审计人员的谈判让步策略与客户的谈判判断:一项实验证据

审计谈判策略是影响审计谈判的重要因素。本文采用实验研究方法检验注册会计师使用的谈判让步策略对客户财务负责人谈判判断的影响。研究结果发现,客户同意的审计差异调整金额在注册会计师使用逐步让步策略时显著高于注册会计师使用初始让步策略,并且客户对审计人员最终决定的审计调整金额的满意度和继续聘用该注册会计师的可能性在注册会计师使用逐步让步策略时也明显较高。这表明使用逐步让步策略审计质量更高,也更有利于审计人员。     

激励因素、模糊情境与审计判断

审计判断是影响审计质量的重要因素，新会计准则和新审计准则的实施进一步加大了审计判断的空间。任何审计判断都是在一定的环境下做出的，激励是重要的环境因素，因此激励因素不可避免地会对审计判断产生影响。本文以我国为被试，以我国注册会计师个体判断模型为基础，检验客户重要性、诉讼风险与预期复核意见三个激励因素对审计判断的影响。实验结果表明，客户重要性、诉讼风险对审计人员判断产生明显影响。客户越为重要，审计人员接受客户提出的会计处理意见的可能性就越大；面临的诉讼风险越高，审计人员接受客户提出的会计处理意见的可能性就越小。预期复核意见与诉讼风险产生了交互影响，诉讼风险高且预期复核意见不一致时，审计人员的判断会变得更加保守。此外，在高诉讼风险的情况下，签字注册会计师比非签字的注册会计师表现的更加保守。     

事务所客户重要性影响审计质量吗?——来自A股市场2003—2006年的证据

客户重要性对审计质量的影响是不确定的,随着时间的推移,各国制度环境发生变化,客户重要性对事务所审计质量的影响也在改变。本文以我国A股市场2003—2006年数据为样本,实证检验客户重要性对事务所审计质量的影响。结果发现,在2004年和2005年,客户重要性与审计质量不存在统计上的显著关系;2006年,客户重要性与审计质量显著正相关。进而对会计师事务所分组检验,在"十大"样本组,客户重要性与审计质量没有显著统计关系;在"非十大"样本组,2006年客户重要性与审计质量在1%水平上显著正相关。统计结果表明,我国审计环境得到了有效改善,对重要客户更加谨慎。     

董事会特征、资产质量与审计收费研究

本文利用我国2001-2003年上市公司数据,实证研究了董事会特征、资产质量与审计收费的关系。研究发现,总体上看,上市公司资产质量越差,董事会越独立,审计收费越低。而董事会越勤勉,审计收费越高,董事会规模与审计收费没有呈现相关性。同时,会计事务所会综合考虑公司资产质量与董事会特征,表现在对资产质量越差,董事会越勤勉的公司收费越高。同时也发现,“四大”与非“四大”会计事务所审计费用影响因素存在显著差异。     

证监会全面检查会计师事务所能提高审计质量吗？——基于“双随机、一公开”的准自然实验

提升审计质量离不开有效的外部监管。证监会对会计师事务所实施的全面检查能否提高其审计质量一直是学界和业界共同关心的重要问题。本文采用双重差分法研究发现,相较于未接受证监会全面检查的会计师事务所,接受证监会全面检查的会计师事务所在经历全面检查后审计质量显著提升,且这一结果主要体现在会计师事务所（审计师）客户重要性低、事务所规模大和审计客户财务复杂度低的样本中。研究结果表明,即使在审计行业面临多重监管的背景下,证监会实施的全面检查仍然对会计师事务所的审计质量提升产生了实质性影响。本文证实了证监会随机抽查制度中设置全面检查方式的积极意义,对优化审计监管方式,提高监管效率具有一定的政策启示。     

客户重要性对审计质量影响实证分析——来自A股市场的经验证据

从投资者的角度出发,用盈余反应系数来衡量审计质量,以2005-2007年A股上市公司为样本,实证检验客户重要性对审计质量的影响。研究表明:客户重要性会影响会计师事务所的审计质量,当客户对事务所越重要时,审计师会越谨慎,审计质量越高。     

客户重要性与审计质量初探——基于A股市场2010-2014年的证据

审计质量是注册会计师发现并报告出财务报告错误或舞弊行为的联合概率,主要取决于注册会计师的专业胜任能力和独立性,本文从注册会计师独立性的角度出发,探究了客户重要性对审计质量的影响以及"四大"会计师事务所对两者关系的不同影响。文章以沪深两市A股上市公司2010-2014年的数据为样本进行实证检验,结果发现,客户重要性与审计质量间无显著的统计关系。进一步将上市公司的审计事务所按"四大"和"非四大"分组进行检验,结果发现,在"四大"样本组,客户重要性与审计质量有着显著的负向关系,而在"非四大"样本组,客户重要性与审计质量没有显著的统计关系。     

保险理赔中的谈判技巧

谈判技巧在保险理赔中有着十分重要的作用，因为保险工作是一种商业行为，理赔人员代表保险公司与客户、第三者以及有关利益方进行交涉，是商业谈判的一种形式。在理赔工作中，保险工作人员与客户的协商谈判，可以说是最简单的一种博弈模型，实际情况中还要加入第三者、修理厂、有关利益方（比如执法部门和公共管理部门）等变量。     

进行有效沟通 实现审计服务职能

近年来，我行各级机构对内部审计在经营管理中的重要作用有了更高的认识，对内部审计工作大多能够积极支持与配合。但也还有一些被审计单位对内部审计仍抱有一定的偏见，造成审计成果不能被充分利用，影响了审计价值的提升。究其原因是多方面的，除了被审计单位对经营与管理关系的认识存在误区，人为割裂内控管理与经营发展的联系，片面强调利润最大化目标，过于看重自身的短期利益和政绩以外，从审计人员角度分析，一个很重要的原因就是内部审计人员在与被审计单位的沟通方面存在欠缺。被审计单位不能充分理解一些有价值的审计发现和审计建议，审计发现问题的整改率和审计建议的采纳率不尽如人意，内部审计的价值就不能得到充分体现。沟通方面出现问题，审计主、客体双方都有责任。但是按照总行提出的“以客户为中心”的经营理念，应该说被审计单位就是我们内部审计人员服务的客户，笔者难过观察，发现作为审计人员在为“客户”服务时，还有一些不足之处。主要表现在：个别审计人员职责定位不准确，似乎自己就是钦差大臣、上级领导，行为方式易引起被审计单位的对立情绪；还有一些审计人员在与被审计单位交流时，虽然提出的问题是有理有据，但沟通的方法生硬，缺乏技巧，让被审计单位难以接受。     

会计师事务所合并对审计质量的影响机理研究——基于2007-2009年的合并案例

基于2007-2009年间证券市场上内资非十大所合并成为内资十大所案例,文章分析了合并对审计质量的影响,发现:事务所合并没有提高不变更事务所客户的审计质量,合并后变更到非十大所的客户审计质量明显过低,合并后变更到十大所的客户与不变更事务所的客户审计质量接近。这表明事务所合并后提高了审计质量标准,使审计质量过低的客户变更审计师。     

The impact of auditor rotation on auditor–client negotiation

This paper reports the results of an experiment designed to investigate how mandatory audit firm rotation affects auditor–client negotiations. Drawing upon process theories of negotiation, we examine the strategies used by auditors and clients as well as the outcomes of their negotiations in alternative settings in which mandatory rotation is imposed or is not imposed. We posit that mandatory rotation changes (1) the dynamics of the audit market by increasing the number of clients who are in the market for a new auditor, and (2) the political costs to a client who switches auditors. These changes, in turn, alter the willingness of the auditor and the client to cooperate during negotiation. The results suggest that with mandatory rotation auditors adopt less cooperative negotiation strategies, producing asset values that are more in line with the auditor’s preferences than with the client’s preferences and more negotiation impasses.     

The relative effectiveness of persuasion tactics in auditor–client negotiations

In this study, we examine the effectiveness of four persuasive arguments that auditors may use to convince clients to accept their desired position in auditor–client negotiations. In addition, we investigate how the style in which the argument is communicated by the auditor impacts its effectiveness. Our results indicate that the type of persuasion tactic used by auditors significantly impacts the amount of concessions made by clients. Specifically, we find that, while threatening to qualify the audit opinion can result in significant client concessions, a tactic of simply informing the client that other companies have handled the accounting issue in a way consistent with the auditor’s preference is as effective, or more effective, than all of the other tactics examined at eliciting significant concessions as well as engendering positive affect toward the auditor. This result is consistent with findings from the persuasion literature relating to the pervasive power of social validation. We also find that clients offer more concessions, evaluate the auditor more positively, and are more satisfied with the negotiation outcome when auditors communicate their arguments using a cooperative, as opposed to a contentious, communication style. The results of this study indicate that auditors may benefit from training in persuasion tactics in order to achieve more desirable negotiation outcomes.     

Audit Reporting of Big 4 Versus Non-Big 4 Auditors: The Case of Ex-Andersen Clients

This paper examines audit reporting of Big 4 auditors versus non-Big 4 auditors for ex-Andersen clients and other clients. It suggests that ex-Andersen clients are more risky than other clients and are able to exert more influence than other clients on non-Big 4 auditors because they are larger in size than other non-Big 4 auditees. In addition, Big 4 auditors are more risk-averse and able to withstand clients' pressure than non-Big 4 auditors. The results show that Big 4 auditors are more likely than non-Big 4 auditors to issue going-concern opinions to ex-Andersen clients or restrict the level of discretionary accruals of those clients compared with other clients. Further, ex-Andersen clients of Big 4 auditors would have had a lower likelihood of receiving going-concern opinions or higher levels of discretionary accruals had reporting practices for other clients been applied. Ex-Andersen clients of non-Big 4 auditors would have had a higher likelihood of going-concern opinions or lower levels of discretionary accruals. Hence, the suggestion to reduce the Big 4 concentration in the audit market by allowing non-Big 4 firms a larger market share should be viewed prudently. Overall, these results are consistent with the suggestion that litigation risk and client pressure are important factors in audit reporting.     

The effect of gender and firm identification on auditor pre-negotiation judgments

This paper extends current auditor negotiation research by considering the effects of two dimensions of auditors' identity that are posited to be relevant to auditors' negotiation: gender and audit firm identification. Women earn over half of college degrees in accounting, and hold more than half of accounting and auditing positions in the US, yet the balance of the gender of partners at audit firms is currently not equal (AICPA, 2017). However, as more women advance into partnership positions in firms, it is increasingly important to have an understanding of how gender affects the behaviors, processes and outcomes of negotiation, and thus the quality of financial statements. The auditor-client negotiation context has features, such as ambiguity and representation of others that can “trigger” the salience of auditors' gender and firm identity. Once salient, these two dimensions of auditors' identity shape auditors' motivational orientation towards negotiations, which, in turn, affects the auditors' negotiation behavior and negotiation outcomes.The study finds that male and female auditors approach the negotiation over audit adjustments differently. Although many negotiation studies find that males negotiate more aggressively than do females, auditor-client negotiation offers a unique setting that has been found to reverse this common trend. We hypothesize and find that female auditors recommend higher audit adjustments than males. However, the level of firm identification moderates female's recommended audit adjustments such that at higher levels of firm identification, the larger audit adjustments recommended by females decrease. This finding is consistent with the growing research on gender differences in auditing and the research on gender and risk tolerance, which find females to be more risk averse, but contrary to much of the negotiation research which shows males as more aggressive and achieving higher negotiated outcomes. In supplemental analysis, we find that our results hold in the senior manager subsample but not in the partner subsample. This result is consistent with theory on gender differences which suggests that the differences will disappear with increased occupational socialization (Smith & Rogers, 2000). Practical implications are discussed.     

Busy auditors,financial reporting timeliness and quality

We investigate whether audit partners with multiple clients are able to complete their audits in a timely fashion, an important but largely unexplored area of academic research. One view is that having multiple clients increases the knowledge and experience of the audit partner resulting in a more efficient and therefore, quicker audit. On the other hand, having multiple clients may over-burden an audit partner resulting in a slower audit process and longer completion times. We find that audit partners with multiple clients take longer to complete their annual audit. More importantly, we also find that companies with busy auditors who take longer to complete their audits also have poorer levels of financial reporting quality. Additionally, in terms of consequences for busy auditors, firms with lengthy audit report lag switched their auditors the next year suggesting that busy audit partners may lose clients if their workload is excessive and they are not able to maintain audit quality. Our results are robust to alternative measures for both audit report lag and audit partner busyness and a range of endogeneity tests. We also undertake simultaneous quantile regression to assess changes in audit report lag depending on the number of audit clients per partner where we find preliminary evidence of a knowledge spill-over effect. Consequently, our results have implications for companies, audit firms, regulators and other key stakeholders.     

Toward an Archival Measure of the Likelihood of Auditor–Client Management Negotiation: An Exploration of the Audit Lag Measures Conjecture*

Salterio (2012) hypothesized that adaptations of an audit efficiency measure, audit report lag (the length of time between the financial statement year‐end date and the auditor's report date), could provide measures of underlying auditor–client management (ACM) negotiation likelihood. Salterio argued that these measures would enable archival researchers to examine issues that heretofore were the exclusive domain of experimental and field researchers. Using an audit report lag measure and a measure of abnormal audit report lag lags (the residual based on audit report lag determinants model), we show that a larger lag is associated with higher audit fees after controlling for other known determinants of audit fees. We also show that larger lags are associated with higher levels of discretionary accruals—that is, lower accrual quality. Based on our findings, we suggest that there is support for Salterio's hypothesis that audit report lags and abnormal audit report provide valid archival proxies for the differences in year‐end ACM negotiation likelihood. We suggest that this proxy will allow researchers to study issues related to published accounting numbers in light of whether negotiations are likely to have occurred in addition to providing regulators and others the means to determine what clients of audit firms are more likely to have different types of ACM relationships.     

Public Attention and Auditor Behavior: The Case of Hurun Rich List in China

Adverse client publicity can entail regulatory scrutiny over audited financial statements and impose political costs on auditors. We use the changes in client publicity caused by their controlling owners’ presence on the Hurun Rich List (the rich listing) in China to test the hypothesis that auditor conservatism increases with client publicity. Our evidence indicates auditors issue more adverse audit opinions to clients and charge higher fees following the rich listing events. Moreover, we observe that auditors strategically respond to clients with different attributes—for clients whose owners accumulated wealth in a more questionable manner, auditors choose more stringent audit reporting to better defend themselves from regulatory scrutiny; for clients without such attributes, auditors primarily rely on increasing audit fees to cope with any post-listing increase in audit risks. Our analyses also suggest the impacts of rich listings tend to be concentrated among large audit firms with stronger reputation concerns or among engagement auditors with more conservative reporting styles. By showing how auditors manage political risks associated with heightened public scrutiny, we contribute to both the auditing and political cost literature.     

Information sharing between mutual funds and auditors

This paper examines whether there is information sharing between mutual funds and their auditors about the auditors’ other listed firm clients. Using data from the Chinese market, we find that mutual funds earn higher profits from trading in firms that share the same auditors. The effects are more pronounced when firms have a more opaque information environment and when the audit partners for the fund and the partners for the listed firm share school ties. The evidence is consistent with information flowing from auditors to mutual funds, providing mutual funds with an information advantage in firms that share the same auditors. Our findings are robust to the use of audit-firm mergers and acquisitions (M&As) as exogenous shocks and several other robustness checks. We further find that auditors benefit by charging higher audit fees for mutual fund clients and by improving their audit quality for listed firm clients. Our study provides evidence of bi-directional information sharing between two important market intermediaries.     

Client importance and audit partner independence

We use data from Taiwan where audit partners are required to sign audit reports to examine whether audit partners compromise their independence for economically important clients. Uniquely, we include both listed and unlisted clients in audit partners’ client portfolios and separately study these clients for Big N and non-Big N auditors. We employ multiple proxies for auditor independence, including various abnormal accruals measures, the propensity of audit partners to issue modified audit opinions, and the probability that clients meet or just beat earnings targets. We fail to find evidence that Big N audit partners compromise their independence for economically important clients; however, we find such evidence for non-Big N auditors. Our results are robust to a battery of sensitivity analyses. While our inferences are limited to the Taiwanese capital market, our study may be of interest to market participants and regulators in other well developed capital markets.     

审计师收取客户债务风险溢价了吗?

已有研究发现,公司债务风险越高,审计师收取的审计费用越高;然而,审计费用提高的原因可能是审计投入的增加,也可能是审计师收取客户公司的债务风险溢价。由于缺少审计投入的数据,已有研究无法回答审计师是否收取客户公司债务风险溢价的问题。本文以我国A股上市公司为研究样本,运用我国独到的审计工时数据,就此展开相关问题研究。研究发现,在控制了审计投入之后,客户债务风险与审计费用显著正相关,表明审计师收取了客户公司的债务风险溢价。进一步研究表明,审计师对财务状况较差和治理较差的公司以及非国有企业收取更高的债务风险溢价,规模较小的会计师事务所收取的债务风险溢价高于规模较大的会计师事务所。