Co‐managers,Information, and the Secondary Market Liquidity of Initial Public Offerings

We provide evidence that co‐managers improve initial public offering (IPO) liquidity through the “information” services they provide. Based on a sample of IPOs completed from January 1993 to December 2005, we find that a high number of co‐managers in the syndicate are associated with a lower spread, lower adverse selection costs, and a lower probability of informed trading. Moreover, increases in the offer price revision, in co‐managers’ underwriting rank, and in the number of analyst recommendations are all associated with the improvement in liquidity. This evidence is consistent with the hypotheses that co‐managers’ premarket and postmarket services mitigate information risk in the aftermarket.     

UNDERPRICING OF IPOS THAT FOLLOW PRIVATE PLACEMENT

In this study we examine the underpricing of initial public offerings (IPOs) by firms that have private placements of equity before their IPOs (PP IPO firms). We find that PP IPOs are associated with significantly less underpricing than their peers. Furthermore, PP IPOs are associated with lower underwriting spreads, more reputable underwriting syndicates, and greater postissue analyst coverage as compared to IPOs that are issued by their industry peers under similar market conditions. Consistent with the implications of the information asymmetry explanation for IPO underpricing, our findings suggest that companies could benefit by conveying their quality via successful pre‐IPO private placements that help reduce the cost of going public.     

The Role of IPO Underwriting Syndicates: Pricing, Information Production, and Underwriter Competition

We examine syndicates for 1,638 IPOs from January 1997 through June 2002. We find strong evidence of information production by syndicate members. Offer prices are more likely to be revised in response to information when the syndicate has more underwriters and especially more co‐managers. More co‐managers also result in more analyst coverage and additional market makers following the IPO. Relationships between underwriters are critical in determining the composition of syndicates, perhaps because they mitigate free‐riding and moral hazard problems. While there appear to be benefits to larger syndicates, we discuss several factors that may limit syndicate size.     

Long‐term Performance of Greek IPOs

We analyse the long‐run performance of 254 Greek IPOs that were listed during the period 1994–2002, computing buy‐and‐hold abnormal returns (BHAR) and cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) over 36 months of secondary market performance. The empirical results differ from international evidence and reveal long‐term overperformance that continues for a substantial interval after listing. Measuring these returns in calendar time, we find statistical significance with several of the benchmarks employed. We also find that long‐term overperformance is a feature of the mass of IPOs conducted during a pronounced IPO wave. Cross‐sectional regressions of long‐run performance disclose several significant factors. The study demonstrates that although Greek IPOs overperform the market for a longer period, underperformance eventually emerges, in line with much international evidence. Our interpretation is that the persistence of overperformance over a significant interval is due to excessive supply of issues during the ‘hot IPO period’. Results associated with pricing during the ‘hot IPO period’ indicate positive short‐ (1‐year), medium‐ (2‐year) and negative long‐term (3‐year) performance.     

Market Underreaction to Free Cash Flows from IPOs

I examine the relation between initial public offering (IPO) long‐run stock performance and the amount of cash raised by the firm in the offering. I find that IPOs raising more cash have poorer long‐run performance. The result is robust to different measurement methods. The evidence suggests that the market underreacts to free cash flow related agency problems in IPOs. Consistent with this interpretation, I find that IPO long‐run performance is more sensitive to the new cash raised in the offering if an IPO firm has lower capital expenditure or higher opening bid‐ask spread.     

Short‐Term Performance of U.S.‐Bound Chinese IPOs

Firms from emerging markets, including China, increasingly seek to raise capital outside of their home markets. We examine the short‐term performance of U.S.‐bound Chinese initial public offerings (IPOs) and find that these IPOs have significantly lower underpricing than a matched sample of U.S. counterparts. We also find that the magnitude of IPO underpricing for U.S.‐bound Chinese firms is positively related to revisions in offer price.     

Underwriter reputation,earnings management and the long‐run performance of initial public offerings

This study contributes to the extant literature on the nature of earnings management surrounding initial public offerings (IPOs) by investigating the role of underwriter reputation. We argue that prestigious underwriters will protect their reputation by carefully monitoring and certifying financial information on IPO firms, thereby limiting any potential earnings manipulation. As a result, those IPO firms that are associated with more prestigious underwriters are likely to exhibit substantially less‐aggressive earnings management. Conversely, we find the existence of a negative relationship between earnings management and the post‐offer performance of an IPO firm’s stocks only for those firms associated with less‐prestigious underwriters.     

Information content of IPO grading

In the year 2007, Indian capital market regulator-SEBI, introduced a unique certification mechanism for IPOs whereby all IPOs have to undergo mandatory quality grading by independent rating agencies. In this paper we argue that such objective, independent and exogenous certifying mechanism provides a better opportunity to test the well established certification hypothesis, especially in the context of emerging markets with institutional voids. Using a sample of 163 Indian IPOs we test the efficacy of IPO grading mechanism. We find, grading decreases IPO underpricing and positively influences demand of retail investors. Grading reduces secondary market risk and improves liquidity. However, grading does not affect long run performance of the IPOs. IPO grading successfully capture firm size, business group affiliation and firm’s quality of corporate governance. Our findings imply that, in emerging markets, regulator’s role to signal the quality of an IPO contributes towards the market welfare.     

Narcissistic managers and IPO underpricing

Using hand-collected data on the signature size of managers in Chinese initial public offerings (IPOs) from 2007 to 2019 as a proxy for managerial narcissism, we examine how IPOs with narcissistic managers (narcissistic IPOs) affect IPO underpricing. The findings suggest that narcissistic IPOs have higher underpricing than non-narcissistic IPOs. Specifically, we find that on average, a narcissistic IPO exhibits approximately 11.3% higher underpricing than a median IPO firm. Our results are robust to alternative metrics of narcissism and underpricing after controlling for endogeneity. Additional analyses suggest that narcissistic IPOs are more likely to engage in earnings management than non-narcissistic IPOs. The former exhibits excessive risk-taking behavior, gauged by earnings volatility pre-IPO and a higher beta post-IPO. In the cross-sectional analyses, we document that the impact of managerial narcissism on IPO underpricing is more salient for IPOs facing unsophisticated investors, high market sentiment, or poor corporate governance.     

DIVERGENCE OF OPINION AND LONG‐TERM PERFORMANCE OF INITIAL PUBLIC OFFERINGS

Miller's hypothesis posits that divergence of opinion can lead to asset overvaluation and subsequent long‐term underperformance in markets (such as initial public offerings [IPOs]) with restricted short‐selling. Consistent with this hypothesis, we find that early‐market return volatility, a proxy for divergence of opinion, is negatively related to subsequent IPO long‐term abnormal returns. This relation holds after accounting for other factors that previous studies suggest affect long‐term abnormal returns for IPOs (including another proxy for divergence of opinion). Moreover, we find that this relation is stronger in IPO markets than in non‐IPO markets (where short‐selling restrictions are less stringent), again consistent with Miller's hypothesis.     

IPO Pricing,Block Sales,and Long‐Term Performance

Block sales following IPOs are related to the IPOs' value relative to an estimate of intrinsic value, opening‐trade return, and IPO size. Overvalued IPOs experience more block sales than undervalued IPOs. IPOs with high block sales outperform IPOs with low block sales from 20 days after IPO through lockup expiration; however, IPOs with high block sales underperform IPOs with low block sales from lockup expiration through the third year after the IPO. The results indicate that block traders are advantaged relative to other traders; whether the advantage is based on superior information or superior valuation capabilities is unknown.     

Regulatory underpricing: Determinants of Chinese extreme IPO returns

The Chinese stock market with its unique institutions is rather different from western stock markets. The average underpricing of Chinese IPOs is 247%, the highest of any major world market. We model this extreme underpricing with a supply-demand analytical framework that captures critical institutional features of China's primary market, and then empirically test this model using a sample of 1377 IPOs listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges between 1992 and 2004. We find that Chinese IPO underpricing is principally caused by government intervention with IPO pricing regulations and the control of IPO share supplies. Besides the regulatory underpricing, this paper also documents some specific investment risks of IPOs in China's stock market.     

Earnings management in IPOs: Post-engagement third-party mitigation or issuer signaling?

Initial public offering (IPO) firms typically hire auditors, underwriters, and attorneys to assist in the IPO process. Many firms that take the IPO route are also backed by venture capitalists. In the extant literature, these four specialists (auditors, underwriters, attorneys, and venture capitalists) are termed third-party certifiers. In this study, we examine 3900 IPOs from 1985 to 2005 and document a significant negative and robust correlation between IPO firm earnings management and the presence of prestigious third-party certifiers. Next, we test if this correlation is driven by (1) IPO firms attempting to signal firm quality or (2) third-party certifiers mitigating earnings management in the issuing firm. Using a two-stage multivariate model, we find empirical support for the signaling hypothesis — IPO firms self-select prestigious certifiers for IPOs. We do not find support for post-engagement mitigation hypothesis — after engagement, third-party certifiers do not significantly impact earnings management in IPOs.     

Venture capital‐backed and commitments test entity initial public offerings on the ASX

This paper examines initial returns to venture capital (VC) backed and non‐VC‐backed IPO companies on the Australian Securities Exchange (ASX). We find support for the theoretical predictions of Rossetto (2008), by providing empirical evidence that VC‐backed CTE IPOs exhibit greater wealth losses to pre‐IPO investors compared to non‐VC‐backed CTE IPOs during hot issue markets. We also find that greater retained ownership increases IPO underpricing. In the subsample of IPOs with below the median level of retained ownership IPOs, VC‐backed CTE IPOs and VC‐backed, non‐CTE IPOs have significantly higher levels of underpricing and wealth loss compared to non‐VC‐backed, non‐CTE IPOs.     

Venture Capital Valuation,Partial Adjustment,and Underpricing: Behavioral Bias or Information Production?

Using a sample of venture capital (VC)‐backed initial public offerings (IPOs), we analyze the role played by perceived valuation changes on IPO underpricing. We find that perceived valuation change from the last pre‐IPO VC round to the IPO affects IPO underpricing in a nonlinear way. Further analysis indicates that information‐based theories, not behavioral biases, explain this nonlinearity. We also find that the previously documented partial adjustment effect and its nonlinear impact on IPO underpricing are related to the trajectory of the perceived valuation changes, which stands in stark contrast to prior evidence of the importance of behavioral biases.     

Strategic Conservative Earnings Management of Technology Firms: Evidence from the IPO Market

In this paper, we investigate the conservative earnings management strategies of technology firms in the IPO market. We hypothesize that technology IPOs, due to their fewer tangible assets, more information asymmetry, and higher uncertainties of future cash flows, tend to have higher litigation risk. At equilibrium, technology firms are more motivated to strategically employ conservative earnings management during the IPO process, to mitigate their higher litigation risk. Using a sample of U.S. IPOs, we find that technology IPOs, on average, involve significantly more conservative earnings management, especially during the bubble periods. Our results also show that the conservative earnings management strategies of technology firms tends to have a greater impact on their underpricing than for non‐tech firms, and thus effectively reduce their risk of being a target in the securities class action lawsuits.     

Earnings management in Malaysian IPOs: The East Asian crisis, ownership control, and post-IPO performance

We find evidence of income-increasing earnings management in Malaysian IPOs, which occurs primarily for IPOs during a period of severe economic stress (the East Asian crisis). Within the high-ownership-concentration Malaysian market, post-IPO control concerns also appear to constrain IPO earnings management: owners seem willing to accept reduced IPO proceeds and signaling opportunities to increase the likelihood of retaining control of the company post-IPO. The requirement to provide a profit guarantee does not seem to greatly affect earnings management. IPO companies engaging in aggressive income-increasing earnings management have significantly worse market-based performance than their more conservative counterparts, but again only for IPOs issued during the economic crisis period. Overall, the results suggest that personal liquidity concerns are an important factor in IPO decisions during the economic crisis.     

What do investment banks charge to underwrite American Depositary Receipts?

We investigate how investment banks determine the gross spreads paid by American Depositary Receipts (ADRs) from 1980 to 2004. We begin by comparing the gross spreads of ADR IPOs and ADR SEOs to those of matching US IPOs and US SEOs. We document clustering at the 7% level for our ADR IPO sample (44% for the ADR IPO firms without a previous equity listing), whereas our ADR SEO sample exhibits no discernable clustering at any level. We then find that ADR IPO gross spreads can be explained by firm and offer characteristics (similar to our matched sample of US IPOs), and by whether the ADR IPO firm has a previous equity listing. ADR SEO gross spreads can be explained more by offer characteristics (more similar to our matched sample of US SEOs).     

Characterizing the Risk of IPO Long‐Run Returns: The Impact of Momentum,Liquidity, Skewness,and Investment

We study 6,686 initial public offerings (IPOs) spanning the period 1981‐2005 and find that the new issues puzzle disappears in a Fama‐French three‐factor framework. IPOs do not underperform in the aftermarket on a risk‐adjusted basis and do not underperform a matched sample of nonissuers. IPO underperformance is concentrated in the 1980s and early 1990s, and IPOs either perform the same as the market or outperform on a risk‐adjusted basis from 1998 to 2005. We find that outperformance in the later period is driven by large firms. Factors for momentum, investment, liquidity, and skewness help to explain aftermarket returns, although size and book‐to‐market tend to proxy for skewness. IPO investors receive smaller expected returns due to negative momentum and investment exposure and in exchange for higher liquidity.     

Universal Banking, Asset Management, and Stock Underwriting

This paper examines institutions that underwrite IPOs and have asset management divisions from 1993 through 1998. We provide evidence that these firms use asset management funds as vehicles to help them earn more equity underwriting business. We also show that asset managers affiliated with IPO underwriters use their superior information about their own institution's IPOs to earn annualised market adjusted returns 7.6% above asset managers of firms who did not underwrite the IPO. Superior future returns by asset managers who trade affiliated IPOs are dependent on the information environment for the IPO and the underwriter reputation rank.