商业银行产品定价研究

商业银行产品定价的目标，包括利润目标、市场份额、风险控制和现金流量，本文通过对这些目标的分析找出影响产品定价的成本、风险、预期利润、经济环境、产品周期、政策水平、服务水平等主要因素及量化方法。为存贷款产品定价模型的选择提供支撑。文章介绍了国际流行的两种定价理念，并结合我国实际情况进行了选择，进而深入分析了工商银行定价管理现状，提出健全定价决策机制、制定统一的价格政策、建立高效的定价执行系统、完善定价信息系统及实施客户关系定价法等构建定价管理体系初步建议。最后对提出的客户盈利性定价方法做了实证数据推导，为下一步实施的方法和可行性提供了保障。     

城市商业银行实施内部资金转移定价的风险管理研究——AB银行的经验启示

在当前金融市场环境下,论文运用案例分析方法,研究AB银行实施内部资金转移定价(FTP)的风险管理。研究发现,AB银行实施FTP可能存在的风险主要为:资金管理模式、定价范围确定、定价方法选择、定价曲线构建、调整项设计等五项流程风险和定价小组治理、资产负债管理委员会治理等两项治理风险,并提出针对性应对措施。研究结论为,我国城市商业银行应更好利用FTP进行精细化管理、防范风险及以帮助提高绩效。     

再谈基于作业成本法的产品定价决策

<正>根据西方经济学和市场营销理论建立起来的企业产品定价方法与模型很多,如成本加成定价法、目标利润定价法、认知价值定价法、差别定价法、撇脂定价法和渗透定价法等。这些模型和方法都以成本为基础,结合顾客和市场竞争等因素制定。成本信息在定价和产品组合决策中非常重要,因为只有产品定价足以保证企业能够收回全部成本,企业才能获得生存和发展的空间,并向投资者提供足够的利润。而且,成本信息具有易获取性,当企业需要在短期内确定多种产品的价格时,成本是产品定价时唯一的依据。甚至在产品价格完全由市场供需     

对我国商业银行产品定价问题的思考

银行贷款定价模型主要需考虑供给成本、风险偏好、客户、市场及利润回报等方面。而贷款定价有成本加总、基准利率加点、货币市场借贷利率加价、综合收益四种模式,都各有特点。我国商业银行提供的大部分产品具有无形性、时效性、附属性等特点,定价复杂。     

化工类国有企业财务定价策略分析

销售价格是实现产品利润和扩大销售的关键因素,财务作为国有企业重要的内部控制部门,理应在制定公司产品的定价策略中发挥重要作用。本文选择化工类国有企业产品作为研究对象,通过总结其特征及价格规律,旨在为化工产品定价提供参考。     

化工类国有企业财务定价策略分析

销售价格是实现产品利润和扩大销售的关键因素,财务作为国有企业重要的内部控制部门,理应在制定公司产品的定价策略中发挥重要作用。本文选择化工类国有企业产品作为研究对象,通过总结其特征及价格规律,旨在为化工产品定价提供参考。     

论融资租赁行业的风险定价机制

文章就融资租赁企业如何强化内部风险管理,降低融资成本,有效应对市场风险,充分利用价格、风险、资本、市场等综合因素,进行分析探讨,并形成规范合理的融资租赁产品风险定价运作机制,为该行业风险定价工作的实施开展提供借鉴和指导.     

中小城市商业银行运用“EVA盈亏定价模型”浅析

银行产品及产品组合定价是银行经营战略的重要内容,同时也是银行经营过程中产品管理体系的重要组成部分。因此,银行在推出产品时,必须认真研究确定产品定价及绩效考核体系。城市商业银行经营活动深受资本、负债规模约束,因此要达到外部监管和内部稳健经营的要求必须建立和完善一套产品定价及考核体系。作为风险调整收益率思想指导下发展起来的经济增加值(E-VA,Economyvalueadded)方法为中小城市商业银行建立和完善这一体系提供了有益的借鉴。本文通过总结目前国内银行产品定价的一般方法,同时结合经济增加值这一业绩衡量方法,提出EVA盈亏定价模型,并尝试使用该模型对中小城市商业银行产品进行定价与评估。     

金融企业风险与应对策略

西方经济学将资金的时间价值、资产定价、风险管理并列称为现代金融理论的三大支柱.对金融企业来说,为取得收益而管理风险是其成功的核心技能.金融企业通过吸收、调解风险和提供咨询意见等3种方式对付风险并获得相应报酬.花旗集团前总裁沃尔特·瑞斯顿曾说过:"我们的一生是在管理风险,而不是排除风险."对金融企业来说,设计产品和营销是非常重要的,但它们不是成功所必需的核心技能.金融企业必须找出风险,并从中榨出利润,金融企业只能通过区分定价适当的风险和定价不当的风险,从而在其业务中求发展.     

顾客感知价值对网络信息产品定价的影响研究

网络经济和信息技术的发展使顾客感知价值逐渐成为影响企业生存的核心因素.由于网络信息产品自身的特性及定价因素的复杂程度,使得网络信息产品定价灵活多变,而顾客感知价值又是影响消费者购买行为的关键因素.为此,从网络信息产品市场结构分析入手,以消费者支付意愿为桥梁,构建顾客感知价值的利润函数模型,通过对垄断市场结构下单一定价和歧视定价策略的对比分析,为网络信息产品厂商在市场竞争中制定和选择有效的定价策略提供理论参考和依据.     

Managing price, gaining profit

The fastest and most effective way for a company to realize maximum profit is to get its pricing right. The right price can boost profit faster than increasing volume will; the wrong price can shrink it just as quickly. Yet many otherwise tough-minded managers miss out on significant profits because they shy away from pricing decisions for fear that they will alienate their customers. Worse, if management isn't controlling its pricing policies, there's a good chance that the company's clients are manipulating them to their own advantage. McKinsey & Company's Michael Marn and Robert Rosiello show managers how to gain control of the pricing puzzle and capture untapped profit potential by using two basic concepts: the pocket price waterfall and the pocket price band. The pocket price waterfall reveals how price erodes between a company's invoice figure and the actual amount paid by the customer--the transaction price. It tracks the volume purchase discounts, early payment bonuses, and frequent customer incentives that squeeze a company's profits. The pocket price band plots the range of pocket prices over which any given unit volume of a single product sells. Wide price bands are commonplace: some manufacturers' transaction prices for a given product range 60%; one fastener supplier's price band ranged up to 500%. Managers who study their pocket price waterfalls and bands can identify unnecessary discounting at the transaction level, low-performance accounts, and misplaced marketing efforts. The problems, once identified, are typically easy and inexpensive to remedy.     

内部资金转移价格在国内商业银行的应用研究

内部资金转移价格在商业银行中的作用是多重的,与商业银行的定价目标、市场风险管理目标以及收益目标息息相关,内部资金转移定价的方法也有很多.中国的商业银行在引入该管理工具时需要结合本银行阶段目标合理选择最切合实际的方法.受制于金融市场、组织架构、激励机制等影响因素,中国的商业银行在FTP运用上整体较落后,但已经具备实施较先进FTP的紧迫性和可行性.商业银行应逐步建立并理顺内部定价机制,提高定价能力,缩短内部转移价格因市场调整而进行决策的周期,加强价格信息披露,进一步强化会计系统中的利率管理功能.     

内部资金转移价格在国内商业银行的应用研究

内部资金转移价格在商业银行中的作用是多重的，与商业银行的定价目标、市场风险管理目标以及收益目标息息相关，内部资金转移定价的方法也有很多。中国的商业银行在引入该管理工具时需要结合本银行阶段目标合理选择最切合实际的方法。受制于金融市场、组织架构、激励机制等影响因素，中国的商业银行在FTP运用上整体较落后，但已经具备实施较先进FTP的紧迫性和可行性。商业银行应逐步建立并理顺内部定价机制，提高定价能力，缩短内部转移价格因市场调整而进行决策的周期，加强价格信息披露，进一步强化会计系统中的利率管理功能。     

Activity-Based Pricing in a Monopoly

In this article, I study the interaction between cost accounting systems and pricing decisions in a setting where a monopolist sells a base product and related support services to customers whose preference for support services is known only to them. I consider two pricing mechanisms—activity‐based pricing (ABP) and traditional pricing—and two cost‐accounting systems—activity‐based costing (ABC) and traditional costing, for support services. Under traditional pricing, only the base product is priced, whereas support services are provided free because detailed cost‐driver volume information on the consumption of support services by each customer is unavailable. Under ABP, customers pay based on the quantities consumed of both the base product and the support services because detailed cost‐driver volume information is available for each customer. Likewise, under traditional costing for support services the firm makes pricing decisions on cost signals that are noisier than they are under ABC. I compare the equilibrium quantities of the base product and support services sold, the information rent paid to the customers, and the expected profits of the monopolist under all four combinations of cost‐driver volume and cost‐driver rate information. I show that ABP helps reduce control problems, such as moral hazard and adverse selection problems, for the supplier and increases the supplier's ability to engage in price discrimination. I show that firms are more likely to adopt ABP when their customer base is more diverse, their customer support costs are more uncertain, their costing system has lower measurement error, and the variable costs of providing customer support are higher. Firms adopt ABC when their cost‐driver rates for support services under traditional costing are noisier measures of actual costs relative to their cost‐driver rates under ABC and when the actual costs of support services are inherently uncertain. I also show that cost‐driver rate information and cost‐driver volume information for support services are complements. Although the prior literature views ABC and activity‐based management (ABM) as facilitating better decision making, I show that ABC and ABP (a form of ABM) are useful tools for addressing control problems in supply chains.     

Intertemporal price discrimination with two products

We study the two‐product monopoly profit maximization problem for a seller who can commit to a dynamic pricing strategy. We show that if consumers' valuations are not strongly ordered, then optimality for the seller can require intertemporal price discrimination: the seller offers a choice between supplying a complete bundle now, or delaying the supply of a component of that bundle until a later date. For general valuations, we establish a sufficient condition for such dynamic pricing to be more profitable than mixed bundling. So we show that the established no‐discrimination‐across‐time result does not extend to two‐product sellers under standard taste distributions.     

商业银行资金转移定价系统:转移方法、定价模式与实施建议

资金转移定价系统是商业银行进行利率风险管理、产品定价、资源配置、利润核算、绩效评价、优化决策和提高运营效率的重要工具.实施资金转移定价对商业银行经营管理水平的提高以及竞争力的提升具有很大的促进作用,对提高商业银行产品利率敏感性、完善货币政策传导机制具有不可忽视的影响.本文介绍了资金转移定价的模式和方法,比较了各自的优劣,并结合我国商业银行目前面临的内外部环境特征,指出我国商业银行实行资金转移定价必须注意的几个问题.     

互联网保险公司财务风险研究

互联网保险特殊经营模式使保险公司呈现固定资产占比较小、资产负债率较低、保险产品"场景化、碎片化"、渠道成本低廉等财务特征,也使保险公司面临更为错综复杂的财务风险,如对股东的权益性资金依赖性较强、定价风险加大、盈利空间不定以及骗赔套保和洗钱风险等.鉴此,应拓宽筹资渠道,优化保险产品定价,提高保费收入持续增长能力,降低运营和合作成本,构建第三方保单认证和风险评估体系,加强资金规范化管理,强化外部监管等.     

Unobservable transfer price exceeds marginal cost when the manager is evaluated using a balanced scorecard

This study investigates the optimal level of transfer prices chosen by managers in a divisionalized firm when they are evaluated based on a balanced scorecard. A unique assumption of our model is that transfer prices are unobservable to a competing firm's managers. In contrast to the findings in several studies that examine strategic transfer pricing, this research shows that a manager who is evaluated using a balanced scorecard chooses a transfer price that exceeds marginal cost given a market competitor in a specific economic environment. This result is caused mainly by our model's assumption that a manager considers the competitor's profit in his/her in decision-making when the objective is to maximize long-term profit. This study makes a significant contribution to the strategic transfer pricing literature by showing that even if the transfer price is unobservable to rivals, the optimal transfer price exceeds marginal cost when the final product market is characterized by price competition, something not shown in previous analytical accounting research.     

Goliath Corporation: An instructional case in transfer pricing policy

This case illustrates some of the issues associated with setting firms’ transfer pricing policies. The simulation requires students to assume the roles of top management and divisional management for Goliath Corporation in negotiating transfer prices. The student playing the role of top management first selects a transfer pricing policy from four possible mechanisms: market-based, cost-based, negotiated, and dual-pricing. Given the top manager’s policy choice, divisional managers are then constrained to use that policy as they decide whether to purchase internally or externally based on their respective negotiations. In each negotiation, there is an ex ante best decision for Goliath as a whole. The case is thus useful in demonstrating how managers’ transfer price policy choices can lead to bad sourcing decisions.     

Strategic transfer pricing,absorption costing,and observability

This paper analyses the use of transfer pricing as a strategic device in divisionalized firms facing duopolistic price competition. When transfer prices are observable, both firms’ headquarters will charge a transfer price above the marginal cost of the intermediate product to induce their marketing managers to behave as softer competitors in the final product market. When transfer prices are not observable, strategic transfer pricing is not an equilibrium and the optimal transfer price equals the marginal cost of the intermediate product. As a strategic alternative, however, the firms can signal the use of transfer prices above marginal cost to their competitors by a publicly observable commitment to an absorption costing system. The paper identifies conditions under which the choice of absorption costing is a dominant strategy equilibrium.