上市公司会计监管:一个分析视角

我国上市公司由于内部治理结构不完善，以及受地方政府的影响，有较强的会计操纵动机，股东、债权人、经营者、地方政府等利益相关者都有进行会汁操纵的可能。因此，本文从上市公司会计监管的博弈模型出发，提出了会计监管的思路和对策。     

会计委派制的利弊分析

针对近年来公有制经济存在的会计监督弱化导致会计信息失真的问题，中央纪委二次全会明确指出：在国有企业、国有控股企业进行会计委派制试点。本文仅就会计委派制的利弊问题加以分析。一、会计委派制可消除“内部人控制”问题，保证会计信息的真实性，消除会计人员造假的动机。我国传统企业制度下，经营者权力相对集中，会计部门同生产管理部门一样，同属于企业管理，会计人员无论在人事关系方面还是在经济利益方面，都受到经营者的制约，在迫于领导的压力，或是受单位利益驱使时，都可能出现造假行为。实行会计委派制，可以促使企业整顿和…     

论会计监督的作用

<正>一、引言经济的健康运行,企业的健康发展,都离不开会计监督。会计失真的案例比比皆是,如何规范保证会计行为、提高会计信息质量,督促企业的合法经营,正是会计监督所要研究的重点内容。二、会计监督1、概念会计监督是根据国家的法律法规、财经规律等,为了保证会计信息适量,防范会计信息失真而对企业的经济活动进行监督的一种行为。2、主体对企业的经济活动能产生影响的都可以会计监督的主体。狭义的主题,是企业内部的会计人员;广义的主体,是内部组织人员、会计人员,以及外部政府,社会利益相关者。3、客体客体是企业的组织机构、人力资源、经济行为。     

新会计准则实施后上市公司财务监管研究

在“十一五”规划的开局之年，新企业会计准则体系正式颁布。新会计准则的实施将有力地规范会计工作秩序和会计行为，提高我国会计信息质量，满足投资者、债权人、政府等利益相关者对会计信息的需求；同时，也可能在很大程度上改变财务报表数据，甚至出现新的财务操纵手法和现象。本文对新会计准则的重大变革进行了纵向比较分析，分析了这些变革即将对上市公司财务报表带来的现实影响和未来变化，提出了可能出现的新的操纵问题以及监管对策。     

会计信息失真的原因及对策

会计行业作为市场经济活动的一个重要领域,会计信息失真会给投资人等利益相关者带来不可估量的损失,因此,创造良好的经济环境必须严格会计核算,强化会计监督。     

利益相关者财务披露监管的分析框架与体制构造

本文分析了利益相关者的会计行为,建立了利益相关者财务披露监管的博弈分析模型,提出了在按会计行为偏好对利益相关者进行分类的基础上实行分工监督的设想,并提出建立由同类利益相关者共同分担监督成本的机制以协调利益相关者集体理性与个体理性之间的矛盾,从而使该设想更具有可行性。     

分配权能对应与会计行为异化

企业财务报告舞弊是企业会计行为异化的结果, 在自利需要、动机驱使与约束缺失的情况下, 会计行为异化就会发生。分配权力和分配能力的对应是扼制会计行为异化的有效制度安排, 这一制度安排与现代企业的“共同治理”模式相结合, 就产生了会计行为应当公平反映、计量各企业利益相关者的要素贡献与剩余索取权的基本要求。现实中各类利益相关者分配权力与分配能力之间的配对错位和冲突, 就会导致会计行为的异化和财务报告舞弊的发生。     

上市公司会计监管制度及其改进

随着会计实践的不断发展和理论的不断深入，会计工作已发生了很大变化，会计涉及的范围不断扩展，业务处理也日趋复杂，投资者、债权人和社会公众等利益相关者对会计信息披露的时效、范围、质量的要求越来越高，对会计监管，尤其是对上市公司会计监督的要求也越来越高。因此，规范会计行为，提高会计信息质量，加强会计监管已成为规范上市公司治理结构一项重要内容。     

新会计准则对企业利润操纵的影响及应对措施

<正>新会计准则的实施对有效规范会计工作秩序和会计行为,提高会计信息质量,缩小企业利润操纵空间,满足投资者、债权人、政府等利益相关者对会计信息的需求,维护社会公众利益等具有重大意义。同时,通过对新旧会计准则的比较发现,新会计准则一方面缩小了企业利润操纵的空间范围,另一方面又可能为企业利润操纵开辟新的空间。     

我国上市公司会计利润操纵的原因及其对策

<正>所谓上市公司会计利润操纵,一般是指上市公司出于某种动机,利用法律规范的空白,甚至违反法规,通过各种手段对上市公司会计利润进行操纵的行为。这种行为严重妨碍了整个社会资源的优化配置和市场经济的健康发展。因此,对我国上市公司会计利润操纵行为进行探究,有一定的理论和实践价值。一、上市公司会计利润操纵行为的原因     

VALUE MAXIMIZATION, STAKEHOLDER THEORY, AND THE CORPORATE OBJECTIVE FUNCTION

This paper examines the role of the corporate objective function in corporate productivity and efficiency, social welfare, and the accountability of managers and directors. The author argues that because it is logically impossible to maximize in more than one dimension, purposeful behavior requires a single‐valued objective function. Two hundred years of work in economics and finance implies that, in the absence of externalities and monopoly, social welfare is maximized when each firm in an economy maximizes its total market value. The main contender to value maximization as the corporate objective is stakeholder theory, which argues that managers should make decisions so as to take account of the interests of all stakeholders in a firm, including not only financial claimants, but also employees, customers, communities, and governmental officials. Because the advocates of stakeholder theory refuse to specify how to make the necessary tradeoffs among these competing interests, they leave managers with a theory that makes it impossible for them to make purposeful decisions. With no clear way to keep score, stakeholder theory effectively makes managers unaccountable for their actions (which helps explain the theory's popularity among many managers). But if value creation is the overarching corporate goal, the process of creating value involves much more than simply holding up value maximization as the organizational objective. As a statement of corporate purpose or vision, value maximization is not likely to tap into the energy and enthusiasm of employees and managers. Thus, in addition to setting up value maximization as the corporate scorecard, top management must provide a corporate vision, strategy, and tactics that will unite all the firm's constituencies in its efforts to compete and add value for investors. In clarifying the proper relation between value maximization and stakeholder theory, the author introduces a somewhat new corporate objective called “enlightened value maximization.” Enlightened value maximization uses much of the structure of stakeholder theory—notably the need to consider the interests of all corporate stakeholders—while continuing to posit maximization of long‐run firm value as the criterion for making the necessary tradeoffs among stakeholders. The paper comes to similar conclusions about the Balanced Scorecard, which is described as the managerial equivalent of stakeholder theory. Although the Balanced Scorecard can add value by helping managers better understand the drivers of shareholder value, it should not be used as a performance measurement and incentive compensation system because it fails to provide a single valued score, a clear way of distinguishing superior from substandard performance.     

证券市场监管者和中小投资者博弈分析

由于我国证券市场发展尚未成熟,同时因为我国的特殊经济模式,监管在维护证券市场稳定发展方面起了很重要的作用。但是,由于我国监管体系的不完善,信息的不透明和不对称性会产生投机行为,中小投资者往往就成为股市博弈的牺牲品。因此,本文将通过对市场过热和市场低迷两种情况下,监管者颁布政策和中小投资者投资行为之间的博弈过程进行分析,以求规范股市投机行为,维护各方利益均衡,达到市场稳定发展。本文的分析表明监管者和中小投资者的均衡策略主要取决于其得到的效用和付出的成本,在不同的临界值下存在不同的均衡结果。最后针对本文的结论和我国的实际情况,提出了相应的建议。     

公司治理结构中会计目标的法律经济学解释——兼论我国会计法律制度的完善

公司治理涉及各种利益相关者责权利的划分和制衡。会计是连接权利和利益的纽带,会计信息质量在公司治理结构中扮演着重要的角色。公司治理中对各种利益相关者的约束与制衡机制需要以会计信息作保障。会计目标与公司治理目标具有内在的关联性,在我国公司目前所处的经济环境下,公司目标是影响公司治理结构的重要因素.会计法律制度的完善对我国公司治理具有重要的意义。     

EVA AND TOTAL QUALITY MANAGEMENT

Both TQM and EVA can be viewed as organizational innovations designed to reduce “agency costs”—that is, reductions in firm value that stem from conflicts of interest between various corporate constituencies. This article views TQM programs as corporate investments designed to increase value by reducing potential conflicts among non-investor stakeholders such as managers, employees, customers, and suppliers. EVA, by contrast, focuses on reducing conflicts between managers and shareholders by aligning the incentives of the two groups. Besides encouraging managers to make the most efficient possible use of investor capital, EVA reinforces the goal of shareholder value maximization in two other ways: (1) by eliminating the incentive for corporate overinvestment provided by more conventional accounting measures such as EPS and earnings growth; and (2) by reducing the incentive for corporate underinvestment provided by ROE and other rate-of-return measures. At a superficial level, EVA and TQM seem to be in direct conflict with each other. Because of its focus on multiple, non-investor stakeholders, TQM does not address the issue of how to make value-maximizing trade-offs among different stakeholder groups. It fails to provide answers to questions such as: What is the value to shareholders of the increase in employees' human capital created by corporate investments in quality-training programs? And, given that a higherquality product generally costs more to produce, what is the value-maximizing quality-cost combination for the company? The failure of TQM to address such questions may be one of the main reasons why the adoption of TQM does not necessarily lead to improvements in EVA. Because a financial management tool like EVA has the ability to guide managers in making trade-offs among different corporate stakeholders, it can be used to complement and reinforce a TQM program. By subjecting TQM to the discipline of EVA, management is in a better position to ensure that its investment in TQM is translating into increased shareholder value. At the same time, a TQM program tempered by EVA can help managers ensure that they are not under investing in their non-shareholder stakeholders.     

Conflicting interests but filtered key targets: Stakeholder and resource-dependency analyses at a University of Applied Sciences

Stakeholder theory (SHT) emphasizes that different stakeholders and their interests need to be identified and addressed to maximize firm performance. This emphasis can make the design of performance measurement systems (PMS) challenging because the interests of stakeholders are often in conflict. Based on previous research and using stakeholder and resource dependency theories, we develop a theoretical model suggesting that resource dependency acts as a “filter” in selecting which of the PMS design measures are emphasized for decision making. We find various conflicting interests between stakeholders in our case organization (a unit of University of Applied Sciences in Finland) that affected PMS design. Contrary to the earlier studies, however, we found that despite conflicting interests, all of the different stakeholders considered one nonfinancial indicator to be the most important: attractiveness, or the number of applicants divided by number of new students. As suggested by resource-dependency theory (RDT), the stakeholder providing the most resources had the most significant impact on the selection of the key performance indicators used. The key resource provider may also have had some effect on the expectations of other stakeholders.     

会计信息不实的行政法律规制研究

1929年-1933年席卷欧美的经济危机和2008年世界金融危机本质上是会计信息不实孕育的“恶果”，证明会计信息不实具有严重的社会危害性。为把不实会计信息的状况限制在低水平，保护相关利益主体的权益，防止信息障碍累积，构建有效经济社会信用体系，避免经济发生重大病变，需要实施全过程一般会计信息问题的有效行政法律监管。如何实施会计信息不实的行政监管，关键是从操作层面完善现有行政法律规制内容.     

Accounting conservatism and corporate social responsibility

In this paper, we examine whether a firm's stakeholder orientation, as manifested by its social responsibility endeavors, matters for its choice of accounting conservatism. We find that the level of conservatism in financial reporting significantly increases with socially responsible activities. This result is robust to several conservatism aspects, including market-based conservatism measure, the aggregate of R&D reserves, advertising reserves, and LIFO reserves, and accrual-based conservatism construct. Moreover, our two-stage regression results validate that conservatism is more pronounced for firms that devote more resources to social responsibility programs. Consistent with stakeholder theory, these findings indicate that CSR-oriented firms are more likely to use accounting conservatism to credibly commit to acting in the interests of stakeholders. As a whole, our results provide a novel implication that the extent of accounting conservatism can be entailed by a firm's efforts to enhance stakeholder relations.     

The Financial Milieu of the IASB and AASB

This paper considers the implications of the convergence of the accounting standards of the International Accounting Standards Board with those of the Australian Accounting Standard Board. Australia seems well placed to comply with the international accounting standards in 2005, but not quite in the way the boards would have us imagine. While actively seeking funds from large multinational corporations and elite accounting firms, the AASB is dominated by stakeholder groups with what are described as "corefinancial" and "partial-financial" interests. This financial milieu may offer cosy deals for the key stakeholders, but does little in the way of civic responsibilities and accounting service for the wider public .     

Accounting Treatment of Inherent versus Incentive Uncertainties and the Capital Structure of the Firm

This paper studies the accounting treatment of uncertainty and how it affects a firm's capital structure. We distinguish two sources of uncertainty that raise reliability concerns: inherent uncertainty and incentive uncertainty. By inherent uncertainty, we refer to uncertainty about the quality of raw information regarding future cash flows. By incentive uncertainty, we refer to uncertainty about the quality of accounting numbers conveying the raw information. We explore features of accounting that can effectively deal with these two types of uncertainties in order to aid in the debt‐equity decision of the firm. To handle inherent uncertainty, preferable accounting involves flexible revenue/expense recognition rules that recognize more profit when the uncertainty level is low. To deal with incentive uncertainty, a stringent revenue/expense recognition rule may be desirable to fend off management's opportunistic reporting behavior. Inflexible accounting rules cause a firm's financing choices to deviate from what would hold with complete information. Given any accounting rule, an information environment with a lower (higher) uncertainty regarding future cash inflows leads to higher (lower) expected debt financing. This is because assessed default risk is increasing in the uncertainty of future cash inflows, holding the uncertainty of the outflows constant.