Credit and liquidity components of corporate CDS spreads

This paper investigates the role of credit and liquidity factors in explaining corporate CDS price changes during normal and crisis periods. We find that liquidity risk is more important than firm-specific credit risk regardless of market conditions. Moreover, in the period prior to the recent “Great Recession” credit risk plays no role in explaining CDS price changes. The dominance of liquidity effects casts serious doubts on the relevance of CDS price changes as an indicator of default risk dynamics. Our results show how multiple liquidity factors including firm specific and aggregate liquidity proxies as well as an asymmetric information measure are critical determinants of CDS price variations. In particular, the impact of informed traders on the CDS price increases when markets are characterised by higher uncertainty, which supports concerns of insider trading during the crisis.     

Money and liquidity in financial markets

We argue that there is a connection between the interbank market for liquidity and the broader financial markets, which has its basis in demand for liquidity by banks. Tightness in the market for liquidity leads banks to engage in what we term “liquidity pull-back,” which involves selling financial assets either by banks directly or by levered investors. Empirical tests on the stock market are supportive. Tighter interbank markets are associated with relatively more volume in more liquid stocks; selling pressure, especially in more liquid stocks; and transitory negative returns. We control for market-wide uncertainty and in the process also contribute to the literature on portfolio rebalancing. Our general point is that money matters in financial markets.     

Understanding liquidity and credit risks in the financial crisis

This paper develops a structured dynamic factor model for the spreads between London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR) and overnight index swap (OIS) rates for a panel of banks. Our model involves latent factors which reflect liquidity and credit risk. Our empirical results show that surges in the short term LIBOR-OIS spreads during the 2007-2009 financial crisis were largely driven by liquidity risk. However, credit risk played a more significant role in the longer term (twelve-month) LIBOR-OIS spread. The liquidity risk factors are more volatile than the credit risk factor. Most of the familiar events in the financial crisis are linked more to movements in liquidity risk than credit risk.     

Contagion of a liquidity crisis between two firms

This paper presents a model in which the contagion of a liquidity crisis between two nonfinancial institutions occurs because of learning activity within a common creditor pool. After creditors observe what occurs in a rollover game for a firm, they conjecture one another's “type” or attitude toward the risk associated with the firm's investment project. Creditors' inference about one another's type then influences their decision to lend to the next firm. By providing an analysis of the “incidence of failure” (the threshold for a liquidity crisis) for each firm, this paper demonstrates that the risk of contagion increases sharply if it originates ex ante from a firm facing a low probability of failure. In addition, the paper proposes some policy measures for mitigating the severity of contagion during a liquidity crisis.     

Market liquidity in the financial crisis: The role of liquidity commonality and flight-to-quality

We examine the dynamics and the drivers of market liquidity during the financial crisis, using a unique volume-weighted spread measure. According to the literature we find that market liquidity is impaired when stock markets decline, implying a positive relation between market and liquidity risk. Moreover, this relationship is the stronger the deeper one digs into the order book. Even more interestingly, this paper sheds further light on so far puzzling features of market liquidity: liquidity commonality and flight-to-quality. We show that liquidity commonality varies over time, increases during market downturns, peaks at major crisis events and becomes weaker the deeper we look into the limit order book. Consistent with recent theoretical models that argue for a spiral effect between the financial sector’s funding liquidity and an asset’s market liquidity, we find that funding liquidity tightness induces an increase in liquidity commonality which then leads to market-wide liquidity dry-ups. Therefore our findings corroborate the view that market liquidity can be a driving force for financial contagion. Finally, we show that there is a positive relationship between credit risk and liquidity risk, i.e., there is a spread between liquidity costs of high and low credit quality stocks, and that in times of increased market uncertainty the impact of credit risk on liquidity risk intensifies. This corroborates the existence of a flight-to-quality or flight-to-liquidity phenomenon also on the stock markets.     

Reprint of: Market liquidity in the financial crisis: The role of liquidity commonality and flight-to-quality

We examine the dynamics and the drivers of market liquidity during the financial crisis, using a unique volume-weighted spread measure. According to the literature we find that market liquidity is impaired when stock markets decline, implying a positive relation between market and liquidity risk. Moreover, this relationship is the stronger the deeper one digs into the order book. Even more interestingly, this paper sheds further light on so far puzzling features of market liquidity: liquidity commonality and flight-to-quality. We show that liquidity commonality varies over time, increases during market downturns, peaks at major crisis events and becomes weaker the deeper we look into the limit order book. Consistent with recent theoretical models that argue for a spiral effect between the financial sector’s funding liquidity and an asset’s market liquidity, we find that funding liquidity tightness induces an increase in liquidity commonality which then leads to market-wide liquidity dry-ups. Therefore our findings corroborate the view that market liquidity can be a driving force for financial contagion. Finally, we show that there is a positive relationship between credit risk and liquidity risk, i.e., there is a spread between liquidity costs of high and low credit quality stocks, and that in times of increased market uncertainty the impact of credit risk on liquidity risk intensifies. This corroborates the existence of a flight-to-quality or flight-to-liquidity phenomenon also on the stock markets.     

Did the crisis induce credit rationing for French SMEs?

This paper focuses on the access of independent French SMEs to bank lending and analyzes whether the observed evolution of credit to SMEs over the recent period was “demand driven” as a result of the decrease in firms’ activity and investment projects or was “supply driven” with an increase in credit “rationing” stemming from a more cautious behavior of banks. Based on a sample of around 60,000 SMEs, we come to the conclusion that, despite the stronger standards used by banks when granting credit, French SMEs do not appear to have been strongly affected by credit rationing since 2008. This result goes against the common view that SMEs suffered from a strong credit restriction during the crisis but is perfectly in line with the results of several surveys about the access to finance of SMEs recently conducted in France.     

Interbank liquidity risk transmission to large emerging markets in crisis periods

In this paper, we conduct two investigations regarding funding liquidity risk in large emerging economies: Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa — BRICS. In the first, we track the relevance of monetary policy decisions originating in developed economies for interbank funding liquidity risk in BRICS economies during crisis periods by applying a time-varying parameter model in a Bayesian framework. The results indicate weak associations between interbank credit market and US monetary policy and market conditions. In contrast, the Federal Reserve's National Financial Conditions Index (NFCI) — a representative of the health of both real and financial sectors in the US — matters more. The temporal patterns of the results imply that key central banking decisions precede or coincide with low degrees of associations. In the second, we examine whether interbank credit crunch exerts an influence on market liquidity risk in BRICS economies using a Granger causality approach. The results reveal that interbank credit crunch depresses market liquidity in the corresponding domestic market and that the state of fear and credit market conditions in the US exert some influence in this regard. Overall, our findings hint at judicious market intervention and liquidity management by BRICS central banks.     

Credit lines as monitored liquidity insurance: Theory and evidence

We propose a theory of credit lines provided by banks to firms as a form of monitored liquidity insurance. Bank monitoring and resulting revocations help control illiquidity-seeking behavior of firms insured by credit lines. The cost of credit lines is thus greater for firms with high liquidity risk, which in turn are likely to use cash instead of credit lines. We test this implication for corporate liquidity management by identifying exogenous shocks to liquidity risk of firms in corporate bond and equity markets. Firms experiencing increases in liquidity risk move out of credit lines and into cash holdings.     

Firm value,illiquidity risk and liquidity insurance

Our interest here concerns liquidity supply to firms. We first examine the relation between firm value and access to liquidity supply, and then we investigate the existence conditions and efficiency properties of financial contracts with a liquidity covenant in a continuous-time, infinite-horizon stochastic model of a repeated firm-investors relationship where the key problem is the mutual commitment between the two parties. To model this problem we consider liquidity supply as a stochastic “regulator mechanism” that prevents the firm’s ability to pay from falling below a predefined threshold (here the market fixed coupon), and we then apply recent developments in dynamic programming techniques for “regulated processes” to obtain a close form solution for the firm’s value. Our main finding is that efficient, i.e. actuarially fair and renegotiation-proof contracts emerge in the absence of perfect commitment as the firm and the investor can exert mutual threat of termination.     

Large EU banks’ capital and liquidity: Relationship and impact on credit default swap spreads

This paper explores the interrelations between bank capital and liquidity and their impact on the market probability of default. We employ an unbalanced panel of large European banks with listed credit default swap (CDS) contracts during the period 2005–2015, which allow us to consider the impact of the recent financial crisis. Our evidence suggests that bank capital and funding liquidity risk as defined in Basel III have an economically meaningful bidirectional relationship. However, the effect on CDS spread is ambiguous. While capital appears to have a relatively large impact on CDS spread changes, liquidity risk is priced only when it falls below the regulatory threshold.     

Internal liquidity risk in corporate bond yield spreads

The recent global financial crisis reveals the important role of internal liquidity risk in corporate credit risk. However, few existing studies investigate its effects on bond yield spreads. Panel data for the period from year 1993 through 2008 show that corporate internal liquidity risk significantly impacts bond yield spreads (and changes) when controlling for well-known bond yield determinant variables, traditional accounting measures of corporate debt servicing ability, cash flow volatility, credit ratings, and state variables. This finding indicates that internal liquidity risk should therefore be incorporated into bond yield spread modeling.     

The seeds of a crisis: A theory of bank liquidity and risk taking over the business cycle

We examine how the banking sector could ignite the formation of asset price bubbles when there is access to abundant liquidity. Inside banks, to induce effort, loan officers are compensated based on the volume of loans. Volume-based compensation also induces greater risk taking; however, due to lack of commitment, loan officers are penalized ex post only if banks suffer a high enough liquidity shortfall. Outside banks, when there is heightened macroeconomic risk, investors reduce direct investment and hold more bank deposits. This ‘flight to quality’ leaves banks flush with liquidity, lowering the sensitivity of bankers’ payoffs to downside risks and inducing excessive credit volume and asset price bubbles. The seeds of a crisis are thus sown.     

Securitized banking and the run on repo

The panic of 2007–2008 was a run on the sale and repurchase market (the repo market), which is a very large, short-term market that provides financing for a wide range of securitization activities and financial institutions. Repo transactions are collateralized, frequently with securitized bonds. We refer to the combination of securitization plus repo finance as “securitized banking” and argue that these activities were at the nexus of the crisis. We use a novel data set that includes credit spreads for hundreds of securitized bonds to trace the path of the crisis from subprime-housing related assets into markets that had no connection to housing. We find that changes in the LIB-OIS spread, a proxy for counterparty risk, were strongly correlated with changes in credit spreads and repo rates for securitized bonds. These changes implied higher uncertainty about bank solvency and lower values for repo collateral. Concerns about the liquidity of markets for the bonds used as collateral led to increases in repo haircuts, that is the amount of collateral required for any given transaction. With declining asset values and increasing haircuts, the US banking system was effectively insolvent for the first time since the Great Depression.     

Flight to liquidity and the Great Recession

This paper argues that counter-cyclical liquidity hoarding by financial intermediaries may strongly amplify business cycles. It develops a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model in which banks operate subject to agency problems and funding liquidity risk in their intermediation activity. Importantly, the amount of liquidity reserves held in the financial sector is determined endogenously: Balance sheet constraints force banks to trade off insurance against funding outflows with loan scale. A financial crisis, simulated as an abrupt decline in the collateral value of bank assets, triggers a flight to liquidity, which strongly amplifies the initial shock and induces credit crunch dynamics sharing key features with the Great Recession. The paper thus develops a new balance sheet channel of shock transmission that works through the composition of banks’ asset portfolios.     

Overview of the special issue on “Policy Implications of and Lessons from the Global Financial Crisis”

This paper reviews the special issue “Policy Implications of and Lessons from the Global Financial Crisis,” and its themes: Global liquidity and the use of international reserves; real and financial economic patterns before and during the global financial crisis.     

Funding liquidity risk: Definition and measurement

Funding liquidity risk has played a key role in all historical banking crises. Nevertheless, a measure for funding liquidity risk based on publicly available data remains so far elusive. We address this gap by showing that aggressive bidding at central bank auctions reveals funding liquidity risk. We can extract an insurance premium from banks’ bids which we propose as a measure of funding liquidity risk. Using a unique data set consisting of all bids in all auctions for the main refinancing operation conducted at the ECB between June 2005 and October 2008 we find that funding liquidity risk is typically stable and low, with occasional spikes especially around key events during the recent crisis. We also document downward spirals between funding liquidity risk and market liquidity. As measurement without clear definitions is impossible, we initially provide definitions of funding liquidity and funding liquidity risk.     

The role of securitization in bank liquidity and funding management

This paper studies the role of securitization in bank management. I propose a new index of “bank loan portfolio liquidity” which can be thought of as a weighted average of the potential to securitize loans of a given type, where the weights reflect the composition of a bank loan portfolio. I use this new index to show that by allowing banks to convert illiquid loans into liquid funds, securitization reduces banks' holdings of liquid securities and increases their lending ability. Furthermore, securitization provides banks with an additional source of funding and makes bank lending less sensitive to cost of funds shocks. By extension, the securitization weakens the ability of the monetary authority to affect banks' lending activity but makes banks more susceptible to liquidity and funding crisis when the securitization market is shut down.     

Fair value accounting,fragile bank balance sheets and crisis: A model

A topic of recent interest in accounting research has been the investigation of the role of fair value accounting (FVA) in the global financial crisis. This research focused on finding a link during the crisis time-period and often states that “accounting is only a messenger”. The model presented in this paper emphasises finding the link before the crisis and “accounting as money.” Use is made of an accounting model of the economy due to the inability of standard models of monetary transmission to incorporate global financial crisis characteristics such as feedback effects, systemic risk and the centrality of the financial sector in the crisis. The model shows FVA in banks to be an accelerator that amplifies the financial cycle upswing. Feedback effects noted in the model include changes in the demand for financial instruments and changes in demand in the real economy. Minsky-like, crisis is shown to be endogenous to the model, working through the fragility of balance sheets in the real sector as well as in the financial sector. Bank balance sheet fragility is caused by bad capital driving out good capital, banks reaching for yield and the inversion of the yield curve. The model shows that the practice of not meeting rising credit demand with increasing credit supply is an essential control mechanism in the financial cycle.     

The non-monotonic impact of bank size on their default swap spreads: Cross-country evidence

This paper studies the drivers of bank's credit default swap (CDS) spread, taken as a measure of credit risk, by considering the impact of housing market along with a number of bank level determinants, such as regulatory capital, leverage, size, liquidity, asset quality and operations income ratio. We build upon a unique dataset consisting of 115 banks (during pre- and post-crisis periods) headquartered in 30 countries from both developed and emerging countries. Results suggest that CDS spread is driven by asset quality, liquidity and operations income ratio, while bank size is found to have a non-monotonic impact on CDS spread. If the bank is small, an increase in size reduces the average credit risk. If the bank is large enough, an increase in size raises the latter. From our results we derive the level of bank size that minimizes the CDS spreads. Financial institutions growing beyond this threshold are subject to higher credit risk, implying that smaller and medium sized banks are safer than large banks. When considering the estimates in the periods before and after the 2007 crisis, we further find a different extreme point of bank size in the former (approximately 1642 billion Euros) relative to a significantly lower level of optimal bank size (around 70 billion) in the post-crisis period, implying too-big-to-fail and too-big-to-save in the pre-crisis regime.