The Earnings Implications of Pension Expense

Abstract

Recent challenges to the actuarial pension model and a movement to harmonize international accounting standards both suggest that the current Canadian standards for pension accounting, CICA 3461, may see substantial revision during upcoming years. To understand better the implications of these possible accounting changes, this paper presents the results of a stochastic analysis that quantifies how the volatility of pension expense for a sample of ten Canadian companies sponsoring defined benefit plans will be increased by the adoption of immediate recognition accounting. For certain companies this increase is significant and is shown to have a material earnings impact. The implications of this earnings volatility for the future of defined benefit pension plans are also explored.     

“De‐risking” Corporate Pension Plans: Options for CFOs

Until the stock market bubble burst in 2000–2002, most CFOs viewed their defined benefit pension plans as profit centers and relatively risk‐free sources of income. Since neither pension assets nor liabilities were reported on corporate balance sheets, and expected returns on pension stocks could be substituted for actual returns when reporting net income, the risks associated with DB plans were masked by GAAP accounting and thus assumed to have no bearing on corporate capital structure. But when stock prices and corporate profits fell together, the risks associated with conventional stock‐heavy pension plans showed up first in reduced pension surpluses (or, in many cases, deficits) and then later in higher required cash contributions and lower reported earnings. As a consequence, today's investors (and rating agencies) are viewing pension and other legacy liabilities as corporate debt, and demands for transparency and increased funding have triggered accounting changes and proposed legislative reforms that will further unmask the economics. This article aims to provide both private‐sector and public‐sector CFOs with suggestions for reducing and controlling the cost of providing for the retirement of their employees. Profitable, tax‐paying companies with DB plans should consider (1) funding any unfunded liabilities (if necessary, by issuing debt) and (2) reducing pension equity and interest rate exposures by shifting some (if not all) pension assets into bonds and defeasing the pension liability (achieving a tax arbitrage in the process). And in cases where the expected costs of maintaining DB plans outweigh the benefits, companies should consider freezing or terminating their plans and switching to a defined contribution (DC) or some form of hybrid plan. The authors also propose similar changes for public pension plans, where underfunding and mismatch problems are greater, less transparent, and in some ways less tractable than those of corporate DB plans.     

Pension Contributions and Firm Performance: Evidence from Frozen Defined Benefit Plans

We study the impact of freezing defined benefit (DB) pension plans and replacing them with defined contribution (DC) plans on liquidity, financial leverage, investment, and market value of a sample of firms over 2001‐2008. We find evidence that the pension freeze tends to attenuate the drain on corporate liquidity and relieve the pressure to borrow to pay for mandatory contributions (MCs) associated with underfunded DB plans. Although investors seem to favor the pension freeze as evidenced by positive announcement abnormal stock returns, there is little reliable evidence that the freeze increases investment efficiency and long‐term stock performance.     

The Shift to Defined Contribution Pension Plans

Abstract

There has been a strong shift away from defined benefit (DB) pension plans toward defined contribution (DC) pension plans in the United States over the last 20 years. A variety of reasons for this shift have been proposed. In another paper in this issue, Krzysztof Ostaszewski presents a new hypothesis to explain the shift to DC plans in the United States. He argues that the decline in importance of DB plans is due to a shift in the way relative returns to macroeconomic factors of production, that is, capital and labor, are being rewarded in the national economy.

This paper attempts to test the Ostaszewski hypothesis using Canadian data. In Canada there has been only a slight decrease in DB plan coverage. It is shown that the Ostaszewski theory does not fit the Canadian experience well. Instead, it is argued that pension regulation and tax legislation play a crucial role in pension design and reform. It is also argued that the difference in pension regulation and taxation in Canada versus the United States has directly influenced plan sponsors in considering their pension objectives, costs, and risks. Differences in the proportion of the workforce that is unionized may also be important. The paper concludes that pension regulation and taxation are more important variables than are macroeconomic reward systems in the use of DB versus DC pension plans.     

Guaranteeing Defined Contribution Pensions: The Option to Buy Back a Defined Benefit Promise

After a long commitment to defined benefit (DB) pension plans for U.S. public sector employees, many state legislatures have introduced defined contribution (DC) plans for their public employees. In this process, investment risk that was previously borne by state DB plans has now devolved to employees covered by the new DC plans. In light of this trend, some states have introduced a guarantee mechanism to help protect DC plan participants. One such guarantee takes the form of an option permitting DC plan participants to buy back their DB benefit for a price. This article develops a theoretical framework to analyze the option design and illustrate how employee characteristics influence the option's cost. We illustrate the potential impact of a buy‐back option in a pension reform enacted recently by the State of Florida for its public employees. If employees were to exercise the buy‐back option optimally, the market value of this option could represent up to 100 percent of the DC contributions over their work life.     

Japanese Corporate Pension Plans and the Impact on Stock Prices

This study focuses on the stock market impact of Japanese corporate decisions to adopt pension plans. Implementing corporate pension plans in Japan is complicated because they are heavily regulated by the government and the traditional lump‐sum‐only severance benefit plans already exist, requiring interfacing newly adopted plans with existing ones. Using the GARCH estimation method, the market model applied in this article for the relatively long period 1975–1995 yields evidence that suggests that the stock market responds to some of the more specific characteristics of adopted plans. Alternative specifications of the pension “event” also suggest that relatively little of the market impact comes from public announcements about pension adoption occasioned by the release of a firm's financial statement.     

Defined Benefit or Defined Contribution? A Study of Pension Choices

We solve an empirically parameterized life‐cycle model of consumption and pension choices to show how expected earnings growth and risk affect the benefits of final‐salary defined benefit (DB) pension plans, relative to pension plans that are defined contribution (DC) in nature. We use micro data on the pension choices of individuals to provide evidence consistent with the model predictions: (1) individuals who expect a higher growth rate of earnings are more likely to choose DB final‐salary schemes, and (2) individuals who face a higher variance of persistent income shocks are less likely to choose DB final‐salary schemes. We control for cohort and age fixed effects in the empirical analysis.     

Good disclosure doesn't cure bad accounting—Or does it?: Evaluating the case for SFAS 158

This paper investigates whether the newly required recognition of the funded status of defined benefit (DB) plans under SFAS 158 is incrementally value relevant in its adoption year (2006) relative to the corresponding amounts which were previously disclosed from both equity investor and credit rating perspectives. In equity valuation models, we use a sample of 878 firms (1756 firm years) offering DB plans in 2005 (disclosure year) and 2006 (recognition year), and find no incrementally significant association with market prices of newly recognized amounts under SFAS 158 over the same information that was disclosed pre-SFAS 158. Our credit rating tests, using a sample of 428 DB firms (856 firm years) for 2005 and 2006 also show no differential impact of recognition over disclosure. Overall, we find that equity investors price the SFAS 158-imposed pension differential while credit rating agencies do not, regardless of whether such information is recognized or disclosed in the financial statements. Our results are consistent with efficiency in both equity and credit markets with respect to pension information and suggest that SFAS 158 has not changed the way market participants in aggregate use pension-related financial statement information.     

The Many Challenges of Pension Accounting

Accounting for defined benefit pension plans has long been a major issue in accounting. Standard‐setters are grappling with revisions to pension accounting standards, and much change has already occurred in the United Kingdom. This paper identifies and discusses most of the major issues that standard‐setters must confront in developing new approaches to financial reporting for pensions. Key issues concern how to report the impact of changes in assumptions, how to recognize pension costs on the balance sheet and income statement, and how to reconcile the differences between accountants' and actuaries' approaches to pensions. Current standards assume that accounting estimates are independent of actuarial assumptions, and yet require a direct comparison of the accounting liability with the pension plan assets, when in fact they are incompatible measures based on differing assumptions and differing methodologies. As well, accounting has been complicit in managers' wishes to hide the volatility inherent in a pension plan investment strategy that focuses on higher‐risk equities to fund estimated monetary liabilities that have been discounted at low‐risk interest rates. Drawing on studies and research done largely in Europe, this paper attempts to consolidate some of the current thinking on the topic and to propose some preferred approaches to dealing with the problems of pension accounting.     

Risk Allocation in Retirement Plans: A Better Solution

The corporate world is reconsidering the cost‐effectiveness of defined benefit pension plans while contemplating a change to defined contribution plans. This article begins by examining the three primary risks faced by sponsors of most DB pension plans—investment risk, interest rate risk, and longevity risk—and shows how shifting these risks to employees through a DC plan would affect both the corporation and the individual. Although DC plans clearly help companies manage risks, they provide at best an incomplete solution for individual participants. This article describes an innovation in pension design—the Retirement Shares Plan (RSP)—that combines many of the best features of DB and DC plans. An RSP provides:

• ? predictable and stable cost to the plan sponsor, with little chance of unfunded liabilities;
• ? lifetime income, guaranteeing that retirees will never outlive their benefits;
• ? a benefit accrual pattern comparable to that of traditional pension plans that preserves value for older, long‐service employees; and
• ? potential inflation protection for retirees.

The RSP accomplishes this by allocating risk to sponsors and individuals differently than either a traditional DB plan or a DC plan. Unlike most DB plans, the RSP shifts investment and interest rate risks from plan sponsors to participants. Unlike DC plans, the RSP keeps longevity risk with the sponsor.     

Managing Pension Risks: A Corporate Finance Perspective

Defined benefit (DB) pension plans of both U.S. and European companies are significantly underfunded because of the low interest rate environment and prior decisions to invest heavily in equities. Additional contributions and the recovery of stock markets since the end of the crisis have helped a bit but pension underfunding remains significant. Pension underfunding has substantial corporate finance implications. The authors show that companies with large pension deficits have historically delivered weaker share price performance than their peers and also trade at lower valuation multiples. Large deficits also reduce financial flexibility, increase financial risk, particularly in downside economic scenarios, and contribute to greater stock price volatility and a higher cost of capital. The authors argue that the optimal approach to managing DB pension risks relates to the risk tolerance of specific companies and their short and long‐term strategic and financial priorities. Financial executives should consider the follow pension strategies:

• Voluntary Pension Contributions: Funding the pension gap by issuing new debt or equity can provide valuation and capital structure benefits—and in many cases is both NPV‐positive and EPS‐accretive. The authors show that investors have reacted favorably to both debt‐ and equity‐financed contributions.
• Plan de‐risking: Shifting the pension plan's assets from equity to fixed income has become an increasingly popular approach. The primary purpose of pension assets is to fund pension liabilities while limiting risk to the operating company. The pension plan should not be viewed or run as a profit center.
• Plan Restructuring: Companies should also consider alternatives such as terminating and freezing plans, paying lump sums, and changing accounting reporting.

     

Investment and Financing Constraints: Evidence from the Funding of Corporate Pension Plans

I exploit sharply nonlinear funding rules for defined benefit pension plans in order to identify the dependence of corporate investment on internal financial resources in a large sample. Capital expenditures decline with mandatory contributions to DB pension plans, even when controlling for correlations between the pension funding status itself and the firm's unobserved investment opportunities. The effect is particularly evident among firms that face financing constraints based on observable variables such as credit ratings. Investment also displays strong negative correlations with the part of mandatory contributions resulting solely from unexpected asset market movements.     

“On the Merger of Two Companies,” Hans Gerber and Elias S. W. Shiu,July 2006

Abstract

Bankruptcy risk falls to pension plan participants if a plan sponsor fails when a defined benefit (DB) pension plan is underfunded. This article examines the incidence of that risk and how it changes when public policy provides a guarantee fund. Although government-based guarantee funds are in a unique position to provide pension protection, primarily because of the extent to which the risk of sponsor default is systematic in nature, a looming question is the extent to which such guarantees are exposed to moral hazard. The article focuses on that question using data from four Canadian provinces, including one (Ontario) that operates a guarantee fund for pensions. The findings show that plan assets per DB-plan participant increase with the earnings of workers and decrease with higher unemployment, and that level of assets also is moderated by the influence of taxes, with higher plan assets observed when and where tax rates are higher. Plans in Ontario had on average $20,035 less in asset value per participant, and Ontario plans covered by the guarantee fund had an average of $16,497 less per participant than other Canadian DB plans not backed by a guarantee fund. A separate model finds the presence of a guarantee fund to be one of a very small number of variables significant in explaining variability in the plans’ funded ratios. These empirical results are consistent with the existence of moral hazard.     

Simulation of the Impact of the Recognition of Stock Options on the Earnings: The case of Canadian Companies*

One of the most controversial accounting issues pertains to stock compensation. In Canada, the Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants (CICA) approved section 3870, Stock‐based Compensation and Other Stock‐Based Payments, on November 13, 2001, to take effect in January 2002. Section 3870 forces companies to “take a look at the real economic cost of most of the stock‐based compensation mechanisms” (AcSB Bulletin, October 2001, 1). The adoption of section 3870 was aimed at harmonizing Canadian accounting practice with U.S. standards. The new standard, which was initially based on two American accounting standards ‐ APB Opinion No. 25 and SFAS No. 123 ‐ gave companies the choice of using either the fair value method or the pro forma disclosure of net income and adjusted earnings per share to account for stock‐based compensation. The Accounting Standards Board (AcSB) nevertheless recommended that Canadian companies use the fair value method, which consists in estimating and recognizing the value of the stock options at the grant date.     

The Public Role of Actuaries in Private Pensions in Canada

Abstract

Actuaries have played prominent public roles in the development of occupational pension plans and social security arrangements in Canada. These roles include advising governments and government-appointed committees about regulatory structures, establishing funding standards, actively participating in regulatory functions, and pioneering valuation work for pension plans covering public sector employees. The formation in 1965 of the Canadian Institute of Actuaries led to the accreditation of actuaries in pension and tax legislation and to the development of actuarial standards of practice for pension work.     

Domestic Practice, Comparative International Analyses and Accounting Discretion—Italian Savings Banks' Pension Cost Accounting

In countries where the use of financial statements is minimal and relative accounting debate less intense, domestic practices may gain benefit from being consistently applied. Comparison with foreign experience is crucial. It leads to questioning of the appropriateness of practices that might otherwise never be discussed, particularly where they are developed in such a way as to favour the stakeholders controlling the accounting process. A salient example evidencing the above claims is to be found in the Italian savings banks (hereafter 'banks') accounting for the cost of defined benefits pension plans. The Italian financial system is credit-based. While banks play a predominant role, the financial industry itself enjoys significant autonomy in setting its accounting standards. This is especially so in respect of the accounting for the cost of pensions as savings banks have offered the most significant and almost unique example of employees' defined benefit pension plans in Italy.
  The present article compares some aspects of the long debated international and Anglo-Saxon standards' recommendations with the infrequently questioned Italian domestic practice. The substantial deviations that emerge in the Italian system favour particularly management and proprietorship by allowing a significant degree of discretion regarding the labour cost figure, thereby enhancing the banks' salary bargaining strength.     

Applying Conceptual Framework Principles to Superannuation1 Fund Accounting

The Australian accounting standard AAS 25, Financial Reporting by Superannuation Plans, was the first pension accounting standard internationally to apply established conceptual framework (CF) principles. In Australia those principles have guided standard setting for more than a decade. However, AAS 25 has been criticized for failing to provide useful financial information. The analysis provided in this article addresses this paradox. The findings reveal major anomalies in AAS 25 associated with the treatment of accrued benefits that distort financial position and performance measures. The conceptual flaws in the standard are attributed to the misapplication of CF principles and an absence of adequate guidance in the CF for non‐corporate entities such as superannuation funds. Distorted financial information produced by superannuation plans has potential undesirable taxation and social outcomes. Consequently, there is an urgent need to update the Australian and international conceptual frameworks to provide guidance for revising accounting standards that better reflect current fiduciary and ownership relationships in non‐corporate entities such as superannuation funds.     

THE EFFECT OF SFAS 87 ON CORPORATE FUNDING OF DEFINED BENEFIT PENSION PLANS

Statement of Financia1 Accounting Standards No. 87 (SFAS 87) modifies the method of accounting for pensions by requiring companies sponsoring defined benefit pension plans to (1) recognize a balance sheet liability for unfunded pension benefits and (2) disclose their obligation for pension benefits based on expected future compensation levels (the projected benefit obligation). These requirements may affect users' perceptions of a company's financial position, especially if these plans are underfunded. This research examines whether the requirements of SFAS 87 result in increased funding of corporate pension plans to counteract possible adverse perceptions of users about these plans. The results indicate that early adopters (companies adopting SFAS 87 in 1985 and 1986) increased the funding of their defined benefit pension plans in response to SFAS 87 ; however, later adopters did not do so. These findings provide evidence that companies may alter economic policies when faced with significant changes in financial disclosure requirements. Further analysis suggests that the effect of SFAS 87 on the pension expense recognized by the sample companies provided impetus for early adoption of this pronouncement.     

Pension plan accounting estimates and the freezing of defined benefit pension plans

This study provides evidence that, when “hard” freezing their defined benefit pension plans, employers select downward biased accounting assumptions to exaggerate the economic burden of their benefit plans. Downward biased expected rates of return and discount rates allow managers to increase reported pension expenses and, for discount rates, allow managers to increase reported pension liabilities. We find that prior to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, both rates are downward biased when firms freeze their plans, whereas after SOX the bias is lower. This finding is consistent with managers opportunistically biasing pension estimates to obtain labor concessions during periods of reduced regulatory scrutiny.     

Do Markets Like Frozen Defined Benefit Pensions? An Event Study

An increasing number of North American companies are freezing or terminating their traditional defined benefit (DB) pension plans. In this article we document a positive announcement effect when a publicly traded company discloses that it has partially or fully frozen its DB plan and replaced it with—or enhanced—the 401(k) defined contribution (DC) plan. This positive risk‐adjusted return is greater for firms with higher beta and/or lower return on equity (ROE) prior to the freeze. In other words the positive impact is more pronounced for firms that are likely to face financial distress if they maintain their traditional pension plan and the associated long‐term promises.