浅议商业银行董事履职的法律规制

一、我国商业银行董事履职现状有效的公司治理是获得和维持公众对银行体系信任和信心的基础,是银行业乃至整个经济体系稳健运行的关键所在。无论是经济合作与开发组织颁布的《OECD公司治理原则》、巴塞尔银行监管委员会制定的《有效银行监管的核心原则》、《健全银行业的公司治理》,     

公司治理与银行借款融资

本文以中国深沪两市A股上市公司为样本,检验了公司治理在银行信贷决策中的作用。通过检验公司治理水平对企业银行借款融资能力和融资成本的影响,我们发现,企业银行借款融资能力方面,无论长期借款还是短期借款,公司治理因素对企业银行借款融资能力均没有影响,银行更看重企业的经营状况。企业银行借款融资成本方面,我们发现公司治理机制中只有监事会特征和股权集中度对企业银行借款融资成本有显著影响。具体地,监事会规模越大,融资成本越低;股权集中度越高,融资成本越高。本文结果说明公司治理因素在我国银行放贷决策中的作用有限。     

浅析银行介入公司治理

文章从银行介入公司治理的必要性和可能性入手,分析了银行介入公司治理的作用,并在此基础上对我国银行在介入公司治理方面存在的问题及相应对策进行了相应阐述。     

浅析银行介入公司治理

文章从银行介入公司治理的必要性和可能性入手,分析了银行介入公司治理的作用,并在此基础上对我国银行在介入公司治理方面存在的问题及相应对策进行了相应阐述。     

政治关联视角下我国上市银行经理层治理效应研究

经理层治理是公司治理和企业管理的联结点,而政治关联是我国上市银行经理层治理的基本特征.基于上市银行的样本数据,借助于多元回归分析,实证性的研究揭示了上市银行经理层治理的内在机理,发现经理层治理的履职政治关联和红色政治关联对公司治理和银行管理均存在着正向促进效应.研究表明,在中国当前的制度和体制下,政治关联是公司治理不可或缺的因素,政治关联的合理应用可以有效提高上市银行经理层的治理效率.     

我国上市银行的公司治理结构研究

上市银行的公司治理水平是决定银行核心竞争力的关键。文章从股权结构、董事会机制、管理者激励、风险控制以及信息披露这五个内部治理结构方面和外部治理来剖析我国上市银行的公司治理结构问题。通过借鉴国外成功上市银行的公司治理模式,提出了优化我国上市银行公司治理结构的建议。     

市场竞争能作为我国银行公司治理的外部机制吗?——来自城市商业银行的经验证据

将股权结构纳入市场结构与银行效率关系的研究框架中,从公司治理角度分析市场竞争影响银行经营效率的作用机理,并采用2005~2015年78家城市商业银行的数据,研究市场竞争作为我国银行公司治理外部机制的作用效果。研究发现:市场势力越强的银行其经营效率越高;市场势力对银行效率的影响程度不因股权结构而异。研究表明:市场竞争未能发挥我国银行公司治理外部机制的作用。     

我国股份制银行公司治理的现实困境和对策选择

我国股份制商业银行公司治理处在“形具而实不至”的现实困境中。公司治理法规和产权结构中的缺陷导致了公司内部治理机制中的缺陷。“股东至上主义”思想导致的融资结构和公司治理结构设置的冲突，削弱了债权人对管理层监控的动力和能力。与此同时，公司控制权等市场发育滞后制约着外部治理机制作用的发挥。因而．协调推进内外部治理机制的建设，形成综合性治理模式是我国股份制银行公司治理的目标选择。     

央行监管、外部审计与银行公司治理

加入WTO后的中国银行业竞争实质是现代制度的竞争，而现代银行制度的核心是银行公司治理结构，其质量直接决定了银行的市场竞争力。以往，理论界对银行构建自律型公司治理结构关注较多，但由于银行产权之结未根本解开，自律机制远未形成，公司治理结构进一步虚弱。多年的实践证明，在中国纯粹依靠银行自律机制构建公司治理结构是远远不够的，必须建筑银行公司治理的突破点。在这一思路指导下，本文从中央银行监管和外部审计的角度出发，分析探讨央行监管和外部审计在银行公司治理中的作用，并对自律型公司治理结构与监管督导型公司治理结构模式进行比较，提出改进我国银行公司治理结构的政策建议。     

银行公司治理与风险管理

公司治理和风险管理之间存在着密切内在的联系,公司治理结构是风险管理的一个基础平台,公司治理机制是风险管理最基本的机制,风险管理是公司治理的重要内容和目的。银行公司治理的核心,主要是提高风险掌控能力,研究银行的公司治理,必须要研究银行风险管理战略和目标。     

Is China's corporate governance beginning to come of age? The case of CEO turnover

This study examines the effectiveness of China's corporate governance during the rapid transition of its economy. We find that poor performance is associated with voluntary and involuntary CEO turnover. We also find that exceptionally good performance is marginally associated with voluntary CEO turnover. For governance variables, more non-executive directors are associated with CEO turnover and CEO duality is marginally negatively related to CEO turnover. In addition, some of the governance variables are related to voluntary, but not involuntary, turnover. These results indicate that China's corporate governance is beginning to resemble the Anglo-American model as its market institutions come of age.     

The Impact of Corporate Governance and Audit Quality on the Cost of Private Loans*

The objective of this paper is to examine whether banks discriminate between firms on the basis of their financial condition when assessing the credit default risk, and to what extent corporate governance and auditor quality mitigate such risks in the pricing of new bank loans. The results indicate that, depending on the probability of bankruptcy, banks rely on different monitoring devices. For firms with a low probability of bankruptcy, banks do not rely on the quality of corporate governance or the auditor's industry specialization. However, auditor tenure and a change in auditor affect the spread. For firms with a high probability of bankruptcy, the spread is adjusted for the quality of corporate governance and the auditor's specialization. These results are robust to alternative specifications and measures.     

中小银行经营绩效影响因素的实证研究——基于中美数据的对比分析

中小银行比较优势需要内外部多方面因素配合,中美中小银行的实证检验表明：宏观环境、市场结构、经营模式和公司治理四个因素对中小银行经营绩效存在显著影响。其中,宏观环境是中小银行生存和发展的基础,适度的市场竞争是中小银行形成比较优势的外部压力,经营模式和公司治理是中小银行比较优势形成的内因,四个因素相互配合才能促进中小银行比较优势发挥。     

Prudential,Pragmatic, and Prescient,Reform of Bank Resolution Schemes

This article examines current initiatives in respect of bank financial distress in response to the 2008‐2009 financial crisis, suggesting that there is considerably more work to be undertaken before bank regulatory oversight, bank corporate governance, and bank resolution regimes have the appropriate preventive safeguards, governance, and timely, efficient and fair responses to bank financial distress. The corporate governance of banks and other financial institutions differs from the governance of corporations because of prudential regulation, banks' significance to the financial system, the different nature of stakeholders with investments at risk, and the existence of deposit insurance. The article offers a number of policy options in respect of how banks and other financial institutions could enhance their prudential, prescient, and pragmatic oversight and governance in a way that protects creditors, deposit holders, and other stakeholders, as well as the public interest in a healthy and sustainable financial sector. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

INTERNATIONAL CORPORATE DIFFERENCES: MARKETS OR LAW?

Current differences in international corporate ownership and governance systems reflect primarily differences in the efficiency of capital markets, not differences in corporate law. Law is an output of this process, not an input. In countries where financial markets are more efficient, there is both less law and greater investor protection. Unlike nations in Asia and most of Europe, the U.S. and the U.K. have large and efficient capital markets, with no restrictions on cross-border capital flows. It is thus notsurprising that when American and English banks, mutual funds, and insurers are allowed by law to increase the concentration of their holdings, they don't do so. With efficient markets, there is no money to be made by holding undiversified blocks in public corporations. If public markets were inefficient, entrepreneurs would arrange for large blocks of stock (or take companies private), just as they grant powers of control to venture capitalists. The effect of law on corporate governance and ownership is far less pronounced in America than in Europe and Japan. Restrictions on U.S. banks aside, corporate law in the United States is “enabling”–that is, it lets people do largely what they want in organizing, managing, and financing the firm. Corporate law in Europe and Japan is much more “directory.” And there is a straightforward explanation for this difference: When capital markets are efficient, the valuation process works better, which in turn provides investors with stronger assurances of fairness. When markets are less efficient, some substitute must be found–law, perhaps, or the valuation procedures of banks. Thus, banks play larger corporate governance roles in nations with less extensive capital markets–and corporate law, as the European Union's company directives show, is more restrictive. European corporate law is today about as meddlesome and directory as U.S. law in the late 19th century, before U.S. capital markets became efficient.     

Cross-listing and corporate malfeasance: Evidence from P-chip firms

The rapid growth of the private sector in China in recent decades has resulted in a large number of capital-hungry private sector firms. An increasing number of these firms choose to raise equity capital on international exchanges, which typically have stronger disclosure, corporate governance, and investor protection regulations. In light of international investors' and regulators' concerns about the corporate finance practice of China's private sector firms, particularly regarding the integrity of their reported earnings, we investigate whether these firms aggressively manipulate their accounts by examining those listed in Hong Kong, commonly known as P-chips. We find systematic evidence that P-chips engage in more earnings management and other corporate misbehaviors than their counterparts in Hong Kong. We posit and provide evidence consistent with cross-jurisdictional enforcement difficulty as a possible explanation for P-chips' questionable practices, and discuss its implications.     

Impact of corporate governance and related controversies on the market value of banks

Effective corporate governance of financial institutions, particularly in the banking sector, is vital for the stability of the financial system and the prevention of financial crises. Thus, this study examines the impact of corporate governance and related controversies on the market value of banks. For this purpose, we utilized Refinitiv’s corporate governance scores, including management, shareholder value, and corporate social responsibility (CSR), as well as its corporate governance controversies scores to analyze their impact on the market value of 242 banks in 43 countries. Using Refinitiv’s ESG database from 2017 to 2021, we conducted a path analysis and found a positive and statistically significant relationship between the CSR strategy scores and the market value of banks as well as between the management scores and the market value of banks. Moreover, there is a statistically significant relationship between the corporate governance controversies scores and the market value of banks.     

伊斯兰银行业公司治理:理论与实践

伊斯兰银行业公司治理由于其自身不同的经营特点而与传统银行业治理存在较大的差异,其治理结构、代理关系较为复杂,成为英美、德日模式之外较具代表性的一种模式。本文从伊斯兰银行的治理结构及其复杂的委托代理关系出发,论述了其面临的代理问题,并就其代理问题介绍了伊斯兰银行业的公司治理实践,以期为我国的银行业治理提供一定的借鉴。     

The Role of Banks in Dividend Policy

We use loan‐specific data to document a significant inverse relation between a firm's dividend payouts and the intensity of a firm's reliance on bank loan financing. Banks limit dividend payouts to protect the integrity of their senior claims on the firm's assets. Moreover, dividend payouts decline in the presence of monitoring by relationship banks, which acts as an effective governance mechanism, thereby reducing the gains from precommitting to costly dividend payouts. Bank monitoring and corporate governance (insider stake and institutional block holdings) are complementary mechanisms to resolve firm agency problems, both reducing the firm's reliance on dividend policy.     

Does Internal Corporate Governance Complement or Substitute for External Auditing? Evidence from China's Anti‐corruption Campaign

Two competing hypotheses have been developed for the relationship between internal corporate governance and external auditing. One proposes a complementary relationship, while the other suggests it is substitutable. This study takes advantage of China's recent anti‐corruption campaign as a quasi‐natural experiment to explore this relationship. Using a difference‐in‐differences approach, we find that, after the campaign, internal corporate governance improved more in SOEs (state‐owned enterprises) than in non‐SOEs. SOEs were less likely to choose Big 10 auditors after the campaign, while audit firms assigned less experienced auditors to their SOE client firms and charged lower audit fees. These effects were more pronounced in SOEs that exhibited greater improvement in corporate governance. Overall, we find the anti‐corruption campaign improved corporate governance in SOEs but, at the same time, reduced external audit quality, which supports the substitution view. We argue that this result might be driven by the fact that SOEs have limited demand for high‐quality accounting information because the Chinese government maintains strong control over the capital markets.