次贷危机后的A股市场投资者行为与市场表现分析

资本市场受人们的乐观贪婪心理影响容易形成泡沫,而在恐惧悲观心理的影响下泡沫又会破灭,市场当中新加入的投资者通常市场专业知识不足,缺乏交易经验,因此极大地增加了股票市场当中的非理性因素。众所周知,我国股票市场当中机构投资者同成熟市场相比比例并不高,由此造成的非理性因素也较大。本文通过选取A股新增账户数以及换手率作为投资者心理因素的代理变量,通过建立VAR模型进行Granger检验分析得出结论:不理性的投资行为,如羊群行为和过度投机对A股市场的走势产生了影响,加剧了A股市场的波动。鉴于此,我国股市应在培育理性市场方面做出更大的努力。     

金融市场MAX效应的影响因素研究 ——基于价格视角

金融市场的变量虽然纷繁复杂,但价格因其直观性和重要性,成为金融市场参与者最易观察且难以忽略的变量,正因如此,价格对市场参与者的心理和行为产生了深刻影响.以中国股市2004年1月至2020年6月的数据为样本,探究价格因素会如何影响由追涨行为所导致的M AX效应.实证结果发现:投资者的追涨勇气和热情明显会受到价格影响,即当反应市场整体价格水平的股指指数近期上涨或波动率越小时,亦或当个股价格越低于其前期最高价、越低于投资者购买价时,投资者越乐于追涨具有"高极端收益"的个股,M AX效应也随之会更显著.     

高送转是馅饼还是陷阱? ——基于中国A股上市公司的研究

上市公司高送转是陷阱还是馅饼,关系广大投资者的利益。本文实证分析了中国A股市场高送转预案公告对股票收益率的影响,比较了不同板块不同送转比例的市场效应。研究发现:所有股票在高送转预案公告前后,均存在显著为正的累计超额收益,但并不存在显著的板块差异;累计超额收益主要产生于高送转预案披露前;上市公司高送转给普通投资者的大概率不是馅饼,而是陷阱。本文结论为监管层出台相关规范高送转行为和内部人减持行为的政策提供了经验证据。     

情绪周期与股票收益——基于中国股票市场月相效应的检验

本文采用月相变化这一外生变量衡量投资者情绪的周期性波动，使研究避开了复杂的社会影响过程而专注于外生性的影响。研究发现，股票收益的运行轨迹与投资者情绪周期性波动的轨迹相同，即股票收益会随着投资者情绪的周期性波动而呈现出同样频率的循环性波动。这一现象无论在机构投资者重仓还是中小投资者重仓的股票中均存在，而机构投资者持股比例的增加可以减弱投资者情绪周期波动对决策行为的影响。股市周期作为一种经济环境的刺激变量，在牛、熊市下对投资者机体变量的作用不同，导致其反应变量出现不同程度的变化，在牛市阶段，投资者情绪周期波动对股票收益的影响更为强烈。与非周期性行业相比，投资于周期性行业时，决策所涉及的风险和不确定性更大，放大了情绪波动对于决策行为的作用，导致股票收益随投资者情绪周期性波动而循环性波动的现象在周期性行业中更为明显。     

投资者关注、股市表现与套利策略——来自百度搜索量的经验证据

本文采用百度指数作为衡量投资者关注度的代理变量,以股票收益率、成交量和股价波动率来描述股票市场的表现,考察投资者关注对当期和下一期股市表现的影响。实证研究发现投资者关注的增加对当期股票成交量和股价波动率有显著的正向影响,而这种影响在下一期会明显减弱。对收益率而言,投资者关注对其的影响具有反转性和非对称性。此外,通过买入关注度低增长股票、卖出关注度高增长股票构建零投资套利组合,并运用Carhart四因素模型进行分析,发现零投资套利组合能够获得显著的超额收益。     

中国股市个体投资者代表性偏差行为的实证分析

基于代表性偏差,股票收益率可能是影响投资者买卖股票行为的重要因素.本文利用某营业部交易数据对股票历史收益率对我国个体投资者买卖股票交易行为的影响进行了实证分析.实证分析发现,股票历史收益率是影响投资者交易行为的重要因素,股票价格波动幅度、股票市场行情、股票收益率的期间都对投资者的交易行为产生重要影响.     

基于股利迎合理论的我国上市公司送转股行为研究

本文运用股利迎合理论,在对股利溢价进行改造的基础上,即将其定义为送转股公司与纯派现公司的平均市值账面比(M/B)的差值,利用Logistic 模型以及多元回归模型来探讨我国上市公司管理者是否存在理性迎合投资者热衷送转股的股利偏好的行为.研究结果发现:投资者股利需求不仅对公司送转股概率的高低有着重要的影响,而且对其送转股比例的高低也有着重要的影响.也因此表明,我国上市公司管理者确实存在理性迎合投资者热衷送转股的股利偏好的行为,而迎合的目的,则是追求公司短期股价最大化,以获取股利溢价.     

投资者情绪、管理者过度自信与现金股利政策北大核心

本文基于行为公司金融的视角,在相关研究的基础上进一步放宽了"理性人"假设,分析了投资者非理性与管理者非理性共存时对公司现金股利的影响,并以2010—2013年期间A股上市公司为研究样本进行了实证分析。结果发现,虽然投资者情绪与管理者过度自信各自对公司现金股利有不同的影响,但是投资者情绪和管理者过度自信两者的共同作用会对公司现金股利产生负向的影响。本文有助于人们从新的角度来认识股利政策。     

"行为融资":公司融资理论的新进展

“行为融资”理论的产生是由于传统公司金融理论已难以解释当前金融市场上出现的一些新的情况。笔者详细地论述了该理论的两种分析方法，即非理性投资者分析法和非理性管理者分析法。前者主要研究投资者的非理性行为是否会影响理性管理者的资产配置行为，亦即当股票市场价格偏离公司真实价值时，致力于实现公司价值最大化的理性管理者将对此做出何种反应；而后者着重强调管理者本身的非理性行为对公司融资行为的影响。     

中国A股市场上的机构投资者是理性的吗——基于知情交易视角的分析

本文利用2000~2014年沪深两市A股一般上市公司季度数据,研究机构投资者知情交易与特征组合相对超额收益的关系。实证结果显示:第一,当机构投资者知情交易变大时,持有盈余价格比高、利润总额同比增长率高、账面市值比低、价格高、规模大的股票的当期相对超额收益变大,知情机构投资者是理性的。第二,当机构投资者知情交易变大时,持有股息率低、盈余价格比低、利润总额同比增长率低、账面市值比低、价格低、规模小的股票的未来相对超额收益变大,知情机构投资者是非理性的。知情机构投资者并非是完全理性的,由于其更关注当期利益,而忽略长期价值投资,不利于维护股市的稳定。     

Are they still called late? The effect of notice period on calls of convertible bonds

When calling its convertible bonds, a company must typically give bondholders a notice period of about 30 days to decide whether to convert the bonds. This notice period affects the optimal call policy for convertible bonds. After accounting for the notice period, convertible bonds in our sample would have been optimally called when the stock was at about an 11% premium (median) relative to the conversion price. We show that after properly accounting for the call notice period and other factors, the median excess call premium is less than 4%—substantially less than the 26–44% call premium previous researchers have documented.     

基于B-S期权定价模型的可转换债券定价实证分析

可转换债券是一种混合金融衍生工具,它把相应的股票看涨期权内嵌在传统的公司债券之中,具有债券和股票的双重性质,因而可转债的定价问题逐渐为企业和投资者所关注。本文借助Black-Scholes定价模型研究定价理论,对Black-Scholes定价模型进行修正,体现了红利发放对可转换债券定价的影响。     

Disappearing Call Delay and Dividend‐Protected Convertible Bonds

Firms do not historically call their convertible bonds as soon as conversion can be forced. A number of explanations for the delay rely on the size of the dividends that bondholders forgo so long as they do not convert. We investigate an important change in convertible security design, namely, dividend protection of convertible bond issues. Dividend protection means that the conversion value of the convertible bond is unaffected by dividend payments and thus dividend‐related rationales for call delay become moot. We document that call delay is near zero for dividend‐protected convertible bonds.     

Convertible Debt: Corporate Call Policy and Voluntary Conversion

This paper examines why, in contrast to the predictions of finance theory, firms do not call convertible debt when the conversion price exceeds the call price. The empirical results suggest that the principal reason is because some firms enjoy an advantage of paying less in after-tax interest than they would pay in dividends were the bond converted. This cash flow incentive is the inverse of an investor's incentive to convert voluntarily if the converted dividends are greater than the bond's coupon. Because of taxation, however, the decisions by investors and firms are not symmetric, and there exist bonds which the firm may not call and an investor will not convert. The results also find that voluntary conversion is significantly related to both the conversion price and the differential between the coupon and the dividends on the converted stock.     

Convertible calls and corporate taxes under asymmetric information

This paper develops a signalling model of call of convertible securities (bonds or preferred stock) in the presence of corporate taxes and asymmetric information about future earnings. In equilibrium, managers with relatively unfavorable information call to force convertible holders to convert to common stock (in spite of the loss of corporate tax benefits if the convertibles are bonds), while those with relatively favorable information do not call. The model predicts that the announcement period common stock returns are more negative at the call of convertible bond than at the call of convertible preferred stock. Furthermore, we predict that when the importance of the tax deductibility of interest differs among firms, so does the stock price reaction to the announcement of convertible debt call. Specifically, the loss of equity value at the announcement decreases with the amount of non-debt tax shield that the calling firm owns, decreases with the book value of convertible debt called, and increases with corporate taxes.     

我国资本市场可转债定价及后市走势研究

从1992年发行第一只可转换公司债券(以下简称“可转债”)至今,中国可转债市场已经历了二十多年的发展。自诞生以来,中国监管机构对可转债的发行要求不断明确,配套监管措施不断完善,可转债市场迅速发展,发行规模不断提高。然而,在2017年以前,虽然可转债的发行规模增长迅速,但其融资总额占资本市场股权产品总融资规模的比重仍处于较低水平。究其原因,一方面是因为可转债的发行主体仅限于上市公司,股权融资存在较大的不确定性;同时可转债的定价条款过于复杂,市场接受程度较低。随着2017年证监会对可转债产品的审核标准进一步明确,可转债发行规模高速增长,目前已成为资本市场上不可忽视的品种。为确定可转债定价方式,本文以“广汽转债”历年来的市场价格为数据基础,以B-S模型为分析模型,通过实证分析寻求影响可转债定价的主要因素,对未来可转债定价的研究具有一定的借鉴意义。     

可转债上市公司调整转股价格的行为及影响分析

摘要：可转债是兼有股票期权和债券性质的复合型金融衍生品。为促使投资者尽快将可转债转换为股票,上市公司的常见做法是向下调整转股价格。因此,研究上市公司调整转股价格的行为及其影响十分必要。本文首先分析了现有可转债上市公司近五年调整转股价格的行为及其原因,并将其行为分为自然调整和主动向下修正两类;然后着重研究上市公司主动向下修正转股价格的行为对转股比例、股票价格、可转债价格j者的影响,最后得出相应结论。     

What drives the performance of convertible-bond funds?

This paper examines the performance of US mutual funds that invest primarily in convertible bonds. Multivariate cross-sectional analyses show a significant relation between a fund’s performance and its asset composition: the higher the difference in the percentage of assets invested in convertible bonds compared to the percentage invested in stocks, the higher the performance, on average. We show that this result can be explained by factors associated with investment opportunities in the convertible-bond market and trading strategies related to convertible arbitrage, as typically performed by hedge funds. Overall, convertible-bond fund performance measured by alpha is comparable to a passive investment in stocks, bonds, and convertible bonds. This performance is the result of weak selection skills and successful timing strategies related to convertible arbitrage.     

New evidence on the announcement effect of convertible and exchangeable bonds

This study investigates the announcement and issuance effects of offering convertible bonds and exchangeable bonds using data for the Swiss and German markets during January 1996 and May 2003. The analysis suggests that announcement effects of convertible bonds and exchangeable bonds are associated with significantly negative abnormal returns. German firms exhibit a stronger reaction than Swiss firms, possibly for institutional reasons. We also investigate the effect of the market return of the announcement effect and find that the negative abnormal returns are significantly more pronounced when previous market returns have been negative. Furthermore, we analyze the relation between the announcement effects and equity components by controlling for the equity signal sent to the market. We find the size of the equity component of an issue to have a strong influence on the announcement effect for convertible but not for exchangeable securities and offer an explanation for this difference.     

The fluctuating maturities of convertible bonds

The maturities of newly issued convertible bonds vary substantially over time. Firm-specific determinants of maturity from the straight debt literature are relevant for convertible bonds. However, the growth of the convertible arbitrage industry and the role of convertible arbitrage hedge funds have changed the importance of firm characteristics in the convertible bond market. Recently issued convertible bonds come with particularly short maturities that serve as substitutes for call provisions. This substitution implies that backdoor-equity and sequential-financing rationales for issuing callable convertible bonds are also applicable for non-callable convertibles with shorter maturities.