大股东交易与中国A股市场股价暴涨暴跌风险北大核心

本文以2008-2016年A股上市公司为样本,研究大股东增持或减持股票如何影响股价极端波动现象的发生。结果表明:大股东交易强度提升显著增加了股价暴涨暴跌风险,其影响主要来源于大股东减持而非大股东增持;上市公司的信息透明度越低、管理层持股比例越高、管理层权力越小,则大股东交易对股价极端波动风险的影响越显著;较高比例的机构投资者持股和独立董事设置能够有效加强对上市公司的监督,削弱大股东交易对股价极端波动风险的不利影响。为了进一步规范大股东交易行为、维护股票市场稳定运行,提出以下对策建议:第一,完善规制大股东交易行为的法律法规和监管规则,防范内幕交易,避免大股东集中、大幅、无序减持股票对市场稳定带来冲击;第二,强化上市公司信息披露要求,提高信息透明度;第三,推动上市公司吸引机构投资者持股、提高独立董事比例,优化公司内部制衡和外部监督机制,以实现对大股东行为的有效制衡和约束。     

个人大股东持股与股价暴跌风险

本文以2007至2016年中国A股上市公司为样本,考察了个人大股东持股与股价暴跌风险之间的关系。研究发现:第一,个人大股东持股比例的增加能够显著降低公司未来股价暴跌风险。这一结论在剔除了个人大股东中董监高持股数量、进行内生性处理、更换不同统计检验方法后依然成立。第二,个人大股东持股对公司管理层监督的效果并不明显,个人大股东持股比例的增加对于公司应计盈余管理、真实盈余管理、投资效率、过度投资等可能影响公司股价暴跌风险的经营指标并没有显著影响。第三,个人大股东的持股加强了公司股权制衡的力度,进而显著降低了公司股价暴跌风险。股权制衡机制解释了大股东持股对股价暴跌风险一半以上的影响。本文的研究对于全面认识个人大股东在资本市场中发挥的作用,促进股市平稳发展具有重要的理论和现实意义。     

股价暴跌、投资者认知与信息透明度

本文基于Merton(1987)不完全信息市场下的认知风险假说,研究了我国股票市场个股股价暴跌与投资者认知风险的关系。我们发现投资者认知风险越大,股价暴跌的风险越大,股价暴跌造成的损失也越大。进一步我们研究了影响认知风险的因素,发现在控制住经营风险和异质信念后,信息披露不透明是影响投资者认知风险的重要因素。稳健性检验的结果表明我们的发现并不受所使用的数据频率的影响。     

投资者关注与股价崩盘风险:抑制还是加剧?

本文以2010—2017年中国A股上市公司为样本,考察了投资者关注影响股价崩盘风险的客观表现和传导路径。研究发现,投资者关注度的提高会显著加剧下一期的股价崩盘风险,存在“关注度的崩盘效应”;分组检验发现,关注度的崩盘效应仅在机构持股比例低的公司和市场处于牛市状态下存在;路径检验发现,投资者关注不存在信息路径,没有改善公司信息透明度,但存在部分的情绪路径,提高了股价同步性和投资者情绪,从而加剧了股价崩盘风险。建议监管部门重视投资者关注对股价带来的冲击,通过进一步提高机构者持股比例,缓解情绪过热导致的定价错误程度,降低股价崩盘风险。     

高校独立董事有效性研究:信息透明度与股价暴跌的视角

本文利用2004-2015年中国上市公司数据,实证检验了高校独立董事与股价暴跌风险之间的相关关系.发现高校独立董事可以减弱股价暴跌风险,进一步研究发现,这种相关关系在市场化程度高和法律环境好的地区更为明显.这说明高校独立董事对于增加公司透明度有着重要的作用,本文从信息透明度的角度为高校独立董事的有效性提出了一个新的认识.     

股价崩盘风险与线上投资者关系管理——基于危机公关的视角

本研究以2009—2017年我国A股上市公司为样本,实证检验股价崩盘风险是否会对上市公司未来线上投资者关系管理产生影响。研究结果表明,当上市公司股价崩盘风险较高时,其后续在线上与投资者沟通互动的效率更高,说明公司通过加强线上投资者关系管理建立事后补救机制以进行危机公关。进一步分析表明,公司信息透明度和高管是否拥有金融会计类工作背景对上述关系具有调节作用,即当上市公司信息透明度较低和拥有较多金融会计类工作背景的高管时,股价崩盘风险对线上投资者关系管理的正向影响更显著,尤其体现在对线上投资者问答回复率的正向影响。本研究反映了测算股价崩盘风险在公司治理角度的信号作用与预测意义,并揭示了信息时代投资者关系管理来自资本市场的决定因素,具有重要的理论和现实意义。     

机构投资者对暴涨暴跌的抑制作用:基于中国市场的实证北大核心CSSCISSCI

本文利用2006年至2015年间中国市场的机构投资者持股数据,考察机构投资者在抑制股价暴涨、暴跌方面的作用。实证结果表明,机构投资者的持有量增加显著降低了股票价格暴涨、暴跌的发生,而且抑制作用对于暴跌现象更为显著,在股权结构更集中、信息透明度更高及市场波动率更大的股票中更为显著。实证结果丰富了对机构投资者通过发挥监管作用稳定市场的相关研究。     

多个大股东与股价崩盘风险

控股股东之外的其他大股东可以抑制控股股东隐藏坏消息的行为,从而降低未来股价崩盘风险。本文以2000-2015年的中国A股上市公司为样本,检验了多个大股东对股价崩盘风险的影响。本文的实证结果表明,当公司存在多个大股东时,其股价的崩盘风险更低。进一步的研究发现,其他大股东对控股股东的监督作用主要体现在其他大股东相对于控股股东的力量较大、控股股东隐藏坏消息的动机较强、以及公司治理机制较弱的公司中。本研究在丰富股权结构以及股价崩盘风险相关领域文献的同时,对上市公司、投资者和政府监管部门也具有重要的启示意义。     

货币政策、流动性不足与个股暴跌风险

本文以2004-2012年中国A股上市公司为研究样本,研究货币政策是否影响个股暴跌风险,以及基金和个股流动性不足对货币政策效果的影响。研究结果表明:(1)货币政策紧缩会显著增加个股的暴跌风险;(2)基金流动性不足和个股流动性不足会显著增加紧缩货币政策对股价暴跌风险的影响;(3)其他机构投资者能够缓解紧缩货币政策以及基金流动性不足对股价暴跌风险的影响。本文丰富了股价暴跌风险研究,同时对于货币政策制定及流动性管理有一定的现实意义。     

内部人抛售、信息环境与股价崩盘

我国自2006年起允许内部人在公开市场交易公司股票,本文分析了其后内部人的抛售行为对股价崩盘风险的作用机理。本文的研究结果表明,内部人中的大股东抛售行为确实引发了股价崩盘,但是股价崩盘并非由于内部人隐藏了坏消息,而是由于大股东的抛售行为加大了与外部投资者之间的利益分离,大幅增加了不确定性,导致外部投资者压低股价寻求风险补偿所致。由内部人抛售引发的不确定性上升,并不能被机构投资者和分析师在基本面信息的搜集过程中预知,相反,一致预期的打破和机构投资者应对不确定性上升的持股调整行为反而加大了股价的崩盘风险。本文的研究对加强内部人交易行为监管,促进资本市场稳定发展具有一定的意义。     

Price Comovement and Institutional Performance Following Large Market Movements

This paper investigates the price comovement of stocks actively traded by institutions and the investment performance of foreign and domestic institutional investors in Taiwan's stock markets during periods of large market movements. Stocks of small size, high share turnover, and high return volatility tend to move together with the market when markets rise sharply. In short-term holdings, foreign investors and domestic mutual funds can outperform the market by trading small-size, high-turnover, and high-volatility stocks.     

Controlling shareholder share pledging and stock price crash risk: Evidence from China

Using the unique setting of the Chinese market from 2003 to 2018, this study examines how share pledging behavior affects firms' stock price crash risk by analyzing the costs and benefits of the controlling shareholder's pledging decision to hoard bad news. We find that during the controlling shareholder share-pledging period, pledged firms exhibit significantly higher future stock price crash risk than their non-pledged counterparts. The risk is also higher during this period relative to in shareholders' own pre-pledging and post-pledging benchmark periods. Considering the internal and external information environment, we further observe a less pronounced increase in stock price crash risk for pledged firms with a strong internal control system and for those with more media attention. Together, our results reveal controlling shareholders' hedging motivations for engaging in pledging activities and the role played by the internal and external information environment in constraining the opportunistic behavior of controlling shareholders.     

Fund ownership and stock price informativeness of Chinese listed firms

We examine the impact of mutual fund ownership on stock price informativeness in China. Existing evidence shows that stock price informativeness is low in China, and attributes this to firms’ lack of disclosure incentives under the weak investor protection institutional environment. Mutual funds are more sophisticated and influential than individual investors to monitor firms, and thus serve as an external governance mechanism to improve corporate transparency. However, the impact of mutual funds in China can also be moderated by state ownership of listed firms, which reduces firms’ dependence on outside investors for capital. Indeed, we find that mutual fund ownership is positively related to share price informativeness, but this effect is less pronounced among state-controlled firms. The main policy implication from our findings is that mutual funds contribute to the corporate information environment of emerging economies but further privatization of listed firms would be needed to realize greater benefit.     

Does societal trust make managers more trustworthy?

This study examines the effects of shareholders' trust on managers' bad news hoarding. Using a large sample of listed firms from 33 countries, we find that firms domiciled in countries with higher societal trust have higher stock price crash risk, which indicates that managers may exploit shareholders' trust to conceal bad news and that a low-trust society can be beneficial in restraining management misconduct due to the monitoring undertaken by low-trust outsiders. We also find that the positive association between societal trust and crash risk is less pronounced (1) when low-trust foreign shareholders have greater control over a country's firms, in line with the view that low-trust shareholders' concerns about being expropriated by managers and the consequent strong efforts at monitoring; (2) when long-term investors have greater control over a country's firms, suggesting that long-term investors playing a complementary role in monitoring corporate governance; and (3) when a country has strong formal institutions, such as investor protection and financial accounting systems, suggesting that robust formal institutions are substitute for social norms.     

Stock-based managerial compensation,price informativeness,and the incentive to overinvest

This paper investigates the relationship among a firm's managerial incentive scheme, the informativeness of its stock price, and its investment policy. It shows that the shareholders' concerns about the effectiveness of stock-based compensation can lead to overinvestment. However, unlike other explanations in the literature, our results are neither caused by suboptimal incentive contracts nor do they rely on the assumption that managers are “empire builders.” Rather, overinvestment serves to induce information production by outside investors. By accepting positive and negative NPV projects, a firm effectively increases the market's uncertainty about its cash flow, thereby giving traders more incentives to become informed.     

Beyond Financial Reporting An Integrated Approach to Disclosure

A company's market value is a key determinant of its future success, affecting its ability to raise capital, recruit and retain key employees, and make strategic acquisitions. Confident, well‐informed investors are necessary for achieving and maintaining accurate valuation of a company's stock. But standard disclosure practice has left many companies releasing a great deal of data while conveying only limited understanding to outsiders. This article presents the outline of an integrated approach to corporate disclosure in which each of the three major elements–required financial reports, supplemental disclosure, and interactions with investors and intermediaries–are consistent and mutually reinforcing. Such an approach begins with required reports that refiect as closely as possible the economic reality of a company's business. But if GAAP income statements and balance sheets are often useful for communicating current and past performance, they are not designed to convey management's strategic vision and the company's prospects for creating value. To achieve and maintain accurate valuation, management must supplement mandated financial reporting with voluntary communication that highlights value drivers and helps investors understand both the company's strategic goals and management's progress in meeting those goals. Finally, management must interact with investors and capital market intermediaries in ways that provide them with a clear and compelling picture of the company's prospects, which should help both analysts and institutional investors become more effective monitors of the firm's performance. Through consistent communication that goes well beyond the sell side's focus on quarterly earnings per share, management will discover that it has the power to set the agenda for how the company's performance is evaluated by the market. In the process, companies are also likely to find that their investors (and analysts) are more patient than they thought, while their operating managers feel less pressure to take shortsighted steps to boost EPS. Both of these expected benefits of an integrated disclosure policy should end up increasing a company's value.     

险资持股对上市公司股价波动的影响研究 ——基于机构投资者异质性视角

保险机构已经成为资本市场重要的机构投资者,其在整个资本市场中的作用日益受到关注.基于机构投资者异质性的视角,对保险机构和证券投资基金、社保基金以及Q FII等其他机构投资者的持股特征进行对比分析,总结梳理保险机构投资者持股的特征.并运用面板数据模型,从长期持股和持股比例变动两个方面对比分析保险机构持股与证券投资基金持股对股价波动的影响.结果表明:在样本期间内,相对于证券投资基金,保险机构长期持股起到了稳定股市的作用,但保险机构持股比例变动会加剧股市的波动.     

Identifying and Attracting the "right" Investors: Evidence on the Behavior of Institutional Investors

This article summarizes the findings of research the author has conducted over the past seven years that aims to answer a number of questions about institutional investors: Are there significant differences among institutional investors in time horizon and other trading practices that would enable such investors to be classified into types on the basis of their observable behavior? Assuming the answer to the first is yes, do corporate managers respond differently to the pressures created by different types of investors– and, by implication, are certain kinds of investors more desirable from corporate management's point of view? What kinds of companies tend to attract each type of investor, and how does a company's disclosure policy affect that process? The author's approach identifies three categories of institutional investors: (1) “transient” institutions, which exhibit high portfolio turnover and own small stakes in portfolio companies; (2) “dedicated” holders, which provide stable ownership and take large positions in individual firms; and (3) “quasi‐indexers,” which also trade infrequently but own small stakes (similar to an index strategy). As might be expected, the disproportionate presence of transient institutions in a company's investor base appears to intensify pressure for short‐term performance while also resulting in excess volatility in the stock price. Also not surprising, transient investors are attracted to companies with investor relations activities geared toward forward‐looking information and “news events,” like management earnings forecasts, that constitute trading opportunities for such investors. By contrast, quasi‐indexers and dedicated institutions are largely insensitive to shortterm performance and their presence is associated with lower stock price volatility. The research also suggests that companies that focus their disclosure activities on historical information as opposed to earnings forecasts tend to attract quasi‐indexers instead of transient investors. In sum, the author's research suggests that changes in disclosure practices have the potential to shift the composition of a firm's investor base away from transient investors and toward more patient capital. By removing some of the external pressures for short‐term performance, such a shift could encourage managers to establish a culture based on long‐run value maximization.     

Sustainability priorities,corporate strategy,and investor behavior

Using a sequential experiment, this study examines whether integration of material environmental, social, and governance (ESG) priorities into corporate strategy impacts investors’ short‐ and long‐term stock price assessments and investment allocation. In our examination, we consider the potential moderating effect of financial performance. We find that integration of ESG priorities into strategy does not have a significant effect on investors’ price assessments or investment allocation. This is true regardless of the trend in the company's financial performance. Our results hold across various demographics and the levels of investment knowledge and investment experience. Investors’ perception of relevance and reliability of material ESG information, however, has a mediating effect on their long‐term price assessment and investment allocation. Overall, our findings suggest that any future requirements on disclosure of ESG information by regulators and standard setters should aim to improve investors’ perception of the relevance and reliability of that information.     

“强者”一定“恒强”吗？——来自中国股票型公募基金动量效应研究的新发现

以2014-2018年中国股票型公募基金市场为样本，改进基金动量组合构造方法，并提出中国公募基金市场“新动量效应”。研究发现：传统动量效应稳健性较差并存在较高“动量崩溃”风险，而剔除历史上表现“最好”的基金，则可以显著提高动量组合收益稳健性;同时，“新动量因子”具有更加稳健的股票横截面定价能力；最后，从“投资者关注”和“处置效应”两个角度，对“新动量因子”存在机制作出了理论解释。