关于中国平安收购上海家化并购动因的研究

作为资源优化配置的重要手段,企业并购的效果与效益已历经时间的验证,越来越受到管理者们的青睐。本文以案例研究为主要方法,以中国平安收购上市公司上海家化为例,主要从并购方以及被并购方两个方面剖析了其并购的动因,并由并购动因带来的积极效应分析动因的影响力,进而从中吸取经验,为今后国有企业改制并购提供帮助,有助于为后来的企业并购案提供实际的指导和参考。     

农业上市公司财务舞弊原因探析——基于万福生科的案例研究

对于农业上市公司而言,已有学者从舞弊三角理论解释其财务舞弊的动因。然而现有研究并未指出在农业上市公司中什么因素是导致财务舞弊的根本原因。本文通过案例研究,对比农业上市公司中舞弊的公司和没有舞弊的公司来识别导致农业上市公司舞弊的根本原因。     

"以股抵债"金融创新:基于电广传媒的案例研究

本文以上市公司湖南电广传媒股份有限公司（000917）为案例研究以股抵债这种金融创新方式。文章提出最小化交易成本和先动优势分别是以股抵债金融创新的内在动因和外在动因，以股抵债价格决定了欠债股东、其它非流通股东和流通股东对创新收益的分享。本文认为：虽然各类股东都从创新中获得收益，但以高于净资产值的价格以股抵债使欠款股东获得了创新收益的大部分；实施以股抵债对上市公司治理影响不大。     

上市公司财务舞弊动因及对策研究——基于风险因子理论

一直以来,上市公司通过各种手段进行财务舞弊的案例时有发生,虽然国家对此加大管理力度,但仍屡禁不止,使投资者造成损失,甚至破坏市场经济的良性发展。为了降低上市公司财务舞弊,结合当前我国市场经济情况,基于舞弊风险因子理论对我国上市公司的财务舞弊行为的动因进行深入分析,并对上市公司惯用的舞弊手段进行研究,从而对防止和识别上市公司财务舞弊提出应对策略。     

谈谈企业改制前后有关债权债务的产权界定及账务处理

企业改制通常是指国有独资企业、国有独资公司及国有控股企业(不包括国有控股的上市公司)改制为国有资本控股、相对控股、参股和不设置国有资本的公司制企业、股份合作制企业或中外合资企业(以下统称企业改制)。在企业改制过程中,改制前企业的债权、债务通常由改制后的企业承担。笔者遇见一个对企业改制后债务核销产权界定的案例,并由此带来一些对企业改制后债权、债务进行产权界定及账务处理的思考,不当之处,请批评指正。     

关联交易的财务风险控制探讨——以五粮液公司为例

大股东频繁利用上市公司进行利益输送引起了关联交易非公允性的讨论。本文以关联交易的财务风险为研究对象,通过阐述关联交易的动因和具体表现来揭示不健康的关联交易所带来的财务风险,并结合五粮液集团利益输送的案例将部分风险更加形象化、具体化地展现出来。最后提出对财务风险进行防范和控制的一系列方法,为其他上市公司提供借鉴。     

我国上市公司私有化动因探析：理论综述与个案研究

近年来,上市公司私有化退市成为全球资本市场的一股潮流。西方学者的研究表明,降低代理成本、转移财富、重估公司价值、防范收购、节省税收和规避管制是上市公司私有化的主要动因。为检验这些理论在我国的适用性,本文采取了诊所方法,对我国A股市场2006年发生的四起私有化案例进行个案分析,结果表明西方经典理论对我国实践有一定的解释力,同时我国公司私有化也存在自己的特点。     

浅析我国上市公司盈余管理的动因与手段

本文将从我国上市公司盈余管理的客观原因入手,探析我国上市公司盈余管理的动因。并从会计政策的选择和生产经营及关联交易的调节两方面研究我国上市公司盈余管理的手段,本文作者在这里只是对我国上市公司盈余管理的动因与手段做了粗浅的介绍,希望能够起到抛砖引玉的作用,希望更多的学者加入到对上市公司的盈余管理的研究中来,为保障投资人利益贡献自己的智慧。     

我国上市公司财务舞弊新特征及政策思考--以万福生科为例

作为创业板上市公司财务舞弊第一案,万福生科案例在成因、手段、处罚、赔付等各方面均具有典型意义,体现出近年来国内证券市场上市公司舞弊问题的新特征。本文通过梳理案例脉络,深入分析舞弊动因和手法,探寻更具针对性的监管政策,以期切实保障投资者的权益,亦为后市的健康发展提供借鉴。     

浅析我国上市公司盈余管理的动因与手段

本文将从我国上市公司盈余管理的客观原因入手,探析我国上市公司盈余管理的动因.并从会计政策的选择和生产经营及关联交易的调节两方面研究我国上市公司盈余管理的手段,本文作者在这里只是对我国上市公司盈余管理的动因与手段做了粗浅的介绍,希望能够起到抛砖引玉的作用,希望更多的学者加入到对上市公司的盈余管理的研究中来,为保障投资人利益贡献自己的智慧.     

The impact of anti-corruption measures and risk effects on equity incentives and financial misreporting in China

This study examines the effects of anti-corruption and equity incentive risk on financial misreporting in the context of China’s unique corporate ownership structure and governance regime. Using a sample comprising 2,708 cases of financial restatement over the 2007–2017 period. Our key findings suggest that managers’ shareholdings are significantly and positively associated with their firms’ financial misreporting, and certain equity risk factors dramatically alter Chinese corporate governance. Furthermore, managers’ motivation to misreport is significantly more pronounced in non–state owned enterprises (non-SOEs), suggesting that equity incentive risk effects mitigate the “absence of ownership” problem believed to affect SOEs. Managers in highly competitive industries and firms with low institutional ownership are found to be highly motivated to misreport performance.     

基于企业性质的社会责任履责动机差异及政策含义

从企业性质的角度出发,分别就履行社会责任的经济动机(价值增值驱动和管理层面对的代理问题驱动)与非经济动机(道德伦理驱动和政治驱动)下,国有与私营企业在履行社会责任动机方面的差异进行初步分析,发现企业的性质、目标决定了我国国有企业比私营企业面临更多的代理问题,私营企业相对国有企业而言更有追逐价值增值而履行社会责任的经济动机,也更加受到寻求政府政治保护等政治因素的驱动。政府应从企业履责动机出发,深刻认识政策法规对企业社会责任的促进作用;通过加强政策导向,直接或者间接促进国有企业和私营企业践行社会责任。     

Earnings Management in Public Family Firms under Economic Adversity

This paper explores the relationship between the ownership of public firms and their motivation to implement earnings management practices, providing evidence on whether family businesses differ from non‐family businesses in terms of earnings management practices. In addition, it focuses on the possibility of asymmetrical earnings management policies between periods of stability and economic adversity. Based on a sample of Portuguese listed family‐controlled firms for the 1999–2011 period and using a panel data approach, we find no significant differences in the incentive to manage earnings between public family and non‐family firms, suggesting a compensation between the alignment hypothesis, the long‐term orientation of family firms and the desire to pass firms onto succeeding generations, and the entrenchment effect. The evidence shows that earnings management decreases with firms’ profitability, and non‐family firms’ discretionary accruals are mainly influenced by the board of directors. In crisis periods, the discretionary accruals of family firms are especially influenced by firm size. After controlling for different earnings management measures, the determinants of earnings management practices seem somewhat sensitive to the earnings quality proxies. The results provide evidence that directors and policy makers should prevent earnings management procedures in particular situations.     

Association Between Borrower and Lender State Ownership and Accounting Conservatism

We examine the association between borrower (firm) and lender (bank) state ownership and accounting conservatism for a sample of Chinese firms. We hypothesize that state‐owned enterprises (SOEs) adopt less conservative accounting than non‐state‐owned enterprises (NSOEs) because lenders are less concerned with downside risk for SOEs than for NSOEs. We also hypothesize a negative relation between conservatism and the fraction of total loans a firm borrows from state‐owned banks (SBs) because SBs have weaker demand for assurance of sufficient net assets to cover loan repayments than non‐state‐owned banks (NSBs). We find support for both hypotheses. Further analyses reveal that: (1) firms that borrow from commercial SBs exhibit more conservative accounting than firms that borrow from policy SBs and (2) firms adopt more conservative accounting as they get more loans from banks with foreign ownership or exclusively foreign banks. However, the results of these additional analyses are to some extent sensitive to alternative measures of accounting conservatism.     

股权分置改革影响控股股东的现金持有偏好吗?

本文以截至2011年底完成股改并满足一定条件的788家上市公司为研究样本,以2004-2011年为时间窗口,研究了控股股东的现金积累偏好在股改前后的差异。按照股权性质分组的研究结论表明,非国有企业控股股东的现金积累偏好在股改后明显减弱,而国有企业前后没有明显变化。按照股改批次分组研究结论表明,控股股东对公司持现比率的影响在股改后存在明显减弱的证据,证实了股改对控股股东侵占动机的缓解作用。     

Corporate Governance,Political Connections,and Intra‐Industry Effects: Evidence from Corporate Scandals in China

This paper investigates intra‐industry spillover effects of corporate scandals in China. We demonstrate how a contagion effect spreads to peer firms depending upon the quality of corporate governance and their political connections. Good corporate governance in peer firms reduces the contagion effect of scandals. External governance has a stronger influence on reducing the contagion effect of both financial and non‐financial scandals, while ownership concentration and the quality of auditors play a more pronounced role in mitigating the contagion effect of financial scandals. State ownership helps to mitigate the negative influence of non‐financial scandals in individual‐owned firms, but not in state‐owned enterprises.     

Effect of disclosure regulation on earnings management through related-party transactions: Evidence from Taiwanese firms operating in China

This study examines the effect of disclosure regulation on earnings management using Taiwanese companies conducting transactions with China as the institutional setting. Measuring earnings management by the amount of discretionary accruals (DACCs), the study shows that disclosure regulation mitigates DACCs of Taiwanese firms engaging in related-party transactions with Chinese entities. Following enactment of the disclosure regulation in November 2000, DACCs among Taiwanese enterprises conducting transactions via offshore affiliates dropped. While the disclosure regulation helps to reduce earnings management, this study reports that such effect is asymmetric between high-tech firms and non–high-tech firms. Specifically, the disclosure regulation is effective in reducing earnings management among firms in non–high-tech sectors. However, such effect is not significant among firms in high-tech sectors. This study discusses the implications of empirical findings for corporate management, regulatory agencies, and firm stakeholders.     

Institutional investors,controlling shareholders and CEO pay‐performance relationship: evidence from China

Using a large sample of China’s listed firms between 2005 and 2015, we find that domestic mutual funds have a positive effect on the CEO pay‐performance relationship, and this effect becomes stronger when their ownership is higher and closer to the controlling shareholder’s ownership. This effect is stronger in non‐state‐owned enterprises (non‐SOEs), firms facing weaker industry competition incentives, and firms located in more developed regions. However, Qualified Foreign Institutional Investors (QFIIs) do not have such an influence. Overall, our study contends that the effectiveness of institutional investors’ monitoring role is subject to their identity, controlling shareholders and institutional environments.     

Ownership,Internal Capital Market,and Financing Costs

The development of China’s financial markets lags behind its economic development, which has set constraints for firms to obtain external finance. In practice, Chinese firms employ an internal capital market to mitigate financial constraints. We provide a case study and empirical analysis to investigate both the determinants for the establishment of an internal capital market and its economic consequence. We find that private enterprises (PEs) have greater motivation to establish an internal capital market and to allocate capital by the market-oriented way. In addition, we find that the internal capital market can help firms reduce financing costs, especially in PEs.     

Monitoring or colluding: the role of venture capital investors in the IPO process

We argue and provide evidence that instead of playing a monitoring role, venture capital (VC) investors collude with controlling shareholders in the IPO process of Chinese non‐state‐owned enterprises (non‐SOEs). We show that VC‐backed IPOs’ applications are more likely to be approved by regulators, especially in firms with excess control rights, but have worse post‐IPO performance. Through investing in firms with excess control rights, VC investors are able to make higher exit returns. We further document that VC investors’ role in the IPO process is stronger when they have political connections, hold higher ownership, and when they make pre‐IPO investment.