Accountability and auditors’ materiality judgments: The effects of differential pressure strength on conservatism,variability, and effort

This study investigates the effects of differential accountability pressure strength on auditors’ materiality judgments. We evaluate whether incremental levels of accountability (i.e., review, justification, feedback) increase judgment conservatism, decreases judgment variability, and increases effort. One hundred sixty auditors participated in a between-subjects experiment that included a planning materiality task and a proposed audit adjustment materiality task. As predicted, auditors under higher levels of accountability pressure (i.e., justification, feedback) provided more conservative materiality judgments and had less judgment variability than auditors under lower levels of pressure (i.e., review, anonymity). The results also indicate that accountability strength was positively related to the amount of time spent on the task, explanation length, and consideration of qualitative materiality factors. Finally, the results show that use of a planning materiality decision aid influenced the accountability effects for the planning materiality judgment. These judgments were more conservative and less variable when the planning materiality decision aid was available. We consider implications for research, practice, and policy in the context of the study’s limitations.     

Report format and task complexity: Interaction in risk judgments

This study reports the results of an experiment to examine the effect of report format (graphic, tabular) and task complexity on the accuracy and bias of internal auditors' risk judgments. Accuracy is measured as the ability to discriminate between high and low risk reports, while bias is the propensity to report observing a high risk report, apart from the frequency of high risk reports in the population. Forty-seven experienced internal auditors judged the potential for error in each of 70 hypothetical reports. After controlling for individual differences, the results show a significant interaction between report format and task complexity, for both decision accuracy and bias. Implications are discussed.     

External auditors' willingness to rely on the work of internal auditors: The influence of work style and barriers to cooperation

The extent to which external auditors rely on the work of internal auditors is an important judgment. Recently, the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board has recommended that external auditors “rely (more) on the work of others” to reduce the greater-than-expected costs associated with compliance with Section 404 of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act. Reliance decisions, however, are complex decision tasks that require professional judgment and may be influenced by a number of factors, both external (environmental) and internal (cognitive and affective), including the auditors' working style and pervious experiences related to barriers to external/internal auditor cooperation (e.g., previously experienced low versus high internal auditor objectivity and/or competence). We experimentally examine these influences in our research reported herein. Consistent with expectations, external auditors' work styles significantly influenced the extent of planned audit testing, internal auditor reliance judgments, and interpretation of analytical procedures results. Auditors' perceptions about internal auditors' competence and objectivity, developed over years of interaction, also influenced these judgments, and interacted with work styles. Inconsistent with expectations, auditor rank (senior versus manager) did not influence judgments.     

External auditors' evaluation of the internal audit function: An empirical investigation

Evaluation of the strength of the client's internal audit function by the external auditor (EA) has taken on increased significance due to stronger regulation around the evaluation of internal controls after SOX (2002). However, research examining how this evaluation occurs in practice is mixed and inconclusive. In this study, we examine empirically whether the Desai et al. (2010) theoretical model is reflective of how auditors make judgments about the strength of their client's internal audit function in practice. Specifically, we present external auditors with evidence about internal auditor work performance, competence and objectivity in a manner consistent with the structure of evidence evaluation implied by the Desai et al. (2010) model. We then compare the auditors' actual strength judgments to the strength levels predicted by the model and evaluate similarities and differences. Results indicate that no one factor dominates the strength judgment in all cases. In addition, EAs do not weigh negative evidence as heavily as does the model. When the evidence about the three factors is conflicting, external auditors have difficulty incorporating them in a consistent way into the calculation of their overall strength judgment. Finally, we find results consistent with prior research indicating auditors tend to be more sensitive to negative than positive evidence. Also, it is harder to move auditors' beliefs away from a negative position with positive evidence than to move those beliefs away from a positive position with negative evidence. Results suggest that additional training and use of a decision aid structured according to the Desai et al. (2010) model would be especially useful when evidence about internal auditors' work performance, competence and objectivity is conflicting.     

An Empirical Investigation of the Interface Between Internal and External Auditors

Professional standards place specific responsibilities on auditors for the discovery of material mis-statements in reports of corporate financial performance. Certain factors have been shown to increase the likelihood of fraudulent financial reporting. One warning sign is the potentially pervasive effect of a weak internal control environment consistent with a weak internal audit group. This study investigates the impact of internal audit department quality differences on auditors ‘willingness to place reliance on the work performed by internal auditors. The study also gives consideration to auditors’ recent experiences with material errors and irregularities and examines the influence of two previously untested individual auditor differences on audit judgment decisions: (1) conflict management style and (2) perception of internal/external auditor communication barriers. The results indicate that auditors attend to internal audit department quality differences and that individual auditor differences exhibit significant influence over auditor judgments. Implications for audit practice are considered and directions for future research are suggested.     

Configural Information Processing in Auditing: Further Evidence

An important issue in audit judgment research has been how auditors combine information in order to make judgments and, in particular, whether auditors ‘judgments involve configural cue usage. Some recent research (Brown and Solomon, 1990; 1991) has found that under certain conditions, many auditors were able to configurally process information. This paper extends this research by examining some conditions that may facilitate the development of auditors’ ability to configurally process available information. The study found that: (a) the proportion of auditors processing the information configurally was greater than chance; (b) for those that processed the information configurally, the form of the interaction was as predicted, that is, ordinal with a compensatory form; (c) increasing depth of processing by requiring subjects to provide explanations for their judgments did not have a significant effect on the number of auditors processing configurally; (d) the level of consensus was higher for auditors who processed configurally than for those who did not; and (e) the analysis of the explanations provided by configurai cue processors indicated that they saw the relevant cues as being substitutable.     

Auditor liability: A comparison of judge and juror verdicts

This research examines differences between judges and jurors in rendering liability judgments in auditor litigation cases. While any number of case contexts would allow us to contrast and compare judges and jurors, we chose one that we believed would also address a second timely issue, auditor reliance or non-reliance upon the work of others. Within the general context of litigation of an alleged audit failure, we manipulated, between-participants, external auditor reliance on the work of others (relied on outsourced work, relied on in-house internal auditors’ work or did not rely). Our results show differences in the liability assessments of judges and jurors. Judges assign more liability to auditors that rely on the work of in-house internal auditors, less liability to auditors that rely on outsourced internal auditors and the least liability to auditors that choose not to rely on the work of internal auditors (but re-perform the work themselves) while jurors assess higher liability regardless of the work done by the auditors. Mediation analyses suggests the differences found in the overall liability assessments of jurors and judges are partially driven by their divergent attitudes towards the public accounting profession with jurors’ unfavorable attitudes leading to them assign liability regardless of the work performed. Further analysis suggests juror insensitivity to our reliance manipulations may reflect a strict liability perspective (consistent with prior work by Charron and Lowe (2008)); while judges consider other factors when making liability assessments.     

Can Auditors Predict the Choices Made by Other Auditors?

An implicit assumption of prior literature on strategic behavior of auditors is that auditors know the preferences of their colleagues. In this study, we conduct an experiment to investigate the validity of this assumption. In our experiment, we match a manager with a pair of top and mediocre audit seniors, as assessed by their firm. Each auditor predicts the choices that will be made by other auditors on two tasks that differ in their level of ambiguity. Our results show no difference in the accuracy among managers, top seniors, and mediocre seniors when they predict the choices made by specific individual auditors for both tasks. When predicting the number of managers and seniors who will choose a specific option on the high-ambiguity task, managers outperform top seniors, who in turn outperform mediocre seniors. For the low-ambiguity task, we find no difference among managers, top seniors, and mediocre seniors. Our results provide some limited support for models of strategic auditor behavior, and indicate that the ability to predict the choices of others is a dimension of an auditor's expertise.     

The comparative effect of process and outcome accountability in enhancing professional scepticism

Responding to concerns about insufficient professional scepticism in audits (e.g. PCAOB, 2011 , 2012 ; ASIC, 2012 ), we investigate the effect of process and outcome accountability in enhancing the level of professional scepticism and the differences in effects across audit experience levels. In our experiment, we manipulate the type of accountability (outcome versus process) for both novice auditors and audit seniors. We examine the effect on four measures of professional scepticism and find that auditors show greater levels of professional scepticism when they are expected to justify their judgment process, rather than their final judgments. Our results also show that the professional scepticism of novice auditors improves to a greater extent than that of more experienced auditors (audit seniors) under process accountability.