上市公司财务重述行为研究

高质量的会计信息是保证证券市场有效性的基础,而财务报告则是投资者获取公司信息的主要途径,财务重述行为反映了上市公司财务信息披露的不规范和随意性。本文首先对上市公司进行财务重述的原因进行分析,并深入研究财务重述所带来的各种经济后果,最后提出若干政策建议。     

财务重述研究述评

财务重述是对存在错误或误导性信息的历史财务报告进行事后补救的公告行为。20世纪90年代末以来,上市公司日趋频繁和普遍的财务重述引起了学术界的广泛关注。研究财务重述,不仅有助于提高上市公司信息披露质量、加强投资者保护和改进政府机构监管,也将为今后进一步完善我国财务重述制度提供有益的借鉴。本文首次对财务重述的相关研究进行了较为全面、系统的回顾,着重从财务重述的经济后果、动因和影响因素等方面进行文献爬梳并评价现有文献存在的问题和不足之处,总结了国内外最新研究动态,以期为中国上市公司财务重述问题的研究提供依据。     

盈余管理与企业投资决策——来自中国上市公司的经验证据

本文根据对财务重述公司各时间区间数据的研究,考察了盈余管理对企业投资决策的影响。本文根据2002至2008年公布的财务重述报告,研究了财务重述期间及财务重述发生前后企业投资规模的变化情况,结果表明,财务重述事项的发生引起了企业投资规模的扩大,财务重述报告发布后,企业的投资情况趋于正常水平,说明盈余管理引起了企业的过度投资,影响了企业的投资决策。     

财务重述公司盈余反应系数研究——基于中国上市公司年报财务重述的经验证据

GAO(2002)的研究报告指出,投资者对财务报告的信心是证券市场有效运作的重要保证。近年来,财务重述现象在国内外呈现出蔓延局势,国外一系列研究表明财务重述对公司价值产生负面影响,而比短期的市场价值受损更可怕的是投资者对重述公司的信任度大打折扣,对整个资本市场的信心下降。中国上市公司的重述现象也不容乐观,但是对于财务重述经济后果的研究相对较少。因此本文主要考察重述报告对重述公司的盈余反应系数的影响,通过理论分析与数据检验投资者对财务重述公司盈余信息的反应程度,研究发现重述公告使重述公司特别是涉及核心会计指标重述公司盈余反应系数降低。以期通过本文的研究为上市公司敲响警钟,并为监管部门对财务重述行为进行规范监管提供经验证据。     

财务重述发生的制度背景分析

财务重述研究已成热潮,但现有研究设计中对制度背景考虑不足。本文通过对财务重述发生机制进行分析,提出了主动披露和被动披露的不同原因。分析表明,我国特色的产权性质和政府治理特征是财务重述相关研究设计中需要重点关注的问题。     

浅析上市公司财务报表重述

自2007年1月1日开始实施的《企业会计准则第28号—会计政策、会计估计变更和会计差错更正》标志着我国财务重述制度的逐渐规范,也伴随着资本市场滥用财务重述制度进行利润操纵等行为,本文分析财务报表重述的现状,从四个方面对提高会计信息质量提出建议.     

财务重述对会计师事务所解聘的影响研究

本文通过检验财务重述后客户解聘会计师事务所的情况以及事务所变更方向是否受到财务重述的影响,扩展了以往相关文献的研究内容。本文发现在财务重述后的一年内,事务所被解聘的频率在财务重述公司中要高于未发生财务重述的公司。此外,本文检验了财务重述对事务所变更方向的影响。尽管未发现财务重述与事务所变更方向之间存在显著关系,但发现与舞弊相关的重述公司在财务重述后将事务所变更为更具有声誉的事务所,而与差错相关的重述公司在财务重述后将事务所变更为更为顺从的事务所。本文的结论表明差错类重述公司在财务重述后解聘原事务所以试图寻求更为顺从的事务所,而舞弊类重述公司在财务重述后解聘事务所旨在恢复其受损的声誉。     

审计师行业专长、产品市场竞争与财务重述——来自中国证券市场的经验证据

以2007~2012年我国 A 股上市公司为样本,对审计师行业专长与财务重述的关系,以及产品市场竞争程度对两者关系的影响进行实证研究。结果表明：审计师行业专长有助于降低财务重述发生的概率;产品市场竞争则削弱了审计师行业专长对财务重述行为的抑制作用。     

财务重述与审计相关问题研究综述

财务重述是上市公司在发现并纠正前期财务报告差错时,重新表述以前公布的财务报表的行为。注册会计师审计与财务重述之间有着千丝万缕的联系,本文从审计的视角出发,对国内外财务重述与审计相关问题进行了综述,并就国内外研究文献进行了对比分析,以期为该领域的未来研究奠定基础。     

公司治理结构与财务重述的关系研究

论文采用计量方法和多案例研究法,探究了公司治理结构对财务重述的影响以及财务重述后公司治理结构的变化。从股权结构、董事会和管理层三方面表征公司治理结构的概念,并基于2014-2018年沪深A股上市公司11772个样本的计量分析发现:股权集中度和高管薪酬与财务重述呈显著负相关关系,董事长总经理一肩挑和董事会规模与财务重述之间呈显著的正相关关系。后续基于103家已发生财务重述公司的多案例研究发现:当财务重述发生后,公司内部治理结构也往往进行一些调整,提高股权集中度、减少董事长总经理一肩挑情况、缩小董事会规模、变更高管人员和提升高管薪酬等是一般的应对措施。论文的研究工作对公司治理结构调整、防范财务重述等具有启示作用,同时,也对财务重述和公司治理结构的相关研究提供了新的视角。     

The Timeliness of Restatement Disclosures and Financial Reporting Credibility

This study investigates whether prompt discovery and disclosure of earnings restatements is associated with greater post‐restatement financial reporting credibility. We measure the timeliness of restatement detection by the length of time between the end of the misstated period and the subsequent restatement announcement. We document that shorter detection periods are significantly associated with high‐quality corporate governance characteristics and executive and/or auditor turnover, but not with characteristics of restatements. We also find that firms with shorter detection periods exhibit a more moderate decline in the information content of earnings following restatement announcements relative to firms with longer detection periods, and that detection period length has an incremental effect on the information content of earnings relative to executive and/or auditor turnover alone. In addition, we find that restatement disclosures are more timely following the implementation of the SOX‐era reforms, and that only firms with shorter detection periods experience more moderate post‐restatement declines in the information content of earnings following the implementation of the SOX‐era reforms. The results from this study suggest that the timeliness of restatement detection and disclosure is associated with greater financial reporting credibility following restatements.     

Understanding the Restatement Process

Much research examines investors' reactions to restatements and the effects of restatements on chief executive officer (CEO), chief financial officer (CFO), and auditor turnover; however, little research explores the process of restating financial reports. In this study, we investigate the process of issuing a restatement. We specifically focus on the interactions among the parties involved (e.g., CFO, board, audit committee, audit partner, and regulators) in determining and ultimately resolving a restatement, as well as the impact of the restatement on the relationships among these parties. We investigate the restatement process via semi‐structured interviews. We immersed ourselves in the restatement process by interviewing all parties typically involved, such as CFOs, auditors, and regulators. Given the findings in the auditor–client management negotiation area, which suggest that negotiation of accounting treatment and disclosure is frequent, our findings indicate that negotiations and/or difficult discussions take place among the parties involved when determining whether a restatement is necessary as well as in achieving the ultimate restatement outcome. Our findings (based on a small sample) suggest that the restatement process may influence or be influenced by such factors as the nature of the misstatement, the party that identified the misstatement, the reaction of the various parties to the misstatement, disagreement among the parties on whether to restate, communication with the regulator, the press release, client size, the personality of the CFO, audit committee strength, and the relationships among the parties subsequent to the restatement.     

中国证券市场年报补丁公司特征研究

在上市公司午报披露之后，屡屡可见公司对年报的各类补充公告与更正公告（即年报补丁），年报朴丁不仅受到媒体的强烈抨击，也为监管部门所关注。本文选取发布2001～2003年年报补丁的公司作为研究样本，并分年度、行业、公司规模选取配对样本，考察补丁公司的经济特征，研究表明，相对配对样本而言，补丁公司的业绩较差，公目的总资产增长较快，较少设置审计委员会，且审计质量较差。     

财务重述、管理层权力与股价崩盘风险：来自中国证券市场的经验证据

股市震荡引发投资者和监管层对股价崩盘风险的关注。从财务重述背后所反映的财务信息质量低下和公司治理失效出发,探讨其对股价崩盘风险的影响,结合管理层权力这一影响组织行为和产出能力的代理人特征,探讨其对财务重述与股价崩盘风险之间关系的影响。研究结果表明：相比未发生财务重述的公司,发生了财务重述的公司的股价崩盘风险明显更高;进一步纳入代理人特征———管理层权力后,发现代理人的这一特征对上述关系有明显的促进作用。     

Do post-restatement firms care about financial credibility? Evidence from the pre- and post-SOX eras

This study examines whether negative-market-reaction firms in the year following restatement announcements adopt more conservative financial reporting to respond to their financial reporting credibility crisis, especially in the post-SOX era. Using Basu’s (1997) measure of conservatism, we find that negative-market-reaction firms in the year following restatement announcements report their financial statements more conservatively in the post-SOX era, as the market reaction following restatement announcements becomes more severe. We also find that as the negative market restatement reaction becomes more severe, negative-market-reaction firms using a Big N auditor in the year following financial restatements report their financial statements more conservatively in the post-SOX era.     

Corporate Investments: Learning from Restatements

This study analyzes the information conveyed by the restatements of financial reports. We argue that restatements contain news about the investment projects of the restating firms' competitors. This news causes competitors to revise their beliefs about the projects' value, and to modify their subsequent investment decisions. Accordingly, we hypothesize that changes in competitors' investments after restatement announcements are related to news in the restatements. Consistent with our prediction, we find that changes in competitors' investments following restatement announcements are significantly related to various proxies for news in the restatements, such as competitors' and restating firms' abnormal returns at the restatement announcements. We conclude that restatements convey information about the investment projects of restating firms' competitors.     

金融发展影响了公司成熟度与现金股利政策的关系吗?

选取留存收益股权比反映公司成熟度,研究不同金融发展水平下,公司成熟度与现金股利的关系,实证结果显示,伴随公司成熟度的提高,公司实施积极现金股利政策的动机会显著提升;金融发展在提高公司成熟度与现金股利支付倾向正向关系的同时,由于提供更多的投资机会,却弱化了公司成熟度与现金股利支付水平的正向关系。进一步研究发现,金融发展水平的提升能够推迟成熟公司首次对外支付现金股利的时机;其对公司成熟度与现金股利政策关系的影响作用主要源于金融发展的"治理效应"路径;将金融发展分为信贷市场发展和股权市场发展,发现与信贷市场促进公司成熟度与现金股利支付倾向正相关关系不同,股权市场抑制了公司成熟度与现金股利支付倾向及支付水平的正相关关系。     

Management Guidance Pre‐ and Post‐Restatement

We examine whether the quality of restating firms’ management guidance differs in periods before and after restatement announcements. While characteristics of restating firms and the consequences of restatement have been a central topic in accounting and auditing research, the quality of management guidance around restatements is less well understood. We consider two competing characterizations of the link between management forecast accuracy and bias and restatement (an event that tends to signal poor financial controls): “Forecast–Opportunism Explanation” and “Forecast–Ability Explanation”. Under the Forecast–Opportunism Explanation, pre‐restatement weaknesses in financial controls enable managers to manipulate earnings toward forecasts and to meet or exceed opportunistically biased forecasts, and the post‐restatement strengthening of financial controls constrains opportunistic behavior. Under the Forecast–Ability Explanation, pre‐restatement weaknesses in financial controls impede managers’ ability to issue accurate forecasts, and post‐restatement improvements remove impediments so that the accuracy of forecasts improves; forecast bias remains unaffected. Evidence indicates that before a restatement, restating firms’ forecasts are more accurate and relatively more downwardly biased than control firms’ forecasts. Post‐restatement, restating firms have less accurate and less downwardly biased management guidance. Our overall results are consistent with the Forecast–Opportunism Explanation.     

Corporate misreporting and bank loan contracting

This paper is the first to study the effect of financial restatement on bank loan contracting. Compared with loans initiated before restatement, loans initiated after restatement have significantly higher spreads, shorter maturities, higher likelihood of being secured, and more covenant restrictions. The increase in loan spread is significantly larger for fraudulent restating firms than other restating firms. We also find that after restatement, the number of lenders per loan declines and firms pay higher upfront and annual fees. These results are consistent with banks using tighter loan contract terms to overcome risk and information problems arising from financial restatements.