Does Shareholder Composition Matter? Evidence from the Market Reaction to Corporate Earnings Announcements

We examine whether institutional ownership composition is related to parameters of the market reaction to negative earnings announcements. When firms report earnings below analysts' expectations, the stock price response is more negative for firms with higher levels of ownership by momentum or aggressive growth investors. There is no evidence, however, that these institutions cause an “overreaction” to earnings news. Ownership structure is also related to trading volume and to stock price volatility on days around earnings announcements. Our findings are consistent with the idea that the composition of institutional shareholders effects stock price behavior around the release of corporate information.     

Options trading volume and stock price response to earnings announcements

We examine the effect of options trading volume on the stock price response to earnings announcements over the period 1996–2007. Contrary to previous studies, we find no significant difference in the immediate stock price response to earnings information announcements in samples split between firms with listed options and firms without listed options. However, within the sample of firms with listed options stratified by options volume, we find that higher options trading volume reduces the immediate stock price response to earnings announcements. This conforms with evidence that stock prices of high options trading volume firms have anticipated and pre-empted some earnings information in the pre-announcement period. We also find that higher abnormal options trading volume around earnings announcements hastens the stock price adjustment to earnings news and reduces post-earnings announcement drift.     

Public Predisclosure Information, Firm Size, Analyst Following, and Market Reactions to Earnings Announcements

Abstract:   This study examines the effects of public predisclosure information on market reactions to earnings announcements. We develop an empirical measure of public predisclosure information impounded in price prior to earnings announcements by cumulating abnormal returns on public news release dates during the quarter. Consistent with prior literature, we document a negative association between this measure and market reactions to subsequent earnings announcements. Moreover, we find that after controlling for this measure, firm size and analyst following are significantly positively associated with market reactions to earnings announcements. Contrary to prior empirical evidence, our results suggest that, after controlling for actual predisclosure information impounded in price, market reactions to earnings announcements are greater in magnitude for larger, more widely-followed firms than for smaller, less widely-followed firms.     

The information content of earnings announcements: new insights from intertemporal and cross-sectional behavior

This study examines the information content of quarterly earnings announcements, measured as the magnitude of stock price revision at earnings announcements relative to price revision at other times. We investigate whether quarterly earnings announcements are informative using a nonparametric approach and 1971–2011 sample period. The findings affirm prior evidence on earlier sample periods that significantly more information is conveyed to investors in the three days around earnings announcements than in randomly chosen three-day periods. Next, we examine the behavior of information content over our sample period and document four key findings. First, there is a dramatic increase in information content at earnings dates from 2001 onward. Second, the market reaction to loss firms is substantially less than that for profitable firms. Third, there is a significantly greater reaction to larger firms. Fourth, reaction at earnings dates is significantly increasing in analyst coverage, and once analyst coverage is controlled, the association with size becomes less significant.     

Earnings Announcements and Systematic Risk

Firms scheduled to report earnings earn an annualized abnormal return of 9.9%. We propose a risk‐based explanation for this phenomenon, whereby investors use announcements to revise their expectations for nonannouncing firms, but can only do so imperfectly. Consequently, the covariance between firm‐specific and market cash flow news spikes around announcements, making announcers especially risky. Consistent with our hypothesis, announcer returns forecast aggregate earnings. The announcement premium is persistent across stocks, and early (late) announcers earn higher (lower) returns. Nonannouncers' response to announcements is consistent with our model, both over time and across firms. Finally, exposure to announcement risk is priced.     

Earnings forecasts and idiosyncratic volatilities

We test the theoretical relation between idiosyncratic return volatilities and the volatilities of cash-flow news based on the expected returns on equity (ROE) for CRSP stocks over the period 1977–2008. Consistent with economic intuition, we find that using analyst forecasts of earnings is superior to using realized earnings to proxy for market expectations about future cash flow news. Our findings are consistent with a market where stock return volatilities are positively and asymmetrically related to changes in the volatilities of expectations for a fundamental driver of cash flow news (ROE). Our findings are robust after correcting for forecast biases, various fundamental variables, newly-listed and mature firms, and periods with and without earnings announcements.     

Is there Information in an Earnings Announcement Delay?

Using a sample of announcements drawn from the 1980s and early 1990s, we reassess the relation between earnings news and earnings announcement timing. Using analyst forecast errors to proxy for news, we find that early announcements are associated with good news relative to late announcements. The relation between news and timing, however, does not appear to be strictly monotonic. Furthermore, we find that unexpected earnings explain 4% or less of the variation in timing. Finally, we assess whether abnormal returns behave in a manner that is consistent with a good news early, bad news late relation.     

Trading volume in options and common stock around quarterly earnings announcements

This study examines trading in call and put options around quarterly earnings announcements and investigates whether the existence of these options affects the common stock trading volume response to these announcements. We find that the options trading volume reaction to earnings announcements is larger than the corresponding reaction in common stock. Consistent with the idea that options provide an alternative vehicle for trading on information, the existence of these options lowers the level of trading in common stock. Options also appear to offer investors an alternative method of taking short positions, as shown by the symmetric stock market trading volume reaction to good versus bad news for firms with listed options. In contrast, firms without listed options exhibit a larger trading volume response to good news than to bad news of similar magnitude.     

Does good corporate governance reduce information asymmetry around quarterly earnings announcements?

We examine the relationship between the quality of corporate governance and information asymmetry in the equity market around quarterly earnings announcements. We use the change in market liquidity (i.e., bid–ask spreads and depths) around the announcements as a proxy for information asymmetry. We use principal components analysis to identify three factors, board independence, board structure and board activity, that capture the information in the eight individual corporate governance variables we examine. We then use ordinary least squares and two-stage least squares to estimate the relations between market liquidity changes and the following four explanatory variables: directors’ and officers’ percentage stock holdings, board independence, board structure, and board activity. Our results indicate that changes in bid–ask spreads at the time of earnings announcements are significantly negatively related to board independence, board activity, and the percentage stock holdings of directors and officers. We also find that depth changes are significantly positively related to board structure, board activity, and directors’ and officers’ percentage stock holdings. Our results are consistent with the hypothesis that firms with higher levels of corporate governance have lower information asymmetry around quarterly earnings announcements.     

Capital market effects of media synthesis and dissemination: evidence from robo-journalism

In 2014, the Associated Press (AP) began using algorithms to write articles about firms’ earnings announcements. These “robo-journalism” articles synthesize information from firms’ press releases, analyst reports, and stock performance and are widely disseminated by major news outlets a few hours after the earnings release. The articles are available for thousands of firms on a quarterly basis, many of which previously received little or no media attention. We use AP’s staggered implementation of robo-journalism to examine the effects of media synthesis and dissemination, in a setting where the articles are devoid of private information and are largely exogenous to the firm’s earnings news and disclosure choices. We find compelling evidence that automated articles increase firms’ trading volume and liquidity. The effects are most likely driven by retail traders. We find no evidence that the articles improve or impede the speed of price discovery. Our study provides novel evidence on the impact of pure synthesis and dissemination of public information in capital markets and initial insights into the implications of automated journalism for market efficiency.     

Earnings Predictability, Information Asymmetry, and Market Liquidity

We investigate the relation between earnings predictability, information asymmetry and the behavior of the adverse selection cost component of the bid-ask spread around quarterly earnings announcements for NASDAQ firms. While we find an increase in the adverse selection component of the bid-ask spread on the day of and the day prior to quarterly earnings announcements for firms with less predictable earnings, we find no evidence of such changes for firms with more predictable earnings. During a non-announcement period, we find that firms with relatively less predictable earnings have consistently higher total bid-ask spreads than firms with more predictable earnings. This finding suggests that firms with relatively less predictable earnings have a higher cost of equity capital than comparable firms with more predictable earning streams, ceteris paribus. Hence, earnings predictability may be a legitimate concern of managers who wish to minimize their cost of equity capital at least as it pertains to bid-ask spreads.     

Strategic insider trading around earnings announcements in Australia

This paper tests, within the Australian setting, whether directors strategically time trades in their own firms, around earnings announcements, in the context of impediments to trading in the immediately preceding period. I show that both signed and unsigned trade activity are insignificantly different from zero in the preceding period, and significantly negative and positive after the event. Further, directors in Australia significantly sell following positive earnings news, and buy after negative news, providing evidence of ‘indirect’ trading. Directors’ trades in the longer-term pre-announcement period are also negatively related to the news content sentiment, contrary to expectation. Finally, I find evidence of positive autocorrelation between directors’ trades over the longer-term past, and those executed after earnings announcements, which, in the absence of the ‘short-swing’ rule in Australia, casts doubt over short-term strategic insider trading, more generally.     

The Extreme Future Stock Returns Following I/B/E/S Earnings Surprises

We investigate the stock returns subsequent to quarterly earnings surprises, where the benchmark for an earnings surprise is the consensus analyst forecast. By defining the surprise relative to an analyst forecast rather than a time‐series model of expected earnings, we document returns subsequent to earnings announcements that are much larger, persist for much longer, and are more heavily concentrated in the long portion of the hedge portfolio than shown in previous studies. We show that our results hold after controlling for risk and previously documented anomalies, and are positive for every quarter between 1988 and 2000. Finally, we explore the financial results and information environment of firms with extreme earnings surprises and find that they tend to be “neglected” stocks with relatively high book‐to‐market ratios, low analyst coverage, and high analyst forecast dispersion. In the three subsequent years, firms with extreme positive earnings surprises tend to have persistent earnings surprises in the same direction, strong growth in cash flows and earnings, and large increases in analyst coverage, relative to firms with extreme negative earnings surprises. We also show that the returns to the earnings surprise strategy are highest in the quartile of firms where transaction costs are highest and institutional investor interest is lowest, consistent with the idea that market inefficiencies are more prevalent when frictions make it difficult for large, sophisticated investors to exploit the inefficiencies.     

Financial Analysts' Earnings Forecast Dispersion and Intraday Stock Price Variability Around Quarterly Earnings Announcements

This study investigates the relationship between the dispersion of analysts' earnings forecasts and stock price variability around quarterly earnings announcements. Consistent with theoretical predictions, the empirical analysis shows that stock price variability at the time of earnings announcements is positively related to the degree of analysts' predisclosure earnings forecast dispersion. Additionally, firms with high levels of forecast dispersion exhibit significant increases in price variability for longer periods prior to and following earnings announcements than do firms with low levels of forecast dispersion. These results suggest that there is information about the earnings announcement that becomes available to at least a subset of investors prior to the earnings release and that market participants take different amounts of time to process the information conveyed by the earnings announcement.     

Does Regulation FD work? Evidence from analysts' reliance on public disclosure

We examine how Regulation FD changed analysts' reliance on firms' public disclosure. Regulation FD is associated with a stronger analyst response to earnings announcements, management forecasts and conference calls—that is, analysts respond to these events more quickly, more frequently and with larger forecast revisions after FD. Further, following public disclosure, the decline in analyst forecast dispersion and forecast error accelerates after FD. We find no such changes either for foreign ADR firms or around several confounding events. Overall, Regulation FD levels the playing field between the analysts and individual investors, thereby promoting “fair game” property of the market.     

The impact of public information on investors

This study investigates the trading behavior of institutional and individual investors around both firm-specific news releases in the Wall Street Journal and macro-economic announcements. For the firm-specific news releases we find that investors conduct a high degree of trading around news releases, especially earnings and dividend news. Institutions buy and sell on both good and bad news, while individual investors only trade on good news. The length of the news article (visibility) is also an important attribute to motivate individual investor trading. Lastly, both institutions and individuals buy large firms after good economic news and sell large firms after bad economic news. The trading of small firms does not appear to be motivated by macro-news.     

Are active fund managers collectors of private information or fast interpreters of public information?

Recent studies of fund manager performance find evidence of outperformance. However limited research exists as to whether such outperformance is because of privately collected information, or merely expedient interpretation of publicly released information. In this study, we examine the trade sequences of active Australian equity fund managers around earnings announcements to provide insights into the source of fund managers’ superior information. We document an increased occurrence of buy‐sell trade sequences around good‐news earnings announcements. The evidence is consistent with fund managers having both private information about forthcoming good‐news earnings announcements and being ‘short‐term profiteers’. We find no evidence that fund managers have private information about forthcoming bad‐news earnings announcements. However, we do find an increase in the frequency of fund managers not trading before bad‐news earnings announcements only to subsequently sell during announcements.     

投资者意见分歧视角下盈余公告的市场反应经验研究

本文从投资者意见分歧角度出发,研究盈余发布前后一段时间内中国股票价格行为特征,并在此基础上首次考虑公告所引发的二次意见分歧对市场反应产生的影响。研究结果表明意见分歧越高的公司,股价在公告前高估情况越严重、在公告时的下降幅度越大,二次意见分歧高的股票其超额收益较大。此外,本文还发现中国股市普遍存在盈余公告提前泄露,股价的收益特征较国外有所前移,通过进一步分析发现市场知道坏消息的时间要早于好消息。     

Is there information content from insider trading activities preceding earnings and dividend announcements in Hong Kong?

This study examines whether insiders (directors) exploit information advantage of their firms by trading stocks before the simultaneous earnings and dividend announcements in Hong Kong. Our findings show that there are significant net-insider-buying activities before the announcements of good news ('Earnings-Dividend Increase') and significant net-insider-selling activities before bad news ('Earnings-Dividend Decrease' and 'Earnings Decrease-Dividend Zero'). In addition, our regression results provide some support for the hypothesis that there is a predictive relation between pre-event insider trading activity and the abnormal return of the announcements.     

PROFITABILITY, EARNINGS ANNOUNCEMENT TIME LAGS, AND STOCK PRICES

This research addresses (1) whether firms with lower (hgher) than expected earnings fgures released those figures to the public later (earlier) than expected and (2) whether there is a reaction by the capital market to the timing of the earnings announcement. The results indicate that later than expected earnings announcements are likely to contain worse news than early announcements. Also the stock returns of late reporting firms appear to be lower than that of early reporting firms in the days surrounding the earnings announcement date.