Multinational banking and the international transmission of financial shocks: Evidence from foreign bank subsidiaries

Using bank-level data on 368 foreign subsidiaries of 68 multinational banks in 47 emerging economies during 1994–2008, we present consistent evidence that internal capital markets in multinational banking contribute to the transmission of financial shocks from parent banks to foreign subsidiaries. We find that internal capital markets transmit favorable and adverse shocks by affecting subsidiaries’ reliance on their own internal funds for lending. We also find that the transmission of financial shocks varies across types of shocks; is strongest among subsidiaries in Central and Eastern Europe, followed by Asia and Latin America; is global rather than regional; and becomes more conspicuous in recent years. We also explore various conditions under which the international transmission of financial shocks via internal capital markets in multinational banking is stronger, including the subsidiaries’ reliance on funds from their parent bank, the subsidiaries’ entry mode, and the capital account openness and banking market structure in host countries.     

Do foreign banks increase competition? Evidence from emerging Asian and Latin American banking markets

In this paper we examine the impact of foreign bank penetration on the competitive structure of domestic banking sectors in host emerging economies. We focus our analysis on Asia and Latin America during the period 1997-2008. Using bank-level panel data to identify foreign banks and to estimate measures of banking competition, we are able to provide robust empirical evidence that an increase in foreign bank penetration enhances competition in these host countries’ banking sectors. We find that this positive foreign bank penetration and banking competition link is associated with a spillover effect from foreign banks to their domestic counterparts. This spillover effect becomes stronger when more efficient and less risky foreign banks enter into less concentrated host country markets. We also find that the spillover effect is greater when foreign banks enter in the form of ‘de novo penetration’ than through mergers or acquisitions of domestic banks (‘M&A penetration’).     

The interbank market after the financial turmoil: Squeezing liquidity in a “lemons market” or asking liquidity “on tap”

After August 2007 the plumbing system that supplied banks with wholesale funding, the interbank market, failed because toxic assets obstructed the pipes. Banks were forced to squeeze liquidity in a “lemons market” or to ask for liquidity “on tap” from central banks. This paper disentangles the two components of the 3-month Euribor–Eonia swap spread, credit and liquidity risk and then evaluates the decomposition. The main finding is that credit risk increased before the key events of the crisis, while liquidity risk was mainly responsible for the subsequent increases in the Euribor spread and then reacted to the systemic responses of the central banks, especially in October 2008. Moreover, the level of the spread between May 2009 and February 2010 was influenced mainly by credit risk, suggesting that European banks were still in a “lemons market” and relied on liquidity “on tap” even before sovereign debt crisis unfolded in Europe.     

Asymmetric information and price competition in small business lending

This paper examines the relationship between bank lending rates and their cost of funds in New Zealand. Our results show that on average mortgage rates respond more quickly to changes in the cost of funds than base business lending rates. We also find an asymmetry in the initial (short-run) response of banks to changes in funding costs; in particular, our results show banks adjust mortgage rates downwards faster than upwards. The speed to which lending rates revert back to their equilibrium relationship with funding costs varies across the lending markets. We find the adjustment speed is faster when mortgage rates are below equilibrium, whereas it is slower when business lending rates are above long-run levels in relation to funding costs. Our analysis suggests that banks prefer the plain-vanilla type of lending such as mortgages in comparison to small business lending consistent with asymmetric information associated with business loans.     

Further analysis of the expectations hypothesis using very short-term rates

Longstaff [Longstaff, F., 2000. The term structure of very short-term rates: new evidence for the expectations hypothesis. Journal of Financial Economics 58, 397–415] finds support for the expectations hypothesis at the very short end of the repurchase agreement (repo) term structure while other studies find calendar-time-based regularities cause rejection of the expectations hypothesis. Using Longstaff’s methods on a sample of repo rates that pre-dates Longstaff’s sample, we reject the expectations hypothesis for every maturity. The pre-Longstaff-sample repo data comes from a time period where the behavior of short-term interest rates is similar to the long-run average behavior of short-term interest rates. Our results imply that expectations hold when rates are less volatile and/or that we may be entering a period of lower volatility.     

Bank health in varying macroeconomic conditions: A panel study

Using panel data on selected Financial Soundness Indicators (FSIs) this paper investigates the potential strengths and vulnerabilities of financial intermediaries across more than 50 countries. Our econometric analysis reveals strong influence of business cycle, inflation, and real effective exchange rates, and size of the industry on capital adequacy —a core indicator of banks' financial soundness. Furthermore, our analyses provide evidence that banks' profitability is determined by a combination of macroeconomic, bank specific and industry characteristics such as business cycle, inflation, credit risk, capital adequacy, and the level of competition.     

Bank runs and investment decisions revisited

We examine how the possibility of a bank run affects the investment decisions made by a competitive bank. Cooper and Ross [1998. Bank runs: liquidity costs and investment distortions. Journal of Monetary Economics 41, 27-38] have shown that when the probability of a run is small, the bank will offer a contract that admits a bank-run equilibrium. We show that, in this case, the bank will chose to hold an amount of liquid reserves exactly equal to what withdrawal demand will be if a run does not occur; precautionary or “excess” liquidity will not be held. This result allows us to show that when the cost of liquidating investment early is high, an increase in the probability of a run will lead the bank to invest less. However, when liquidation costs are moderate, the level of investment is increasing in the probability of a run.     

A computational approach to the optimal structure of bank input prices

Most bank deposits contain an embedded option which permits the depositor to withdraw funds at will. Demand deposits generally allow costless withdrawal, while time deposits often require payment of an early withdrawal penalty. Managing the risk that depositors will exercise their withdrawal option is an important aspect of input pricing. This paper acknowledges the threat of deposit withdrawal and then solves for the optimal structure of bank deposit rates.     

Financial dollarization: The role of foreign-owned banks and interest rates

Why in many economies households and firms borrow and make deposits in foreign currency? Expanding on the existing literature, our framework addresses this question allowing for interest rate differentials and access to foreign funds to play a role in explaining this process of asset substitution or financial dollarization. Using a newly compiled data set on transition economies and employing a standard panel as well as a panel-VAR methodology we find that increasing access to foreign funds leads to higher credit dollarization, while it decreases deposit dollarization. Interest rate differentials matter for the dollarization of both loans and deposits.     

The term structure of CD rates and monetary policy transmission

The paper investigates the term structure of CD rates and its relationship with the federal funds rate or monetary policy. The term structure derived in this paper is governed primarily by the federal funds rate and secondarily by banks’ income smoothing behavior. It is consistent with the estimation results and differs significantly from the standard term structure of interest rates. The downturn phase of business cycles appears to be accompanied by more aggressive income smoothing by banks (compared with the upturn phase) due to their pessimistic expectations of future profits. The compositional shift in banks’ liabilities during the downturn phase away from CDs toward transaction deposits may pose a greater withdrawal risk for banks.     

Bank capital regulation and credit supply

Banks can meet the need to increase their capital ratio either by issuing new equity or by reducing loans. It is generally known that banks prefer to reduce assets due to the high cost of equity. With a simple banking model we show that, if incumbent shareholders are to benefit, banks may prefer to reduce loans, even though they can recapitalize by issuing new equity without any cost. The result holds when banks hold relatively small amounts of long-term loans, or when the economy is in downturn.     

Anatomy of banking crises in developing and emerging market countries

This paper uses a Binary Classification Tree (BCT) model to analyze banking crises in 50 emerging market and developing countries during 1990-2005. The BCT model identifies three conditions (and the specific threshold of the key indictors) at which the vulnerability to banking crisis increases—(i) very high inflation, (ii) highly dollarized bank deposits combined with nominal depreciation or low bank liquidity, and (iii) low bank profitability—which highlight that foreign currency risk, poor financial soundness, and macroeconomic instability are important drivers of banking crises. The results also emphasize the importance of conditional thresholds in triggering crises, in that banking crises are underlined by a combination of vulnerabilities—or a sequence of (non-linear) conditions—rather than the deterioration of a unique factor.     

No-arbitrage Near-Cointegrated VAR(p) term structure models,term premia and GDP growth

The recent macro-finance literature does not agree either about the empirical properties of the expectation part and of the term premium on long-term bonds or about the importance or even the direction of the relationship between the term premium and future economic activity. This paper proposes a two-step approach to handle both problems. First, in a VAR setting, we extract a reliable measure of the term premium by means of averaging estimator techniques aiming at optimally solving prediction problems when highly persistent processes are present and, thus, providing a so called Near-Cointegrated VAR(p) approach. Second, we analyze the dynamic response of GDP to shocks to the term premium by using the New Information Response Function concept. As far as the first problem is concerned, we find that the NCVAR-based term premium measure is rather stable and counter-cyclical, as suggested by interest rates survey-based estimation of yield curve models and by its risk compensation role. Regarding the second problem, we find that an increase in the long-term spread caused by the term premium induces two effects on future economic activity: the impact is negative for short horizons (less than 1 year), whereas it is positive for longer ones.     

The term structure of real interest rates: theory and evidence from UK index-linked bonds

This paper studies the behavior of the default-risk-free real term structure and term premia in two general equilibrium endowment economies with complete markets but without money. In the first economy there are no frictions as in Lucas (Econometrica 46 (1978) 1429) and in the second risk-sharing is limited by the risk of default as in Alvarez and Jermann (Econometrica 68 (2000) 775; Rev. Financial Studies 14 (2001) 1117). Both models are solved numerically, calibrated to UK aggregate and household data, and the predictions are compared to data on real interest rates constructed from the UK index-linked data. While both models produce time-varying risk or term premia, only the model with limited risk-sharing can generate enough variation in the term premia to account for the rejections of expectations hypothesis.     

International evidence on bond risk premia

This paper revisits the study of time-varying excess bond returns in international bond markets. Using newly available yield curve data from 10 different countries with independent monetary policy, I test the robustness of Cochrane and Piazzesi (2005). For most countries in my sample, I find more modest predictive power for forward rates than originally found by Cochrane and Piazzesi (2005) for the US. Their single-factor model captures well the predictability in international data, and this factor also tends to have a tent-shape in most countries of my sample. CP factors are more idiosyncratic across countries than yields or forward rates. Finally, I show that the recent financial crisis has significantly affected the predictability of excess bond returns.     

Market conditions,default risk and credit spreads

This study empirically examines the impact of the interaction between market and default risk on corporate credit spreads. Using credit default swap (CDS) spreads, we find that average credit spreads decrease in GDP growth rate, but increase in GDP growth volatility and jump risk in the equity market. At the market level, investor sentiment is the most important determinant of credit spreads. At the firm level, credit spreads generally rise with cash flow volatility and beta, with the effect of cash flow beta varying with market conditions. We identify implied volatility as the most significant determinant of default risk among firm-level characteristics. Overall, a major portion of individual credit spreads is accounted for by firm-level determinants of default risk, while macroeconomic variables are directly responsible for a lesser portion.     

Efficiency and risk in European banking

We assess the inter-temporal relationship between bank efficiency, capital and risk in a sample of European commercial banks employing several definitions of efficiency, risk and capital and using the Granger-causality methodology in a panel data framework. Our results suggest that lower bank efficiency with respect to costs and revenues Granger-causes higher bank risk and that increases in bank capital precede cost efficiency improvements. We also find that more efficient banks eventually become better capitalized and that higher capital levels tend to have a positive effect on efficiency levels. These results are generally confirmed by a series of robustness tests. The results have potentially important implications for bank prudential supervision and underline the importance of attaining long-term efficiency gains to support financial stability objectives.     

Interest rates and bank risk-taking

A recent line of research views the low interest-rate environment of the early to mid 2000s as an element that triggered increased risk-taking appetite of banks in search for yield. This paper uses approximately 18000 annual observations on euro area banks over the period 2001-2008 and presents strong empirical evidence that low-interest rates indeed increase bank risk-taking substantially. This result is robust across a number of different specifications that account, inter alia, for the potential endogeneity of interest rates and/or the dynamics of bank risk. Notably, among the banks of the large euro area countries this effect is less pronounced for French institutions, which held on average a relatively low level of risk assets. Finally, the distributional effects of interest rates on bank risk-taking due to individual bank characteristics reveal that the impact of interest rates on risk assets is diminished for banks with higher equity capital and is amplified for banks with higher off-balance sheet items.