Behavioral arbitrage with collateral and uncertain deliveries

In this paper we study the implications of the absence of Behavioral arbitrage opportunities (BAO) in a two period incomplete markets economy where default is allowed but there are collateral requirements and utility penalties due to uncertainty on deliveries. We obtain a modified version of the Fundamental Theorem of asset pricing with default when deliveries are defined in terms of units of account, as in Dubey et al. (1995), and when deliveries are defined as bundles of goods, as in Dubey et al. (2005). Also, we establish that independent of the way that we define deliveries, absence of BAO is compatible with the existence of equilibrium.     

The optimal design of Ponzi schemes in finite economies

As no rational agent would be willing to take part in the last round in a finite economy, it is difficult to design Ponzi schemes that are certain to explode. This paper argues that if agents correctly believe in the possibility of a partial bailout when a gigantic Ponzi scheme collapses, and they recognize that a bailout is tantamount to a redistribution of wealth from non-participants to participants, it may be rational for agents to participate, even if they know that it is the last round. We model a political economy where an unscrupulous profit-maximizing promoter can design gigantic Ponzi schemes to cynically exploit this “too big to fail” doctrine. We point to the fact that some of the spectacular Ponzi schemes in history occurred at times where and when such political economies existed—France (1719), Britain (1720), Russia (1994), and Albania (1997).     

Optimal loan-to-value ratio and the efficiency gains of default

We study the optimal loan-to-value (LTV) ratio in a monetary general equilibrium model with heterogeneous agents, collateral default, production and a banking sector. We find that the welfare of the debtor is not monotonically increasing in the LTV ratio, i.e. tighter financing constraints can be welfare-improving for the debtor. Moreover, the optimal LTV ratio for both the debtor and the creditor allows for the possibility of ex post default. Collateral default enhances efficiency by allowing for better consumption smoothing and risk hedging. Our result improves the argument in Dubey et al. (Econometrica 73(1):1–37, 2005) and Zame (Am Econ Rev 83(5):1142–1164, 1993), which use default penalties instead of collateral to induce repayment and show the efficiency gains of default.     

Secured Loans and Risky Assets in a Monetary Economy

We study the implication of secured credit with a default option for monetary equilibrium. The intermediary structure has the feature of costly state verification, with the monitoring cost interpreted as the cost of foreclosing assets once a default occurs. Without monitoring costs, uncertainty in asset payoffs does not matter for allocation. The asset price can exhibit a liquidity premium because more assets as collateral raises the borrower's credit limit. When there are monitoring costs, the asset's liquidity premium is strictly positive because pledging more assets reduces the default probability and thus the chance to incur monitoring costs. Under some circumstances, increased risk to dividends of the pledged asset may decrease the marginal borrowing cost to such an extent that bank lending rises, and higher default rates are accompanied by larger aggregate liquidity.     

Asset scarcity and collateral rehypothecation

This paper introduces collateral rehypothecation, a widespread practice in derivatives, swaps, and repo markets, in a general equilibrium model with default. Rehypothecation frees up collateral because it allows lenders to resell or repledge assets pledged by borrowers. The risk that lenders will not return the asset, however, limits gains from rehypothecation. Still, when markets are contractually incomplete or decentralized, rehypothecation can achieve a superior use of scarce collateral. These results have implications for the repo market and suggest that limits to rehypothecation can cause price fragmentation.     

Optimal design of derivatives in illiquid markets*

Abstract

The aim of this paper is to determine the optimal structure of derivatives written on an illiquid asset, such as a catastrophic or a weather event. This transaction involves two agents: a bank which wants to hedge its initial exposure towards this illiquid asset and an investor which may buy the contract. Both agents also have the opportunity to invest their residual wealth on a financial market.

Based on a utility maximization point of view, we determine an optimal profile (and its value) such that it maximizes the bank's utility given that the investor decides to make the deal only if it increases its utility. In the case of exponential utility, we show that the pricing rule is a non-linear function of the structure and that the bank always transfers the same proportion of its initial exposure. In the general case, an additional term appears, depending only on the relative log-likelihood of the two agents' views of the distribution of the illiquid asset.     

The impact of keeping up with the Joneses behavior on asset prices and portfolio choice

This paper studies the asset pricing and portfolio choice implications of keeping up with the Joneses preferences. In terms of portfolio choice, we provide sufficient conditions on the utility function under which no portfolio bias can arise across agents in equilibrium. Regarding asset prices, we find that under Joneses behavior asset prices are a function of the economy's aggregate consumption, the agents preference parameters, the wealth endowment distribution and the weighting across agents in the Joneses definition. We present necessary and sufficient conditions such that equilibrium prices are only a function of aggregate wealth. Non-financial, non-diversifiable income is introduced in the model. In the presence of Joneses behavior, an under-diversified equilibrium emerges where investors will bias their portfolios towards the financial assets that better hedge their exposure to the non-financial income risk.     

The Cost of Debt

We use exogenous variation in tax benefit functions to estimate firm‐specific cost of debt functions that are conditional on company characteristics such as collateral, size, and book‐to‐market. By integrating the area between the benefit and cost functions, we estimate that the equilibrium net benefit of debt is 3.5% of asset value, resulting from an estimated gross benefit (cost) of debt equal to 10.4% (6.9%) of asset value. We find that the cost of being overlevered is asymmetrically higher than the cost of being underlevered and that expected default costs constitute only half of the total ex ante costs of debt.     

Growth options,macroeconomic conditions,and the cross section of credit risk

This paper develops a structural equilibrium model with intertemporal macroeconomic risk, incorporating the fact that firms are heterogeneous in their asset composition. Compared with firms that are mainly composed of invested assets, firms with growth options have higher costs of debt because they are more volatile and have a greater tendency to default during recession when marginal utility is high and recovery rates are low. Our model matches empirical facts regarding credit spreads, default probabilities, leverage ratios, equity premiums, and investment clustering. Importantly, it also makes predictions about the cross section of all these features.     

A Markov model for valuing asset prices in a dynamic bargaining market

This paper proposes a Markov chain model for studying the impact on asset prices of illiquidity associated with search and bargaining in an economy. The economy consists of finitely many agents who can trade only when they find each other, and any trade between agents changes the population of the agent types which affects the asset price in the future. Assuming that the equilibrium utility as well as the trade price is proportional to the asset dividend, we obtain the asset prices in steady state. Through extensive numerical experiments, we observe that the equilibrium prices exhibit the cutoff phenomenon (i.e. crash) as the fraction of pessimistic agents becomes large. Models with a market maker as well as irrational agents are also considered.     

Margining in derivatives markets and the stability of the banking sector

We investigate the effects of margining, a widely-used mechanism for attaching collateral to derivatives contracts, on derivatives trading volume, default risk, and on the welfare in the banking sector. First, we develop a stylized banking sector equilibrium model to develop some basic intuition of the effects of margining. We find that a margin requirement can be privately and socially sub-optimal. Subsequently, we extend this model into a dynamic simulation model that captures some of the essential characteristics of over-the-counter derivatives markets. Contrarily to the common belief that margining always reduces default risk, we find that there exist situations in which margining increases default risk, reduces aggregate derivatives’ trading volume, and has an ambiguous effect on welfare in the banking sector. The negative effects of margining are exacerbated during periods of market stress when margin rates are high and collateral is scarce. We also find that central counterparties only lift some of the inefficiencies caused by margining.     

Another Example of a Credit System that Co-Exists with Money

We study an economy in which exchange occurs pairwise, there is no commitment, and anonymous agents choose between random monetary trade or deterministic credit trade. To accomplish the latter, agents can exploit a costly technology that allows limited record-keeping, and enforcement. An equilibrium with money and credit is shown to exist if the cost of using the technology is sufficiently small. Anonymity, record-keeping, and enforcement limitations also permit some incidence of default, in equilibrium.     

Equilibrium, price formation, and the value of private information

An economy is analyzed in which agents first choose whetherto acquire costly information about the return to a risky asset,and then choose demand functions that determine that allocationof assets. It is a well-known paradox that if agents are price-takersand prices are fully revealing, then an equilibrium with costlyinformation acquisition does not exist. It is shown that ifthe price formation process is modeled explicitly and agentsare not price-takers, then it is possible to have an equilibriumwith fully revealing prices and costly information acquisition.     

LDC Debt: Forgiveness,Indexation, and Investment Incentives

We compare different indexation schemes in terms of their ability to facilitate forgiveness and reduce the investment disincentives associated with the large LDC debt overhang. Indexing to an endogenous variable (e.g., a country's output) has a negative moral hazard effect on investment. This problem does not arise when payments are linked to an exogenous variable such as commodity prices. Nonetheless, indexing payments to output may be useful when debtors know more about their willingness to invest than lenders. We also reach new conclusions about the desirability of default penalties under asymmetric information.     

Optimal regulation,executive compensation and risk taking by financial institutions

We present an equilibrium model of financial institutions to examine the optimal regulation of risk taking. Shareholders provide incentives for management to increase risk to excessive levels. Regulators use caps on asset risk and compensation to achieve the socially optimal risk level. This level trades off costs of risk shifting and costs of bank default. Without regulation, equilibrium risk lies above the optimal level. If information and enforcement are perfect, either policy tool (caps on asset risk or compensation) achieves the optimal risk level. If there are frictions – if enforcement is limited, if there is uncertainty about the incentives facing management and costs of risk shifting, or if regulation cannot be bank specific – welfare can be improved by employing both policy tools.     

Do banks care about analysts' forecasts when designing loan contracts?

We investigate whether banks rely on the information content in equity analysts’ annual earnings forecasts when assessing the risk of potential borrowers. While a long literature finds that analysts provide useful information to market participants, it is not clear that banks, which have access to privileged information, would benefit from publicly available analysts’ forecasts. If, however, banks do rely on this information, then more precise private information in earnings forecasts may inform banks. We focus our analysis on the requirement of collateral because it is a direct measure of default risk, whereas other loan terms such as interest spread and debt covenants can also protect against other risks, such as asset misappropriation. The direct link between collateral and default risk allows us to examine whether information from analysts is relevant to banks when designing loan contracts. Consistent with our predictions, we find that higher precision of the private information in analysts’ earnings forecasts is associated with a lower likelihood of requiring collateral, and this effect is larger when a borrower does not have a prior relationship with the lender or their accounting or credit quality is low. We also find that this association disappears after the implementation of Regulation FD, consistent with this regulation reducing analysts’ access to private information.     

Rollover Risk and Market Freezes

The debt capacity of an asset is the maximum amount that can be borrowed using the asset as collateral. We model a sudden collapse in the debt capacity of good collateral. We assume short‐term debt that must be frequently rolled over, a small transaction cost of selling collateral in the event of default, and a small probability of meeting a buy‐to‐hold investor. We then show that a small change in the asset's fundamental value can be associated with a catastrophic drop in the debt capacity, the kind of market freeze observed during the crisis of 2007 to 2008.     

The inefficiency of refinancing: Why prepayment penalties are good for risky borrowers

This paper provides a theoretical analysis of the efficiency of prepayment penalties in a dynamic competitive lending model with risky borrowers and costly default. When considering improvements in the borrower's creditworthiness as one of the reasons for refinancing mortgages, we show that refinancing penalties can be welfare improving and that they can be particularly beneficial to riskier borrowers in the form of lower mortgage rates, reduced defaults, and increased availability of credit. Thus, a high concentration of prepayment penalties among the riskiest borrowers can be an outcome of efficient equilibrium in a mortgage market. We also provide empirical evidence that is consistent with the key predictions of our model.     

Estimating default barriers from market information

Brockman and Turtle [J. Finan. Econ., 2003, 67, 511–529] develop a barrier option framework to show that default barriers are significantly positive. Most implied barriers are typically larger than the book value of corporate liabilities. We show theoretically and empirically that this result is biased due to the approximation of the market value of corporate assets by the sum of the market value of equity and the book value of liabilities. This approximation leads to a significant overestimation of the default barrier. To eliminate this bias, we propose a maximum likelihood (ML) estimation approach to estimate the asset values, asset volatilities, and default barriers. The proposed framework is applied to empirically examine the default barriers of a large sample of industrial firms. This paper documents that default barriers are positive, but not very significant. In our sample, most of the estimated barriers are lower than the book values of corporate liabilities. In addition to the problem with the default barriers, we find significant biases on the estimation of the asset value and the asset volatility of Brockman and Turtle.