管理层股权激励:利益趋同还是利益壕沟——来自股权分置改革后中国上市公司的经验证据

本文从股权分置改革的制度背景来考察国内上市公司管理层股权激励效应及其内在机理。研究结果表明,股权分置改革后,管理层股权激励显著提高了公司绩效,但在不同产权性质公司中激励效果不同:非国有控股公司表现为利益趋同效应,股权激励降低了代理成本,改善了公司绩效;而国有控股公司表现为利益壕沟效应,股权激励对代理成本和公司绩效没有显著影响。进一步研究发现,国有控股公司内部人控制、管理层权力过大是股权激励效应弱化的主要原因。     

会计稳健性或高管股权激励——不同代理冲突下的治理方式选择

会计稳健性和高管股权激励是上市公司降低代理成本的重要途径,其治理效应备受关注。本文选择2008～2010年中国A股非金融类上市公司作为研究样本,按照代理冲突程度高低将研究样本划分为两类,在此基础上实证研究会计稳健性与高管股权激励的治理效应。研究结果表明:在低代理冲突样本组中,会计稳健性能显著降低代理成本,而高管股权激励的治理效果不显著;在高代理冲突样本组中,高管股权激励能显著降低代理成本,而会计稳健性的治理效果不显著。研究显示出,在选择合适的治理方式时,必须考虑代理冲突的严重程度。     

上市公司高管股权激励研究

股东与高管之间的代理问题一直是公司治理研究的热点话题,有关股权激励与公司业绩之间的关系现有研究存在较大的争议.本文通过梳理分析国内外有关股权激励的研究文献,重点关注股权激励与企业业绩之间的关系及实施股权激励的动机,通过对深圳万科股份有限公司2011年推行的股权激励方案的研究,对我国经济转轨和社会转型背景下的上市公司的股权激励方案具有一定启示作用.     

股价下跌大背景下股权激励对比分析

随着我国经济体不断完善,社会主义市场经济发展,越来越多的上市公司使用股权激励制度来减少代理成本,在当前股价下跌大背景下,国内大多数上市公司则取消了股权激励计划。一般而言,股价下跌大背景下,公司拟定的期望指标较难实现,公司一般会撤销股权激励,而海普瑞药业股份有限公司和佳隆食品股份有限公司则反其道而行,继续推行股权激励计划,本文通过对这两个公司股权激励计划方案及其两个公司业绩状况比较分析,着重研究在股价下跌大背景下公司继续推行股权激励计划的初衷以及其中存在的问题。     

会计变更、股权激励与上市公司绩效

2007年1月1日起,根据《企业会计准则第11号——股份支付》,我国上市公司实施股票期权计划被要求按照公允价值进行费用化处理,并在财务报表中披露。本文采用因子分析法研究此次会计变更对我国实施股权激励计划的上市公司2007年度绩效的影响,发现股权激励措施并未促进公司绩效的增长,其代理成本也没有显著降低,说明我国现行股权激励制度尚未很好解决上市公司的代理问题,股权激励制度的设计目标也未能有效实现。     

上市公司股权激励的影响因素与效果分析

建立股权激励制度可以有效解决公司股东与经理层之间的委托—代理问题,但现实中激励效果受到多种因素的影响。本文首先对上市公司股权激励的影响因素进行了分析,通过国内外文献的综述,研究了股权激励的效果,提出了我国上市公司股权激励制度优化及路径选择。     

上市公司股权激励的文献综述

本文将对管理者股权激励的理论基础,股权激励的动机、决定因素以及股权激励对上市公司会计、财务行为的影响的主要文献进行回顾性的综述。通过文献综述,我们将阐述管理者股权激励的涵义,介绍管理者持股与公司会计政策选择及盈余管理的关系、公司管理者持股与公司股利政策行为及其投资行为之间的关系,国外研究所发现的经验证据以及中国上市公司的研究现状将是本文实证研究设计的基础。己有国内外文献的理论框架和经验证据是本文研究的基础。     

高管股权激励、内部控制缺陷披露与资本成本研究

合理有效的股权激励机制能对约束经理层的自利和短视行为起到积极作用,从而达到降低企业资本成本、提升企业价值的目的。本文根据我国上市公司的数据进行实证研究后发现,实施高管股权激励后,上市公司的资本成本并未显著降低,反而在一定程度上加大了管理层权力,增加了代理成本。进一步研究发现,企业通过实施内部控制审计,能够抑制股权激励带来的负面效应,通过股权激励机制从激励和监督两方面完整实现委托代理机制带来的治理目的。     

中国上市公司股权激励文献综述

公司治理一直是学术界研究的焦点问题,而公司治理中有关股权激励的讨论一直不绝于耳。股权激励作为缓解企业代理关系双方利益分歧的方式之一受到国内外企业的广泛运用,而国内外的相关研究也是层出不穷．本文仅以国内相关研究为基础,对股权激励动机、股权激励方案、股权激励效果、股权激励发展趋势等方面进行文献综述。     

我国上市公司股权激励机制对其股价影响的实证研究

委托-代理一直是公司治理问题中一个非常重要的问题,而股权激励机制可以在一定程度上解决委托-代理问题.2005年中国股权费制改革全面推行后,越来越多的公司提交了股权激励方案.到底股权激励能在多大程度上给上市公司的股票带来收益,由此而产生的利好消息会产生多大的市场反应,本文利用我国上市公司数据对这一系列问题进行了细致的研究...     

The Effect of Managerial Incentives to Bear Risk on Corporate Capital Structure and R&D Investment

In this study we use estimates of the sensitivities of managers' portfolios to stock return volatility and stock price to directly test the relationship between managerial incentives to bear risk and two important corporate decisions. We find that as the sensitivity of managers' stock option portfolios to stock return volatility increases firms tend to choose higher debt ratios and make higher levels of R&D investment. These results are even stronger in a subsample of firms with relatively low outside monitoring. For these firms, managerial incentives to bear risk play a particularly pivotal role in determining leverage and R&D investment.     

On the decision to go public with dual class stock

Why do firms deviate from a one share-one vote regime when going public? This question raises considerations that are at the core of many corporate governance issues. We consider three arguments for this choice. Examining data on IPOs from 1980 through 2008, we do not find that firms go public with dual class stock so managers have more incentive to invest in hard to monitor projects nor to gain more when selling control of the firm. Rather, managers appear to take their firms public with dual class stock in order to retain control of their firms while reducing their lack of diversification costs.     

期权激励与企业并购行为

本文以2006年至2015年我国上市公司为研究对象,考察了期权激励对企业并购行为的影响。研究发现:授予高管的期权激励显著提升了企业发起并购的可能性和并购规模。缓解代理问题和提升风险承担是潜在的作用渠道。进一步研究表明,激励对象异质性会影响期权激励的效果,期权激励对企业并购倾向和并购规模的提升作用在管理者年龄较高、管理者任期较长以及管理者相对薪酬水平较低的企业中更加明显。此外,期权激励对企业并购行为的影响在非国有企业中更加突出。最后,本文还发现期权激励提升了企业并购的财务业绩。本文的研究不仅丰富了有关期权激励效果方面的文献,而且对于理解企业并购行为具有一定的参考意义。     

Reducing managers’ incentives to cannibalize: Managerial stock options when shareholders are diversified

We analyze the relative advantage of option grants compared to stock compensation when shareholders are diversified. Our analysis recognizes a conflict that is largely neglected in the corporate finance literature. Shareholders want to maximize their portfolio value while capital budgeting rules direct managers to choose projects that maximize firm (equity) value. Options can reduce this conflict by motivating managers to avoid projects that enhance the value of one firm at the expense of another firm. Also, in our framework, relative performance evaluation destroys value for shareholders as it encourages firms to engage in cannibalistic activity. Consistent with the predictions of our model we find that firms with lower insider ownership, higher institutional ownership, and lower leverage tend to provide more option grants as compensation to their executives.     

CEO Stock Options and Equity Risk Incentives

Abstract:   We test the hypothesis that the risk incentive effects of CEO stock option grants motivate managers to take on more risk than they would otherwise. Using a sample of mergers we document that the ratio of post‐ to pre‐merger stock return variance is positively related to the risk incentive effect of CEO stock option compensation but this relationship is conditioned on firm size, with firm size having a moderating effect on the risk incentive effect of stock options. Using a broader time‐series cross‐sectional sample of firms we find a strong positive relationship between CEO risk incentive embedded in the stock options and subsequent equity return volatility. As in the case of the merger sample, this relationship is stronger for smaller firms.     

Ironing out the kinks in executive compensation: Linking incentive pay to average stock prices

Traditional stock option grant is the most common form of incentive pay in executive compensation. Applying a principal-agent analysis, we find this common practice suboptimal and firms are better off linking incentive pay to average stock prices. Among other benefits, averaging reduces volatility by about 42%, making the incentive pay more attractive to risk-averse executives. Holding the cost of the option grant to the firm constant, Asian stock options are more cost effective than traditional stock options and provide stronger incentives to increase stock price. More importantly, the improvement is achieved with little impact on the option grant’s risk incentives (after adjusting for option cost). Finally, averaging also improves the value and incentive effects of indexed stock options.     

Executive Stock Options: To Expense or Not?

In analyzing the decision to expense stock options, we find a greater likelihood of options expensing for firms with greater transparency and a closer alignment of interests between managers and shareholders. These results provide indirect evidence that expensing is more likely in firms that practice good corporate governance. We show that firms are less likely to expense when option usage is higher and that this negative relation is stronger for firms that are smaller, have high growth, and are less profitable. We also find that the announcement period returns are not significantly different from zero.     

Highly Valued Equity and Discretionary Accruals

Abstract:  Overvalued equity provides a strong incentive for managers to report earnings that do not disappoint the market (  Jensen, 2005 ). We find that this can be extended to highly valued equity more generally. In the year following the classification as highly valued and compared to firms with less extreme valuations, highly valued firms have significantly higher discretionary accruals and exhibit a more pronounced positive association between discretionary accruals and proxies for the likelihood of failing to meet earnings targets. These findings are consistent with the use of discretionary accruals to manage earnings in support of extreme valuation. Because highly valued equity will likely result in CEOs with valuable stock and stock option portfolios, we test whether and show that the overvalued equity incentive is incremental to a CEO's equity portfolio incentive. One implication is that directors and audit committees should be especially on guard for possible earnings management when a firm has extremely high valuation multiples and when the CEO has a lot of equity at risk.     

Executive compensation and corporate risk-taking: Evidence from private loan contracts

We examine how management stock options affect corporate risk taking. We exploit exogenous variation in stock option grants generated by FAS 123R and use loan spreads to infer risk taking. Using a difference-in-differences approach, we find that the spreads of loans taken by firms that did not expense options before FAS 123R (treated firms) significantly decrease after FAS 123R relative to firms that either did not issue stock options or voluntarily expensed stock options before 123R (control firms). We also find that the effect is stronger for firms with high agency conflicts associated with risk-shifting. Furthermore, loans taken by the treated firms are less likely to contain collateral requirements and are less likely to have covenants restricting capital investment post FAS 123R.     

Who Writes the News? Corporate Press Releases during Merger Negotiations

Firms have an incentive to manage media coverage to influence their stock prices during important corporate events. Using comprehensive data on media coverage and merger negotiations, we find that bidders in stock mergers originate substantially more news stories after the start of merger negotiations, but before the public announcement. This strategy generates a short‐lived run‐up in bidders' stock prices during the period when the stock exchange ratio is determined, which substantially impacts the takeover price. Our results demonstrate that the timing and content of financial media coverage may be biased by firms seeking to manipulate their stock price.