存款保险制度如何影响公众对不同银行的信心？——来自中国的证据

在政府对于银行具有隐性担保的经济体中,引入存款保险制度会对不同的银行带来什么影响,是个有待学术界研究的重要问题。本文利用中国推出存款保险制度这个准自然实验, 首次通过事件研究法实证检验和识别了市场对于隐性担保和存款保险的看法。研究发现,短期内,存款保险制度让公众对于某些银行的存款更加不放心: 存款保险制度的推出对于规模较大、全国性的国有银行和股份制银行的冲击并不显著,而对于规模较小、地方性的城市商业银行有较为显著的负向效应。一个可能的解释是,存款保险制度将政府隐性担保显性化; 这种冲击对小银行更明显,而公众还是相信大型国有银行和全国性股份制银行会“大而不倒”。     

存款保险制度对银行风险承担的影响—基于跨国微观角度的实证分析

金融危机后,全球加快了存款保险制度建设的步伐,2015年5月,我国成为全球第 114个建立显性存款保险制度的国家。本文基于全球80个国家的1122家上市银行的微观数据, 研究存款保险制度对银行风险承担的影响,研究发现：存款保险制度的建立增大了个体银行的 风险承担,表现为道德风险效应。此外,本文还研究了存款保险机构性质、存款保险基金管理 方式、风险差别费率、存款保险基金来源和共同保险这5个存款保险制度设计对银行风险承担 的影响。最后根据实证结论,提出相关政策建议。。     

实行显性存款保险制度的必要性和可行性分析

无论隐性和显性存款保险制度,在增强公众信心,维护金融体系稳定的同时,都增加了银行的道德风险。从隐性存款保险制度向显性存款保险制度转变是否具有可行性?本文从银行的特许权价值、显性存款保险的可信性、被保险存款占负债总额的比例、“大而不倒”的现实性、不良贷款水平等角度分析这一转变过程中银行道德风险的变化。     

政府外部治理、存款保险与银行风险承担

为保证社会公众利益，规范银行业经营，我国于2015年建立了存款保险制度。在存款保险制度之外，政府部门通过公共环境治理、政府干预及政企关系，也发挥着对银行经营的外部治理作用。本文选取2011～2021年我国93家商业银行的公开数据，通过中介效应模型分析了政府外部治理与存款保险制度对银行风险承担的作用机制，并对存款保险制度下政府外部治理如何影响银行风险承担展开进一步探讨。研究发现，政府通过提升公共治理环境，有效缓解了存款保险制度对银行风险承担的负面效应，而政府干预及政企关系等政府直接行为，虽然同样能够缓解存款保险制度的负面效应但作用效果有限。同时，在存款保险制度下，政府外部治理的正面效应可以有效提升银行的风险承担能力，而负面效应对银行风险承担的影响并不显著。本文研究有助于厘清存款保险制度下，政府外部治理与银行风险承担之间的关系，并为地方政府的金融稳定工作提供具有理论支撑和经验依据的政策参考。     

存款保险制度与市场约束的激励兼容机制研究

目前,中国实现以“国家信誉”为担保的隐性存款保险制度,对银行业的市场约束造成挤出和替代效应。在国有银行股权过度集中且国家对国有银行特殊支持的背景下,公众对银行的选择形成了“规模偏好”,致使存款的资金价格和可获得性的信号指引从“风险导向”扭曲为“规模导向”,削弱了市场监控和市场影响的有效性,进而导致市场约束异化。本文对存款保险对于市场约束的影响因素和机理进行学理剖析,设计优化的显性存款保险制度及其相关配套机制,以促进显性存款保险与市场约束的激励兼容。     

市场约束、显性存款保险制度与银行风险承担——基于回归控制法的研究

基于我国利率市场化进程日趋完善和新推出显性存款保险制度的金融大背景,本文从市场约束与显性存款保险制度的视角,将显性存款保险制度政策视为一个“准自然实验”,采用2010~2016年的面板数据,研究了存款保险制度及其与市场约束的相互作用对银行风险承担的影响,并藉此评价了其政策效应。研究结果表明:(1)我国不同类别商业银行的两类市场约束效应存在较大差别。就价格约束效应而言,对地方银行显著有效,而对全国性银行和外资银行则不显著;就数量约束效应而言,三类银行均不显著。(2)基于回归控制法的估计结果表明,存款保险制度的实施对银行风险承担有显著的正向影响,且其对地方银行的冲击强于全国性银行。(3)进一步基于非线性双重差分的估计结果显示,存款保险制度显著弱化了市场约束对银行风险承担的负向影响,表明我国存款保险制度的政策影响逐渐开始发挥出来。     

存款保险制度能否抑制银行个体风险承担?

基于2008—2019年我国30家上市银行的财务数据,研究了存款保险制度实施对银行风险承担行为的影响。对选取的经济变量进行单位根检验发现,变量均为平稳变量。利用固定效应模型进行实证回归分析,结果表明:总体上看,存款保险制度的推出增加了银行的风险承担行为;在将银行进行分类后,存款保险制度的实施对大型商业银行的风险承担影响不大,但显著提升了股份制商业银行和城市商业银行的风险承担行为;在银行个体异质性方面,存贷比和净资产收益率越高的银行存款保险制度对其风险承担行为的促进作用越强,资本充足率则相反。     

存款保险制度与银行风险承担——基于风险共担视角的再检验

完善存款保险制度是深化金融供给侧结构性改革的制度保障，是实施金融安全战略的关键举措。从风险共担的视角出发研究存款保险制度防范银行风险的作用机制，并利用我国2012年至2021年商业银行面板数据，设计并应用双重差分法检验了存款保险制度防范银行风险的有效性。研究发现：首先，由“风险共担效应”产生的正面效应会抑制由“道德风险效应”产生的负面效应，存款保险制度的实施会降低银行风险；其次，双重差分法结果说明存款保险制度的实施能够有效降低资本相对丰裕银行的风险承担水平；再次，机制检验说明，我国存款保险制度的建立推动银行从优化股份结构、提高独立董事占比、扩大监事会规模和增强管理层激励等四个维度强化银行内部治理机制和架构，促使“风险共担效应”发挥作用抵消了存款保险制度产生的道德风险等负面效应，使得银行风险显著降低。     

市场约束对中国银行监管的实证研究

本文认为,四大国有银行的隐性存款保险制度破坏了市场约束,并产生了道德风险。不同所有制结构的银行对市场约束的破坏程度取决于隐性存款保险的覆盖范围。中国银行监管机构应进行改革以强化市场约束。     

存款保险制度与银行资产证券化

存款保险制度的实施可能会提升银行风险承担，并导致资产流动性结构恶化，而这些因素构成了银行发展资产证券化的潜在动因。本文以2012年信贷资产证券化重启后的银行数据为样本，研究存款保险制度对银行资产证券化发展的影响。研究发现：存款保险制度的实施显著促进了银行资产证券化发展。机制检验表明，主动风险承担的提升、资产流动性结构的恶化及资本充足水平的降低，是存款保险制度促进银行资产证券化发展的重要作用渠道。进一步检验异质性特征，发现存款保险制度的实施主要促进了银行抵押贷款证券化的发展，并对全国性和城市商业银行的资产证券化发展具有显著促进作用。本文不仅基于银行微观行为深化了对存款保险制度影响效应的认知，而且拓展了银行资产证券化的研究视域，对进一步优化存款保险制度和资产证券化发展路径提供了新的思路。     

Bank regulation and risk-taking incentives: An international comparison of bank risk

This paper uses a panel database of 251 banks in 36 countries to analyze the impact of bank regulation on bank charter value and risk-taking. After controlling for deposit insurance and for the quality of a country's contracting environment, the results indicate that regulatory restrictions increase banks' risk-taking incentives by reducing their charter value. Banks in countries with stricter regulation have a lower charter value, which increases their incentives to follow risky policies. These results corroborate a negative relation between regulatory restrictions and the stability of a banking system. Deposit insurance has a positive influence on bank charter value, mitigating the risk-shifting incentives it creates. This positive influence disappears when we control for the possible endogeneity of deposit insurance.     

Credit information sharing in the nexus between charter value and systemic risk in Asian banking

In this paper, we assess whether the link between charter value and systemic risk in banking is affected by credit information sharing at the country level. Using a sample of Asian listed banks, we document that banks with higher charter value exhibit lower systemic risk because these banks hold more capital. Nevertheless, we find that the self-disciplining role of charter value in banking is more pronounced for countries with lower depth of credit information sharing. Specifically, our findings also reveal that higher charter value alleviates systemic risk and increases capitalization, particularly in countries with lower quality of private credit bureaus. These findings suggest that higher charter value can be detrimental for financial stability due to an increase in bank systemic risk, particularly when private credit bureaus are of better quality. In order to overcome bank systemic risk, this paper advocates the importance of strengthening bank competition to limit charter value, in addition to promoting the development of private credit bureaus.     

An Analysis of Bank Charter Value and Its Risk-Constraining Incentives

Valuable bank charters have been hypothesized to provide bank managers self-regulatory incentives to constrain their risk taking. However, this paper presents evidence that charter value itself may derive from high-risk activities, indicating that minimizing risk taking also would limit the value of the charter. During economic expansions, bank charter values increase to reflect growth opportunities. In turn, high-charter-value banks gain easier access to equity capital sources for expansion. The result is a positive relationship between charter value and capital ratios during expansions. However, this relationship may invert during economic contractions. Panel regressions demonstrate that the charter value and bank leverage relationship is sensitive to market conditions.     

Effects of Deposit Insurance Reform on Moral Hazard in US Banking

In cross sections of US banks before the deposit-insurance system was reformed in the early 1990s, bank risk-taking was positively associated with bank size and negatively associated with the value of bank charters and bank capital. These empirical associations have an easy theoretical interpretation. Bank size is positively related, while charter value and capital are negatively related, to the moral hazard associated with flat insurance premiums and other aspects of a laxly administered system. Hence the observed associations of risk-taking with size, charter value, and capital reflected the expected positive relation between moral hazard and risk-taking. We test the hypothesis that the three associations became weaker after reform. In the case of unsystematic risk, we find no evidence of significant changes for any of the three. In the case of systematic risk, we find that risk-taking associated with lower charter values and larger size is indeed significantly weaker after reform. Risk-taking associated with capital ratios is also weaker after reform, though not significantly so. Since systematic risk is undoubtedly the more appropriate measure, reform seems to have reduced moral hazard.     

Deposit Insurance, Moral Hazard and Market Monitoring

The paper analyses the relationship between deposit insurance, debt-holder monitoring, and risk taking. In a stylised banking model we show that deposit insurance may reduce moral hazard, if deposit insurance credibly leaves out non-deposit creditors. Testing the model using EU bank level data yields evidence consistent with the model, suggesting that explicit deposit insurance may serve as a commitment device to limit the safety net and permit monitoring by uninsured subordinated debt holders. We further find that credible limits to the safety net reduce risk taking of smaller banks with low charter values and sizeable subordinated debt shares only. However, we also find that the introduction of explicit deposit insurance tends to increase the share of insured deposits in banks' liabilities.     

Surety bonds and moral hazard in banking

We examine a policy in which owners of banks provide funds in the form of a surety bond in addition to equity capital. This policy would require banks to provide the regulator with funds that could be invested in marketable securities. Investors in the bank receive the income from the surety bond as long as the bank is in business. The capital value could be used by bank regulators to pay off the banks’ liabilities in case of bank failure. After paying depositors, investors would receive the remaining funds, if any. Analytically, this instrument is a way of creating charter value but, as opposed to Keeley (1990) and Hellman, Murdock and Stiglitz (2000), restrictions on competition are not necessary to generate positive rents. We demonstrate that capital requirements alone cannot prevent the moral hazard problem arising from deposit insurance.     

The Impact of Capital Requirements and Managerial Compensation on Bank Charter Value

This paper examines the joint impact of capital requirements and managerial incentive compensation on bank charter value and bank risk. Most of the previous literature in the area of banking and agency theory has focused on asymmetric information between either banks and regulators, (and therefore on the role of bank capital), or between bank shareholders and bank managers, (and therefore on the role of managerial ownership). In this paper we unify these issues and present empirical results from the regression of capital requirements jointly with measures of incentive compensation on Tobin's Q, our proxy for bank charter value, and on the standard deviation of total return, our proxy for bank risk. In a sample of 102 bank holding companies we find that capital levels are consistently a significant positive factor in determining bank charter value and a significant negative factor in determining risk. On the other hand, we find our six measures of incentive compensation to be generally insignificant relative to charter value but do provide some evidence consistent with a theory relating types of incentive compensation with risk.     

The Regulation of Private Money*

Financial crises are bank runs. At root, the problem is short-term debt (private money), which while an essential feature of market economies, is inherently vulnerable to runs in all its forms (not just demand deposits). Bank regulation aims at preventing bank runs. History shows two approaches to bank regulation: the use of high-quality collateral to back banks’ short-term debt and government insurance for the short-term debt. Also, explicit or implicit limitations on entry into banking can create charter value (an intangible asset) that is lost if the bank fails. This can create an incentive for the bank to abide by the regulations and not take too much risk.     

Beyond Bank Competition and Profitability: Can Moral Hazard Tell Us More?

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the relation between competition, profitability, and risk. The investigation uses bank-level panel data from 171 Chinese banks during 1993 to 2007. Throughout the whole sample, the empirical results divulge that increased bank concentration in China improves the profitability and the risk of its banks. These results support the structure-conduct-performance and the moral hazard hypotheses. In terms of persistence, both the profit and the risk of the banks rise significantly by showing the enhancement of profit and risk from one period to the next. When different types of banks are considered, joint-stock banks have the highest persistence in profit and risk, and therefore more stable profits. City banks support the moral hazard hypothesis. They have entrenched managers that tend to take on more risk when the bank’s charter value falls in a very competitive (less concentrated) environment. Further, deregulation which in 2003 China allowed foreign banks to formally enter China has a negative impact on the structure of China’s banking sector.     

Are bank shareholders enemies of regulators or a potential source of market discipline?

In moral hazard models, bank shareholders have incentives to transfer wealth from the deposit insurer – that is, maximize put option value – by pursuing riskier strategies. For safe banks with large charter value, however, the risk-taking incentive is outweighed by the possibility of losing charter value. Focusing on the relationship between Tobin’s q and an ex ante measure of the failure probability, this paper develops a semi-parametric model for estimating the critical level of bank risk at which put option value starts outweighing charter value. From these estimates, we infer the prevalence of moral hazard. Examining publicly held bank holding companies (BHC) during the tumultuous 1986–1992 period, we find that shareholders’ risk-taking incentives were confined to a small fraction of highly risky institutions. Furthermore, our analysis shows that the inflection point at which banks begin to tilt in favor of moral hazard increased substantially in 1993–2005. These findings are encouraging to bank regulators and legislators because they indicate that tighter capital rules and more rigorous supervision introduced by several legislative initiatives in the 1990s have helped squeeze a lot of the moral hazard incentives out of the banking system.