Outside Directors,Litigation Environment,and Management Earnings Forecasts

This study examines whether outside directors factor in litigation costs for the firm while monitoring optimal disclosure policy. It investigates the association of management earnings forecast disclosure and the proportion of outside directors across two regimes with unequal litigation costs, the United States and Canada. I find that the positive association between forecast frequency/ precision and the proportion of outside directors is stronger in Canada. This suggests that outside directors are more likely to encourage disclosure in less litigious Canada. I also find that firm‐level governance mechanisms such as outside directors and country‐level litigation environment act as governance substitutes in determining unbiased forecasts. Specifically, the negative association between forecast bias and the proportion of outside directors is stronger in Canada. I also revisit the effect of legal regime on forecast disclosure in a non‐U.S. context. Recent legislation has increased the likelihood of class‐action lawsuits in Canada. The passage of these laws has decreased the precision in forecasts by Canadian firms.     

How do auditors view managers’ voluntary disclosure strategy? The effect of earnings guidance on audit fees

The objective of this study is to examine the relation between attributes of earnings forecasts issued by managers and audit fees. Although there is an extensive literature on managers’ disclosure of earnings forecasts, there is a paucity of research on how auditors incorporate information from these voluntary disclosures. We find that the issuance of an annual or quarterly management earnings forecast in the prior period is positively associated with the current period audit fees. Our results indicate that on average, audit fees are higher by about 7% for firm-years associated with an annual forecast. Among the firms that issue earnings forecasts, we find no association between audit fees and likelihood of updating a previously issued earnings forecast, indicating that auditors do not view such behavior negatively. Further, we find audit fees to be positively associated with the error and the bias (or optimism) in the forecasts for annual forecasts but not for quarterly forecasts. Overall, these results suggest that management’s forecast behavior captures higher business risk for the auditor via greater risk of earnings management or litigation risk.     

Real earnings management and the properties of analysts' forecasts

Prior literature generally finds analysts are able to identify and process complex financial information. However, research suggests that in certain settings, analysts struggle to fully incorporate into their forecasts all available information. We examine analysts' forecast properties in the face of a specific type of complex financial information: real earnings management (REM). First, we investigate the relation between measures of REM and analysts' forecast properties. We find REM measures are associated with greater forecast error and dispersion in the following year. However, REM measures, by definition, capture abnormal operating results, and thus include both firms engaging in manipulative REM as well as firms experiencing firm-specific economic shocks. Thus, we conduct cross-sectional tests of analysts' forecasts for firms with and without incentives to manipulate earnings. We find that firms with low incentives to engage in earnings management (i.e., firms most likely experiencing firm-specific economic shocks) generate the strongest positive relation between REM measures and the following year's analysts' forecast properties, suggesting analysts more fully incorporate the earnings implications of firms with high incentives (i.e., firms most likely engaging in manipulative REM). Our results are consistent across numerous REM proxies and indicators of earnings management incentives.     

Serial Correlation in Management Earnings Forecast Errors

We examine whether management earnings forecast errors exhibit serial correlation and how analysts understand the serial correlation property of management forecast errors (MFEs). MFEs should not exhibit serial correlation if managers efficiently process information in prior forecast errors and truthfully convey their earnings expectations through management forecasts. However, for long‐horizon management forecasts of annual earnings, we find significantly positive serial correlation in MFEs, and sample self‐selection does not seem to drive this phenomenon. Further analyses suggest that managers’ unintentional information processing bias contributes to this positive serial correlation. Analysts anticipate the intertemporal persistence of MFEs but underestimate the persistence level when reacting to management forecasts. Our findings have implications for market participants who rely on management forecasts to form earnings expectations, and also shed light on the efficiency of managerial decision making.     

Analyst reputation and management earnings forecasts

Prior studies show that analysts with high reputation are influential in the market. This paper examines whether managers consider analyst reputation in shaping their voluntary disclosure strategy. Using Institutional Investor magazine’s All-American (AA) rankings as a proxy for analyst reputation, we find that the coverage of AA analysts is positively associated with the likelihood of quarterly management earnings forecasts (MEFs). We also find that AA analysts’ forecast optimism is more positively associated with the likelihood of MEFs than non-AA analysts’ forecast optimism when the firm is covered by AA analysts. Analyses based on AA analyst coverage changes and AA status changes confirm the relation between analyst reputation and MEFs. We further find that analyst reputation influences other MEF properties, such as forecast news, bias, and revisions, and that our results are robust to alternative measures of analyst reputation. Further analyses show that market reactions at quarterly earnings announcements are more positive (negative) when firms meet/beat (miss) AA analysts’ forecasts than when firms meet/beat (miss) non-AA analysts’ forecasts. Collectively, our findings suggest that managers strategically provide voluntary forecasts by taking into account the reputation of individual analysts following their firms.     

Are more able managers good future tellers? Learning from Japan

Baik et al. (2011) find that high-ability managers in the U.S. are more likely to issue accurate management earnings forecasts. Focusing on Japan, where management earnings forecasts are effectively mandated, we extend the literature by exploring (1) whether the relationship between managerial ability and forecast accuracy is unique to the U.S. disclosure system, where management forecasts are voluntary, and (2) how high-ability managers increase their forecast accuracy. We find that managerial ability is negatively associated with forecast errors based on initial forecasts, suggesting that high-ability managers are more likely to issue accurate forecasts at the beginning of the fiscal year. We then show that high-ability managers are less likely to revise their initial earnings forecasts and less likely to use earnings management to improve the accuracy of their earnings forecasts. Our findings show that, while high-ability managers are more likely to issue accurate initial management forecasts, low-ability managers are more likely to revise their forecasts and conduct earnings management to reduce their forecast errors.     

Forecasting National Recessions Using State‐Level Data

We investigate whether there is information useful for identifying U.S. business cycle phases contained in subnational measures of economic activity. Using a probit model to forecast the National Bureau of Economic Research expansion and recession classification, we assess the incremental information content of state‐level employment growth over a commonly used set of national‐level predictors. As state‐level data adds a large number of predictors to the model, we employ a Bayesian model averaging procedure to construct forecasts. Based on a variety of forecast evaluation metrics, we find that including state‐level employment growth substantially improves nowcasts and very short‐horizon forecasts of the business cycle phase. The gains in forecast accuracy are concentrated during months of national recession.     

管理层盈余预告与分析师预测关系的实证研究——基于中国上市公司的经验证据

论文以2006—2010年沪深两市A股上市公司为样本,研究了管理层盈余预告消息性质、盈余预告披露精确性对分析师预测行为的影响。研究结果表明,相对于坏消息,管理层对好消息的预告会得到均衡透明的披露,因此分析师跟踪人数更多,预测更为准确,分歧度更小。另外还发现盈余预告精确性的提高对分析师跟踪人数并无显著影响,但是随着管理层盈余预告精确性的提高,分析师的预测误差和分歧度均有所减小。     

Analyst forecast,accounting conservatism and the related valuation implications

This study investigates whether financial analysts incorporate accounting conservatism into their earnings forecasts and whether it is more difficult for them to forecast earnings for less conservative firms, and then examines the impact of the findings on the return predictability of the value‐to‐price (V/P) ratio. After controlling for the other factors affecting forecast accuracy, such as earnings predictability and information uncertainty, I find that analysts incorporate accounting conservatism into their earnings forecasts and that forecasting earnings is more difficult for less conservative firms. Consequently, the return predictability of the V/P ratio is stronger for more conservative firms, and previously reported return predictability of the V/P ratio is an average across firms with differing levels of conservatism.     

Accrual usage to manage earnings toward financial analysts' forecasts

This study examines whether management uses discretionary accounting accruals to move earnings upward toward analysts' earnings forecasts when it appears that earnings before discretionary accruals will fall short of the forecast. An earnings shortfall relative to analysts' forecasts could lead management to fear lower compensation and an increase in the likelihood of job termination. The article finds that firms whose earnings before discretionary accruals are below analysts' forecasts use income-increasing discretionary accruals and do so to a greater extent than do firms whose earnings before discretionary accruals are above analysts' forecasts.     

The effect of Regulation FD on the properties of management earnings forecasts

We investigate Regulation FD’s (FD) effect on management earnings forecast properties. We posit FD’s prohibition on private manager-analyst communication reduces (increases) optimism (pessimism) in management earnings forecasts. Prior to FD, managers could avoid publicly retracting prior optimistic forecasts by privately communicating with analysts, who could lower investor expectations with a new analyst forecast. After FD, managers with optimistic forecasts must either publicly admit their optimism by issuing a new management forecast or they must negatively surprise investors at the earnings announcement. Further, FD forces managers to use public forecasts instead of private communications to establish beatable expectations. Our evidence suggests FD reduced optimism in management forecasts. This reduction in optimistic bias is not offset by an increase in pessimistic bias. Consistent with this, we further find post-FD improvements in forecast accuracy and informativeness. We find no such changes around several potentially confounding events or for foreign firms surrounding FD. Overall, our evidence suggests FD improved firms’ forecast properties (less bias, greater accuracy, and greater informativeness).     

Forecasts in IPO Prospectuses: The Effect of Corporate Governance on Earnings Management

Prior research suggests that managers may use earnings management to meet voluntary earnings forecasts. We document the extent of earnings management undertaken within Canadian Initial Public Offerings (IPOs) and study the extent to which companies with better corporate governance systems are less likely to use earnings management to achieve their earnings forecasts. In addition, we test other factors that differentiate forecasting from non‐forecasting firms, and assess the impact of forecasting and corporate governance on future cash flow prediction. We find that firms with better corporate governance are less likely to include a voluntary earnings forecast in their IPO prospectus. In addition, we find that while IPO firms use accruals management to meet forecasts; the informativeness of the discretionary accruals depends on whether or not the firm would have missed its forecast without the use of discretionary accruals.     

Investor sentiment and management earnings forecast bias

This study investigates whether investor sentiment is associated with behavioral bias in managers’ annual earnings forecasts that are generally issued early in the year when uncertainty is relatively high. I provide evidence that management earnings forecast optimism increases with investor sentiment. Furthermore, I find that managers’ annual earnings forecasts are more pessimistic during low‐sentiment periods than during normal‐sentiment periods. Since managers lack incentives to further deflate stock prices during a low‐sentiment period, this evidence indicates that sentiment‐related management earnings forecast bias is likely to be unintentional. In addition, I find that the relationship between management earnings forecast bias and investor sentiment is stronger for firms with higher uncertainty, consistent with investor sentiment having a greater influence on management earnings forecasts when uncertainty is higher.     

Public regulatory reform and management earnings forecasts in a low private litigation environment

We examine the impact of continuous disclosure regulatory reform on the likelihood, frequency and qualitative characteristics of management earnings forecasts issued in New Zealand’s low private litigation environment. Using a sample of 720 earnings forecasts issued by 94 firms listed on the New Zealand Exchange before and after the reform (1999–2005), we provide strong evidence of significant changes in forecasting behaviour in the post‐reform period. Specifically, firms were more likely to issue earnings forecasts to pre‐empt earnings announcements and, in contrast to findings in other legal settings, those earnings forecasts exhibited higher frequency and improved qualitative characteristics (better precision and accuracy). An important implication of our findings is that public regulatory reforms may have a greater benefit in a low private litigation environment and thus add to the global debate about the effectiveness of alternative public regulatory reforms of corporate requirements.     

Tests of Market Reaction and Analysts' Forecast Revisions to the Disclosure of Improved Management Earnings Expectations: A Case of Concurrent Bad News Management Earnings Forecasts

This paper tests whether a negative stock market reaction, associated with a management forecast of near term bad earnings, is lessened by a concurrent management forecast of improved longer term earnings expectations. Stock market reactions depend on the creditability of management forecasts of improved earnings expectations. In this analysis, the authors examined market reactions around the time of management forecasts of bad earnings, with and without longer-term management forecasts of improved earnings expectations. The results show that the stock market reaction is significantly less negative when management forecasts of bad earnings are followed by management forecasts of improved long run earnings expectations than when management forecasts of bad earnings are not accompanied by management forecasts of improved earnings expectations. In addition, this paper examines financial analysts' reactions to management bad earnings forecasts and management forecasts of improved earnings expectations. The findings show that analysts react less negatively to management forecasts of improved earnings expectations than to management forecasts of bad earnings. An analysis of a sub-sample of observations shows that analysts consider management forecasts of improved earnings expectations to imply improved expected future performance, thus conveying that analysts give credence to management forecasts of improved earnings expectations. However, results show that the stock market and analysts are unable to distinguish management forecasts of improved earnings expectations that come true from management forecasts of improved earning expectations that do not come true.     

Earnings forecast disclosure regulation and earnings management: evidence from Taiwan IPO firms

This study examines whether the Taiwanese regulation requiring disclosure of earnings forecasts in the IPOs resulted in disclosure of more optimistic earnings forecasts and whether the forecast error was reduced more by manipulating the reported earnings rather than revising the earnings forecasts to meet the forecast error threshold. The study is based on 759 forecasts issued by the Taiwanese IPO firms from 1994 to 2001, i.e. 8-year period after the regulation was modified to increase the forecast error threshold to 20%. The findings show that the disclosure regulation resulted in more optimistic forecasts than conservative forecasts, especially for firms expecting better performance in the forecast year compared to the previous year. Firms disclosing optimistic earnings forecasts engaged more in manipulation of reported earnings than revision of forecasts to meet the forecast error threshold. These findings thus suggest that the disclosure regulation resulted in earnings manipulation, which reduced the quality of reported earnings. We received valuable comments at the 2003 American Accounting Association and 2004 Euorpean Accounting Association annual meetings. We also thank the participants at the research seminars at Rutgers University, City University of Hong Kong, and Pace University, for their insightful comments. Picheng Lee especially thanks Pace University for 2003 summer research grant.     

Risk-based forecasting and planning and management earnings forecasts

This study examines the association between a firm’s internal information environment and the accuracy of its externally disclosed management earnings forecasts. Internally, firms use forecasts to plan for uncertain futures. The risk management literature argues that integrating risk-related information into forecasts and plans can improve a firm’s ability to forecast financial outcomes. We investigate whether this internal information manifests itself in the accuracy of external earnings guidance. Using detailed survey data and publicly disclosed management earnings forecasts from a sample of publicly traded U.S. companies, we find that more sophisticated risk-based forecasting and planning processes are associated with smaller earnings forecast errors and narrower forecast widths. These associations hold across a variety of different planning horizons (ranging from annual budgeting to long-term strategic planning), providing empirical support for the theoretical link between internal information quality and the quality of external disclosures.     

What Drives Target Price Forecasts and Their Investment Value?

This paper examines the informativeness of analysts’ target price forecasts by relating the investment value of target prices to their primary drivers. Decomposing target price forecasts into near‐term earnings forecasts and price‐to‐earnings ratio forecasts, we show that target price revisions reflect information from both components. In addition, we also find that the relative importance of each component in target price revisions is related to firm characteristics. A portfolio based on target price implied expected returns delivers significant abnormal returns. More importantly, we find that the abnormal returns are associated with both earnings and price‐to‐earnings forecasts, which suggests that the informativeness of target price forecasts comes not only from analysts’ ability to forecast short‐term earnings but also from their ability to assess risk and long‐term growth prospect implied in price‐to‐earnings forecasts.     

Initial public offering prospectus forecast errors and mandatory explanations: evidence from New Zealand

This paper examines management forecast errors in initial public offering (IPO) prospectuses of New Zealand firms and subsequent management explanations for earnings forecast errors in recent years. New Zealand has several unique features and recent changes that are worthy of research, including the requirement for management to make forecasts; a requirement to explain differences between forecast and actual; and a recent change that provides the voluntary opportunity to obtain a negative assurance opinion on forecasts. Using hand-collected IPO data between 1998 and 2014, we find that firms that include a negative assurance opinion on the prospective financial information in the prospectus have more accurate earnings and cash flow forecasts. We investigate the subsequent explanations for forecast errors, which are mandated by a financial reporting standard. We show that management tends to attribute negative and large forecast errors to external causes rather than their own actions. Our findings have implications for regulators and investors in New Zealand and other settings.     

The Association between Trading Recommendations and Broker-Analysts' Earnings Forecasts

This study examines analyst forecast errors within the context of stock recommendations. We predict positive forecast error (i.e., optimism) for buy recommendations and negative forecast error (i.e., pessimism) for sell recommendations. We offer two explanations for this prediction: (1) the unconscious tendency to process information in a manner that supports one's goal, which we refer to as the "objectivity illusion" hypothesis, and (2) the economic incentive to boost trade, which we refer to as the "trade boosting" hypothesis. The pattern of analyst forecast bias we predict (i.e., optimism for buys and pessimism for sells) is opposite in direction to that predicted by the management relations hypothesis—a commonly cited hypothesis for analyst forecast bias.
We find broker-analyst earnings forecast errors are significantly optimistic for buy recommendations and significantly pessimistic for sell recommendations, consistent with the objectivity illusion and trade boosting hypotheses. Our study indicates that the pattern of results reported in prior research (i.e., increasingly optimistic earnings forecasts as the stock recommendation becomes less favorable) is likely driven by a correlated omitted variable, actual earnings. Results of an analysis to distinguish between trade boosting and objectivity illusion appear more consistent with the objectivity illusion.