Leverage and investment in diversified firms

Within diversified firms, the negative impact of leverage on investment is significantly greater for high q than for low q segments and significantly greater for non-core than for core segments. This differs substantially from focused firms and is consistent with the view that diversified firms allocate a disproportionate share of their debt service burden to their higher q and non-core segments. We also find that, among low-growth firms, the positive relation between leverage and firm value is significantly weaker in diversified firms than in focused firms. We conclude that the disciplinary benefits of debt are partially offset by the additional managerial discretion in allocating debt service that is provided by the diversified organizational structure.     

Investment and financing constraints in China: Does working capital management make a difference?

We use a panel of over 116,000 Chinese firms of different ownership types over the period 2000–2007 to analyze the linkages between investment in fixed and working capital and financing constraints. We find that those firms characterized by high working capital display high sensitivities of investment in working capital to cash flow (WKS) and low sensitivities of investment in fixed capital to cash flow (FKS). We then construct and analyze firm-level FKS and WKS measures and find that, despite severe external financing constraints, those firms with low FKS and high WKS exhibit the highest fixed investment rates. This suggests that an active management of working capital may help firms to alleviate the effects of financing constraints on fixed investment.     

The effect of foreign segment location on the geographical diversification discount

We study how the countries in which foreign segments are located affect the value of globally-diversified firms. We use the Heritage Foundation/Wall Street Journal Index of Economic Freedom and the World Bank's Financial Development and Structure database to characterize the locations of the foreign segments. We find that U.S. globally-diversified firms with foreign segments in countries with more entrepreneurs (i.e., Business Freedom) and a better investment environment (i.e., Investment Freedom) are associated with higher excess values. Our findings suggest that globally-diversified firms can add value by carefully selecting locations for their foreign segments in countries that rate highly on key indices of economic freedom. Our analysis of the World Bank's Financial Development and Structure factors shows that investors do not value highly U.S. globally-diversified firms with foreign segments in overseas locations that share the same “financial” characteristics as their home country. We attribute that to a lack of heterogeneity between parent- and foreign segment-country characteristics, thus nullifying the diversification benefits for the parent company's shareholders.     

Boards: Does one size fit all?

This paper reexamines the relation between firm value and board structure. We find that complex firms, which have greater advising requirements than simple firms, have larger boards with more outside directors. The relation between Tobin's Q and board size is U-shaped, which, at face value, suggests that either very small or very large boards are optimal. This relation, however, arises from differences between complex and simple firms. Tobin's Q increases (decreases) in board size for complex (simple) firms, and this relation is driven by the number of outside directors. We find some evidence that R&D-intensive firms, for which the firm-specific knowledge of insiders is relatively important, have a higher fraction of insiders on the board and that, for these firms, Q increases with the fraction of insiders on the board. Our findings challenge the notion that restrictions on board size and management representation on the board necessarily enhance firm value.     

Debt enforcement,investment, and risk taking across countries

We argue that the prospect of an imperfect enforcement of debt contracts in default reduces shareholder–debtholder conflicts and induces leveraged firms to invest more and take on less risk as they approach financial distress. To test these predictions, we use a large panel of firms in 41 countries with heterogeneous debt enforcement characteristics. Consistent with our model, we find that the relation between debt enforcement and firms’ investment and risk depends on the firm-specific probability of default. A differences-in-differences analysis of firms’ investment and risk taking in response to bankruptcy reforms that make debt more renegotiable confirms the cross-country evidence.     

Foreign institutional ownership and the speed of leverage adjustment: International evidence

Employing a large sample of 7246 firms across 38 economies from 2000 to 2013, we show a positive relation between foreign institutional ownership (FIO) and firms' speed of leverage adjustment. This positive relation is concentrated for over-leveraged firms that need to decrease financial leverage to rebalance their capital structures. We validate our findings using a 2SLS regression and a DiD estimation to exploit the exogenous variations in FIO generated by the inclusion of MSCI membership and the passage of the JGTRRA. These results suggest that foreign institutional investors play an important monitoring role in mitigating agency conflicts between shareholders and managers. Overall, this paper lends support to the dynamic trade-off theory.     

International tests of a five-factor asset pricing model

Average stock returns for North America, Europe, and Asia Pacific increase with the book-to-market ratio (B/M) and profitability and are negatively related to investment. For Japan, the relation between average returns and B/M is strong, but average returns show little relation to profitability or investment. A five-factor model that adds profitability and investment factors to the three-factor model of Fama and French (1993) largely absorbs the patterns in average returns. As in Fama and French, 2015, Fama and French, 2016, the model's prime problem is failure to capture fully the low average returns of small stocks whose returns behave like those of low profitability firms that invest aggressively.     

FOREIGN INVESTOR PARTICIPATION IN PRIVATIZATIONS: DOES THE INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT MATTER?

We examine the determinants of foreign investors' participation in the privatization process of developing countries. First, we estimate the probability that foreign investors target privatized firms in a given country. We show that a favorable legal environment where investor protection is higher enhances foreign investors' participation. Foreigners also prefer large, strategic firms from high‐growth economies and socially stable countries with low political risk. Second, we restrict our analysis to privatized firms that foreign investors actually choose and show that the stakes foreigners hold are larger if the firms are privatized by private sales as opposed to public offerings.     

Is local bias a cross-border phenomenon? Evidence from individual investors’ international asset allocation

Extant literature consistently documents that investors tilt their domestic equity portfolios towards regionally close stocks (local bias). We hypothesize that individual investors’ local bias is not limited to the domestic sphere but instead also determines their international investment decisions. Our results confirm the presence of a cross-border local bias. Specifically, we show (i) that the stockholdings of individual investors living within regional proximity to a foreign country display a significantly lower foreign investment bias towards investment opportunities in that country and (ii) that this drop in foreign investment bias levels is disproportionately driven by investments in regionally close neighbor-country companies. The impact of cross-border local bias on investors’ bilateral foreign equity investments is economically significant and holds even after controlling for previously identified explanations of international asset allocation.     

Managerial rights,use of investment banks,and the wealth effects for acquiring firms’ shareholders

We examine the relation between managerial rights in acquiring firms and the decision to use an investment bank in merger and acquisition deals, and explore whether this relation impacts the wealth effects for acquiring firms’ shareholders. We find that acquiring firms whose managers have relatively strong rights are more likely to use investment banks to facilitate deals and are more likely to use reputable banks. The wealth effects to acquiring firms are inversely related to the use of investment banks when managerial rights are relatively strong. However, the wealth loss is mitigated when acquiring firms use reputable investment banks.     

Equity issues and temporal variation in information asymmetry

We investigate the intertemporal relation between information asymmetry and equity issues, and particularly focus on which firms drive this relation. We find that when information asymmetry for a particular firm is low compared to the recent past, the firm is more likely to issue equity as opposed to debt. Importantly, this intertemporal association is driven by firms with high levels of information asymmetry. These firms are more prone to adverse selection costs and thus have more to gain by issuing equity after a narrowing of the information gap between managers and investors. Our findings are robust to various firm-specific proxies for information asymmetry.     

Do higher value firms voluntarily disclose more information? Evidence from China

This paper examines the effect of guanxi on the relation between firm value and voluntary disclosure of information about new investment projects in China's institutional setting. We find a negative relation between firm value and voluntary disclosure for firms that rely heavily on guanxi in their value creation (e.g. non-high-tech firms, and firms located in regions with underdeveloped institutions). By contrast, for firms that rely less heavily on guanxi and more on other sources of core competencies (e.g. high-tech firms, and firms in high-marketisation regions), we find a positive relation between firm value and voluntary disclosure. The moderating role of guanxi on the relation between firm value and voluntary disclosure is explained by firms conscientiously balancing the costs and benefits of voluntary disclosure relative to guanxi. Specifically, high guanxi-dependence firms refrain from detailed voluntary disclosures for fear of revealing sensitive information that may harm their guanxi. In contrast, low guanxi-dependence firms rely more heavily on voluntary disclosures to reduce information asymmetry and financing cost, with such incentives being particularly strong for high value firms. Our evidence has implications for research on motives for disclosure and regulation of financial reporting.     

Form versus substance: The effect of ownership structure and corporate governance on firm value in Thailand

We examine the relation between the quality of corporate governance practices and firm value for Thai firms, which often have complex ownership structures. We develop a comprehensive measure of corporate governance and show that, in contrast to conventional measures of corporate governance, our measurement, on average, is positively associated with Tobin’s q. Furthermore, we find that q values are lower for firms that exhibit deviations between cash flow rights and voting rights. We also find that the value benefits of complying with “good” corporate governance practices are nullified in the presence of pyramidal ownership structures, raising doubts on the effectiveness of governance measures when ownership structures are not transparent. We conclude that family control of firms through pyramidal ownership structures can allow firms to seemingly comply with preferred governance practices but also use the control to their advantage.     

Heterogeneity in the Effect of Managerial Equity Incentives on Firm Value

We document significant heterogeneity in the relation between chief executive officer (CEO) equity incentives and firm value using quantile regression. We show that CEO delta is more effective in the presence of ample investment opportunities, while CEO vega is more beneficial for firms lacking investment opportunities. Further, Tobin's Q increases in CEO delta for more risk‐tolerant firms but increases in CEO vega for more risk‐averse firms. We also observe that higher monitoring intensity after the Sarbanes‐Oxley Act reduces CEO delta's role in compensation. Risk aversion alters the optimal incentive‐value relation, and the nature of this relation also depends on the level of Tobin's Q.     

Banking system reform and investment–cash flow relation: Case of a small transition economy

This research examines the effect of banking system reform which is measured by foreign bank's presence on investment–cash flow relation in a context of a small transition economy. The U-shape relation between investment and cash flow is found. We also find evidence that the presence of foreign banks in Vietnam results in decreasing in dependence on local banks and has changed corporate investment behaviors. Company investments are less reliant on internal cash flow in the post reform period. Although overinvestment of state controlled firms is not reduced but underinvestment problem of non-state-controlled listed firms is mitigated due to better accessibility to bank loans. The investigated relation between investment and leverage is robust for this conclusion.     

The stock market valuation of human capital creation

We develop a measure of firm-year-specific human capital investment from publicly disclosed personnel expenses (PE) and examine the stock market valuation of this investment. Measuring the future value of PE (PEFV) based on the relation between lagged PE and current operating income, we first show that PEFV is positively associated with characteristics of human-capital-intensive firms. Next, we find that PEFV has a positive pricing coefficient, implying that the market recognizes some of its variation. In our main analysis, we find that market participants fail to fully impound the investment in human capital. The absolute value of analyst forecast errors is increasing in firm PEFV, and the signed value of these errors reveals that analysts are pessimistic for earnings of firms with high human capital investments. A long-short portfolio based on PEFV produces annualized value-weighted (equal-weighted) abnormal returns of 6.5% (3.5%). Portfolios formed by interacting PEFV with total PE, which combines the current potential investment in human capital with the historic portion of PE that created human capital, increase these returns to between 4.8% and 7.8%. These results are insensitive to numerous empirical choices.     

Testing limits to policy reversal: Evidence from Indian privatizations

We examine the effect of regime change on privatization. In the 2004 Indian election, the pro-reform BJP was unexpectedly defeated by a less reformist coalition. Stock prices of government-controlled companies that had been slated for privatization by the BJP dropped 3.5% relative to private firms. Government-controlled companies that were under study for possible privatization fell 7.5% relative to private firms. This is consistent with investor belief of a “point of no return,” where advanced reforms are more difficult to reverse. Further analysis suggests that layoffs, combined with the privatization announcement, served as a credible commitment to privatize.     

Nonlinear Effects of Debt on Investment: Evidence from Dutch Listed Firms

Abstract

Nonlinear effects of debt on investment are investigated using an unbalanced panel of 94 Dutch listed nonfinancial firms during the period 1985–2000. Evidence shows that the nonlinear relation between debt and investment can be represented by a U curve, which contradicts the financial constraints theory. One possible explanation of the U curve relation between debt and investment may be the debt capital gain in the presence of inflation.     

Opacity of young businesses: Evidence from rating disagreements

A conventional wisdom in the contemporary corporate finance literature argues that small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) are informationally opaque. We use data from two credit information companies and in particular their disagreements over the creditworthiness of SMEs to study the empirical relevance of this often invoked assumption. Our panel data analysis shows that once unobserved firm-effects are controlled for, the disagreements (i.e., rating splits) are inversely related to the age of firms. We are not able to document such a robust relationship between the disagreements and the size of firms. This finding holds a lesson for empirical corporate finance researchers who need firm-level proxies for informational imperfections and asymmetries: of the two often-used proxies, firm size is not as closely related to informational opacity as firm age is.     

Capital investment,internationalization, and firm performance: Evidence from Southeast Asian countries

This study asks whether firms that invest more have higher degrees of internationalization and whether firms with higher degrees of internationalization perform better than those with lower degrees of internationalization. Using a large panel sample that consists of non-financial firms in five countries in the Southeast Asia region during the period 1990–2014, I show that capital investment negatively affects the level of internationalization but has a positive effect on foreign sales growth. The negative effect of capital investment on internationalization levels is weaker for firms with higher degrees of internationalization. The level of internationalization is not associated with firm performance, measured as return on assets; however, there is some evidence for the positive relation between the level of internationalization and firm performance, measured as the stock return.