论会计师事务所的业务质量控制

会计师事务所在我国资本市场、货币市场中扮演着监督者的重要角色。会计师事务所在打击企业财务造假、维护经济金融秩序、推动市场经济建设以及保障广大投资者权益等方面发挥着重要的作用。同时,加强业务质量控制、提升审计质量是树立会计师事务所品牌信誉、培育会计师事务所社会认可度与市场竞争力的有力途径。因此,强化会计师事务所业务质量控制,于公于私均具有积极作用。本文总结了会计师事务所的质量控制现状,并深入分析强化业务质量控制的重要意义,并就如何加强会计师事务所业务质量控制提出相应的措施与建议。     

事务所投标承接业务应注意的问题

目前,越来越多的企业通过招标的形式选择会计师事务所,作为一种新的业务承接方式,它一方面便于企业选择质优价低的会计师事务所,减轻了委托人的经济负担,有利于保护委托人的利益,另一方面也扩大了会计师事务所的选择范围,为一些信誉好、实力强的会计师事务所提供了一个更有利的     

当前事务所名称管理存在的问题及其改进建义

会计师事务所是一种向社会提供专业服务的机构,其信誉需要通过长期的合法执业活动才能得到社会公众的认可。如果一家会计师事务所拥有良好的     

会计师事务所内部治理机制问题探讨——以福建省为例

加强内部治理机制建设是我国会计师事务所做大做强的必由之路,也是提升会计师事务所执业质量和信誉的重要保障。本文在阐述会计师事务所加强内部治理必要性的基础上,分析福建省会计师事务所内部治理存在的一些问题,并提出完善内部治理机制的政策建议。     

山西省会计师事务所品牌建设实施意见

为进一步贯彻落实中国注册会计师行业"十二五"发展规划提出的"鼓励大型会计师事务所创建自主国际知名品牌、支持中小会计师事务所精专优品牌建设"的要求,推动我省会计师事务所加快品牌建设,增强品牌文化软实力,实现会计师事务所品牌、信誉和竞争力的全面提升,制定本实施意见.     

关于《会计师事务所以投标方式承接审计业务指导意见(征求意见稿)》的起草说明

背景最近几年,审计委托人以公开招标或邀请招标的方式选择会计师事务所的现象日益增多,会计师事务所也日益重视通过投标方式承接审计业务。会计师事务所以投标方式承接审计业务是会计市场一种重要的竞争形式,为审计委托人实现以较低的价格选择信誉较好、质量较高的会计师事务所提供了便利,同时,也为会计市场实现公平竞争提供了一个平台。但从目前来看,会计师事务所在投标时具有很大的盲目性,投标报价往往压得很低,甚至低于审计成本,不仅导致审计质量下降和会计市场恶性竞争,而且也损害行业形象。因此,一些地方注册会计师协会、会计师事务所…     

论注册会计师责任保险制度

注册会计师责任保险对于提高会计师事务所的风险抵御能力和保护投资者利益两方面都具有重要意义.在我国,注册会计师责任保险尚处于起步阶段,无论是需求还是供给都存在不足.但随着我国虚假陈述民事诉讼制度的不断完善,注册会计师的法律诉讼风险将大大提高.为了降低事务所的执业风险、保护受到虚假陈述侵害的投资者利益,我国应当借鉴其他国家和地区的经验,完善我国的注册会计师责任保险制度,并建立相关的配套措施,促进注册会计师责任保险制度的发展.     

上市公司审计独立性缺失的博弈分析

随着资本市场的发展，投资者人数众多，企业所有权分散化，审计制度中的委托与代理关系发生了重大变化，导致审计独立性缺失，难以发挥注册会计师审计应有的作用。首先从博弈角度审视审计独立性缺失的经济含义；其次，通过构建多重博弈模型来进一步分析影响会计师事务所独立性和上市公司舞弊倾向的相关因素。在此基础上提出从“适度垄断”和“审计招标”的观点，进而有针对性地提出防止审计合谋和实现注册会计师审计监督职能的政策建议。     

浅谈有限公司会计师事务所的内部民事法律责任

一、引言会计师事务所组织形式选择中的民事法律责任问题是注册会计师法修订的焦点问题。对于这个问题,作为事务所潜在债权人的股票投资者最为关注。因为当受损害的投资者向事务所要求赔偿时,往往发现在“有限责任”公司外壳保护下的会计师事务所似乎没有多少赔偿能力。因此,本     

现金流量指标在上市公司财务欺诈识别中应用的实证研究

一、引言 近年来,中国证券市场上市公司财务欺诈问题屡见不鲜,这种行为不仅误导投资者和债权人,使他们根据失实的财务信息做出错误的判断和决策,而且误导政府监管部门,使监管部门不能及时发现和防范由上市公司的财务风险所引发的市场风险.另外,财务欺诈也使作为上市公司财务信息的审计监督方--会计事务所的信誉遭到了挑战,注册会计师审计面临着信任危机.因此,如何有效地识别财务信息欺诈成为投资者和债权人、政府监管部门、会计事务所所共同关注的问题.     

Japanese stock market reaction to announcements of news affecting auditors’ reputation: The case of the Olympus fraud

The revelation of accounting fraud by the Olympus Corporation gave rise to shareholder allegations of audit failure against Olympus’ auditors—Ernst & Young ShinNihon LLC and KPMG AZSA LLC—in 2011. In this study, we investigate whether the auditors’ affiliation with Olympus contributes to divergent perceptions of audit quality in the event of news announcements affecting the reputation of Olympus’ auditors. First, we use a nonparametric generalized rank event study methodology on 918 sample firms from the First Section of the Tokyo Stock Exchange (TSE) to observe Japanese investors’ perceptions of auditor reputation as proxied by abnormal returns. Second, we perform a multivariate linear regression on firms’ abnormal returns after controlling for firm-specific variables. We find that Japanese investors do not respond to negative or neutral reputational information arising from news announcements concerning Olympus’ auditors for firms affiliated and not affiliated with those auditors. In the absence of legal penalties imposed on Olympus’ auditors, we argue that Japanese investors consider the Olympus fraud case as an expected occurrence of audit failure due to a lack of evidence suggesting systematic audit failure on the part of Olympus’ auditors and an expectation of lower audit quality in the Japanese capital market. As a result, Japanese investors do not consider news announcements affecting the Olympus auditors’ reputation as sufficient evidence to change their prior expectation regarding the reputations of the audit firms affiliated with the Olympus fraud case.     

Do Opinions on Financial Misstatement Firms Affect Analysts’ Reputation with Investors? Evidence from Reputational Spillovers

We examine whether opinions on firms subsequently revealed to have misstated earnings affect analysts’ reputation with investors. We find that positive opinions by bullish analysts hurt their reputation, leading investors to react less to their research on non‐misstatement firms after the misstatement revelation (i.e., negative spillovers). We also find that bearish analysts issuing more negative opinions gain reputation and experience positive spillovers. Finally, for analysts who dropped coverage of the misstatement firm before the misstatement revelation, we find no spillovers, which suggests that analysts experience limited reputational gains when they did not issue a public negative opinion.     

Underwriter reputation and IPO underpricing: The role of institutional investors in the Chinese growth enterprise market

This paper investigates the effects of underwriter reputation on initial public offering (IPO) underpricing in the Chinese Growth Enterprise Market, in light of the conflicting evidence in the literature on IPO underpricing. Using data during the post global financial crisis period, we find that IPO firms with prestigious underwriters have lower market-adjusted initial returns on average. We further find that prestigious underwriters reduce IPO underpricing by minimizing the time gap between the offering and listing, choosing high-quality firms to underwrite, and reducing information asymmetry between issuers and investors. In the presence of institutional investors, however, we find that more underpricing occurs, as these investors tend to obtain access to IPO shares at a higher price discount via private placements. This new finding suggests that the institutional investors have a role to play in the case of high under-pricing, which partly gets corrected via underwriter reputation.     

Does the market dole out collective punishment? An empirical analysis of industry,geography, and Arthur Andersen’s reputation

Arthur Andersen’s reputation was tarnished following news that its Houston office had shredded documents related to the auditing of energy giant Enron. Earlier studies documented widespread spillover of the reputation effect, suggesting a strong commonality in Big 5 audit practices. We examine whether the market is more discriminating in its assessments. We focus on the roles industry specialization of auditors and the geography of clients’ audit offices play in accounting for the contagion. Our results are supportive of investors who differentiate audit practices by industry and who account for the location of the specific office where the audit work is done. We find that losses suffered by energy firms or firms located close to Houston are equivalent to approximately 90% of the aggregate abnormal losses suffered by Big 5 clients. Our evidence suggests the possibility of more localized impact of accounting scandals and supports accounting regulations targeted at individual industries.     

Underwriter Reputation and Initial Public Offers: The Detrimental Effects of Flippers

In this research, we examine the relationship between the reputation of investment banks and the investor clientele to whom they market initial public offers. We hypothesize that the most reputable investment banks have considerable distribution power but confine initial public offer sales to investors with long-term horizons in an effort to maintain prestige. Using the level of relative after-market trading volume to proxy for investor type, we find that as underwriter reputation increases investors with short-term trading horizons (“flippers”) tend to dominate the offerings over the lower prestige levels. For underwriters in the upper reputation tier, however, this dominance begins to decline with increasing reputation. In addition, we find a negative relation between the after-market price performance of the initial public offer firm and the first week's trading volume. The results suggest that flippers can be detrimental to the performance of initial public offer firms. While distributing power may be essential for the maintenance of the reputation of investment banks, the type of investor clientele also appears to be of major importance.     

Behavioral spillover between firms with shared auditors: The monitoring role of capital market investors

This paper examines the monitoring role of investors in the behavioral spillover between firms with shared auditors. Our context involves firms receiving U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission comment letters on issues relating to the recognition of revenue, gains, or losses (RRGL) in their 10-K filings and subsequently engaging in a higher degree of accounting conservatism. Investors of firms who did not receive a comment letter but share auditors with RRGL comment letter recipients react adversely to the release of these comment letters. Through the threat of downward stock price pressure on the value of Chief Financial Officers' equity compensation, investors induce the nonrecipients to also engage in a higher degree of accounting conservatism. When exposed to higher reputation and litigation risks, the shared auditors further contribute to the behavioral spillover between their clients by acting as informational intermediaries.     

Private Equity,the Rise of Unicorns,and the Reincarnation of Control‐based Accounting

This article discusses the rise of intangibles‐intensive companies and private equity (PE) since the late 1970s, and the role of both in bringing about the creation of a streamlined, more flexible set of accounting rules that, since their approval by the IASB and FASB in 2009, have been used by private companies and their investors. The PE industry comprises both venture capital (VC) firms that fund high‐growth enterprises and leveraged buyout (LBO) firms that fund more traditional, cash‐generating operations. Mainly because of the greater risks associated with both VC‐backed firms and LBOs—risks that make them ill‐suited for most public investors—such companies tend to require the more direct and active oversight provided by PE investors. And as the author goes on to argue, the more direct and active ownership of PE investors, as compared to the governance provided by most public‐company boards, suggests that financial accounting and reporting play a fundamentally different role in private than in public companies. Whereas the primary role of public‐company GAAP has increasingly (since the creation of the SEC in 1933) been to provide information for outside investors when valuing companies, the most important function of accounting reports in private companies is internal control—more specifically, ensuring that the interests of the managers of their portfolio companies are aligned with those of all the providers of capital. And recognizing this difference in the role of accounting, both the IASB and FASB responded to the requests of various parties (including private companies) by approving in 2009 the use by private companies of a streamlined and more flexible set of accounting standards. To the extent that the workings of PE markets continue to reduce the numbers of U.S. public companies, the author predicts that the resulting increase in the use of private‐company GAAP will continue to shift the primary role of accounting away from valuation and back toward its traditional roots in internal control and corporate governance.     

Desired attributes of public accounting firms in the job selection process: an empirical examination of accounting graduates' perceptions

The purpose of this study is to identify attributes of public accounting firms that accounting graduates find most desirable in their job selection decisions, and the impacts of individual differences on these perceptions. Factor analysis performed on the responses of 167 final-year accounting students in Hong Kong to a 30-item questionnaire identified seven factors. The results indicate that accounting graduates considered help in finishing their professional accounting examinations and good staff relationships as the most important criteria in their choice of employers. In addition, female accounting graduates were more concerned about the possibility of being required to travel or be transferred, but were less concerned about the reputation and profile (such as the client base and the size) of the firms than their male counterparts. Accounting graduates with a higher grade point average (GPA) were less concerned about the working environment, but more concerned about a firms' reputation and profile than those with a lower GPA. The implications of these results are discussed.     

发审委身份公开、会计师事务所声誉与IPO公司盈余质量

本文以我国2000至2007年期间IPO公司财务报告为样本,以2003年我国由证监会遴选执业会计师出任股票发行审核委员会(简称"发审委")委员的身份公开为背景,研究被证监会遴选执业会计师出任股票发审委委员的会计师事务所是否有动机提高审计质量,以维护来自政府认可的信任声誉。实证研究发现,这些会计师事务所审计的IPO公司财务报告的盈余质量,无论横向比较还是纵向比较均有显著提高。据此推论,来自政府认可的会计师事务所声誉与源于市场口碑的会计师事务所声誉一样,对享有这些声誉的会计师事务所提高审计质量有明显激励作用。     

Venture Capital and Capital Allocation

I show that venture capitalists' motivation to build reputation can have beneficial effects in the primary market, mitigating information frictions and helping firms go public. Because uninformed reputation‐motivated venture capitalists want to appear informed, they are biased against backing firms—by not backing firms, they avoid taking low‐value firms to market, which would ultimately reveal their lack of information. In equilibrium, reputation‐motivated venture capitalists back relatively few bad firms, creating a certification effect that mitigates information frictions. However, they also back relatively few good firms, and thus, reputation motivation decreases welfare when good firms are abundant or profitable.