex ante economic efficiency, which results solely from its strategic effect: the CRA assigns more firms high ratings and allows them to gamble for resurrection. We derive empirical predictions on the determinants of rating standards and inflation and discuss policy implications.     

Rating Agency Reputation,the Global Financial Crisis,and the Cost of Debt

Why do foreign firms obtain credit ratings by global rating agencies rather than from their home country's rating agencies even though global raters typically assign lower credit ratings when these foreign firms issue bonds in their home currencies? We find that bonds rated by a global agency decreased yields 11‐14 basis points (bps) when compared to those rated by Japanese rating agencies but, during the 2007‐2009 financial crisis, the yields on these Japanese bonds increased 12‐17 bps, thus fully negating the advantage of obtaining a bond rating from a global rater. This suggests that the reputation of global rating agencies declined during the 2007‐2009 crisis period.