The ADR shadow exchange rate as an early warning indicator for currency crises

We develop an indicator for currency crisis risk using price spreads between American Depositary Receipts (ADRs) and their underlyings. This risk measure represents the mean exchange rate ADR investors expect after a potential currency crisis or realignment. It makes crisis prediction possible on a daily basis as depreciation expectations are reflected in ADR market prices. Using daily data, we analyze the impact of several risk drivers related to standard currency crisis theories and find that ADR investors perceive higher currency crisis risk when export commodity prices fall, trading partners’ currencies depreciate, sovereign yield spreads increase, or interest rate spreads widen.     

Are survey forecasts of individual and institutional investor sentiments rational?

We examine the effects of rational risk factors on investor sentiments. We find that institutional investor sentiments are more rational than individual investor sentiments. There are significant positive effects of, market return and dividend yield and negative effect of inflation on both types of sentiments. These risk factors have stronger effects on institutional than individual investor sentiments. Also, there are significant effects of term spread and HML on the institutional investor sentiments. The evidence suggests that linkages between sentiments and stock return stems from a combination of rational outlook and noise i.e. expectations that are not fully justified by information.     

How return and risk experiences shape investor beliefs and preferences

Combining brokerage records and matching monthly survey measurements of a sample of individual investors from the Netherlands for the period April 2008 through March 2009, we examine how individual investors update their beliefs (return expectations and risk perceptions) and preferences (risk tolerance) as a result of their personal return and risk experiences. We find that investors' past returns positively impact return expectations and risk tolerance, and negatively impact risk perceptions. Realised risk, however, has no effect. That is, even in a highly volatile stock market period in which risk appears very salient, investors do not take it into account when updating their beliefs and preferences.     

Changes in sentiment on REIT industry excess returns and volatility

REIT characteristics pose unique risks and benefits to investors who seek liquid diversification and hedging vehicles to complement their portfolios. This paper tests for the asymmetric effect of individual and institutional investor sentiment on REIT industry returns and conditional volatility. We simultaneously model the impact of two markedly different groups of investors on the return generating process of the REIT industry. Our findings suggest that noise trading imposes significant systemic risk on the realization of REIT industry returns. Interestingly, corrections in institutional investor expectations have a larger effect on REIT industry returns and volatility than changes in individual investor expectations. More specifically, bearish shifts in institutional investor expectations of future market conditions have a significantly larger impact on returns and volatility than bullish shifts. Results align with the overreaction to negative information and loss aversion hypotheses.     

Understanding commonality in liquidity around the world

We examine how commonality in liquidity varies across countries and over time in ways related to supply determinants (funding liquidity of financial intermediaries) and demand determinants (correlated trading behavior of international and institutional investors, incentives to trade individual securities, and investor sentiment) of liquidity. Commonality in liquidity is greater in countries with and during times of high market volatility (especially, large market declines), greater presence of international investors, and more correlated trading activity. Our evidence is more reliably consistent with demand-side explanations and challenges the ability of the funding liquidity hypothesis to help us understand important aspects of financial market liquidity around the world, even during the recent financial crisis.     

Incorporating risk input into the analysis of bank productivity: Application to the Taiwanese banking industry

This study reappraises banks’ productivity by using 42 Taiwanese banks during 1999–2007 as observations. It introduces an input-oriented generalized metafrontier Malmquist productivity index (I-gMMPI), while considering the latent effect of risk-taking behavior in the analytic framework. We learn that public and private banks should face separate short-term technological frontiers, while the econometric model considering risk input can portray banks’ operating frontiers better. Moreover, neglecting the influence of risk input would bring about distortions of efficiency, technology and TFP dynamic estimations for banks; meanwhile, the degree of scale economies would also be overestimated. The paper concludes that neglecting the risk-taking essence in bank performance evaluation is equal to allowing banks to barter risk-bearing as the term for further output growth. Consequently, the potential cost is that banks may excessively aggrandize their scales of business, implying the possibility of another financial crisis.     

Institutional trading and stock resiliency: Evidence from the 2007–2009 financial crisis

We examine the impact of institutional trading on stock resiliency during the financial crisis of 2007–2009. We show that buy-side institutions have different exposure to liquidity factors based on their trading style. Liquidity supplying institutions absorb the long-term order imbalances in the market and are critical to recovery patterns after a liquidity shock. We show that these liquidity suppliers withdraw from risky securities during the crisis and their participation does not recover for an extended period of time. The illiquidity of specific stocks is significantly affected by institutional trading patterns; participation by liquidity supplying institutions can ameliorate illiquidity, while participation by liquidity demanding institutions can exacerbate illiquidity. Our results provide guidance on why some stocks take longer to recover in a crisis.     

Option trading and individual investor performance

This paper examines the impact of option trading on individual investor performance. The results show that most investors incur substantial losses on their option investments, which are much larger than the losses from equity trading. We attribute the detrimental impact of option trading on investor performance to poor market timing that results from overreaction to past stock market returns. High trading costs further contribute to the poor returns on option investments. Gambling and entertainment appear to be the most important motivations for trading options while hedging motives only play a minor role. We also provide strong evidence of performance persistence among option traders.     

Disagreement and asset prices

How do differences of opinion affect asset prices? Do investors earn a risk premium when disagreement arises in the market? Despite their fundamental importance, these questions are among the most controversial issues in finance. In this paper, we use a novel data set that allows us to directly measure the level of disagreement among Wall Street mortgage dealers about prepayment speeds. We examine how disagreement evolves over time and study its effects on expected returns, return volatility, and trading volume in the mortgage-backed security market. We find that increased disagreement is associated with higher expected returns, higher return volatility, and larger trading volume. These results imply that there is a positive risk premium for disagreement in asset prices. We also show that volatility in and of itself does not lead to higher trading volume. Instead, only when disagreement arises in the market is higher uncertainty associated with more trading. Finally, we are able to distinguish empirically between two competing hypotheses regarding how information in markets gets incorporated into asset prices. We find that sophisticated investors appear to update their beliefs through a rational expectations mechanism when disagreement arises.     

Investor Trading Behavior and Sentiment in Futures Markets

This study investigates the effects of investor trading behavior and investor sentiment on futures market return. We find that the spot investor trading behavior, futures investor trading behavior, spot market sentiment, and futures market sentiment all have positive effects on daily futures returns in Chinese financial market. More importantly, we show that the effect of (spot) futures investor trading behavior has better explanatory power than (spot) futures market sentiment on futures returns. Further supporting our results, high investor trading behavior and high investor sentiment strengthen the positive relation between sentiment-returns and behavior-returns.     

Impact of FDICIA internal controls on bank risk taking

The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act (FDICIA) of 1991 was designed, among other things, to introduce risk-based deposit insurance, increase capital requirements, and improve banks’ internal controls. Of particular interest in this study are the requirements for annual audit and reporting of management’s and auditor’s assessment of the effectiveness of internal control for banks with $500 million or more in total assets (raised to $1 billion in 2005). We study the impact of these requirements on banks’ risk-taking behavior prior to the recent financial crisis and the consequent implications for bank failure and financial trouble during the crisis period. Using a sample of 1138 banks, we provide evidence that banks required to comply with the FDICIA internal control requirements have lower risk taking in the pre-crisis period. Specifically, the volatility of net interest margin, the volatility of earnings, and Z score show less risk-taking behavior. Furthermore, these banks are less likely to experience failure and financial trouble during the crisis period.     

Prospect theory and trading patterns

Reference dependence, loss aversion, and risk seeking for losses together comprise the preference-based component of prospect theory that sets its value function apart from the standard risk-aversion model. Using an elasticity analysis, we show that this distinctive preference component serves to underpin negative-feedback trading propensities, but cannot manifest itself in behavior directly or holistically at the individual-choice level. We then propose and demonstrate that the market interaction between prospect-theory investors and regular CRRA investors allows this preference component to dominate in equilibrium behavior and hence helps to reestablish the intuitive link between prospect-theory preferences and negative-feedback trading patterns. In the model, the interaction also reconciles the contrarian behavior of prospect-theory investors with asymmetric volatility and short-term return reversal. The results suggest that prospect-theory preferences can lead investors to behave endogenously as contrarian noise traders in the market interaction process.     

Credit risk transfer activities and systemic risk: How banks became less risky individually but posed greater risks to the financial system at the same time

A main cause of the crisis of 2007-2009 is the various ways through which banks have transferred credit risk in the financial system. We study the systematic risk of banks before the crisis, using two samples of banks respectively trading Credit Default Swaps (CDS) and issuing Collateralized Loan Obligations (CLOs). After their first usage of either risk transfer method, the share price beta of these banks increases significantly. This suggests the market anticipated the risks arising from these methods, long before the crisis. We additionally separate this beta effect into a volatility and a market correlation component. Quite strikingly, this decomposition shows that the increase in the beta is solely due to an increase in banks’ correlations. Thus, while banks may have shed their individual credit risk, they actually posed greater systemic risk. This creates a challenge for financial regulation, which has typically focused on individual institutions.     

KNOW YOUR CLIENT! INVESTOR PROFILE AND TAILOR‐MADE ASSET ALLOCATION RECOMMENDATIONS

We study how the investor profile influences the asset allocation recommendations of professional advisors. We find the investor's perceived risk attitude influences more the mix of risky assets, whereas the socioeconomic variables influence more the cash percentage. The recommendations are consistent with a diversification behavior driven by actual asset correlations. These findings support the utility of investor advisory that may help enhance the risk and return trade‐off. The main drawback of the recommendations may consist in the degree of customization that is limited by the small number of investor characteristics actually influencing the asset allocation.     

Managerial risk-taking behavior and equity-based compensation

Equity-based compensation affects managers’ risk-taking behavior, which in turn has an impact on shareholder wealth. In response to an exogenous increase in takeover protection in Delaware during the mid-1990s, managers lower firm risk by 6%. This risk reduction is concentrated among firms with low managerial equity-based incentives, in particular firms with low chief executive officer portfolio sensitivity to stock return volatility. Furthermore, the risk reduction is value-destroying. Finally, firms respond to the increased protection accorded by the regime shift by providing managers with greater incentives for risk-taking.     

Bank regulation and international financial stability: A case against the 2006 Basel framework for controlling tail risk in trading books

In attempting to promote international financial stability, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2006) provided a framework that sought to control the amount of tail risk that large banks around the world would take in their trading books relative to their corresponding minimum capital requirements. However, many of these banks suffered significant trading losses during the recent financial crisis. Our paper examines whether the Basel framework allowed banks to take substantive tail risk in their trading books without a capital requirement penalty. We find that it allowed banks to do so and that its minimum capital requirements can be notably procyclical. Hence, focusing on the way the Basel framework sought to control the amount of tail risk in trading books relative to their corresponding minimum capital requirements, our paper supports the view that it was not properly designed to promote financial stability. We also discuss alternative regulatory frameworks that would potentially be more effective than the Basel framework in preventing banks from taking substantive tail risk in their trading books without a capital requirement penalty.     

Market uncertainty and the importance of media coverage at earnings announcements

We investigate whether increased investor demand for financial information arising from higher market uncertainty leads to greater media coverage of earnings announcements. We also investigate whether greater coverage during times of higher uncertainty further destabilizes financial markets because of greater attention-based trading or, alternatively, improves trading and pricing by lowering investor acquisition and interpretation costs. When uncertainty is higher, we find evidence of greater media coverage of earnings announcements and that the greater coverage leads to improvements in investor informedness, information asymmetry, and intraperiod price timeliness, and greater trade by both retail and institutional investors. In contrast to the media serving an expanded role in improving capital markets during more uncertain times, we fail to find that changes in firm-initiated disclosures lead to similar improvements and find that less frequent analyst forecast revisions exacerbate problems in capital markets during earnings announcements.     

An analysis of commodity markets: What gain for investors?

In this paper we study whether the commodity futures market predicts the commodity spot market. Using historical daily data on four commodities—oil, gold, platinum, and silver—we find that they do. We then show how investors can use this information on the futures market to devise trading strategies and make profits. In particular, dynamic trading strategies based on a mean–variance investor framework produce somewhat different results compared with those based on technical trading rules. Dynamic trading strategies suggest that all commodities are profitable and profits are dependent on structural breaks. The most recent global financial crisis marked a period in which commodity profits were the weakest.     

Are small investors naive about incentives?

Security analysts tend to bias stock recommendations upward, particularly if they are affiliated with the underwriter. We analyze how investors account for such distortions. Using the NYSE Trades and Quotations database, we find that large traders adjust their trading response downward. While they exert buy pressure following strong buy recommendations, they display no reaction to buy recommendations and selling pressure following hold recommendations. This “discounting” is even more pronounced when the analyst is affiliated with the underwriter. Small traders, instead, follow recommendations literally. They exert positive pressure following both buy and strong buy recommendations and zero pressure following hold recommendations. We discuss possible explanations for the differences in trading response, including information costs and investor naiveté.     

Quiet bubbles

Motivated by the recent subprime mortgage crisis, we explore whether speculative bubble models of equity based on investor disagreement and short-sales constraints can also provide an explanation for the overvaluation of debt contracts. We find that this is unlikely. Equity bubbles are loud: price and volume go together as investors speculate on capital gains from reselling to more optimistic investors. But this resale option is limited for debt since its upside payoff is bounded. Debt bubbles then require an optimism bias among investors. But greater optimism leads to less speculative trading as investors view the debt as safe and having limited upside. Debt bubbles are hence quiet—high price comes with low volume. We find the predicted price–volume relationship of credits over the 2003–2007 credit boom.