共查询到19条相似文献,搜索用时 156 毫秒
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本文实证检验了不同内部控制水平下,异质机构持股在抑制管理层盈余操纵方面的公司治理效应。研究发现,相比外地或短期机构持股,本地或长期机构持股更有助于提升应计质量和降低盈余噪音;当公司存在实质性内部控制缺陷时,本地或长期机构持股在抑制管理层盈余操纵方面的治理效应显著降低;相比国有控股,异质机构持股治理效应的发挥在非国有控股公司中受内部控制的影响更大;当公司存在财务报告实质性内控缺陷时,异质机构持股发挥的治理效应明显更弱。这些结果表明,异质机构持股治理效应的发挥离不开公司内部控制机制,二者之间是互补而非替代关系,这种互补关系主要由财务报告内部控制缺陷驱动。本研究有助于深化理解异质机构持股影响公司治理的具体作用机理,为实务界和监管机构改善公司治理、加强投资者保护提供经验参考。 相似文献
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内部控制、现金持有及经济后果 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
以我国A股上市公司为研究样本,本文系统研究了内部控制质量对于企业现金持有的影响及作用机制。实证结果表明,内部控制质量改善能够显著提高企业的现金持有价值,即投资者对内部控制质量高的企业的现金持有给予了显著更高的定价;其作用机制在于,内部控制质量的完善有助于抑制企业内部对自由现金流的过度投资,从而有助于企业更高效地持有相对较多现金以预防未来经营中的不确定性。本文的研究丰富和拓展了内部控制及现金持有等相关领域的研究文献,同时印证了近些年我国监管机构致力于内控体系规范建设的重要现实意义。 相似文献
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企业避税为股东增加价值的同时也增加了违反税收法规的风险,本文从企业合规目标的视角,检验了内部控制对企业避税行为的影响。本文以2007年至2012年沪深证券交易所的A股上市公司为样本,实证研究发现高质量的内部控制能有效抑制企业激进的避税行为;进一步的分析发现,在税收征管执法更严格的环境中,内部控制对企业激进避税行为的约束效应更强。本文的研究结果表明,高质量的内部控制能有助于企业合规目标的实现,减少企业因激进避税而增加的违规风险,并保护投资者利益。本文的研究结果为全面理解我国企业内部控制的经济后果提供了增量的经验证据,也丰富了公司治理机制对企业避税行为影响的研究文献。 相似文献
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本文首先借鉴LLSV(2002)及Doidge等(2004)的模型框架,分析了公共治理环境对于上市公司股权分置改革对价补偿水平的可能影响。然后本文利用纯送股形式的上市公司股权分置改革方案数据实证考察了这种影响。本文的研究表明,在中国证券市场存在公共治理溢价,投资者关注上市公司的公共治理环境并采取了具有区别性的反馈行为,监管者在改善公共治理环境方面做出的努力将显著提高证券市场对于普通投资者的吸引力。 相似文献
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关于企业内部会计控制制度建设的探讨 总被引:2,自引:0,他引:2
内部控制制度在企业内部管理监控系统中起着举足轻重的作用。研究内部控制,尤其是研究内部会计控制,对于改善我国企业的内部控制现状,保证会计信息的质量,完善公司治理和信息披露制度,保护投资者的合法权益并保证资本市场的有效运行有着非常重要的意义。本文首先论述了企业内部会计控制制度建设的必要性,进而指出企业内部控制的现状,最后提出了一些改变目前内部控制局面的措施。 相似文献
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内部控制是企业有效防御和应对各种风险的重要措施之一。本文选取了2012—2014年沪、深A股上市公司作为研究样本,检验机构投资者持股比例和第一大股东持股比例对内部控制质量的影响。研究结果表明:(1)机构投资者持股比例上升能够提升企业内部控制质量,但前提是机构投资者已具有一定的持股比例;(2)在企业处于非绝对控股的情况下,第一大股东持股比例上升对内部控制质量产生显著正向影响;(3)在企业处于绝对控股情况下,机构投资者对内部控制质量的提升作用会受到抑制。 相似文献
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《会计研究》2017,(5)
依据机构持股具有的"有效监督"假说和"利益冲突"假说,本文从三个维度实证检验机构持股对内部控制缺陷的影响。研究发现:机构持股与内部控制缺陷显著负相关,大机构投资者(持股比率大于3%)对内部控制缺陷的抑制作用更强,验证了机构持股的"有效监督"假说;与非独立型机构投资者相比,独立型机构投资者对内部控制缺陷的抑制作用更大;与短期机构投资者相比,长期机构投资者更能抑制内部控制缺陷的产生。此外,终极产权性质会影响机构持股对内部控制缺陷的治理监督作用,总的来说,机构持股对内控缺陷抑制作用在非国企中更为明显,且不同类型机构持股对内控缺陷抑制作用在国企与非国企中存在差异。 相似文献
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《Journal of Accounting and Public Policy》2021,40(6):106873
This study investigates whether loosened monitoring from institutional investors affects firm tax planning decisions. We take advantage of shocks to unrelated parts of institutional investors’ portfolios and examine how plausibly exogenous changes in monitoring from institutional investors influence the level of firm tax avoidance. We find that investee firms significantly increase their temporary tax avoidance when there are temporary reductions in the attention of their dedicated institutional investors. Cross-sectional tests show that the tax impact of reduced dedicated investor attention and monitoring intensity is more pronounced when a firm’s information environment is less transparent and when a firm is subject to weaker internal governance. Our findings are robust to alternative research designs. 相似文献
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Prior research finds that risk-taking has declined after the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, consistent with the notion that SOX's corporate governance and internal control mandates diverted resources away from corporate risk-taking. We introduce to the accounting literature a new measure of R&D productivity, Research Quotient, to examine whether SOX affects R&D risk-taking and R&D productivity differently and whether the quality of the firm's governance and internal controls, pre-SOX, moderate these relations. While we find the relation between SOX and R&D risk-taking is sensitive to research design choices, we find a consistent positive relation between SOX and Research Quotient. Our evidence indicates that while firms may allocate fewer resources to R&D post-SOX, they concurrently manage their R&D investments more productively. Further, our results are robust to a difference-in-difference design and are stronger for firms with weaker governance pre-SOX. 相似文献
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Sheng-Syan Chen 《Journal of Banking & Finance》2012,36(2):395-409
We examine how various aspects of corporate governance structures affect the capital allocation inefficiency that drives the value discounts of diversified firms. Diversified firms with more effective internal or external governance mechanisms experience more efficient investment allocations at both the firm and segment levels and show less of a diversification discount. The efficiency of the investment allocation process is better for diversified firms with high board independence, low board busyness, high institutional ownership, high outside director ownership, high CEO equity-based pay, high audit quality, and strong shareholder rights. The results hold after controlling for other potential influences. Our evidence suggests that corporate governance considerations are important in assessing the relation between investment efficiency and firm value for diversified firms. 相似文献
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Even though corporate governance is a channel for qualified foreign institutional investors (QFIIs) to mitigate information asymmetry and is essential in substituting for poor institutional quality in the host countries of QFIIs, systematic evidence is scanty due to the challenge of capturing institutional quality changes in the host country. Thus, this study examines how improvements in country-level institutional quality affect QFIIs' trust in a firm's audit quality. Using a propensity score matching method, we found that after the 2013 anti-corruption reform improved the institutional quality level in China, Chinese firms without an audit committee experienced a sharp increase in QFII ownership relative to their peers. This finding is more pronounced in regions where the government exerted more effort in combating corruption. Our findings provide supporting evidence that the improvement in institutional quality increases QFIIs' trust in the audit quality, thereby decreasing their reliance on the audit committee as an internal corporate governance mechanism. 相似文献
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产权性质、制度环境与内部控制 总被引:3,自引:0,他引:3
内部控制是近年来国内外监管部门、实务界和学术界关注的热点与前沿问题。本文研究我国上市公司最终控制人的产权性质与地区制度环境对公司内部控制质量的影响。利用厦门大学内控课题组(2010)构建的2007-2009年我国上市公司内部控制指数,本文主要发现:首先,相比于中央政府控制的公司,地方政府控制的公司内部控制质量相对较差,而非政府控制的公司内部控制质量与中央政府控制的公司之间则没有明显差异;其次,上市公司所在地区的市场化程度越高或政府对经济的干预程度越低,公司的内部控制质量越高,尤其是对于地方政府控制和非政府控制的上市公司,并且,良好的外部制度环境有助于缩小地方政府控制和非政府控制公司的内部控制与中央政府控制公司之间的差距。本文的研究结果对相关主管部门及监管机构具有一定的政策启示意义。 相似文献
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This paper investigates how large family shareholders and institutional block-holders jointly influence informed trading and firm valuation in the Hong Kong stock market. It combines market microstructure research with studies on the governance roles of multiple block-holders and finds that institutional block-holders rely on their relative controlling power vis-à-vis family owners to mitigate problems associated with informed trading. They also use their ownership rights to improve the structure of informed trading. However, these governance roles are predominantly exercised by pressure-resistant institutional block-holders. Informed trading reduces firm valuation, while an improvement in its structure increases valuation. Therefore, the governance roles of controlling families and pressure-resistant institutional block-holders may have different implications in terms of investors’ perceptions of private information risk. 相似文献
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宏观调控、所有权结构与商业银行信贷扩张行为 总被引:2,自引:0,他引:2
本文结合公司金融和商业银行相关理论,厘清了股权结构对商业银行信贷扩张的作用机理,重点分析政府宏观调控政策目标和意图如何通过股权结构作用于信贷行为。选用21家银行2003-2010年间的面板数据,估计得出中央政府控制、民营化程度低、大股东持股比例高的银行具有更强的信贷扩张冲动;并利用2009年宏观经济扩张政策外生冲击形成的"自然实验"环境,通过双重差分(Difference-in-Difference)估计策略发现,宏观调控对中央政府控制、民营化程度低、大股东持股比例高的银行的信贷行为影响更为显著。本文的研究从政府控制和银行内部治理的视角为信贷扩张的微观机制以及商业银行市场化改革之后政府宏观经济调控的传导渠道提供了一个新的解释。 相似文献
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In this study, we examine how corporate governance structure affects market valuation of capital and R&D investments. We employ three empirical proxies of corporate governance—analyst following, board composition, and institutional holdings, and study whether market valuation of corporate investments varies with governance structure. Our results show that the market valuation of the firm's capital and R&D investments depends critically on analyst following and board composition, but not on institutional holdings. 相似文献
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媒体监督、内部控制质量与管理层代理成本 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
基于公司外部治理机制和内部治理机制的角度,研究媒体监督与内部控制质量对我国A股上市公司管理层代理成本的影响,结果表明:媒体监督与内部控制质量具有降低管理层代理成本的作用;不同性质的媒体报道对不同产权背景下企业的监督治理作用不同;同时,媒体监督与内部控制质量具有互补关系,二者的整合治理能更有效地降低管理层代理成本,保护相关者利益。 相似文献