刍议金融消费者自主选择权及其保护

金融消费者的自主选择权是金融消费者权利体系中的基础性权利,必须受到保护和尊重。本文阐释金融消费者自主选择权的基本内涵,分析当前金融消费者自主选择权频受侵害的原因,提出保护金融消费者自主选择权的对策建议。     

浅析金融消费者自主选择权保护现状及对策建议——以格式条款为例

本文选取金融消费者享有的自主选择权作为研究对象,从常见的格式条款为例分析金融消费者自主选择权的实现和保护现状,从权利平等视角提出保障金融消费者自主选择权的对策和建议。     

互联网金融中的消费者权利保护研究

互联网金融给消费者带来便捷金融服务的同时，在金融消费者安全权、知情权、自主选择权等权利保护方面也存在不足。应当加强互联网金融企业自律机制的建设，发挥好行业协会在保护消费者权益方面的引导和促进作用；完善互联网金融消费者的权利保护体系，以促进互联网金融的健康发展。     

浅谈如何保护金融消费者的合法权益

金融消费者是为生活需要购买、使用金融产品或接受金融服务的个体社会成员,在金融消费中享有安全权、真情知悉权、自由选择权等诸项权利。然而由于金融机构与金融消费者权利义务的不平等性,导致金融消费者的权益时常受到侵犯。因此,分析探讨如何保护金融消费者的权益有着重要现实意义和深远的历史意义。     

浅谈如何保护金融消费者的合法权益

金融消费者是为生活需要购买、使用金融产品或接受金融服务的个体社会成员,在金融消费中享有安全权、真情知悉权、自由选择权等诸项权利。然而由于金融机构与金融消费者权利义务的不平等性,导致金融消费者的权益时常受到侵犯。因此,分析探讨如何保护金融消费者的权益有着重要现实意义和深远的历史意义。     

消费者自主选择权与餐饮行业格式条款的规制逻辑

消费者自主选择权的内涵与合同自由原则具有耦合性,其要义在于通过若干法律制度的配套使消费者克服市场失灵,对生活消费市场上失却的两大基本前提"市场充分竞争"、"信息充分披露"进行补足,从而重新达致与经营者之间的力量平衡。为达到此目标,一种理想化的餐饮行业格式条款规制结构应当建立,即在充分竞争的领域施加信息规制,而在竞争不充分的领域则施加具体的标准规制,同时辅之以反垄断执法措施。新"消法"对不平等的格式条款一概禁止的做法消解了规制的谦抑性品格,打破了消费者与经营者应有的权利平衡,并会出现规则难以落实的尴尬。     

我国农村金融消费者权益保护问题初探

农村金融消费者权益保护事关我国农村的金融发展和社会稳定。长期以来,由于农村金融体系残缺、偏重金融机构利益保护的体制、投诉受理机制缺失和农村金融消费教育滞后等原因,导致我国农村金融消费者权益保护处于十分严峻的境地。城乡金融消费的差异表明,当前应加强制度和体制建设,重点保护对农村金融消费者的自由选择权、财产安全权、知情权和受教育权等基本权利。     

金融消费权益保护现状及对策——基于M市的调查问卷分析

<正>金融消费是消费者以金融产品、信息或服务作为交易对象,在信息不对称情况下,与金融机构发生的一切活动或过程。金融消费者权益一般包括:知情权、自主选择权、隐私权、受服务权、受益权、投诉权、赔偿权等方面。金融消费者权益保护状况取决于多方面:一是金融机构提供的金融服务的种类、水平及质量;二是金融消费者对金融消费     

金融消费者权益受到侵害的表现、成因及建议

随着金融服务与产品不断走进寻常百姓家,消费者与金融机构的联系变得日益密切。与此同时,因金融消费服务而引发纠纷,金融消费者权益被侵害现象偶有发生。金融消费者权益受损事件频见报端,引起各级政府高度重视和网络媒体普遍关注。一、金融消费者权益受到侵害的主要表现(一)自由选择权被剥夺。近年来,商业银行收费多、乱、杂情况,已成为行业的"三聚氰胺"。尽管监管部门多次下文予     

我国保险消费纠纷的替代性解决机制分析

目前我国的保险消费纠纷替代性解决机制看似多元,实则并没有为保险消费者提供一个多元、畅通和低成本的救济渠道,因此亟待从维护保险消费者权益和便利消费者维权的角度出发,构建一公平、合理与便捷的保险消费纠纷替代性解决机制。从根本上讲,要本着保护消费者的目的,对我国保险消费纠纷替代性解决机制做出体系化、专业化和结构化的思考,从而确保消费者在替代性纠纷解决机制中享有充分的自主选择权,并且体现出非诉讼解决机制在便利性与低成本方面的优势。     

Market participation in delegated and intrinsic common‐agency games

We study how competition in nonlinear pricing between two principals (sellers) affects market participation by a privately informed agent (consumer). When participation is restricted to all or nothing (“intrinsic” agency), the agent must choose between both principals' contracts and selecting her outside option. When the agent is afforded the additional possibilities of choosing only one contract (“delegated” agency), competition is more intense. The two games have distinct predictions for participation. Intrinsic agency always induces more distortion in participation relative to the monopoly outcome, and equilibrium allocations are discontinuous for the marginal consumer. Under delegated agency, relative to monopoly, market participation increases (respectively, decreases) when contracting variables are substitutes (respectively, complements) on the intensive margin. Equilibrium allocations are continuous for the marginal consumer and the range of product offerings is identical to both the first‐best and the monopoly outcome.     

Price‐increasing competition

In a discrete choice model of product differentiation, the symmetric duopoly price may be lower than, equal to, or higher than the single‐product monopoly price. Whereas the market share effect encourages a duopolist to charge less than the monopoly price because a duopolist serves fewer consumers, the price sensitivity effect motivates a higher price when more consumer choice steepens the firm's demand curve. The joint distribution of consumer values for the two conceivable products determines the relative strength of these effects. The analysis provides precise conditions for price‐increasing competition and reveals that it is unexceptional from a theoretical perspective.     

全面补偿协议在保证保险经营中的应用

全面补偿协议(GIA)是美国合同保证保险业务实践中普遍使用的一种契约形式,其本质是对保险人追偿权利的固化和具体化。以GIA协议代替严格的反担保机制,不仅更加全面地维护了保险人的追偿权益,也更好地兼顾了权利人和义务人共同的利益诉求。借鉴美国经验,全面引入GIA协议,构建保证保险各方当事人共赢机制,是推动我国保证保险制度走向成熟和规范的必要途径。     

Contracting with Present-Biased Consumers in Insurance Markets

Present bias challenges consumers with self-control problems when they implement precautionary efforts in insurance markets. To explore how rational insurance companies respond to this bias, this paper analyzes a contract design problem in a monopolistic insurance market with ex ante moral hazard. We consider two types of consumers with this bias: the “naifs”, who do not foresee the present bias and make decisions in a myopic way, and the “sophisticates”, who foresee the bias and incorporate it in the decision process. Relative to the benchmark case where consumers are time-consistent, we show that (i) present bias reduces the monopoly profit, regardless of the consumer type; (ii) present bias can either reduce or increase the coverage of the profit-maximizing insurance contract depending on the extent of the bias; and (iii) when present bias is severe, the insurance company can profitably exploit naifs but not sophisticates. These results still hold when consumers are heterogeneous and their types are unknown to the insurance company.     

投票权重向创业团队的倾斜配置及股权结构设计

股权结构设计和控制权安排是协调股东与经理人代理冲突的基础性公司治理制度安排。"同股不同权"构架的核心是通过投票权重配置向创业团队倾斜,实现创业团队与外部投资者之间从短期雇佣合约到长期合伙合约的转化。上述构架由于顺应了以互联网技术为标志的第四次工业革命对创新导向的企业权威重新配置的内在要求,而受到诸多高科技企业青睐。"一股一票"并非对投资者利益最好的保护,"同股不同权"也并非对投资者利益最不好的保护,投资者自愿购买"同股不同权"构架股票,并未从根本上动摇股东处于公司治理权威地位的"股东中心主义"。与现实需求相契合,"同股不同权"的股权结构设计中,应遵循资金投入要求、日落条款设置及股东权威性不变等设计理念。     

从制度经济学角度分析土地流转

我国农村土地制度具有三个特点:等级性、社区封闭性和政府控制。与产权残缺相比,土地的保障功能更可能是减少供给从而阻碍土地流转的主要原因。土地承包权只有成为物权,才能表现为一种具有交换价值的独立资产。赋予农户以处分权的意义也在于使承包者能够将承包权当作独立的交换价值进行流转。只有存在完整意义上的承包经营权,才谈得上形成土地使用权流转的市场机制。     

Controlling opportunism in vertical contracting when production precedes sales

In a make‐to‐stock vertical contracting setting with private contracts, when retailers do not observe each other's stocks before choosing their prices, an opportunism problem always exist in contract equilibria but public market‐wide Resale Price Maintenance (RPM) can restore monopoly power. However other widely used tools which do not fall under antitrust scrutiny and require only private bilateral contracts, such as buyback contracts, also allow the producer to fully exercise his monopoly power. We conclude that a more lenient policy toward RPM is unlikely to affect the producer's ability to control opportunism.     

Store characteristics in retail oligopoly

I use a consumer choice model for the British supermarket industry to compare the incentives of firms, selecting store characteristics, with the interests of consumers. I perform a series of counterfactual changes to store size and location and rank the alternatives by gains per unit of fixed cost. Jointly, firms gain most from large stores, which increase total consumer expenditure. Individually, however, firm incentives are strongly influenced by business‐stealing effects, resulting in a close agreement with consumers, who value middle‐sized stores and distance‐reducing relocations. These individual firm incentives provide little consumer‐protection justification for recent size and location regulations.     

全球数字服务税发展态势与应对策略研究

面对数字经济时代国际税收治理竞争格局加快重塑,中国作为数字经济生产大国、消费大国和输出大国,不能甘做全球数字经济税收权益争夺之战的旁观者,需从建立公平、合理、有效的国际税收新秩序高度,做好应对外部税收环境变化的思想准备和工作储备.立足长远大势把握当前形势,兼顾短期应对和中长期发展,不仅要积极参与数字税国际规则和标准制定,提前筹划应对单边数字税措施方案,还要不断完善国内数字经济税收征管法律法规,依托数字技术领先优势提升税收征管水平.     

Outsourcing with long term contracts: capital structure and product market competition effects

This paper analyzes how capital structure and product market competition affect the firms’ strategic choice between outsourcing with long term contracts and outsourcing to the spot market. When outsourcing to the spot market firms are exposed to price uncertainty, whereas a long term contract allows them to set in advance the outsourcing price. We show that, to the extent that leverage and uncertainty can lead to financial distress costs in bad states of nature, firms may use long term contracts as a risk management device to hedge input price uncertainty. With a monopoly in the final product market, the outsourcing decision involves a trade-off between a positive convexity effect of input price uncertainty under the spot regime and the option to avoid financial distress costs under the long term contract regime. Moreover, product market competition among buyers can lead to an increase in financial distress costs not only for firms outsourcing to the spot market but also for firms outsourcing with a long term contract. We examine the monopolist’s outsourcing decision and derive the equilibrium for an oligopoly, and show that the equilibrium depends on the magnitude of these costs and on the level of efficiency of the supplier.