刍议金融消费者自主选择权及其保护

金融消费者的自主选择权是金融消费者权利体系中的基础性权利,必须受到保护和尊重。本文阐释金融消费者自主选择权的基本内涵,分析当前金融消费者自主选择权频受侵害的原因,提出保护金融消费者自主选择权的对策建议。     

浅析金融消费者自主选择权保护现状及对策建议——以格式条款为例

本文选取金融消费者享有的自主选择权作为研究对象,从常见的格式条款为例分析金融消费者自主选择权的实现和保护现状,从权利平等视角提出保障金融消费者自主选择权的对策和建议。     

互联网金融中的消费者权利保护研究

互联网金融给消费者带来便捷金融服务的同时,在金融消费者安全权、知情权、自主选择权等权利保护方面也存在不足。应当加强互联网金融企业自律机制的建设,发挥好行业协会在保护消费者权益方面的引导和促进作用;完善互联网金融消费者的权利保护体系,以促进互联网金融的健康发展。     

浅谈如何保护金融消费者的合法权益

金融消费者是为生活需要购买、使用金融产品或接受金融服务的个体社会成员,在金融消费中享有安全权、真情知悉权、自由选择权等诸项权利。然而由于金融机构与金融消费者权利义务的不平等性,导致金融消费者的权益时常受到侵犯。因此,分析探讨如何保护金融消费者的权益有着重要现实意义和深远的历史意义。     

浅谈如何保护金融消费者的合法权益

金融消费者是为生活需要购买、使用金融产品或接受金融服务的个体社会成员,在金融消费中享有安全权、真情知悉权、自由选择权等诸项权利。然而由于金融机构与金融消费者权利义务的不平等性,导致金融消费者的权益时常受到侵犯。因此,分析探讨如何保护金融消费者的权益有着重要现实意义和深远的历史意义。     

消费者自主选择权与餐饮行业格式条款的规制逻辑

消费者自主选择权的内涵与合同自由原则具有耦合性,其要义在于通过若干法律制度的配套使消费者克服市场失灵,对生活消费市场上失却的两大基本前提"市场充分竞争"、"信息充分披露"进行补足,从而重新达致与经营者之间的力量平衡。为达到此目标,一种理想化的餐饮行业格式条款规制结构应当建立,即在充分竞争的领域施加信息规制,而在竞争不充分的领域则施加具体的标准规制,同时辅之以反垄断执法措施。新"消法"对不平等的格式条款一概禁止的做法消解了规制的谦抑性品格,打破了消费者与经营者应有的权利平衡,并会出现规则难以落实的尴尬。     

我国农村金融消费者权益保护问题初探

农村金融消费者权益保护事关我国农村的金融发展和社会稳定。长期以来,由于农村金融体系残缺、偏重金融机构利益保护的体制、投诉受理机制缺失和农村金融消费教育滞后等原因,导致我国农村金融消费者权益保护处于十分严峻的境地。城乡金融消费的差异表明,当前应加强制度和体制建设,重点保护对农村金融消费者的自由选择权、财产安全权、知情权和受教育权等基本权利。     

金融消费权益保护现状及对策——基于M市的调查问卷分析

<正>金融消费是消费者以金融产品、信息或服务作为交易对象,在信息不对称情况下,与金融机构发生的一切活动或过程。金融消费者权益一般包括:知情权、自主选择权、隐私权、受服务权、受益权、投诉权、赔偿权等方面。金融消费者权益保护状况取决于多方面:一是金融机构提供的金融服务的种类、水平及质量;二是金融消费者对金融消费     

金融消费者权益受到侵害的表现、成因及建议

随着金融服务与产品不断走进寻常百姓家,消费者与金融机构的联系变得日益密切。与此同时,因金融消费服务而引发纠纷,金融消费者权益被侵害现象偶有发生。金融消费者权益受损事件频见报端,引起各级政府高度重视和网络媒体普遍关注。一、金融消费者权益受到侵害的主要表现(一)自由选择权被剥夺。近年来,商业银行收费多、乱、杂情况,已成为行业的"三聚氰胺"。尽管监管部门多次下文予     

金融消费者选择权及其保障问题探析

金融消费者的选择权作为金融消费者权益的一个重要组成部分,应纳入统一的金融消费者权利保护体系,采取措施确保金融消费者在进行金融消费时想选择、会选择、能选择,并且能够正确选择,实现金融机构和金融消费者的互利共赢。     

Market participation in delegated and intrinsic common‐agency games

We study how competition in nonlinear pricing between two principals (sellers) affects market participation by a privately informed agent (consumer). When participation is restricted to all or nothing (“intrinsic” agency), the agent must choose between both principals' contracts and selecting her outside option. When the agent is afforded the additional possibilities of choosing only one contract (“delegated” agency), competition is more intense. The two games have distinct predictions for participation. Intrinsic agency always induces more distortion in participation relative to the monopoly outcome, and equilibrium allocations are discontinuous for the marginal consumer. Under delegated agency, relative to monopoly, market participation increases (respectively, decreases) when contracting variables are substitutes (respectively, complements) on the intensive margin. Equilibrium allocations are continuous for the marginal consumer and the range of product offerings is identical to both the first‐best and the monopoly outcome.     

Price‐increasing competition

In a discrete choice model of product differentiation, the symmetric duopoly price may be lower than, equal to, or higher than the single‐product monopoly price. Whereas the market share effect encourages a duopolist to charge less than the monopoly price because a duopolist serves fewer consumers, the price sensitivity effect motivates a higher price when more consumer choice steepens the firm's demand curve. The joint distribution of consumer values for the two conceivable products determines the relative strength of these effects. The analysis provides precise conditions for price‐increasing competition and reveals that it is unexceptional from a theoretical perspective.     

从制度经济学角度分析土地流转

我国农村土地制度具有三个特点:等级性、社区封闭性和政府控制。与产权残缺相比,土地的保障功能更可能是减少供给从而阻碍土地流转的主要原因。土地承包权只有成为物权,才能表现为一种具有交换价值的独立资产。赋予农户以处分权的意义也在于使承包者能够将承包权当作独立的交换价值进行流转。只有存在完整意义上的承包经营权,才谈得上形成土地使用权流转的市场机制。     

金融消费者保护制度亟待建立——一起借款合同纠纷案件引发的思考

金融消费者保护在国外尤其是在欧美发达国家已逐步成熟,而在我国近年来才逐渐引起重视。本文通过对一起借款合同纠纷案件的分析,指出了我国金融消费者保护存在的主要问题,提出了完善我国金融消费者保护制度的建议。     

The choice of maturity and additional covenants in debt contracts: A panel data approach

This paper provides a comprehensive analysis for the choice of contract terms in UK Eurobonds. Typically, the theory associates the choice of debt contract terms to firm and market characteristics, arguing that an adequate choice of these terms allows for the reduction of debt contracting costs. We use a panel data approach to examine the validity of extant predictions concerning the choice of maturity, call options, convertible options and protective covenants. Findings provide support to the agency prediction that debt contract terms function as alternative control mechanisms. Additionally, complementary role is found for the use of convertible and call options. Evidence that managers follow a maturity-matching rule, favour capital structure's flexibility in high growth scenarios and use protective covenants when firm's credibility is low corroborates further agency predictions.     

上下级税务机关间的交易成本与契约选择

通过对上下级税务机关之间出现交易成本的原因的分析,我们发现上下级税务机关之间的信息不对称、上下级税务机关之间的效用函数不一致以及下级税务机关的机会主义行为是导致税务机关之间出现高昂的交易成本的根本原因。对固定工资契约、分成契约和税收计划契约进行比较研究,可以看出税收计划契约是一个能有效地节约交易成本的契约安排,因而也是在现有条件下税务机关做出的一个理性选择。     

保险合同法定解除权之考察

保险合同法定解除权作为一种利益失衡的矫正方式,对保险合同双方当事人的利益影响极大。本文通过埘投保人与保险人法定解除权的行使情形进行列举,分析现行法定解除制度存在的缺陷,并借鉴其他国家有关规定,对进一步完善我斟保险合同法定解除制度提出建议。     

Contracting with Present-Biased Consumers in Insurance Markets

Present bias challenges consumers with self-control problems when they implement precautionary efforts in insurance markets. To explore how rational insurance companies respond to this bias, this paper analyzes a contract design problem in a monopolistic insurance market with ex ante moral hazard. We consider two types of consumers with this bias: the “naifs”, who do not foresee the present bias and make decisions in a myopic way, and the “sophisticates”, who foresee the bias and incorporate it in the decision process. Relative to the benchmark case where consumers are time-consistent, we show that (i) present bias reduces the monopoly profit, regardless of the consumer type; (ii) present bias can either reduce or increase the coverage of the profit-maximizing insurance contract depending on the extent of the bias; and (iii) when present bias is severe, the insurance company can profitably exploit naifs but not sophisticates. These results still hold when consumers are heterogeneous and their types are unknown to the insurance company.     

解决贷款担保权益转让难题的要素

长期以来,因贷款担保权益转让手续繁琐、可操作性较差等原因,市场趋于回避担保类贷款的转让交易,客观上限制了贷款转让交易的活跃度。《贷款转让交易主协议（2010年版）》本着稳妥务实、尊重合同自由的原则,允许当事人在遵守法律及合同规定的基础上,协商确定担保权益转让手续的合理措施,较好解决了担保权益转让的难题。最后,文章结合实务提示了办理贷款担保权益转让手续的注意事项。     

Think Twice Before Going for Incentives: Social Norms and the Principal's Decision on Compensation Contracts

Principals make decisions on various issues, ranging from contract design to control system implementation. Few studies examine the principal's active role in these decisions. We experimentally investigate this role by studying how a principal's choice of an incentive contract that may discourage misrepresentation, compared to a fixed‐salary contract, affects the honesty of his or her agents’ cost reporting. Results show that, besides an incentive effect and a principal trust effect, the active choice for incentives produces a negative “information leakage” effect. When principals use incentives, their choices not only incentivize truthful reporting and signal distrust, but they also leak important information about the social norm, namely, that other agents are likely to report dishonestly. Agents conform to this social norm by misrepresenting cost information more. Our results have important practical implications. Managers must recognize that their decisions can leak information to their agents, which may produce unanticipated consequences for the social norms of the organization.