The Effect of Shareholder Approval of Equity Issuances Around the World

Mandatory shareholder approval of equity issuances varies considerably across and within countries. In the United States and a few other countries, management typically needs the approval of only its board of directors to issue common stock. In most countries, however, by law or stock exchange rule, shareholders must vote to approve equity issuances when using certain methods or contemplating offers that exceed a specified fraction of outstanding shares. In some countries, shareholders must approve all equity issuances. Even in the United States, shareholder approval is mandatory under certain circumstances. The differences in the stock market reaction to shareholder‐approved equity issuances and to issues undertaken unilaterally by management are strikingly and consistently large. When shareholders approve stock issuances, whether public or rights offerings, or private placements, the average announcement returns are significantly positive, on the order of 2%. But when managers issue stock without shareholder approval, as in the case of U.S. public offerings, returns are significantly negative and 4% lower, on average, than for shareholder‐approved issues. What's more, the closer in time the shareholder vote is to the issue date, and the greater the required plurality (say, two‐thirds instead of half the vote required for approval), the more positive is the market reaction to the issue—and these findings hold for each of the three main kinds of offerings that take place in all 23 countries in the author's sample. Also telling, in countries where shareholder approval is required, such as Sweden and Malaysia, rights offers predominate over public issues. But in countries like the U.S. and Japan, where managers may generally issue stock without shareholder approval, public offers predominate over rights issues. These findings suggest that agency problems—the tendency of corporate managements to put their own interests before their shareholders'—play a major role in equity issuances. Such findings are also largely inconsistent with the adverse selection, market timing, and signaling explanations that currently dominate academic thinking about equity issuances by public corporations.     

A Fundamental Analysis Approach to Oil and Gas Firm Valuation

Most fundamental analysis studies have focused on fundamentals selected by a data-driven approach on large samples of firms from numerous industries. This paper reports the results of a fundamental analysis of a single industry, the US oil and gas exploration and production industry, using variables identified by industry financial analysts. The results demonstrate a significant relationship between a number of the fundamentals with both the market value of equity and cumulative stock return. The results also suggest that the fundamentals provide incremental information beyond earnings, change in earnings, and book value of equity when explaining equity values and stock returns.     

Expectations‐Based Management

The authors begin by summarizing the results of their recently published study of the relation between stock returns and changes in several annual performance measures, including not only growth in earnings and EVA, but changes during the year in analysts' expectations about future earnings over three different periods: (1) the current year; (2) the following year; and (3) the three‐year period thereafter. The last of these measures—changes in analysts' expectations about three‐ to five‐year earnings—had by far the greatest explanatory “power” of any of the measures tested. Besides being consistent with the stock market's taking a long‐term, DCF approach to the valuation of companies, the authors' finding that investors seem to care most about earnings three to five years down the road has a number of important implications for financial management: First, a business unit doesn't necessarily create shareholder value if its return on capital exceeds the weighted average cost of capital—nor does an operation that fails to earn its WACC necessarily reduce value. To create value, the business's return must exceed what investors are expecting. Second, without forecasting returns on capital, management should attempt to give investors a clear sense of the firm's internal benchmarks, both for existing businesses and new investment. Third, management incentive plans should be based on stock ownership rather than stock options. Precisely because stock prices reflect expectations, the potential for prices to get ahead of realities gives options‐laden managers a strong temptation to manipulate earnings and manage for the short term.     

CEO EQUITY PORTFOLIO INCENTIVES AND LAYOFF DECISIONS

CEOs with higher equity‐based compensation are widely believed to be more likely to act in shareholders' interests. Unlike less common acquisitions, voluntary liquidations, or seasoned equity offerings, layoffs are comparatively common elements of firms' operating strategies. We find that CEOs with at least one year of tenure who possess greater incentives from portfolios of restricted stock and stock option grants are more likely to announce layoffs, and that these layoffs create shareholder value. We conclude that accumulated portfolios of restricted stock and stock option grants encourage CEOs to adopt operating strategies that improve operating profits and stock performance.     

SIX CHALLENGES IN DESIGNING EQUITY-BASED PAY

The past two decades have seen a dramatic increase in the equitybased pay of U.S. corporate executives, an increase that has been driven almost entirely by the explosion of stock option grants. When properly designed, equity‐based pay can raise corporate productivity and shareholder value by helping companies attract, motivate, and retain talented managers. But there are good reasons to question whether the current forms of U.S. equity pay are optimal. In many cases, substantial stock and option payoffs to top executives–particularly those who cashed out much of their holdings near the top of the market–appear to have come at the expense of their shareholders, generating considerable skepticism about not just executive pay practices, but the overall quality of U.S. corporate governance. At the same time, many companies that have experienced sharp stock price declines are now struggling with the problem of retaining employees holding lots of deep‐underwater options. This article discusses the design of equity‐based pay plans that aim to motivate sustainable, or long‐run, value creation. As a first step, the author recommends the use of longer vesting periods and other requirements on executive stock and option holdings, both to limit managers' ability to “time” the market and to reduce their incentives to take shortsighted actions that increase near‐term earnings at the expense of longer‐term cash flow. Besides requiring “more permanent” holdings, the author also proposes a change in how stock options are issued. In place of popular “fixed value” plans that adjust the number of options awarded each year to reflect changes in the share price (and that effectively reward management for poor performance by granting more options when the price falls, and fewer when it rises), the author recommends the use of “fixed number” plans that avoid this unintended distortion of incentives. As the author also notes, there is considerable confusion about the real economic cost of options relative to stock. Part of the confusion stems, of course, from current GAAP accounting, which allows companies to report the issuance of at‐the‐money options as costless and so creates a bias against stock and other forms of compensation. But, coming on top of the “opportunity cost” of executive stock options to the company's shareholders, there is another, potentially significant cost of options (and, to a lesser extent, stock) that arises from the propensity of executives and employees to place a lower value on company stock and options than well‐diversified outside investors. The author's conclusion is that grants of (slow‐vesting) stock are likely to have at least three significant advantages over employee stock options:

• ? they are more highly valued by executives and employees (per dollar of cost to shareholders);
• ? they continue to provide reasonably strong ownership incentives and retention power, regardless of whether the stock price rises or falls, because they don't go underwater; and
• ? the value of such grants is much more transparent to stockholders, employees, and the press.

     

What drives the dating game of executive options exercise? Evidence from Taiwan

Examining Taiwanese firms from 2002 to 2008, this paper investigates the motivations behind backdating the exercising of executive stock options. The probability of suspect exercises (backdating) is positively related to the firm’s stock return, the value of the option, tax savings, institutional ownership and the extent of CEO equity ownership and negatively related to firm‐specific risk and the use of Big Four accounting firms. Tax incentives motivate executives to backdate the exercise date, implying that the greater the potential for larger tax savings, the greater the likelihood of backdating. Backdating usually occurs in firms that have heavy ownership by the CEO, have more claims to executive stock options and are not family‐run, confirming the presence of the agency cost problem.     

If private equity sized up your business

As the dust settles on the recent frenzy of private equity deals (including transactions topping $20 billion), what lessons can companies glean? Directors and executives of public companies may now be slightly less fearful of imminent takeover, yet the pressure remains: They face shareholders who wonder why they aren't getting private-equity-level returns. Rather than dismiss the value private equity has created as manipulated or aberrant, public company leaders should recognize the disciplined management that often underlies it. Pozen, a longtime leader in the financial services industry, finds that in the aftermath of buyouts, companies undergo five major thrusts of reform. These translate into five key questions that directors should pose to senior management: Have we left too much cash on our balance sheet instead of raising our cash dividends or buying back shares? Do we have the optimal capital structure, with the lowest weighted after-tax cost of total capital, including debt and equity? Do we have an operating plan that will significantly increase shareholder value, with specific metrics to monitor performance? Are the compensation rewards for our top executives tied closely enough to increases in shareholder value, with real penalties for nonperformance? Finally, does our board have enough industry experts who have made the time commitments and been given the financial incentives necessary to maximize shareholder value? The era of private equity is far from over - the top funds have become very large and are likely to play an influential role in future market cycles. Boards that ask these questions, and act on them, won't just beat the takeover artists to the punch. They will build stronger businesses.     

Incentive effects of stock purchase plans

Financial economists are interested in whether alternative compensation plans are adopted primarily for tax, incentive or signaling reasons. As most compensation plans have tax implications, examining for other effects is difficult. In this paper we examine the stock market reaction to employee stock purchase plans which are ‘non-tax advantageous’ and adopted for incentive/signaling reasons. The results suggest that (1) equity-based compensation schemes have a positive effect on shareholder wealth for reasons other than tax reduction, (2) a motive for adopting these plans is to align managerial and shareholder interests, and (3) equity ownership motivates key executives more than subordinate employees.     

Are Performance Shares Shareholder Friendly?

Performance shares, or PSUs, have become the largest element of pay for top executives in corporate America. Their spread was ignited by institutional investors looking for more “shareholder‐friendly” equity awards—as opposed to restricted stock and stock options, which have been characterized as “non‐performance” equity. Although that characterization has been challenged by many directors and compensation professionals, proxy advisers like Institutional Shareholder Services have continued to insist that the majority of stock be granted based on performance, compelling public companies to conform to that standard. With over a decade of experience with PSUs, the evidence is in regarding their net effect:

• PSUs greatly complicate long‐term incentives. Pay disclosures are dominated by discussion of PSUs, including metrics, goals, performance and vesting, and any differences in one grant year versus the next over three overlapping periods.
• PSUs may be contributing to the increase in pay. Companies issuing a significant portion of their long‐term incentives in the form of PSUs have been granting about 35% more in value than companies granting only restricted stock and stock options.
• Shareholders don't appear to be getting anything for that added complexity and cost. S&P 500 companies using PSUs have underperformed their sector peers, and companies using solely “non‐performance” equity have significantly outperformed their sector peers, and in every single year over the last decade.

Given these findings on PSUs, it is time for institutional investors and their proxy advisors to reconsider their view of these vehicles as “shareholder‐friendly,” and rethink their unqualified promotion of their use by the companies they invest in.     

Life Sciences Roundtable: Strategy and Financing

In light of the challenges facing the pharmaceutical industry, a distinguished group of pharma executives and strategic and financial advisers discusses the following corporate decisions:

相似文献   

WHY ISSUE TRACKING STOCK? INSIGHTS FROM A COMPARISON WITH SPIN‐OFFS AND CARVE‐OUTS

In recent years, tracking stocks, which amount to a new form of corporate restructuring, have been gaining in popularity. In 1999 alone, 17 companies announced new tracking stock issues, and by February 2000 there were 40 tracking stocks trading in the U.S. equity markets. Why have tracking stocks become so popular in recent years? In this article, the authors present new evidence on the effectiveness of tracking stock issues in creating shareholder value as compared to the record of two other closely related forms of corporate restructuring—spin‐offs and equity carve‐outs. The authors find that the parents and subsidiaries of tracking‐stock firms are more “related” than those that undertake the other two forms of corporate restructuring, that there is a positive announcement effect (similar in size to that of spin‐offs but greater than that of equity carve‐outs) on stock prices, and that the number of analysts following the firm increases following the issuance of tracking stock. These findings are interpreted as suggesting that the main corporate motives for issuing tracking stock are the valuation benefits from providing investors with more information about the newly listed subsidiary, while at the same time preserving the existing synergies between the business units involved. This maintenance of existing synergies, however, appears to have come at a significant price. Under the tracking stock structure, there seem to be no benefits attributable, as in the case of spin‐offs, to improvements in corporate governance. While spinoffs significantly increase the probability that the parents or subsidiaries will later be taken over (with its disciplining effect on management), there is no such increase in takeover probability for firms issuing tracking stock. Consistent with this difference, the authors find that the market‐adjusted two‐year holding period return for tracking stock parents and subsidiaries is significantly lower than the corresponding return for spinoffs and their corporate parents.     

前景价值能否预测股票收益？——基于定向增发的实证研究

基于前景理论,提出前景价值影响股票收益的研究假设,运用2006-2016年定向增发的相关数据,实证检验前景价值对增发股票收益的预测能力.结果表明:在定向增发实施前,投资者对定增股票的前景价值估值为负,且对股票收益有负向影响,当前景价值较高或收益较低时,前景价值对股票收益的预测能力相对较强,投资者和监管部门可运用前景价值作为决策变量,制定其投资组合方案和监管政策.     

Postmodern Corporate Finance

One of the core tenets of modern finance theory is that corporations create value by producing operating rates of return on capital that are greater than the cost of capital. “Postmodern” corporate finance, while reaffirming the importance of earning an adequate return on capital, also attempts to restore at least part of the traditional corporate emphasis on top-line growth that prevailed before the intense focus on returns by modern shareholder value advocates. One important reason for the heightened emphasis on growth in addition to returns is that most rate-of-return measures used by companies and investors are based on conservative accounting practices that make old assets look more profitable than new ones, thereby discouraging investments in growth. This article introduces a new return measure called “Gross Business Return” that, when evaluated against a Required Return framework that reflects the level of current stock prices, has a stronger correlation with how companies are valued by the stock market. Moreover, in reviewing historical returns over time for both the market and specific industries, the author's research suggests that the market appears to demand considerably lower current returns than those implied by traditional weighted average cost of capital (WACC) approaches. And to the extent corporate executives rely on WACC, they could be passing up valuable growth opportunities. To help evaluate tradeoffs between growth and return, the author introduces a cash-based measure of corporate economic profit called Residual Cash Earnings. Unlike most traditional return and economic profit measures, Residual Cash Earnings, when expressed as a percentage of sales, provides a way for corporate managers to identify growth opportunities that, while producing current returns lower than WACC, are likely to add value over a multi-year time horizon. These new measures and analytical tools are suitable for strategic planning, budgeting, resource allocation, performance measurement, and rewards. Consistent application of these principles across these management processes provides a framework for constantly rebalancing the emphasis on growth and return to adapt to changes in the economy, industry, and competitive landscape.     

EVA IN THE E&P INDUSTRY: THE CASE OF NUEVO ENERGY

This article presents a case study illustrating some aspects of the new business model discussed in the roundtable above. Continuing a major theme in the roundtable, the authors begin by arguing that the long‐run failure of the E&P industry to create shareholder wealth stems to a large degree from weak or distorted incentives held out to the top executives and managers of most large, publicly traded companies. This article traces the incentive problem to the lack of an effective wealth creation metric to guide the financial management process. Although the industry employs a variety of accounting‐based performance measures, none is a reliable measure of wealth creation. In place of traditional financial metrics such as earnings, annual cash flow, and return on capital, this article recommends a performance evaluation and incentive compensation system that is tied to the use of a “reserve‐adjusted” EVA measure—one that exhibits a strong statistical correlation with changes in shareholder wealth in the E&P business. The greater explanatory power of this new measure reflects the reality that changes in the value of reserves in the ground can greatly outweigh changes in annual earnings or cash flows. As the focal point of a compensation plan, EVA has advantages over stock options in that it can be calculated at various levels in the organization, even at the level of a single well, whereas stock prices only exist for the company as a whole. For this reason, an EVA incentive system permits a clearer “line of sight” between pay packages and the performance of the part of the business for which managers are directly accountable. Perhaps even more important, EVA can be calculated (using an “internal hedging” mechanism) in a way that removes the impact of changes in oil prices on the incentive outcome. And, as demonstrated in the case study of Nuevo Energy, such internal hedging allows companies to give their employees a much greater share of wealth created with far less cost than by simply granting stock or stock options.     

Equity‐Based Incentives,Risk Aversion,and Merger‐Related Risk‐Taking Behavior

We find that post‐merger equity risk is negatively related to the sensitivity of CEO wealth to stock return volatility (vega), but is concentrated in CEOs with high proportions of options and options that are more in‐the‐money. The probability of industrial diversification also increases in vega. Additional tests show that the decline in post‐merger equity risk results in a significant decrease in shareholder wealth. This decrease is concentrated among firms with CEOs having the highest delta and the highest delta and vega. Our results suggest that the increased convexity provided by option‐based compensation does not necessarily increase risk‐taking behavior by CEOs.     

The Equity Premium: Consistent with GDP Growth and Portfolio Insurance

We find that the long‐term equity premium is consistent with both GDP growth and portfolio insurance. We use a supply‐side growth model and demonstrate that the arithmetic average stock market return and the returns on corporate assets and debt depend on GDP per capita growth. The implied equity premium matches the U.S. historical average over 1926–2001. Separately, we find that the equity premium tracks the value of a put option on the S&P 500. Our theory predicts a smaller equity premium in the future, assuming that the recent regime shifts in dividend policies, interest rates, and tax rates are permanent.     

Dividend taxes and stock volatility

How do dividend taxes affect stock volatility? If a risk-averse executive faces price risk through his incentive contract, changes in stock volatility due to dividend taxes may increase agency costs and therefore decrease overall welfare. In this paper, I use a decrease in dividend taxes as a natural experiment to identify their effect on the firm’s idiosyncratic stock return volatility. Stock volatility decreased after the tax cut for firms at which executives have larger sensitivity to stock price in their incentive compensation package relative to firms at which executives have a smaller sensitivity. Therefore, with risk-averse executives and risk-neutral shareholders, dividend taxes may exacerbate agency costs. The increase in agency costs will decrease shareholder welfare, which can be partially offset by the use of options in the employment contract.     

Rethinking bank shareholder equity: The case of Deutsche Bank

We introduce and apply an innovative accounting approach to analyse the equity position of a European systemically important financial institution, Deutsche Bank, between 2001 and 2015. According to our findings, the actual contribution by shareholders to bank equity capital was limited, while shareholder payout policies, including share buybacks and trading on its own shares, were both material. These findings raise concerns on the actual capacity by shareholder equity to assure protection against (residual) risk and loss absorption. Customer and investor protections appear to lay with bank entity equity dynamics. These findings have implications for bank financial sustainability and resilience, company capital maintenance, and regulatory capital requirements. Further developments based upon this innovative methodology may improve on existing prudential and accounting regulations.     

Growth Strategies and Value Creation: What Works Best for Stock Exchanges?

In recent years, demutualized stock exchanges increasingly have been engaging in mergers and acquisition (M&A) and alliance activities. To examine the effect of these growth strategies on exchange shareholders’ value creation, we focus on 15 public stock exchanges and investigate their short‐run share price responses to the formation of 111 M&As and alliances around the world spanning the period 2000–2008. Our findings show that the average stock price responses for M&As and alliances are positive. M&As create more value than alliances. For alliances, joint ventures generate more value than nonequity alliances. More value accrues when the integration is horizontal than when it is vertical. Cross‐border integration creates more value than domestic integration. In addition, there is evidence of learning‐by‐doing effects in stock exchange integration activities. Finally, we find that when the partnering exchange is located in a country with better shareholder protection, accounting standards, and capital market development, more shareholder value accrues to our sample exchange. These patterns are consistent when we examine the exchanges’ long‐run performance.     

Analytic option pricing and risk measures under a regime-switching generalized hyperbolic model with an application to equity-linked insurance

Option pricing and managing equity linked insurance (ELI) require the proper modeling of stock return dynamics. Due to the long duration nature of equity-linked insurance products, a stock return model must be able to deal simultaneously with the preceding stylized facts and the impact of market structure changes. In response, this article proposes stock return dynamics that combine Lévy processes in a regime-switching framework. We focus on a non-Gaussian, generalized hyperbolic distribution. We use the most popular linked equity of ELIs, the S&P 500 index, as an example. The empirical study verifies that the proposed regime-switching generalized hyperbolic (RSGH) model gives the best fit to data. In investigating the effects of stock return modeling on pricing and risk management for financial contracts, we derive the characteristic function, embedded option price, and risk measure of equity-linked insurance analytically. More importantly, we demonstrate that the regime-switching generalized hyperbolic (RSGH) model is realistic and can meet the stylistic facts of stock returns, which in turn can be employed in option pricing and risk management decisions.