What makes great boards great

In the wake of meltdowns at WorldCom, Tyco, and Enron, enormous attention has been focused on the companies' boards. It seems inconceivable that business disasters of such magnitude could happen without gross or even criminal negligence on the part of board members. And yet a close examination of those boards reveals no broad pattern of incompetence or corruption. In fact, they followed most of the accepted standards for board operations: Members showed up for meetings; they had money invested in the company; audit committees, compensation committees, and codes of ethics were in place; the boards weren't too small or too big, nor were they dominated by insiders. In other words, they passed the tests that would normally be applied to determine whether a board of directors was likely to do a good job. And that's precisely what's so scary, according to corporate governance expert Jeffrey Sonnenfeld, who suggests that it's time for some new thinking about how corporate boards operate and are evaluated. He proposes thinking not only about how to structure the board's work but also about how to manage it as a social system. Good boards are, very simply, high-functioning work groups. They're distinguished by a climate of respect, trust, and candor among board members and between the board and management. Information is shared openly and on time; emergent political factions are quickly eliminated. Members feel free to challenge one another's assumptions and conclusions, and management encourages lively discussion of strategic issues. Directors feel a responsibility to contribute meaningfully to the board's performance. In addition, good boards assess their own performance, both collectively and individually.     

中国企业家最缺少什么

对于个体而言，未来属于有准备的人。同样道理，一个有着明确战略并认真执行的企业一定能够很好地把握未来的命运。国内的企业天天都梦想有朝一日成为IBM或CITIBANK。可当企业家们能把国外知名企业的战略倒背如流的时候，自己却没有可以真正能够指导自己的战略。战略，这个听起来有点空泛的词对于中国企业的未来究竟意味着什么呢？就此相关问题，长江商学院EMBA学术主任，企业战略知名学者曾鸣教授接受本刊记者采访     

对金融改革,还有多少期待

当前中国经济发展与改革的难点很多，金融就是其中之一，甚至有人断定：中国未来发展的“可持续”在于金融改革的路径和勇气。     

中国反垄断:反什么?怎么反?

当人们对于自由竞争无比崇尚之时，垄断便成了一无是处的魔鬼。于是好事者就不顾后果地打倒一切，反垄断成了产业界和学界的时尚。一阵亢奋之后，我们突然发现反垄断的结果是越反越垄断。究竟垄断是什么？怎样反垄断？带着这些问题本刊记者采访了垄断问题专家、首都经济贸易大学工商管理学院副院长、ＭＢＡ中心主任戚聿东教授     

Why do corporate managers misstate financial statements? The role of option compensation and other factors

We investigate the incentives that led to the rash of restated financial statements at the end of the 1990s market bubble. We find that the likelihood of a misstated financial statement increases greatly when the CEO has very sizable holdings of in-the-money stock options. Misstatements are also more likely for firms that are constrained by an interest-coverage debt covenant, that raise new debt or equity capital, or that have a CEO who serves as board chair. Our results indicate that agency costs increased [Jensen, M.C., 2005a, Agency costs of overvalued equity. Financial Management 34, 5–19] as substantially overvalued equity caused managers to take actions to support the stock price.     

Temporary components of stock returns: What do the data tell us?

Within the past few years several articles have suggested thatreturns on large equity portfolios may contain a significantpredictable component at horizons 3 to 6 years. Subsequently,the tests used in these analyses have been criticized (appropriately)for having widely misunderstood size and power, rendering theconclusions inappropriate. This criticism however has not focusedon the data, it addressed the properties of the tests. In thisarticle we adopt a subjectivist analysis - treating the dataas fixed - to ascertain whether the data have anything to sayabout the permanent/temporary decomposition. The data speakclearly and they tell us that for all intents and purposes,stock prices follow a random walk.     

What do economists know about the effect of rent control on housing maintenance?

Economists' views concerning the effect of rent control on the maintenance of controlled apartments are based on extremely simple models of housing markets and rent control ordinances and on casual empiricism. This paper shows that the models are seriously deficient in that they ignore essential features of actual rent control ordinances and important responses to them. When these features and responses are taken into account, the effect of rent control on maintenance of the controlled stock is theoretically ambiguous. The paper also shows that the few systematic empirical studies have serious flaws. Therefore, there is no basis for economists' strongly-held belief that rent control leads to worse maintenance.     

What does a technology shock do? A VAR analysis with model-based sign restrictions

This paper estimates the effects of technology shocks in VAR models of the U.S., identified by imposing restrictions on the sign of impulse responses. These restrictions are consistent with the implications of a popular class of DSGE models, with both real and nominal frictions, and with sufficiently wide ranges for their parameters. This identification strategy thus substitutes theoretically motivated restrictions for the atheoretical assumptions on the time-series properties of the data that are key to long-run restrictions. Stochastic technology improvements persistently increase real wages, consumption, investment and output in the data; hours worked are very likely to increase, displaying a hump-shaped pattern. Contrary to most of the related VAR evidence, results are not sensitive to a number of specification assumptions, including those on the stationarity properties of variables.     

Not‐for‐Profit Annual Reports: What do Museum Managers Communicate?

This study addresses: (1) What disclosures are provided in annual reports of not‐for‐profit entities?(2) What characteristics of the reporting entities explain variations in the quantity of financial disclosure?(3) How do not‐for‐profit disclosures compare with those in for‐profit corporate reports? The annual reports of 170 not‐for‐profit museums were examined. The reports were highly variable. Some contained no financial data and only 22 percent included complete financial statements with footnotes. Regression analysis indicated that the amount of museum financial data was positively associated with museum size, a larger number of pages of donor disclosures, and museum type (art and history, but not science, natural history, or general).     

Evaluating absolute return managers

One traditional measure of investment performance, the information ratio (IR), is defined as the active return (alpha) divided by the tracking error (the standard deviation of the active return). Calculating an IR is straightforward when the benchmark for performance is a buy-and-hold standard like the S&P 500. For absolute return managers, however, the typical benchmark is zero, meaning that any excess return is classified as alpha and deemed to represent the return from active management or skill. In this paper, we argue that this standard approach confuses beta returns and alpha returns. The former can be earned by following generic strategies that are easily implemented and often replicated by ETFs, while the later are associated with more original or complex strategies that more genuinely reflect unique skills or expertise. We propose a new performance metric that strips out beta returns associated with investment-style factors. This approach leads to a new statistic, the alpha ratio, which can dramatically impact the relative performance rankings of managers and provide a clearer signal of manager skill.     

In praise of middle managers

Middle managers have often been cast as dinosaurs. Has-beens. Mediocre managers and intermediaries who defend the status quo instead of supporting others' attempts to change organizations for the better. An INSEAD professor has examined this interesting breed of manager--in particular, middle managers' roles during periods of radical organizational change. His findings will surprise many. Middle managers, it turns out, make valuable contributions to the realization of radical change at companies--contributions that go largely unrecognized by most senior executives. Quy Nguyen Huy says these contributions occur in four major areas. First, middle managers often have good entrepreneurial ideas that they are able and willing to realize--if only they can get a hearing. Second, they're far better than most senior executives at leveraging the informal networks at companies that make substantive, lasting change. Because they've worked their way up the corporate ladder, middle managers' networks run deep. Third, they stay attuned to employees' emotional needs during organizational change, thereby maintaining the transformation's momentum. And finally, they manage the tension between continuity and change--they keep the organization from falling into extreme inertia or extreme chaos. The author examines each of these strengths, citing real-world examples culled from his research. Of course, not every middle manager in an organization is a paragon of entrepreneurial vigor and energy, Huy acknowledges. But cavalierly dismissing the roles that middle managers play--and carelessly reducing their ranks--will drastically diminish senior managers' chances of realizing radical change at their companies. Indeed, middle managers may be the most effective allies of corner office executives when it's time to make major changes in businesses.     

Predicting fraud by investment managers

We test the predictability of investment fraud using a panel of mandatory disclosures filed with the SEC. We find that disclosures related to past regulatory and legal violations, conflicts of interest, and monitoring have significant power to predict fraud. Avoiding the 5% of firms with the highest ex ante predicted fraud risk would allow an investor to avoid 29% of fraud cases and over 40% of the total dollar losses from fraud. We find no evidence that investors receive compensation for fraud risk through superior performance or lower fees. We examine the barriers to implementing fraud prediction models and suggest changes to the SEC's data access policies that could benefit investors.     

Motivating managers to make investment decisions

Owners of capital frequently lack knowledge about investment opportunities. One alternative is to turn to a manager for assistance. The owner's problem of contracting for the services of a manager is treated as a problem in buying information. The surprising result is that it is sometimes possible to trade information even when the owner is unable to form his own assessment of the information's value. Under some conditions it is possible to write a managerial compensation contract which will induce the manager to act in the best interests of the owner. These conditions require owner knowledge of the manager's employment and investment alternatives and risk preferences as well as some, but not all, of the characteristics of the investment opportunities.     

The great transition

As China's economy grows and opens further, the opportunity it presents to multinationals is changing. Foreign companies are moving to country development and new strategic choices. Now, foreign firms can actually go after the Chinese domestic market, and it's worth going after. Improvements in China's infrastructure, workforce, and regulatory environment are making it possible for companies to lower their costs to reap new competitive advantages. Multifaceted and often-shifting risks accompany this shifting opportunity. The reforms required for admission into the WTO will be politically difficult for China to implement, and its progress will be slowed by the scarcity of resources for the country's shaky banking system, the inadequacy of the social safety net, environmental problems, and local governments' cash shortage. China's breathtaking 9% average annual GDP growth rests on an unsteady foundation of overcapitalized state-owned enterprises, which have oversupplied many markets, and fiercely protectionist regional government officials pursuing growth-at-almost-all-costs policies. Frequent changes in regulations, bureaucracies, and reporting relationships will continue to make planning difficult, and, as the SARS epidemic demonstrated, there is always the potential for serious disruptions. But for at least the next ten years, multinationals should be the biggest winners in China. To reap the benefits, a multinational must properly nest its effort into its overall organization, show "one face to China" at the national level but also tailor local strategies, be wary of joint ventures, and mitigate risk, in particular the theft of intellectual property. China is a major opportunity for companies that forthrightly face its complexities. It will remain largely inscrutable--and unprofitable--for the rest.     

The great intimidators

After Disney's Michael Eisner, Miramax's Harvey Weinstein, and Hewlett-Packard's Carly Fiorina fell from their heights of power, the business media quickly proclaimed thatthe reign of abrasive, intimidating leaders was over. However, it's premature to proclaim their extinction. Many great intimidators have done fine for a long time and continue to thrive. Their modus operandi runs counter to a lot of preconceptions about what it takes to be a good leader. They're rough, loud, and in your face. Their tactics include invading others' personal space, staging tantrums, keeping people guessing, and possessing an indisputable command of facts. But make no mistake--great intimidators are not your typical bullies. They're driven by vision, not by sheer ego or malice. Beneath their tough exteriors and sharp edges are some genuine, deep insights into human motivation and organizational behavior. Indeed, these leaders possess political intelligence, which can make the difference between paralysis and successful--if sometimes wrenching--organizational change. Like socially intelligent leaders, politically intelligent leaders are adept at sizing up others, but they notice different things. Those with social intelligence assess people's strengths and figure out how to leverage them; those with political intelligence exploit people's weaknesses and insecurities. Despite all the obvious drawbacks of working under them, great intimidators often attract the best and brightest. And their appeal goes beyond their ability to inspire high performance. Many accomplished professionals who gravitate toward these leaders want to cultivate a little "inner intimidator" of their own. In the author's research, quite a few individuals reported having positive relationships with intimidating leaders. In fact, some described these relationships as profoundly educational and even transformational. So before we throw out all the great intimidators, the author argues, we should stop to consider what we would lose.