Non-Homothetic Preferences and the Non-Environmental Effects of Environmental Taxes

We show that, if the utility function is non-homothetic, environmental taxes can have positive non-environmental effects. These effects are illustrated with specific reference to taxes on gasoline and tobacco, in the context of a computational model. We also clarify the relationship between the double dividend (associated with a marginal change from a tax system with low reliance on environmentally motivated taxes) and the situation in which the optimal environmental tax rate is greater than the Pigouvian tax rate. These two situations are generated by rather similar combinations of parameters.JEL Code: H21, H23, D58     

Stochastic CVP Analysis with Economic Demand and Cost Functions

The analysis focuses on key concepts associated with the extensive CVP under uncertainty literature which has developed since the seminal contribution by Jaedicke and Robichek (1964). For the most part the previous literature has not incorporated economic functions relating production quantity to price and/or average cost. This model developed herein incorporates a linear demand function and a quadratic average cost function. Explicit solutions are found for five special quantities: (1) the lowest quantity which sets breakeven probability equal to the minimum acceptable level, (2) the quantity which maximizes breakeven probability, (3) the quantity which maximizes a Cobb-Douglas utility function defined on expected profits and breakeven probability, (4) the quantity which maximizes expected profits, and (5) the highest quantity which sets breakeven probability equal to the minimum acceptable level. Comparative statics effects are determined of the various model parameters on the five special quantities. A CVP possibilities graph is developed showing attainable combinations of expected profits and breakeven probability. Possible applications of the model are discussed.     

Conduit Entities: Implications of Indirect Tax-Efficient Financing Structures for Real Investment

As well known, companies shift income from high to low tax jurisdictions. Typically, profit shifting is achieved by direct financing structures whereby companies use debt finance in the high tax entity and equity finance in the low tax entity. However, certain tax policies can lead to indirect financing structures whereby a conduit entity provides an opportunity to achieve at least two deductions for interest expenses for an investment made in the host country. The effect of direct and indirect financing structures on real investment is compared.     

Horizontal Inequity and Vertical Redistribution

Inequality of post-tax income among pre-tax equals is evaluated andaggregated to form a global index of horizontal inequity in the income tax.The vertical action of the tax is captured by its inequality effect on averagebetween groups of pre-tax equals. Putting the two together, horizontalinequity measures loss of vertical performance. The identification problem,which has previously been thought insuperable, is addressed by a procedurevalidating the banding of income units into close equals groups. Thehorizontal and vertical effects of a major Spanish income tax reform areevaluated. Lines for future investigation are suggested.     

Explaining Underutilization of Tax Depreciation Deductions: Empirical Evidence from Norway

Many corporations do not claim all of their allowable tax depreciation deductions. Intuitively, this kind of behavior might seem odd. However we propose several possible explanations. First, we find strong evidence that firms facing current tax losses or carrying forward past losses underutilize depreciation in order to recover tax losses before they expire. Second, corporations with bad economic performance tend to underutilize their deductions, suggesting that corporations use costly windowdressing on their accounting measures. Third, we find support for the hypothesis that tax compliance costs discourage the utilization of accelerated depreciation, especially by small firms. We do not find much support for other hypotheses. For example, we find no evidence of substitution between tax depreciation and private debt due to competition between the benefits of private bank monitoring and the tax savings from using tax allowances to postpone tax payments, as suggested in earlier literature. We also study the effects of the uniform reporting accounting system (typical of many European countries) which can, under certain circumstances, constrain dividends. Forgoing some tax depreciation can loosen the dividend constraint, but the evidence does not support this motivation. Unusual access to extremely detailed individual firm tax return forms in Norway made our empirical analysis possible. In addition, the 1992 Norwegian tax reform provided a natural experiment for testing some of the hypotheses. We use the time-series and cross-sectional variation across Norwegian corporations in 1988, 1991, 1992 and 1993.     

Addressing the Transfer-Pricing Problem in an Origin-Basis X Tax

In a previous paper I described how the tax design called the X Tax would facilitate an international tax system free of many of the complexities and avoidance opportunities plaguing the existing international tax regime and also have neutrality properties generally deemed desirable. A choice must, however, be made between two basic treatments of transborder business transactions—the origin and destination principles. The destination-principle approach sidesteps the need to identify arm's length terms of transborder transactions between related business entities—the transfer-pricing problem. This serious problem remains in the origin-principle approach, which, however, presents fewer challenges of monitoring the flow of goods and services across borders, obviates what I call the tourism problem whereby people can reduce their taxes by consuming in a low-tax jurisdiction and, arguably most important, avoids transition effects associated with introduction of the tax and subsequent tax rate changes that occur in the destination approach. In this paper I explore possible special rules for transborder transactions between related parties in an origin-based system to eliminate the transfer-pricing problem.     

从前景理论看纳税遵从决策与征管策略选择

本文认为,以理性和自利为假设前提的预期效用理论虽然可以解释一般的纳税遵从决策,却无法解释那些并不完全理性、自利的遵从行为,20世纪80年代以来前景理论的引入弥补了这方面的不足。前景理论的反射性效应、确定性效应和分离性效应原理解释了纳税人的实际决策与理性决策相偏离的现象,为税收征管策略的选择提供了重要的理论基础和政策启示。     

Exploring Formula Allocation for the European Union

This paper explores the efficiency impacts of two methods of consolidated base taxation with formula allocation under consideration in the European Union. The first method, common (consolidated) base taxation (CCBT), would allow companies to choose a single tax base for their EU-wide operations. This tax base would be common throughout the participating member states. The second method, Home State taxation (HST), would also allow companies to choose a single tax base for their EU-wide operations. But, unlike with CCBT, the tax base would be defined according to the rules in the company's residence, or home, state. Thus, several different tax bases would exist within the EU. Both methods would use a common formula to distribute profits across countries. This paper finds that since countries continue to set corporate income tax rates, economic inefficiencies continue to exist under both methods. However, under HST, since the tax base differs according to residence, additional inefficiencies may arise depending on whether countries reduced their tax rates to combat the incentive for companies to relocate to locations with narrow tax bases.     

Incentive Targeting, Influence Peddling, and Foreign Direct Investment

We expand the traditional tax incentive redundancy argument by investigating the implications of allocating incentives primarily to firms that would have invested even in the absence of special tax treatment. Incorporating government revenue constraints, pliable tax officials, endogenous tax liabilities, and firms with heterogeneous before-tax returns, we show that tax incentives, if given to the wrong firms, are not only ineffective in stimulating FDI, but result in a form of tax shifting and may reduce FDI. Data from countries of the former Eastern Bloc suggests that tax incentive schemes have significantly negative impacts on FDI in countries that poorly target firms.     

The origin principle and the welfare gains from indirect tax harmonization

This paper establishes a parallelism between indirect tax harmonization when taxes are levied according to the destination principle and its counterpart when taxes are imposed on an origin basis. Using a simple two-country model of international trade it is argued that, under normal circumstances, indirect tax harmonization under the origin principle, considered as a movement of domestic taxes toward an appropriately designed average tax structure, is potentially Pareto improving. It is also shown that if the initial position is a Nash equilibrium, there are exceptional situations under which the above-mentioned reform may generate an actual Pareto improvement, so that both countries improve their welfare without any need for a compensating international transfer.