Market discipline,disclosure and moral hazard in banking

This paper examines empirically the hypothesis that market discipline is effective in providing incentives for banks to limit their risk of default, by holding capital buffers against adverse outcomes in portfolio risk. We have constructed a large cross-country panel data set consisting of observations on 729 individual banks from 32 different countries over the years 1993 to 2000. Theory implies that the strength of market discipline ought to be related to the extent of the government safety net, the observability of bank risk choices and to the proportion of uninsured liabilities in the bank's balance sheet. Using panel data techniques, we test whether these factors provide incentives for banks to hold larger capital buffers against adverse outcomes in portfolio risk. Our results suggest that government safety nets result in lower capital buffers and that stronger market discipline resulting from uninsured liabilities and disclosure results in larger capital buffers, all else equal. While our results therefore point to the effectiveness of market discipline mechanisms in general, we also find that the effect of disclosure and uninsured funding is reduced when banks enjoy a high degree of government support. Our results finally suggest that while competition leads to greater risk taking incentives, market discipline is more effective in curbing these incentives in countries where competition among banks is strong.     

Disciplina de mercado en el sistema bancario centroamericano

This article empirically tests the market discipline hypothesis in the Central American banking system. Whether the riskier banks (with the worst bank fundamentals) pay higher interest rates and attract fewer amounts of deposits. We use dynamic panel data models and the generalized method of moments (SYS GMM) estimator, and a sample of 30 banks from six Central American countries over the years 2008-2012. In contrast to most of the previous empirical literature, particularly in developed countries, in Central America we did not find evidence for market discipline. The results are robust to different indicators of the bank fundamentals, to the effect of the internal demand for funding by banks, and to other econometric methods. These findings indicate weakness in the disclosure policy of banking information.     

Bank market power,asset liquidity and funding liquidity: International evidence

Our investigation of the association between bank market power and liquidity in 101 countries reveals that a bank's initial gains of market power lead to increases in bank liquidity, but does so at a diminishing rate. Beyond an empirically determined threshold, further increases in market power are inversely associated with bank liquidity. From a cross-sectional viewpoint, banks that lack market power hold more liquid assets and are net lenders in the interbank market. In contrast, dominant banks hold less liquid assets and are net interbank borrowers. For a given level of market power, ceteris paribus, developed nation banks hold less asset liquidity and obtain more interbank funding liquidity than their developing country peers. These results remain equally relevant during the 2007–2009 global financial crisis (GFC).     

How do global banks scramble for liquidity? Evidence from the asset-backed commercial paper freeze of 2007

We investigate how banks scrambled for liquidity following the asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP) market freeze of August 2007 and its implications for corporate borrowing. Commercial banks in the United States raised dollar deposits and took advances from Federal Home Loan Banks (FHLBs), while foreign banks had limited access to such alternative dollar funding. Relative to before the ABCP freeze and relative to their non-dollar lending, foreign banks with ABCP exposure charged higher interest rates to corporations for dollar-denominated syndicated loans. The results point to a funding risk manifesting as currency shortages for banks engaged in maturity transformation in foreign countries.     

The bright side of market power in Asian banking: Implications of bank capitalization and financial freedom

Using a sample of listed banks in the Asia-Pacific region from 2000 to 2016, this paper documents that higher market power reduces risk taking but increases loan growth and performance in banking. This highlights the "bright side" of bank market power in general. However, the positive effect of market power on bank stability is more pronounced for well-capitalized banks, although their performance tends to decline, and loan growth is unaffected by market power. Hence, bank capitalization plays an important role in strengthening financial stability due to an increase in bank market power. Moreover, banks with higher market power located in countries with a lower degree of financial freedom exhibit lower riskiness, higher loan growth, and better performance. Greater control by authorities in the financial sector is essential, not only to enhance financial stability, but also to boost financial intermediation and bank performance following an increase in bank market power.     

Funding advantage and market discipline in the Canadian banking sector

We employ a comprehensive data set and a variety of methods to provide evidence on the magnitude of large banks’ funding advantage in Canada in addition to the extent to which market discipline exists across different securities issued by the Canadian banks. The banking sector in Canada provides a unique setting in which to examine market discipline along with the prospects of proposed reforms because Canada has no history of government bailouts, and an implicit government guarantee has been in effect consistently since the 1920s. We find that large banks have a funding advantage over small banks after controlling for bank-specific and market risk factors. Large banks on average pay 80 basis points and 70 basis points less, respectively, on their deposits and subordinated debt. Working with hand-collected market data on debt issues by large banks, we also find that market discipline exists for subordinated debt and not for senior debt.     

Wholesale funding and bank stability: The impact of economic policy uncertainty

The primary aim of this paper is to examine the conditioning effects of economic policy uncertainty on the relationship between wholesale funding and bank stability. Based on a sample of 1829 commercial banks in 27 countries over the period 2005–2020, we provide evidence of a nonlinear relationship between wholesale funding and bank stability. Specifically, a small share of nondeposit funding to total deposit and short-term funding (below 22.3%) offers some risk reduction, but a substantial mixing of nondeposit and deposit funding increases bank fragility. Moreover, the adverse effects of excessive wholesale funding on bank stability are strengthened during periods of high policy uncertainty. Nevertheless, banks in advanced countries, large banks, and high-quality banks with better asset quality are less affected by the detrimental impact of excessive wholesale funding on bank stability when during periods of increased policy uncertainty.     

Which banks smooth and at what price?

By adjusting lending, banks can smooth the macroeconomic impact of deposit fluctuations. This may, however, lead to extended periods of disproportionately high lending relative to deposit intake and, under certain conditions, to the accumulation of risk in the banking system. Using bank-level data for 8477 banks in 129 countries for the period from 1992 to 2015, we examine how banks' market power and other characteristics may contribute to smoothing or amplification of shocks and the accumulation of risk. We find that the higher their market power the lower is the growth rate of lending relative to deposits. As a result, in periods of falling deposits higher market power for the average bank is associated with a greater fall in lending, consistent with amplification of adverse effects during relatively bad times. Strikingly, at very high levels of market power, there is a threshold past which the effect of market power on the growth rate of lending relative to deposits turns positive so that “superpower” banks may contribute to the smoothing of adverse effects when deposits are falling. In periods of rising deposits, however, such banks are more likely to lead to amplification and accumulation of risk in the economy.     

Market concentration and bank competition in emerging asian countries over pre and post the 2008 global financial crisis

This paper examines the relationships between market concentration, bank competition, and efficiency in banking across six emerging Asian countries namely Bangladesh, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Vietnam over the period 2005 to 2012. The countries selected for this study operate commercial banking activities with a comparatively large number of both publicly listed and private commercial banks providing a broad range of commercial banking services. For example, banks in Bangladesh, India and Vietnam used to be predominantly state-owned. But over the last few decades, governments have been issuing licenses to private owners. The methodological approach taken by our study provides an important and original contribution to the extant literature by testing various hypothesis that investigate the relationship between competition and efficiency across banks from a select group of Asian countries. We find that market concentration has a positive effect whereas competition has a negative effect on the efficiency of banks operating in these countries. This finding conveys a critically important message to the regulators of banks in these countries: there is a trade-off between quantity and quality. Our analyses also reveal that the effect of bank size on efficiency is positive whereas the effect of liquidity risk on efficiency is negative. This again supports the conventional wisdom that large banks are in a position to provide cost efficient services because they have the ability to attain economies of scale and scopes. Here again, the regulators have very important roles to play: while they have to put in place effective mechanism preventing big banks from being an oligarchy; at the same time, they should make sure that banks get liquidity support as funding pressure builds up.     

Measuring systemic risk-adjusted liquidity (SRL)—A model approach

Little progress has been made so far in addressing—in a comprehensive way—the negative externalities caused by excessive maturity transformation and the implications for effective liquidity regulation of banks. The SRL model combines option pricing theory with market information and balance sheet data to generate probabilistic measure of systemic liquidity risk. It enhances price-based liquidity regulation by linking a bank’s maturity mismatch impacting the stability of its funding with those characteristics of other banks, subject to individual changes in risk profiles and common changes in market conditions impacting funding and market liquidity risk. This approach can then be used (i) to quantify an individual institution’s time-varying contribution to expected losses from system-wide liquidity shortfalls and (ii) to price insurance premia that provide incentives for banks to internalize the social cost of their individual funding decisions.     

Endogenous debt maturity and rollover risk

We empirically study the nature of rollover risk and show how banks manage it. Having to roll over debt does not lead to higher default risk per se. Only banks that lose significant access to new funding while having to roll over debt display higher default risk. We identify a factor that determines this buildup of risk: specifically, debt maturity shortening (forcing debt to be more frequently rolled over) and reduced access to new funding are both driven by market pessimism about banks’ future performance. We also provide evidence consistent with dynamic coordination risk.     

Leverage,balance-sheet size and wholesale funding

Positive co-movements in bank leverage and assets are associated with leverage procyclicality. As wholesale funding allows banks to quickly adjust leverage, banks with wholesale funding are expected to exhibit higher leverage procyclicality. Using Canadian data, we analyze (i) if leverage procyclicality exists and its dependence on wholesale funding, (ii) market factors associated with this procyclicality, and (iii) if banking-sector leverage procyclicality forecasts market volatility. The findings suggest that procyclicality exists and that its degree positively depends on use of wholesale funding. Furthermore, funding-market liquidity matters for this procyclicality. Finally, banking-sector leverage procyclicality can forecast volatility in the equity market.     

内部资金转移价格在国内商业银行的应用研究

内部资金转移价格在商业银行中的作用是多重的，与商业银行的定价目标、市场风险管理目标以及收益目标息息相关，内部资金转移定价的方法也有很多。中国的商业银行在引入该管理工具时需要结合本银行阶段目标合理选择最切合实际的方法。受制于金融市场、组织架构、激励机制等影响因素，中国的商业银行在FTP运用上整体较落后，但已经具备实施较先进FTP的紧迫性和可行性。商业银行应逐步建立并理顺内部定价机制，提高定价能力，缩短内部转移价格因市场调整而进行决策的周期，加强价格信息披露，进一步强化会计系统中的利率管理功能。     

内部资金转移价格在国内商业银行的应用研究

内部资金转移价格在商业银行中的作用是多重的,与商业银行的定价目标、市场风险管理目标以及收益目标息息相关,内部资金转移定价的方法也有很多.中国的商业银行在引入该管理工具时需要结合本银行阶段目标合理选择最切合实际的方法.受制于金融市场、组织架构、激励机制等影响因素,中国的商业银行在FTP运用上整体较落后,但已经具备实施较先进FTP的紧迫性和可行性.商业银行应逐步建立并理顺内部定价机制,提高定价能力,缩短内部转移价格因市场调整而进行决策的周期,加强价格信息披露,进一步强化会计系统中的利率管理功能.     

Do we need big banks? Evidence on performance,strategy and market discipline

For an international sample of banks, we construct measures of a bank’s absolute size and its systemic size defined as size relative to the national economy. We then examine how a bank’s risk and return on equity, its activity mix and funding strategy, and the extent to which it faces market discipline depend on both size measures. We show that bank returns increase with absolute size, yet decline with systemic size, while neither size measure is associated with bank risk as implicit in the Z-score. These results are consistent with the view that growing to a size that is systemic is not in the interest of bank shareholders. We also find that systemically large banks are subject to greater market discipline as evidenced by a higher sensitivity of their funding costs to risk proxies, consistent with the view that they can become too large to save. A bank’s interest costs, however, are estimated to decline with bank systemic size for all banks apart from those with very low capitalization levels. This suggests that market discipline, exercised through funding costs, does not prevent banks from attaining larger systemic size.     

中资银行海外拓展及市场准入研究

全面理解各国对外资银行的准入监管法规是中资银行构建海外网络、拓展境外业务的重要前提。本文在分析中资银行开展跨国经营的内在动因和外部条件的基础上,以WTO框架下与各国银行业开放相关的服务贸易谈判为背景,着重对中资银行境外分支机构申请设立和开业登记遇到的准入限制、业务监管限制两大方面进行了分析,并就中资银行如何应对东道国的监管限制提出了建议。     

Bank activity and funding strategies: The impact on risk and returns

This paper examines the implications of bank activity and short-term funding strategies for bank risk and return using an international sample of 1,334 banks in 101 countries leading up to the 2008 financial crisis. Expansion into noninterest income-generating activities such as trading increases the rate of return on assets, and it could offer some risk diversification benefits at very low levels. Nondeposit, wholesale funding in contrast lowers the rate of return on assets, while it can offer some risk reduction at commonly observed low levels of nondeposit funding. A sizable proportion of banks, however, attract most of their short-term funding in the form of nondeposits at a cost of enhanced bank fragility. Overall, banking strategies that rely prominently on generating noninterest income or attracting nondeposit funding are very risky, consistent with the demise of the US investment banking sector.     

Bank globalization and efficiency: Host- and home-country effects

Analyzing 126 countries for 1995–2013, we investigate the link between bank globalization and efficiency from the perspective of both host and home countries. We find strong and consistent evidence that foreign bank entry is associated with lower efficiency in host countries (host-country effect), while foreign expansion in the banking sector improves the efficiency of banks at home (home-country effect). We further observe that the effect of bank globalization is dependent on the regulatory and institutional regimes of the respective host (home) countries. Specifically, stringent activity restrictions, tight supervision, fewer limitations on foreign banks, lower market entry barriers, and less government interference all help mitigate the efficiency loss from foreign bank entry. Less supervision power, multiple supervisors, more restrictions on foreign banks, and a competitive banking market are all conducive to the higher efficiency gain of incumbent domestic banks from the respective country’s outward investments in the banking sector. Moreover, we find that the adverse impact on efficiency from foreign bank presence is less pronounced for less risky, more profitable, and larger banks, while banks that are more efficient, more profitable, taking on more risk, and/or smaller gain more efficiency from their country’s foreign expansion.     

Foreign bank penetration and the lending channel in emerging economies: Evidence from bank-level panel data

This paper examines the main implications of recently increasing foreign bank penetration on bank lending as a channel of monetary policy transmission in emerging economies. Using a dynamic panel model of loan growth, we investigate the loan granting behavior of 1273 banks in the emerging economies of Asia, Latin America, and Central and Eastern Europe during the period from 1996 to 2003. Applying the pooled OLS, system GMM, and panel VAR estimators, we find consistent evidence that foreign banks are less responsive to monetary shocks in host countries, as they adjust their outstanding loan portfolios and interest rates to a lesser extent than domestic private banks, independent of their liquidity, capitalization, size, efficiency, and credit risk, and although there exists a bank lending channel in the emerging economies, it is declining in strength due to the increased level of foreign bank penetration. We also explore possible driving factors for the different responses of foreign and domestic banks to monetary policy shocks by investigating foreign banks’ different behavior during banking crises and tranquil periods, the effects of mode of entry to host countries, the home-country effects, and the response of foreign banks from OECD countries vs. all foreign countries including non-OECD countries. We suggest the access of foreign banks to funding from parent banks through internal capital markets as the most convincing explanation.     

An examination of the effect of stock market liquidity on bank market power

This paper investigates the spillover effects of aggregate stock market liquidity on bank market power using a sample of 44 countries and 7297 individual banks from 1999 to 2014. Country-level and bank-level analysis shows that enhancement in stock market liquidity strengthens the market power of the banking sector. This relationship is more pronounced in developed market countries and in countries with common law origin, which offer better investor protection. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper to provide comprehensive empirical evidence of the complementary relationship between banks and stock markets, providing important policy implications for regulators.