首页 | 本学科首页   官方微博 | 高级检索  
相似文献
 共查询到20条相似文献,搜索用时 109 毫秒
1.
本文以583家中小企业板上市公司2007-2010年间的数据为样本,讨论并检验了高管薪酬与公司业绩之间的相关性。研究结果表明:无论最终控制人是国有法人还是非国有法人,中国中小企业上市公司的高管薪酬与公司业绩、公司规模之间都存在着显著的正相关关系;无论是国有控股还是非国有控股,高管持股比例均与高管薪酬显著正相关;在国有股控股的中小企业中,高管薪酬与股权集中度正相关,在非国有股控股的中小企业中,高管薪酬与股权集中度负相关;在国有控股的中小企业板上市公司中,公司的成长性与高管薪酬同步变化,而非国有控股的中小企业板上市公司的成长性与高管薪酬负相关。  相似文献   

2.
近年来我国上市公司高管薪酬增长迅速,其“天价薪酬”的合理性和透明性日益遭到中小股民及老百姓的质疑.同时随着股权分置改革的完成,如何规范实施高管薪酬成为我国上市公司需要解决的重要现实问题,固此.对高管薪酬进行实证分析和研究具有重要的现实意义。本文以2010年云南省在沪深两市的上市公司为样本数据,对上市公司高管薪酬进行了实证研究分析。结果发观、高管平均工资收入和高管薪酬差距与公司业绩存在正相关关系.独立董事平均薪酬以反高管持股比例与公司业绩不存在相关关系。  相似文献   

3.
近年来,关于高管薪酬的研究得到众多学者的重视,研究者从不同视角、以不同的方式对高管薪酬的合理区间进行了探究.本文在以往研究的基础上,通过建立回归模型,从高管持股比例、公司规模、公司业绩、国有持股比例四个方面分析了影响河北省上市公司高管薪酬的因素.研究发现,高管总薪酬水平只与企业规模存在显著的正相关关系,而与高管持股比例、公司业绩和国有持股比例存在显著的负相关关系.这说明河北省上市公司的薪酬激励制度的设计存在缺陷,应尽快设计更加完善的高管薪酬激励制度.  相似文献   

4.
本文通过收集高管薪酬数据,以2012年民营上市公司为样本,以公平理论、社会比较理论以及锦标赛理论为基础,以控股股东作为调节变量,分析了我国民营上市公司高管-员工薪酬差距的影响因素及其经济后果。实证研究发现,民营企业高管团队的规模以及公司外部环境的不确定性均会显著影响高管与员工之间的薪酬差距,但是控股股东会产生抑制作用。此外,高管-员工薪酬差距对于公司业绩会产生显著正向影响,符合社会比较理论和锦标赛理论的预期,同样,控股股东会抑制薪酬差距与公司业绩之间的正向关系。  相似文献   

5.
公司高级管理层的薪酬问题越来越受到社会的普遍关注。高管薪酬问题是由于控制权和所有权的分离而产生的。高管的薪酬进而又产生了代理成本问题。本文研究的目的是分析高管薪酬与公司业绩之间的关系。经研究发现:高管薪酬与公司业绩之间存在显著正相关。  相似文献   

6.
本文以679家A股制造业上市公司2007~2009年间1946个时间序列的观测值为研究样本,实证检验了高管薪酬、团队特征与公司业绩之间的敏感性。实证结果表明:对制造业上市公司而言,高管薪酬与业绩是同向变化的;高管年龄越大,企业经营的惰性越大;高管的教育水平没有显著影响公司业绩;两职兼任利于管理层制定高薪酬,但是并没有显著提高企业绩效;管理层股权激励并没有显著提高公司业绩,但有助于管理层利用权力获取高额薪酬;财务杠杆成为拉低高管薪酬的反向力,一定程度上既有助于激励管理层实现组织目标,又能限制管理层利用权力从企业获得高薪酬。  相似文献   

7.
本文利用Eviews统计软件对上市公司数据进行分析。通过对高管薪酬与其他数据的相关性分析,得出高管薪酬与公司业绩,公司规模正相关,与高管持股比例负相关的结论。通过分析,我们发现高管薪酬对公司业绩有显著的影响。  相似文献   

8.
一般认为,上市公司高管薪酬水平会受到公司规模、公司业绩、治理结构、股权结构、行业、地区等因素的影响。本文以2001—2006年广西上市公司为研究样本,先采用因子分析法提取主因子,再通过多元回归模型检验主因子与高管薪酬水平的相关关系,通过广西上市公司6年数据的检验,结果发现:广西上市公司高管薪酬水平与公司规模、公司业绩、高管对公司的关注度成正相关关系,与高管规模、公司风险和两职合一无显著相关关系。  相似文献   

9.
王暄  肖地福 《中国外资》2013,(24):96-97
作为高杠杆化、高资金流动、高人才聚集的房地产行业,企业建立有效的激励和约束机制是解决委托代理问题的前提,而考察企业业绩与高管薪酬的关系是完善管理的基础,本文以民营房地产上市公司为例,实证表明,高管薪酬与公司业绩负相关,与公司规模正相关,高管薪酬与业绩的敏感性与公司规模、公司负债比关系不显著。  相似文献   

10.
本文在研究假设的基础上,以黑龙江省上市公司2011年高管薪酬与有关业绩指标为基础,运用SPSS统计软件实证检验了两者的线性相关关系。研究结果表明:黑龙江省上市公司高管薪酬差距明显,高管薪酬与企业业绩之间不存在显著的线性相关关系,并根据分析与实证检验结果对黑龙江省上市公司高管薪酬激励方式存在的问题提出相应对策。  相似文献   

11.
This study investigates empirically the effect of corporate governance principles on executive compensation and firm performance prior to and after the adoption of the first Greek Law on corporate governance. Prior to the adoption of the law, managers were not compensated in line with their performance. Since its introduction, a significant link has been observed between executive compensation and company performance as measured by accounting measures of performance. Following the adoption of corporate governance principles by law, the main mechanism that controls executive compensation is the election of independent non-executive board members. The results are robust to alternative accounting measures of performance.  相似文献   

12.
Accounting fundamentals and CEO bonus compensation   总被引:2,自引:0,他引:2  
Research indicates that there is a positive association between accounting earnings and chief executive officer (CEO) cash compensation; however, evidence also suggests that this positive association ceases to exist when earnings performance is poor or declining. This latter result has led some critics of corporate compensation policies to conclude that CEOs are not penalized for poor or declining firm performance. The purpose of this study is to further illuminate the pay-performance debate by expanding the traditional executive bonus compensation model to include a set of accounting fundamentals that prior research indicates are related to both current and future firm performance. Our results indicate that there is a highly significant relationship between accounting fundamentals and the level of and change in CEO bonus compensation. Moreover, we find a highly significant relationship between accounting fundamentals and both bonus omissions and bonus reductions. When earnings are negative or declining, we find that the above relationships remain intact. In contrast, when earnings are negative or declining, we find that the relationship between aggregate earnings and bonus compensation is weak or insignificant in most of our analyses. Taken together, our results suggest that the apparently weak relationship between accounting earnings and CEO bonus compensation (particularly when earnings are negative or declining) is partly due to the fact that the bonus compensation model excludes accounting fundamentals which are strongly associated with bonus compensation. Thus, we conclude that (i) bonus compensation is more closely tied to firm performance than critics sometimes claim and (ii) bonus compensation awarded to CEOs when earnings performance is poor is at least partially explained by the presence of favorable accounting fundamentals.  相似文献   

13.
This paper investigates whether compensation committees actively intervene to adjust accounting performance‐based incentive schemes for the real, or perceived, reduced earnings credibility signalled by the purchase of non‐audit services. Using a nonlinear, two‐stage least‐squares method that accounts for the simultaneity of executive pay, firm performance and non‐audit fees, we find a significant negative relationship between non‐audit fees and the sensitivity of chief executive officer (CEO) pay to firm performance. Point estimates suggest that the reduced weight applied to accounting performance lowers the incentive component of executive pay between roughly 5 and 8 per cent for the CEO of the ‘average firm’.  相似文献   

14.
合理的高管人力资本激励机制是发挥高管人力资本效用进而提高企业绩效的有效途径。本文通过实证检验管理层权力、高管人力资本激励与企业绩效的关系,结果表明:高管货币薪酬与企业绩效显著正相关,与国有企业相比,非国有企业的相关性更明显;管理层权力削弱了高管货币薪酬对企业绩效的激励作用。国有企业的在职消费与企业绩效显著负相关,但非国有企业其二者之间的相关性并不显著;管理层权力加大了在职消费对企业绩效的负向影响。高管团队内部薪酬差距与企业绩效显著正相关,且非国有企业比国有企业的相关性更明显;管理层权力削弱了高管团队内部薪酬差距对企业绩效的激励作用。  相似文献   

15.
This paper examines the impact of domestic and foreign acquisitions on chief executive officer (CEO) compensation packages using a sample of 147 completed bids by UK companies from 1999 to 2005. We find that foreign acquisitions lead to higher CEO compensation than domestic acquisitions. Overall, our findings suggest that CEOs have strong incentives to do foreign acquisitions rather than domestic acquisitions since they receive larger compensation following a foreign acquisition regardless of how poor firm performance is. Furthermore, we observe a positive and significant relation between CEO compensation and firm size during the pre-acquisition period for firms involved in foreign acquisitions, thus their CEOs would expect to increase their compensation package through foreign acquisitions. However, our results show that there is no significant link between firm size and CEO compensation during the pre-acquisition period for firms involved in domestic acquisitions.  相似文献   

16.
Most studies of the determination of executive compensation are based on the experience of developed countries, and mainly focus on Chief Executive Officer (CEO) compensation. Determination of board compensation is relatively ignored in the literature. This paper examines the effect of corporate governance, firm performance, and corporate diversification on the board, as well as CEO compensation and its components, in the context of an emerging economy-India-where a managerial market has yet to develop. Data for 462 firms for 1997-2002 in the Indian manufacturing sector have been used. This paper finds that board compensation largely depends on current- and past-year performance and diversification of the firm, whereas CEO compensation depends on current-year firm performance only. Among the personal attributes of the CEO, only in-firm experience has significant influence on CEO compensation. This finding contradicts the existing studies, where current- and past-year firm performance, as well as age, experience, and education of the CEO are important factors in determining CEO compensation.  相似文献   

17.
《Pacific》2008,16(5):606-623
This paper provides the first systematic evidence on the nature of the relation between executive compensation and firm performance in the Philippines. Comparable to studies of Japan, Korea, and China, we find a positive relation between executive compensation and performance in the Philippines for those firms not affiliated to a corporate group, but that this relation does not hold for affiliated firms. We conclude that the substantial portion of the Philippine economy that is under the control of group networks incentivize managers in ways other than through use of pay–performance schemes.  相似文献   

18.
The objectives of this paper are (i) to provide evidence on the association between the choice of group versus individual compensation schemes for senior executives and firm characteristics, and (ii) to provide evidence on the economic consequences of adopting a particular compensation scheme. Our key findings based on 2517 firm years for the period of 2001–2010 show that on average, the choice between group or individual compensation schemes for senior executive compensation schemes are consistent with a firm’s economic characteristics and on average, the choice of compensation schemes does not affect subsequent firm performance. However, we find some evidence that firms that adopt compensation schemes inconsistent with their economic characteristics have lower subsequent performance. Our findings are robust to a number of sensitivity tests.  相似文献   

19.
This study examines the economic and director‐specific determinants of non‐executive director (NED) compensation in the Australian setting. We find that NED compensation is associated with firm size, complexity, growth, risk and liquidity. It is also associated with director reputation, experience, connectedness and the directors' involvement with the firm. The additional compensation paid to the chairperson is positively associated with their prior experience and negatively associated with NED reputation and involvement. We find inconclusive evidence on the association between changes in NED compensation and firm performance.  相似文献   

20.
This study examines how executive compensation is set when a firm is a business group member. Using Korea's unique setting of family-controlled business groups, we find that a member firm's executive cash compensation is positively linked to the stock performance of other member firms as well as its own. Further analyses reveal that this positive link is consistent with the hypothesis that corporate managers are rewarded for their decision to benefit the controlling family at the expense of the firm they manage. Specifically, we find that the sensitivity of executive pay to other member firms’ performance exists only in respect to firms in which the cash flow rights of the controlling family exceed those of the subject firm. We also find that this sensitivity is strengthened if the controlling family's control–ownership disparity in the subject firm is above the sample median.  相似文献   

设为首页 | 免责声明 | 关于勤云 | 加入收藏

Copyright©北京勤云科技发展有限公司  京ICP备09084417号