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1.
中央银行的独立性在世界各国现代金融体系中日益凸显。中央银行货币政策和银行监管职能分离,加强中央银行的独立性逐渐成为趋势。本文结合中国当前的银行监管体系改革趋势,分析了中央银行货币政策与银行监管职能分离的必要性。  相似文献   

2.
中央银行的独立性在世界各国现代金融体系中日益凸显.中央银行货币政策和银行监管职能分离,加强中央银行的独立性逐渐成为趋势.本文结合中国当前的银行监管体系改革趋势,分析了中央银行货币政策与银行监管职能分离的必要性.  相似文献   

3.
一、中央直属商业银行金融监管机制现状分析传统上,我国对银行业的监管由中国人民银行负责。随着金融改革的推进,同时借鉴国际上的相关经验,我国电开始对证券业、保险业和银行业实行分业监管。继证监会、保监会从中央银行分离后, 2003年银行监管职能又从中央银行分离,并成立了专门履行银行监管职能的银行业监督管理委员会。至此,金融业分业经营、分业监管的框架已经初步形成。  相似文献   

4.
财政部门对中央直属商业银行的监管分析   总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1  
《财政监督》2006,(5):25-27
一、中央直属商业银行金融监管机制现状分析 传统上,我国对银行业的监管由中国人民银行负责。随着金融改革的推进。同时借鉴国际上的相关经验,我国也开始对证券业、保险业和银行业实行分业监管。继证监会、保监会从中央银行分离后,2003年银行监管职能又从中央银行分离,并成立了专门履行银行监管职能的银行业监督管理委员会。至此。金融业分业经营、分业监管的框架已经初步形成。  相似文献   

5.
通常认为,银行监管从中央银行分离之后,中央银行就不再具有金融监管职权。实际上,这是对中央银行职能转换的一个误解。现阶段,我国的中央银行依然保留适当的金融监管职权,为货币政策的宏观调控而服务。  相似文献   

6.
银行监管历来是现代中央银行最为重要的职能之一.然而,20世纪80年代后期以来,在部分发达国家却出现了银行监管职能与中央银行分离的新现象.  相似文献   

7.
发达国家银行监管体制研究及借鉴   总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1  
美国、英国、日本在银行监管方面有着领先的经验,具备典型的模式.美国是由中央银行负责银行监管、较早实行典型金融分业监管体制的国家,而日本与英国则实行了将银行监管职能从中央银行分离并成立综合性金融监管机构、实行统一的金融监管体制的国家.又由于其历史、文化背景不同,具备了各自不同特色.下面我将分析以上各国的银行监管的模式来为探索适合我国国情的银行监管模式提供启示.  相似文献   

8.
新修订的<中华人民共和国中国人民银行法>赋予了中国人民银行"维护金融稳定"的职能,这是我国首次以法律的形式提出金融稳定的概念,也是中国人民银行作为中国的中央银行在银行监管职能分离之后,从微观金融风险监管向系统的、宏观的金融风险监管的重大职能转变.由于我国中央银行的金融稳定工作刚刚起步,面临许多来自理论、法律和市场环境等方面的问题,需要积极思考和寻求对策.  相似文献   

9.
李斌  唐亮 《济南金融》2003,(11):16-19
本文以经济发展水平、中央银行独立性、是否允许混业经营和法律环境这四个变量做自变量,中央银行是否承担监管职能做因变量构建了一个计量经济模型。回归结果表明经济发展水平和中央银行独立性这两个变量对央行是否承担监管职能的影响是显著的。对回归结果进行详细分析之后,得出如下结论:将银行监管职能赋予较独立的央行有助其及时灵活地采取行动,而独立性较低的央行则应将监管职能分离出去以更好履行其货币政策职能。最后运用得出的结论并结合我国实际情况,对中国人民银行监管职能的分离提出自己的见解。  相似文献   

10.
一、实现信息共享的必要性 货币政策和银行监管职能分离后,中央银行与银监部门各司其职,中央银行享有充分的货币政策信息和不完备的银行监管信息,银监部门则享有充分的银行监管信息和不完备的货币政策信息.  相似文献   

11.
乔海曙  张贞乐 《金融论坛》2006,11(11):48-52
对于银行突发事件,若处理不当则会演变成银行危机,乃至会对社会金融和经济产生严重影响。本文从内生性突发事件和外生性突发事件出发,探讨了“蝴蝶效应”导致发生局部银行危机的可能性;运用外部性经济学原理,对银行突发事件的负外部效应和风险溢出进行了探讨。对于突发事件与银行危机的解决,可以从监管机构与商业银行两个方面加强治理:对于监管机构而言,央行要发挥金融稳定职能实施外部援助,银行监管部门加强对商业银行的外部监督;对于商业银行而言,应加强内控机制建设,增强管理层对突发事件的预防和处置能力,防止工作人员道德风险的产生。  相似文献   

12.
我国商业银行信贷投放亲周期性实证研究及缓释对策   总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1  
为有效地规避和防范银行信贷亲周期性及其对宏观经济周期性波动和货币政策调控的负面影响,本文从外部监管和商业银行内部管理提出了缓释我国商业银行信贷投放的亲周期效应的具体对策.如结合我国国情修改并积极实施新资本协议,加强银监会和央行的沟通与协调,构建有差异的资本充足率监管框架,建立反周期资本充足率监管框架和引入动态风险拨备机制等.  相似文献   

13.
自上个世纪末以来,影子银行快速发展,资产规模已接近传统银行体系。影子银行的风险被认为是造成2008年全球金融危机的重要原因,各国和国际金融机构近年纷纷出台加强影子银行监管的措施,试图改变过去监管缺失的状态。和国外影子银行以资产证券化为核心不同,我国影子银行的主要功能是作为融资渠道。因此,我国要借鉴国外影子发展和监管的经验,正确看待影子银行的作用,引导其规范发展并将其作为银行体系的有益补充。  相似文献   

14.
Ongoing changes in the structure and nature of banking, as well as banking crises across the globe have focused the attention of policy makers on the appropriate structure, scope, and degree of independence of banking supervision. Key issues for banking supervision structure are whether there should be one or multiple supervisory authorities, and whether the central bank should be involved in bank supervision. The issue pertaining to the scope of supervision is whether bank supervisory authorities should supervise other financial service industries, including in particular securities and insurance. Finally, the issue regarding the independence of supervisory authorities is the degree to which bank supervisors should be subject to political and economic policy pressure and influence. How these issues are addressed is important, because policies that fail to provide for an appropriate bank supervisory framework may undermine bank performance and even lead to full‐scale banking crises. The intense interest policy makers have shown in these issues has not been matched, however, by researchers. In particular, there is very little systematic empirical evidence on how, or indeed whether, the structure, scope, or independence of bank supervision affects the banking industry. This paper addresses this gap in three respects. First, drawing on the existing literature, we discuss the various policy issues surrounding the structure, scope, and degree of independence of bank supervision. Second, we provide comparative information on the actual choices that have been made regarding these three aspects of supervision across a wide range of developed and emerging market economies. Third, using both country‐specific data for 55 countries in all parts of the world, and data for over 2,300 individual banks in those countries, we examine the relationship between the structure, scope, and independence of bank supervision and one key dimension of the banking industry – bank profitability. Our results indicate, at most, a weak influence for the structure of supervision on bank performance. In particular, we find some evidence that a single‐supervisor system enhances bank performance. However, following our discussion of the caution one must use in interpreting data on the supervisory framework, our re‐estimates using an alternative source of data on the structure of supervision failed to duplicate this result. Our results have a bearing on a key dimension of the policy debate on how to structure supervision. In particular, given the dearth of empirical evidence on the issues, advocates of one form or another of supervisory structure have asserted that a particular change is likely to affect (favorably or adversely, as the advocate sees fit) the performance of banks. Our results provide little support at best to the belief that any particular bank supervisory structure will greatly affect bank performance. This is significant, because it suggests that the on‐going debate might more broadly focus on the impact of the supervisory structure on other aspects of the health of the banking system, including individual bank safety and soundness, systemic stability, and the development of the banking system.  相似文献   

15.
What does the general public know about banking supervision? What objectives does the public think bank supervisors should pursue? We investigate these issues using a survey among Dutch households. First, we find that the public's knowledge about banking supervision is far from perfect. We also find that respondents often expect more from supervisors than they can realistically achieve. Finally, our findings suggest that better-informed people have more realistic views on banking supervision. Realistic views on banking supervision lead to more prudent financial behavior, which, in turn, contributes to financial stability. Therefore, the communication policies of banking supervisors should aim to improve the public's knowledge about banking supervision.  相似文献   

16.
研究银行业对外开放具有十分重要的现实意义。文章首先对当前中国银行业开放现状和存在的问题进行了深刻分析。接着,从有效维护金融安全、促进民族金融业的发展等战略高度深入探讨了关于银行业是否对外资银行全面开放、全面开放的内涵、开放后的外资银行的国民待遇、监管机构的审慎监管、外资入股中资银行等重大问题。文章认为,在对外开放进程中,一是要加强对外资银行母国和母行的风险研究;二是要严格外国银行的监管,平衡外国银行分行与外资法人机构的发展;三是要提高对外资银行的监管和处罚力度;四是合理引导外资银行入股中资银行。  相似文献   

17.
Since monetary policy is constrained in fixed exchange rate regimes, we should observe fewer banking crises due to moral hazard in countries with credible currency pegs. However, three countries with seemingly credible pegs in the nineteen-eighties and -nineties, namely China, Hong Kong and Argentina, still suffered crises in their domestic banking sectors. The present note illustrates that bank incentives to take on excess risk still exist in countries with currency peg credibility and that the size of that risk exposure (and thus the potential for crisis) may be positively related to the level of central bank foreign exchange reserves.  相似文献   

18.
造成当前我国银行体系流动性过剩的因素很多,本文以广西为实证,从研究国库资金的运行规律出发,分析国库资金影响银行流动性的机制以及对中央银行货币政策效应的影响,最后提出财政政策和货币政策应协调搭配以缓解我国流动性的问题。  相似文献   

19.
We study whether central bank independence (CBI) and monetary policy arrangements can jointly influence the likelihood of policymakers assigning banking supervision to central banks. Our empirical analysis shows that, assuming a benevolent government, a higher degree of central bank operational (economic) independence is associated with a lower probability of supervisory powers being entrusted to the monetary authority. We interpret this result as deriving from governments’ fear of the risk of excessively discretionary monetary policy. However, there is evidence that – conditional on operational independence – central banks are more involved in supervision when they pursue tighter monetary policy goals (a specific aspect of political independence). Our interpretation is that the latter may represent a commitment to mitigate central banks’ discretion in the monetization of financial distress. Our study suggests that CBI can be relevant, not only for its alleged effects on macroeconomic variables, but also in influencing policymakers’ decisions on the allocation of banking supervisory powers.  相似文献   

20.
Using data for more than 200 banks from 21 OECD countries for the period 2002–2008, we examine the impact of bank regulation and supervision on banking risk using quantile regressions. In contrast to most previous research, we find that banking regulation and supervision has an effect on the risks of high-risk banks. However, most measures for bank regulation and supervision do not have a significant effect on low-risk banks. As banking risk and bank regulation and supervision are multi-faceted concepts, our measures for both concepts are constructed using factor analysis.  相似文献   

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