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1.
股权结构设计和控制权安排是协调股东与经理人代理冲突的基础性公司治理制度安排。"同股不同权"构架的核心是通过投票权重配置向创业团队倾斜,实现创业团队与外部投资者之间从短期雇佣合约到长期合伙合约的转化。上述构架由于顺应了以互联网技术为标志的第四次工业革命对创新导向的企业权威重新配置的内在要求,而受到诸多高科技企业青睐。"一股一票"并非对投资者利益最好的保护,"同股不同权"也并非对投资者利益最不好的保护,投资者自愿购买"同股不同权"构架股票,并未从根本上动摇股东处于公司治理权威地位的"股东中心主义"。与现实需求相契合,"同股不同权"的股权结构设计中,应遵循资金投入要求、日落条款设置及股东权威性不变等设计理念。  相似文献   

2.
李逸 《云南金融》2011,(7X):159-159
目前,我国上市公司国有股"一股独大"的现象依然严重,在这种股权结构下,企业所面临的主要代理问题并非所有者与管理层之间的利益冲突,而是大股东与中小股东之间的利益冲突。本文结合中国上市公司的现状,分析当前股权结构存在的问题及由此产生的代理问题,及其对公司价值的影响,提出优化股权结构,降低代理成本的建议,并就其对我国上市公司的借鉴意义做一个说明。  相似文献   

3.
李逸 《时代金融》2011,(21):159
目前,我国上市公司国有股"一股独大"的现象依然严重,在这种股权结构下,企业所面临的主要代理问题并非所有者与管理层之间的利益冲突,而是大股东与中小股东之间的利益冲突。本文结合中国上市公司的现状,分析当前股权结构存在的问题及由此产生的代理问题,及其对公司价值的影响,提出优化股权结构,降低代理成本的建议,并就其对我国上市公司的借鉴意义做一个说明。  相似文献   

4.
一、国外股权结构特征及公司治理模式 股权结构是指公司股东的构成,包括股东类型及各类股东持股所占比例、股票集中或分散程度、股东稳定性及高层管理者持股比例等。股权结构对公司治理结构有重大影响,它是公司治理结构的基础。股东种类不同、各类股东持股比例不同,以及股票集中程度和流动性不同,导致的股权结构也截然不同。纵观世界各国股权结构与治理结构,虽然在产权多样化、流动性、资本社会化运作与企业制度安排方面基本相同,但在具体的股权结构和控制运行方式上却各具特色,其中美、德、日公司的股权结构与治理模式最具代表性(见表1和表2)。  相似文献   

5.
股权结构与公司治理问题的研究   总被引:3,自引:0,他引:3  
上市公司的股权结构是公司治理的产权基础,它决定着所有权与控制权分配的比例关系,因此,股权结构对公司治理效率起着非常重要的作用。股权结构不同会导致不同委托代理问题,因此,主要的公司治理问题就不一样,采取的解决措施也是不同的。在股权高度分散的公司,主要的治理问题是所有者与管理者的利益冲突,而在股权高度集中、存在控股股东的情况下,主要的治理问题是大股东对小股东的侵害。  相似文献   

6.
上市公司的股权结构是公司治理的产权基础,它决定着所有权与控制权分配的比例关系,因此,股权结构对公司治理效率起着非常重要的作用.股权结构不同会导致不同委托代理问题,因此,主要的公司治理问题就不一样,采取的解决措施也是不同的.在股权高度分散的公司,主要的治理问题是所有者与管理者的利益冲突,而在股权高度集中、存在控股股东的情况下,主要的治理问题是大股东对小股东的侵害.  相似文献   

7.
本文从理论层面上剖析了公司股权结构对风险承担的影响及具体作用机理,然后基于2002~2018年我国77家财险公司的非平衡面板数据构建联立方程模型,利用三阶段最小二乘法(3SLS)进行参数估计。研究发现,股权结构对我国财险公司的风险承担行为存在显著影响。具体而言,股权集中度对承保风险存在显著正向影响,表现出"侵占效应";股权制衡度对承保风险存在显著负向影响,对投资风险存在显著正向影响;外资参股对承保风险和投资风险分别存在显著正向和负向影响,外资股东的进入有利于降低财产保险公司的投资风险,但在一定程度上会提高其承保风险。基于此,本文提出强化股权的穿透式监管、推进形成"相对集中、多股制衡"的股权结构以及适当引入外资丰富财险公司股权结构等建议。  相似文献   

8.
本文将双重股权结构视为拥有高倍投票权的内部股东与同股同权外部股东的集体选择,以1991-2018年赴美上市的中概股公司为样本,从选择原因和选择结果两个视角探讨外部股东为何自愿放弃投票权而选择双重股权公司.研究发现:企业在产品市场中的竞争优势越强,上市时选择双重股权结构的概率越大,这在新经济公司样本中表现的更明显;而选择该结构后也将更有利于实现企业绩效和股东价值.从机理来看,产品市场竞争优势通过显示内部股东的能力来影响外部股东对双重股权公司的选择.研究启示外部股东可参考企业在产品市场上的竞争优势来选择投资双重股权公司,而上市公司也应增加其产品市场竞争优势的信息披露以加强外部股东利益保护.  相似文献   

9.
我国股权大都集中在大股东的手中,终极控制股东普遍采用金字塔股权结构的方式对底层公司实施控制并影响会计稳健性。基于Basu模型,采用2012-2017年深沪两市A股上市公司数据,对终极控制股东产权性质、金字塔股权结构对上市公司会计稳健性进行研究。结果表明:与终极控制股东为非国有的上市公司相比,终极控制股东为国有的上市公司会计稳健性更高;金字塔层级增加导致会计稳健性降低;金字塔层级的增加对于国有控股企业和非国有控股企业会计稳健性的影响存在差异,国有终极控制上市公司的会计稳健性更高。  相似文献   

10.
本文基于大股东所属产权类型,从理论和实证两方面就我国上市公司股权结构对企业价值的影响进行研究,试图克服目前国内相关研究“股权分类不彻底、股东持股比例计算方法不合理、ROE度量企业价值不合理”的缺陷。研究结果表明,第一大股东持股比例对企业价值的影响呈倒U形态;较之于其他类型,私营产权控股股东对企业价值的影响要显著很多。本文还分析了股权分置改革后上市公司股权结构对企业价值影响的新变化。  相似文献   

11.
This paper examines whether shareholder rights, which enable shareholders to replace managers, can constrain earnings management, and whether this effect is conditional on the level of insider ownership. Using the comprehensive shareholder rights measure constructed by Gompers et al. ( 2003 ), we find that firms with stronger shareholder rights are associated with fewer income‐increasing discretionary accruals, suggesting that stronger shareholder rights deter managers from reporting aggressive earnings. Moreover, if insider ownership introduces managerial entrenchment, managers with higher ownership would be insulated from shareholder discipline. Consistent with this entrenchment theory, we find that the association between shareholder rights and earnings management becomes insignificant in the presence of higher levels of insider ownership. Shareholder rights are negatively associated with earnings management only when insider ownership is low. Our results indicate that the disciplinary effect of shareholder rights can be attenuated by high levels of insider ownership.  相似文献   

12.
This study tests the relationship between ownership dispersion across large shareholders and the structure of loan syndicates. The results of an analysis of a set of bank loan contracts that were extended to Indonesian listed firms, from 1992 to 2016, show that an uneven ownership distribution between the largest controlling shareholder and multiple large shareholders is associated with a smaller and more concentrated syndicate. In line with the agency and moral hazard theoretical framework, the results suggest that in a weak legal system, when banks are lending to companies that are at a high risk of expropriation, they decrease the syndicate size and increase the syndicate concentration in order to intensify their efforts in due diligence and monitoring.  相似文献   

13.
We are interested in understanding how agency conflicts in private firms arise through ownership structures and family relationships. Specifically, we analyze auditors’ increase of effort and firms’ choice of auditors in situations with higher level of agency conflicts. For a large sample of private firms, we use unique and confidential data (obtained through special permission by the government) to measure direct and ultimate ownership for each shareholder as well as extended family relationships (based on marriage and blood lines, going back four generations and extending out to fourth cousin) among all shareholders, board members, and CEOs. We first find that audit fees, our proxy for audit effort, vary as hypothesized with firm-level characteristics related to ownership structures and family relationships. Second, we find evidence that firms in higher agency cost settings respond by having their financial statements audited by a higher-quality auditor (i.e., a Big 4 firm). However, for CEO family-related settings (i.e., where the CEO is related to the major shareholder or as the number of board members related to the CEO increases), we find no evidence of a greater demand for a Big 4 auditor.  相似文献   

14.
The shareholder composition of listed property companies has changed from the fragmented, retail ownership, to more concentrated, institutional ownership over the past decade. In this paper, we first document significant variation in the composition of the shareholder base across the world's five largest listed property markets. We then examine the relation between the composition of the shareholder base and stock market performance and share turnover during the turbulent trading days of 2008 and 2009. By directly relating the shareholder base of firms to excess returns and turnover on these volatile days, we are able to isolate the importance of shareholder composition during periods when trading behavior is most likely to vary across different types of shareholders. We find that both large block holdings and high levels of institutional ownership decrease trading volumes and moderate stock returns; however, the effects largely occur when stock prices move sharply downward. Moreover, these effects are strongest when ownership concentration and institutional ownership exceed 25 percent. We also find that the disaggregation of institutional investors into distinct categories (banks, pension funds, advisors, etc.) increases our understanding of stock trading and share price dynamics of listed property companies.  相似文献   

15.
Abstract

This paper reports on empirical investigations into the relationship between dividend policy and ownership structure of firms, using a sample of 139 listed Italian companies. Ownership structure in Italy is highly concentrated and hence the relevant agency problem to analyse seems to be the one that arises from the conflicting interests of large shareholders and minority shareholders. This paper therefore attempts to test the rent extraction hypothesis by relating the firm’s dividend payout ratio to various ownership variables, which measure the degree of concentration in terms of the voting rights of large shareholders. The hypothesis that other non-controlling large shareholders may have incentives to monitor the largest shareholder is also tested. The results of the empirical analysis reveal that firms make lower dividend payouts as the voting rights of the largest shareholder increase. Results also suggest that the presence of agreements among large shareholders might explain the limited monitoring power of other ‘strong’ non-controlling shareholders.  相似文献   

16.
本文利用深交所的社会公众股东网络投票数据,研究了中小股东参与网络投票与公司决策的影响因素和经济后果。结果表明,大股东代理问题严重、机构投资者持股比例较高的公司,中小股东的网络投票参与率较高;中小股东的网络投票参与率与公司股票异常回报正相关,并且这种关系随着大股东代理问题的严重程度而增强。与小股东利益更为相关的股权分置改革提案中,中小股东投票参与率更高,并且这种更高的投票参与率在股权分置改革提案中能为中小股东增进财富。  相似文献   

17.
We examine the relation between minority shareholder protection laws, ownership concentration, and board independence. Minority shareholder rights is a country-level governance variable. Ownership structure and board composition represent firm-level governance variables. Prior research hypothesizes and documents a negative relation between countries' minority shareholder rights quality and firms' ownership concentration. We introduce the hypothesis that shareholder protection rights and firms' board independence are positively related. When a country's minority shareholder rights are strong, then minority shareholders should have the legal power to affect board composition. Using a sample of large firms from 14 European countries, we test both hypotheses and find that countries with stronger shareholder protection rights have firms with lower ownership concentrations and with more independent directors, consistent with both hypotheses. We also find evidence that ownership concentration and board independence are negatively related.  相似文献   

18.
This paper studies the impact of the features of the shareholder base on the performance of a large sample of Italian listed firms between 2007 and 2019, both within and across firms. We expand the empirical evidence on the relation between shareholder type and different dimensions of firm performance by dividing shareholders into six categories, and further differentiating between domestic and foreign investors. We provide extensive evidence on the relation between firm performance and different types of shareholders, showing how diverse performance metrics are correlated with the voting rights of specific types of shareholders. Consistent with previous studies, the picture that emerges from our analysis shows that the ownership structure of Italian listed companies is characterized by a high degree of concentration. In this context, we find that ownership concentration or the presence of a controlling shareholder is in general associated with better performance. Moreover, a positive relation exists between diverse firm performance metrics and the voting rights of family shareholders, founders and foreign investors, while government ownership is detrimental in the short-term.  相似文献   

19.
This paper examines the effect of ownership concentration and state ownership on the tax reporting practices of China’s publicly listed firms. I argue that ownership concentration and state ownership are important for tax reporting practices in China because listed firms have high ownership concentrations and high levels of state ownership. Using a sample of 758 listed Chinese firms over the 1998–2008 time period, I find that firms with concentrated share ownership have lower effective tax rates. I also find that firms whose largest shareholders are government‐related have higher effective tax rates compared to firms whose largest shareholders are nongovernment related. In other words, the nature of the largest shareholder (government vs. nongovernment) matters. I also show that ownership‐concentrated firms are able to achieve preferential statutory tax rates compared to firms with low ownership concentration regardless of the identity of the largest shareholder.  相似文献   

20.
关于股改前后现金股利影响因素的实证研究   总被引:20,自引:2,他引:18  
对股改前后影响现金股利水平的公司治理变量研究表明,虽然股改矫正了现金股利与增长机会之间的关系,使股改后当存在增长机会时,公司会减少现金股利的发放,但是我国上市公司的现金股利尚未呈现出全流通资本市场上作为降低控股股东与中小股东代理成本工具的现金股利政策应有的特征,突出表现在股改前后影响上市公司现金股利支付水平的股权结构变量并未发生变化,股改前后都存在股权集中度、第一大股东持股比例及第二到第十大股东持股比例与每股现金股利呈显著正相关、而流通(非限售)股比例与每股现金股利呈显著负相关的关系。  相似文献   

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