商务部：禁止可口可乐收购汇源 称为保护公平竞争

商务部3月18日表示，可口可乐并购汇源未通过反垄断调查，因为收购会影响或限制竞争，不利于中国果汁行业的健康发展。 商务部具体阐述了未通过审查的三个原因：第一，如果收购成功，可口可乐有能力把其在碳酸饮料行业的支配地位传导到果汁行业。第二，如果收购成功，可口可乐对果汁市场的控制力会明显增强．使其它企业没有能力再进入这个市场。     

商务部:禁止可口可乐收购汇源称为保护公平竞争

商务部3月18日表示,可口可乐并购汇源未通过反垄断调查,因为收购会影响或限制竞争,不利于中国果汁行业的健康发展.     

外资并购中反垄断审查相关问题的思考——以可口可乐并购汇源案为背景

2009年3月18日，商务部表示，可口可乐并购汇源未通过反垄断调查因为收购会影响或限制竞争，不利于中国果汁行业的健康发展。至此可口可乐并购计划流产，汇源公司董事长朱新礼也“嫁女未成”。此案虽经商务部的决定而一锤定音，但是，其引起的各方争议却为平息，其中涉及的法律问题更值得我们深思。本文试着从可口可乐并购汇源案为出发点，拨开重重“迷雾”，主要探讨一下对反垄断审查中申报标准和审查标准中相关市场界定的一些想法。     

可口可乐收购汇源果汁的反垄断法律分析

可口可乐收购汇源果汁,是《反垄断法》生效以来第一个社会反响巨大的并购案例。作为长期关注知识产权和反垄断的律师,笔者依据媒体披露的资料和汇源果汁的公告,尝试作如下分析。     

浅析汇源集团进军乳饮品业存在的问题及对策

2009年3月18日,商务部对可口可乐并购汇源果汁的反垄断审查作出正式的裁决,禁止可口可乐并购汇源。该裁决对汇源造成了很大的伤害:汇源的经营利润、市场份额以及品牌形象大幅下降。在这个十字路口,汇源决定进行转型,向乳饮品行业全面进攻。但是乳饮品业已有娃哈哈、小洋人、蒙牛和伊利这样的劲敌存在,加上汇源自身在乳饮品上不具有优势,这使得汇源要"围剿"喝"牛奶"存在很大的困难。本文旨以乳饮品业产业组织为基础,运用产业组织中的市场结构理论,着重分析乳饮品业的市场结构。揭示汇源要成功进入乳饮品业存在的问题以及提出解决的对策。     

快速消费品行业外资并购民营企业的动因分析——以达能并购乐百氏为例

2008年9月3日可口可乐公司以约179.2亿港元收购汇源集团,汇源集团是否成为乐百氏第二?本文以达能并购乐百氏的动因分析为主线,进一步分析了在快速消费品行业中外资并购我国民营企业的动因,通过外资并购的动因分析来解读外资并购行为。     

并购股投资,三思而后行

从去年可口可乐以高于汇源果汁股价近190%的溢价提出收购后者100%股份,到今年3月18日并购案最终遭商务部否决,汇源股价从大涨到大跌,给投资者奉献了一个生动的并购股投资案例。上市公司被并购或私有化,对持有这些公司股票的投资者来说是天上掉馅饼的大喜事,收购方或大股东一般会对     

浅探企业并购动因——以Facebook收购WhatsApp为例

随着经济的发展,资本市场的竞争愈发激烈,企业间的并购成为一种常见现象。本文阐述了企业并购动因相关理论,并以Facebook对WhatsApp的收购事件为例,对Facebook发起并购的动因进行了可能性探讨。     

公司并购动因理论综述

兼并与收购是资本市场永恒的主题。国内外学者对于公司并购的动因进行了深入的研究。本文从理性及有限理性行为角度,以及价值创造和价值转移的视角对国内和国外并购动因理论进行了综述。     

公司并购动因理论综述

兼并与收购是资本市场永恒的主题。国内外学者对于公司并购的动因进行了深入的研究。本文从理性及有限理性行为角度,以及价值创造和价值转移的视角对国内和国外并购动因理论进行了综述。     

Distributive inefficiency in horizontal mergers: Evidence from wealth transfers between merging firms and their customers

The ultimate goal of antitrust enforcement is to maximize the surplus consumers enjoy by enhancing production efficiency and eliminating market power. Previous literature focuses on the average net wealth effects on merging firms and their stakeholder firms and reports evidence of efficiency gains while no evidence of market power in horizontal mergers. In this paper, we examine how efficiency gains distribute between the merging firms and their customer firms. We find a significant negative relation between the combined abnormal returns on the merging firms and those on their customer firms, demonstrating a wealth transfer effect. Such a negative relation is more pronounced when market power is likely to be more intensive. On average, the merging firms gain, and their customers do not lose. Our results suggest that market power allows merging firms to withhold merger gains that would have been passed to the downstream under perfect competition and prevents customers from enjoying the whole consumer surplus. Distributive inefficiency exists in horizontal mergers.     

OPTIMAL TIMING AND TERMS IN A VERTICAL MERGER WITH TWO SOURCES OF UNCERTAINTY

In this article we provide the optimal timing and equilibrium terms of a vertical merger with two sources of uncertainty in the production chain, namely, marginal cost of raw material and price level of final product. By eliminating monopoly power and transaction cost in the production process between upstream and downstream firms, a vertical merger can increase social welfare, which is consistent with the literature. The optimal threshold of a vertical merger is negatively correlated with transaction cost in the intermediate product market. Vertical mergers also accelerate when merging provides natural hedging for the postmerger firm, that is, when the correlation between the two uncertainties increases.     

Vertical integration,exclusive dealing,and expost cartelization

This article uncovers an unnoticed connection between exclusive contracts and vertical organization. A vertically integrated firm can use exclusive dealing to foreclose an equally efficient upstream competitor and to cartelize the downstream industry. Neither vertical integration nor exclusive dealing alone achieves these anticompetitive effects. The cartelization effect of these two practices may be limited when downstream firms are heterogeneous and supply contracts are not contingent on uncertain market conditions. The extent of cartelization also depends on the degree of downstream market concentration and on the degree to which downstream competition is localized.     

Colluding through suppliers

This article investigates downstream firms’ ability to collude in a repeated game of competition between supply chains. We show that downstream firms with buyer power can collude more easily in the output market if they also collude on their input supply contracts. More specifically, an implicit agreement on input supply contracts with above‐cost wholesale prices and negative fixed fees (that is, slotting fees) facilitates collusion on downstream prices. Banning information exchange about wholesale prices decreases the scope for collusion. Moreover, high downstream prices are more difficult to sustain if upstream rather than downstream firms make contract offers.     

When is upstream collusion profitable?

Motivated by the recent antitrust cases in which Japanese auto parts suppliers colluded to raise supply prices against their long‐term collaborators, the Japanese carmakers, we study the conditions under which an upstream collusion is profitable even after compensating downstream direct purchasers. Oligopoly competition in successive industries is shown to give rise to a vertical externality and a horizontal externality. If a collusive price of intermediate goods better balances the two externalities, the collusion will raise the joint profit of all firms in the two industries and is therefore profitable for the upstream after compensation of downstream firms.     

Dual transfer pricing with internal and external trade

This paper examines a transfer pricing problem between two divisions of a decentralized firm. The selling division is privately informed about its own costs and produces a good that is sold both externally in an intermediate market and internally within the firm. Unlike most previous work, we focus on dual transfer pricing systems that allow the selling division to be credited for an amount that differs from the amount charged to the buying division. We identify conditions under which efficient decentralized trade and external price setting incentives can be provided with a properly chosen set of dual transfer prices that do not rely on direct communication. Instead, the optimal dual transfer prices will depend only on public information about the market price charged by the upstream division in the external market, which indirectly communicates information about production costs to the downstream division. For a variety of well-known demand functions, the optimal transfer prices will be linear functions of the market price. Our main results hold when the upstream division faces multiple internal buyers or faces a binding capacity constraint.     

关于政府会计监管的再思考

政府会计监管产生的主要动因在于市场失灵,但与此对应的则是政府失灵,后者导致了监管成本膨胀以及对市场竞争条件的破坏。由此引发了对政府会计监管的再度思考———怎样使政府会计监管更加富于效率和效果?本文认为,转变监管理念,实现行政处罚让位于法律约束是根本途径;而法律约束发挥作用的基础则在于信誉机制,不仅包括管理层和独立审计信誉机制,也包括政府会计监管本身的信誉。     

优势互补与融资便利：中色集团并购重组山东奥博特案例

本文对中色集团兼并重组山东奥博特案例进行了分析,认为兼并重组可以在短期内提高资源占有能力与提高市场效率,但对其中的政府边界及其对市场竞争机制的滞后效应问题应予关注。     

The effect of the PricewaterhouseCoopers merger on auditor concentration in Australia: A note

Concerns have been raised about the impact of the PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) merger on the structure of and competition in the audit and assurance services market in Australia. The market share of publicly listed companies for audit firms for each industry category pre– and post–merger is examined in this paper to ascertain levels of auditor concentration. Using the approach outlined by the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission a decrease in the level of competition is identified. However, when using another generally accepted concentration measure, the Herfindahl Index, the merger is found to not necessarily decrease competition. In fact, for a number of industry sectors a more equitable spread of clients between the main audit firms was achieved.     

Guess what: It’s the settlements! Vertical integration as a barrier to efficient exchange consolidation

Exchanges and other trading platforms are often vertically integrated to carry out trading and settlement as one operation. We show that these vertical silos can prevent the full realization of efficiency gains from horizontal consolidation of trading and settlement platforms. When costs of settlement are private information, a merger of vertical silos cannot be designed to always ensure efficient trading and settlement after the merger. We also show, however, that efficiency can be guaranteed either by merging the trading platforms and delegating the operation of settlement platforms to independent agents or by forcing competition across vertical silos through cross-listings.