燃油税猜想

自从国家发展与改革委员会能源研究所所长透露．国家将很快开征燃油税后．社会对开征燃油税的新一轮讨论日渐升温。所谓燃油税,就是将现有的养路费和其他相关费用转换成燃油税。我国曾多次提出择机开征燃油税．但因条件不成熟一直未果。当前,金融危机爆发导致石油价格下降．每桶由近150美元下降到50美元左右．为开征燃油税提供了良好的外部条件。同时,为应对金融危机的影响,     

燃油税政策的国际比较及对我国的启示

燃油税的开征是我国公路税费改革的一项重大决策，也是当前我国税制改革的一个重要突破口。我国从1994年提出开征燃油税，同时在海南省进行燃油税的征收试点，以望在全国范围内推广。曾经一路攀升的油价，一直是决策层无法下决心开征燃油税的重要掣肘。而今，全球金融危机、经济疲软、油价持续回落，这为开征燃油税创造了一个有利的时机。我国燃油税制的构建和完善面临着一些问题，而国外在这方面有很多成功经验。因此，我国要在基于本国国情的同时，借鉴国际经验来完善燃油税制。     

由“多用路多付费”到“多用油多付费”

社会关注了多年的燃油税改革，在拖了10年后，如今终于实行了。 国家发改委、财政部、交通部、国家税务总局公布的《成品油价税费改革方案》引起了社会上的热议。对此，我们不妨冷静下来回首追问：我国为何要开征燃油税？开征的目的是什么？     

八方新闻眼

要闻油价难降燃油税面临困境国际油价高企,CPI越线,加上近期抗洪形势等综合考虑,近期开征燃油税的可能性不大。有关燃油税改革方案已基本就绪,开征燃油税只是时间问题。业内专家表示,开征燃油税的意义已经突破了简单的费改税,而是与当前节能减排以及经济增长方式转型相联系,     

燃油税：想说爱你不容易

有关燃油税即将开征的消息近期不绝于耳，延宕十余年的燃油税即将“破茧而出”，可以说是税收制度和环保举措上的一大进步。燃油税体现了社会公平，有利于环保，它的改革不仅对国民经济影响意义重大，与每个人的生活也息息相关。在新华网的调查中．九成网友都表态非常支持燃油税开征，但在现有的条件下．燃油税对于个人而言是否值得弹冠相庆还有待考验。     

燃油税即将开征

国家发展和改革委员会能源研究所所长韩文科11月18日向媒体透露,我国将很快开征燃油附加税。几天后,国家发改委也证实：相关部委正在就开征燃油税的问题进行内部讨论,并称最快12月1日开征。     

燃油税开征

什么是燃油税燃油税是指对在我国境内行使的汽车购用的汽油、柴油所征收的税。它是费改税的产物,是取代养路费而开征的,其实质是汽车燃油税。简而言之,就是将现有的养路费转换成燃油税,实行捆绑收费。为什么要征燃油税由于现行的养路费一般是按吨位和运营收入两种计费方法收取,实际上形成了一种定额费。而对于用油大户尤其是汽车来说,道路使用率存在较大差距。     

利益的天平——浅议我国燃油税改革问题

自1994年中央提出实施燃油税方案至今已经有14个年头。而随着当今国际油价的起伏，外界对燃油税是否即将推行也存在众多议论。本文从博弈的角度分析了我国燃油税开征的难点，并就实施中遇到的难题进行利益平衡进而提出自己的观点。     

国外燃油税探析

燃油税是政府财政收入的源泉之一，一些国家的燃油税是专为道路维护目的而设立的，燃油税被更多地理解为一种道路使用费，如美国；在另一些国家，燃油税是政府财政收入的重要来源，其使用没有特定的目的，如欧洲国家。随着社会和经济的发展，燃油税除了筹集财政资金和道路维建费用外，还被赋予了越来越多的使命，如节约能源调节消费、提升能源使用效率、保护环境减少污染、缓解道路交通压力、筹集石油战略储备资金等等。本文旨在通过对国外燃油税的介绍和分析，来深入了解燃油税本身的优势与局限，以期能对我国下一步开征燃油税提供一些借鉴。     

燃油税开征 几家欢喜几家愁

燃油税改革已被各界呼吁了十余年,但时至今日,有关方面在谈到燃油税时的公开表述仍是"择机出台"。随着国际油价近期持续下跌,市场对燃油税推出的预期也开始不断加强。开征燃油税,对许多行业将带来重要影响,可谓几家欢喜几家愁。     

Auditing internal transfer prices in multinationals under monopolistic competition

This paper derives an appropriate standard price that can be used by the tax authorities of a country for auditing transfer prices in multinational firms (MNFs) for the purpose of social welfare maximization of the country. We assume that the corporate tax rate in the host country, where MNFs undertake foreign direct investment to locate their manufacturing divisions, is lower than that in the home country. Our conclusion is that the tax authorities of the home country should not always force MNFs to hold down the transfer price through a too strict audit standard if it aims to maximize social welfare of the country in the long-run equilibrium. This result implies that tax authorities face a trade-off between consumer welfare and tax revenue when determining the standard price used for auditing. One notable implication is that the tax authorities should raise the upper-limit price allowed for internal transfers as the elasticity of substitution between brands for consumers decreases.     

Games within borders: are geographically differentiated taxes optimal?

The discontinuous tax treatment of sales at borders creates incentives for individuals to cross-border shop. This paper addresses whether it is optimal for a state composed of multiple regions to levy differentiated commodity tax rates across the regions. In a model where states maximize social welfare, a state’s optimal commodity tax system is almost always geographically differentiated. The optimal pattern of geographic differentiation critically depends on fundamental parameters as well as whether the state has a preference for high or low taxes. Under the assumption that utility is linear in consumption and that the elasticity of cross-border shopping is less than unity in absolute value, high-tax states will find it optimal to set a tax rate that is lower in the border region than in the periphery region and low-tax states will find it optimal to set a tax rate that is higher in the border region than in the periphery region. Optimizing high-tax states will set a higher tax rate in the border region if the social welfare measure is sufficiently redistributive. With welfare maximization, it is possible for taxes to be higher in the region near the state border—an outcome that cannot arise when the government cares only about total tax revenue.     

On the optimal progressivity of the income tax code

This paper computes the optimal progressivity of the income tax code in a dynamic general equilibrium model with household heterogeneity in which uninsurable labor productivity risk gives rise to a nontrivial income and wealth distribution. A progressive tax system serves as a partial substitute for missing insurance markets and enhances an equal distribution of economic welfare. These beneficial effects of a progressive tax system have to be traded off against the efficiency loss arising from distorting endogenous labor supply and capital accumulation decisions.Using a utilitarian steady state social welfare criterion we find that the optimal US income tax is well approximated by a flat tax rate of 17.2% and a fixed deduction of about $9,400. The steady state welfare gains from a fundamental tax reform towards this tax system are equivalent to 1.7% higher consumption in each state of the world. An explicit computation of the transition path induced by a reform of the current towards the optimal tax system indicates that a majority of the population currently alive (roughly 62%) would experience welfare gains, suggesting that such fundamental income tax reform is not only desirable, but may also be politically feasible.     

A collateral tax sanction: When does it mimic a welfare-improving tag?

The suspension of a driver’s license or the revocation of a passport or a professional license are used by the tax authorities as sanctions for failure to comply with tax obligations and are referred to as collateral tax sanctions. In this paper, I propose a new rationale for why it may be beneficial to use collateral tax sanctions for the purpose of tax enforcement. By affecting consumption and providing enforcement targeted to a group, collateral tax sanctions may allow the government to impose punishment correlated with an individual’s earning potential. Such punishment also makes the effective tax rates correlated with an individuals’ earning potential and therefore leads to a more effective redistribution of income. I show that the use of collateral tax sanctions could increase the CES social welfare function when the skill distribution of the targeted group first-order stochastically dominates the skill distribution of the other group and the social welfare function is sufficiently concave.     

减税降费的价格和福利效应——引入成本传导率的投入产出价格模型分析

本文在增值税抵扣机制的投入产出价格模型中引入社保费和成本传导机制,并利用2017年中国投入产出表和税收数据模拟分析了不同成本传导率条件下,减税降费的价格效应和福利效应。研究表明:(1)减税降费使得各行业产品价格降低,对第三产业的价格影响最为明显。(2)成本传导率越高,则产品价格的下降幅度越大。当成本传导率分别为1/3、2/3和1时,各行业产品价格的平均下降幅度分别为0.32%、0.93%和2.66%。(3)较为合理的中国整体成本传导率约为1/3,减税降费是2019年中国PPI下降的主要因素之一。当成本传导率为1/3时,模拟计算的PPI下降幅度与国家统计局公布的2019年PPI的下降幅度(-0.3%)非常接近。(4)减税降费使消费者价格下降,居民福利得以改善,且城镇居民福利改善高于农村居民。随着价格传导率增大,城镇居民与农村居民的人均福利改善差距扩大。     

论公司社会责任的税法补缺

公司需要对雇员、环境、社会公益事业承担社会责任,这种公司社会责任的实现需要法律的激励,尤其是税法的激励,但实践中税法在激励公司履行社会责任方面存在严重的缺位。为此,建议尽快完成促进公司履行环境保护、资源利用以及参与社会公益事业方面社会责任的税法补缺。     

Economic integration and the choice of commodity tax base with endogenous market structures

This paper analyzes the choice of commodity tax base when countries set their taxes noncooperatively in a two-country symmetric reciprocal dumping model of intraindustry trade with free entry and trade costs. We show that the consumption base (destination principle) dominates the production base (origin principle) when trade costs are high or demand is linear. For lower levels of trade costs and nonlinear demand, the welfare ranking of the two tax bases is ambiguous. Hence, there is no clear preference for a tax principle with an ongoing movement toward closer economic integration.     

Capital tax competition and social security

The classic capital tax policy externality is studied in the presence of a social security program where both the benefits and taxes depend on wages in an overlapping generations economy with many countries and mobile capital. We study the response and welfare implications of a coordinated capital tax rate increase across countries competing for the mobile tax base on the initial generations, the transition, and the steady state. The tax increase is initially completely capitalized, but some of the burden is shifted to labor on the transition path and in the steady state. Several new welfare effects are uncovered including an effect involving the parameters of the social security program. Sufficient conditions are provided so that all current and future generations are better off from the reform. However, social security may reduce the gain to capital tax reform.     

Taxation and the optimal constraint on corporate debt finance: why a comprehensive business income tax is suboptimal

The tax bias in favour of debt finance under the corporate income tax means that corporate debt ratios exceed the socially optimal level. This creates a rationale for a general thin capitalization rule limiting the amount of debt that qualifies for interest deductibility. This paper sets up a model of corporate finance and investment in a small open economy to identify the optimal constraint on tax-favoured debt finance, assuming that a given amount of revenue has to be raised from the corporate income tax. For plausible parameter values, the socially optimal debt-asset ratio is 2–3% points below the average corporate debt level currently observed. Driving the actual debt ratio down to this level through limitations on interest deductibility would generate a total welfare gain of about 5% of corporate tax revenue. The welfare gain would arise mainly from a fall in the social risks associated with corporate investment, but also from the cut in the corporate tax rate made possible by a broader corporate tax base.     

Indirect Taxes on International Aviation*

There has recently been much discussion of the possible use of internationally coordinated indirect taxes, or equivalent charges, on international aviation, whether as a source of finance for development or as part of a response to heightened concerns with climate change. This paper considers the strengths and weaknesses of the leading candidate instruments of this kind. It argues that, on both policy and administration grounds, the case for increasing indirect taxes on international aviation is strong: the indirect tax burden on international aviation is very low, yet aviation contributes significantly to border-crossing environmental damage, is just as proper an object of taxation as any other commodity, and incipient tax competition is likely to result in these taxes being set at inefficiently low levels. But the form(s) in which such taxes are levied matters: a tax on aviation fuel would address the key border-crossing externalities most directly; a tax on final ticket values would have greater revenue potential, and perhaps some distributional advantage; departure/arrival taxes face the least legal obstacles, but are much blunter instruments. Optimal policy, it is shown, typically requires deploying both a fuel tax and a ticket tax, and the paper explores, both in principle and by simulation, the key considerations and trade-offs involved in designing a suitable indirect tax regime for international aviation.