抵押风险分析和抵押贷款违约损失率研究

违约损失率是BaselⅡ规定的六大风险指标之一,而抵押是BaselⅡ标准法规定的信用风险缓释工具之一,两者在巴塞尔新资本协议中有着非常关键的地位和作用.本文总结了国内外违约损失率的研究概况,在利用历史数据对我国商业银行抵押贷款的违约损失率进行实证分析后发现：（1）回收率同融资金额成反比;（2）回收率同融资折率成反比;（3）回收率呈“U”型分布.本文的分析有助于进一步探究我国商业银行抵押贷款违约损失率的特征,是量化风险暴露和计算监管资本的基础,并为我们下一步的折率研究做好了铺垫.     

抵押贷款违约损失率研究

新巴塞尔资本协定将违约概率(PD)和违约损失率(LGD)纳入监管资本衡量的基本框架,国际活跃银行内部风险管理指标已从不良贷款率转向PD和LGD。本文简要综述了国际上LGD理论与实证研究的成果,并对国内商业银行抵押贷款LGD进行了实证研究,得出了一些重要结论与管理建议。     

个人住房抵押贷款违约风险跃迁概率研究

巴塞尔新资本协议提出针对个人住房抵押贷款可采用内部评级高级法评估其风险,在满足某些最低条件和披露要求的前提下,商业银行可根据自己对个人住房抵押贷款违约概率、违约损失率、违约风险暴露和期限等要素的估计值确定相应的资本要求。本文提出将风险跃迁概率引入到对个人住房抵押贷款提前还款-违约概率的定量估计中。借助逻辑斯特模型,本文将这一概念实际运用到对个人住房抵押贷款微观数据的分析当中,得到的实证研究结论包括借款人历史还款状态可以作为表征其未来还款状态的重要指标,贷龄与借款人还款状态的跃迁概率显著相关等。     

商业银行抵押风险分析

抵押是巴塞尔新资本协议规定的风险缓释工具之一。抵押品对商业银行优化资本结构、改变盈利模式和防范信用风险有着重要的作用和意义。本文首先借助一个数量模型和LGD的概念,对抵押品的风险缓释功能进行了理论分析,进而结合我国商业银行抵押贷款现状的统计结果,分析了当前银行抵质押业务中存在的问题,据此给出了对策建议。     

商业银行抵押风险分析

抵押是巴塞尔新资本协议规定的风险缓释工具之一.抵押品对商业银行优化资本结构、改变盈利模式和防范信用风险有着重要的作用和意义.本文首先借助一个数量模型和LGD的概念,对抵押品的风险缓释功能进行了理论分析,进而结合我国商业银行抵押贷款现状的统计结果,分析了当前银行抵质押业务中存在的问题,据此给出了对策建议.     

城区特征对商业银行住房抵押贷款决策的影响：国外研究综述与启示

城区特征通过多种途径影响商业银行的住房抵押贷款决策。商业银行可以根据城区特征判断一个城区的住房抵押贷款的违约风险,进而确定对该城区的最低首付款比例或拒贷率。本文通过分析国外城区特征对商业银行住房抵押贷款决策的影响机制,联系我国实际情况,指出我国商业银行根据城区特征进行住房抵押贷款决策具有合理性,建议商业银行密切关注城区住房价格波动率,并且政府应该限制中低收入城区商业银行的数量。     

商业银行个人住房抵押贷款违约风险损失度量研究

随着个人住房抵押贷款的快速发展,我国商业银行个人住房贷款业务所聚集的潜在风险正日益凸现.本文借鉴国内外最新研究成果,从防范风险、提高商业银行资金利用效率的角度,应用Credit metric风险度量模型对采集数据进行度量研究,重点测量了商业银行个人住房抵押贷款所面临的非预期损失,得到了各信用等级抵押贷款的风险价值以及商业银行该为此贷款提取的经济资本,并提出了建立更加科学合理的经济资本缓冲制度的对策建议.     

不同首付比率下住房抵押贷款违约率的测算研究

迄今为止,我国个人住房抵押贷款的不良率在1%左右,是商业银行不良贷款率最低的信贷业务。按照国际经验,个人住房抵押贷款的风险暴露期为3至8年。随着我国个人住房抵押贷款业务的发展,不良贷款率和违约率呈上升趋势,个人住房贷款的违约问题已经成为银行界关注的焦点。违约概率的测度方法主要有:基于内部信用评级历史资料的测度方法;基于期权定价理论的测度方法;基于保险精算的测度方法;基于风险中性市场     

抵押贷款业务专业化经营的优势与发展

商业银行鉴别和处置抵押品时遇到诸多困难，其解决的途径之一是发展抵押贷款业务专业化经营。商业抵押公司是集商品购销与融资担保为一体的专业商业机构，商业银行借助于商业抵押公司的运作，可以有效地调整商业银行的抵押贷款规模和期限结构，降低抵押贷款的系统风险，提高抵押贷款业务的专业化经营水平，促进业务增长。     

商业银行期房抵押贷款风险规避分析

我国商业银行个人住房抵押贷款有大量是采用期房抵押形式。期房贷款解决了购房者融资问题,开发商也大大受益,但贷款银行却承担了极大的不确定性风险。虽然到目前为止,银行个人住房抵押贷款业务的呆坏账比例不高,但这主要是高首付率的结果,并不能说明期房贷款体系运行健康。随着我国住房抵押贷款的飞速发展,期房贷款风险有积聚放大的可能。本文从信息经济学视角分析银行在期房抵押贷款中面临的诸多风险,并对风险规避提出一些建议。     

Money and Collateral

This paper presents a model in which collateralized monetary loans are essential as trading instruments. Money and private debt collateralized by real assets complement each other as allocative tools in an environment with informational and commitment limitations. Public debt may play a socially beneficial role when collateral is scarce.     

有效抵押品的新命题

本文在借鉴前人研究成果的基础上,通过对价值2亿元酒店抵押4000万元贷款风险案例的分析,建立并验证了有效抵押品的新命题。有效抵押品必须具有有效控制借款者履行其保证承诺,有多种可供选择的发展可能性或者用途和方便处置的种种便利;其中,抵押品的保证和控制功能是第一位的,变现和替代功能是第二位的。     

The Role of Collateral in Entrepreneurial Finance

Abstract:  Previous research has suggested collateral has the role of sorting entrepreneurs either by observed risk or by private information. In order to test these roles, this paper develops a model which incorporates a signalling process (sorting by observed risk) into the design of an incentive-compatible menu of loan contracts which works as a self-selection mechanism (sorting by private information). It then tests this Sorting by Signalling and Self-Selection Model, using the 1998 US Survey of Small Business Finances. It reports for the first time that: high type entrepreneurs are more likely to pledge collateral and pay a lower interest rate; and entrepreneurs who transfer good signals enjoy better contracts than those transferring bad signals. These findings suggest that the Sorting by Signalling and Self-Selection Model sheds more light on entrepreneurial debt finance than either the sorting-by-observed-risk or the sorting-by-private information paradigms on their own.     

Loan Rates and Collateral

We investigate the relation between corporate loan spreads and collateralization. We use propensity scoring to create a matched sample of pairs of loan facilities from the Dealscan database. We find that noncollateralized loans are associated with lower spreads even after controlling for risk.     

Collateral in Monetary Policy Operations

We present a portfolio decision model for banks that permits us to estimate the costs associated with the need to collateralise loans from the central bank. This allows us to calibrate the difference between a restrictive collateral eligibility framework for open market operations, such as that applied by the FED, with a more flexible approach such as that of Eurosystem. We also document that there could potentially appear relevant cost differences between the various collateral mobilisation procedures (pooling and earmarking) that currently coexist in the eurozone.     

Are the Liquidity and Collateral Roles of Asset Bubbles Different?

Several papers explain why asset bubbles are observed when growth is large. These papers differ in the role of the bubble, used to provide liquidities or as collateral in a borrowing constraint. We compare the liquidity and collateral roles of bubbles in an overlapping generations model. When the bubble is deterministic, the equilibrium is identical under these two roles, implying that the same mechanism explains the crowding-in effect of the bubble on growth. With stochastic bubbles, growth is larger when bubbles play the liquidity role, because the burst of a bubble used for liquidity is less damaging to capital investors.     

The Role of Collateral in the Credit Acquisition Process: Evidence from SME Lending

This study tests the simultaneous impact of observed characteristics and private information on debt term contracts in a multi‐period setting, using a dataset of 12,666 credit approvals by one major Portuguese commercial bank during 2007–2010. The main results show that borrowers with good credit scores that know they have a high probability of success and are unlikely to default are more willing to pledge collateral in return for a lower interest rate premium (IRP). Furthermore, lenders tailor the specific terms of the contract, increasing both collateral requirements and the IRP from observed risk, for borrowers operating in riskier industries and with less credit availability. The results are robust to controls for joint debt terms negotiation and the degree of collateralization offered by the borrower.     

股票抵押贷款预期回收率比较分析

股票抵押贷款是一种风险较大的产品.股票价值和收益的高波动性造成抵押品价值的回收率不稳定,进而影响贷款预期回收率,使得银行经营风险加大.为了有效估算股票抵押贷款回收率,本文运用预期回收率模型,借助中国色诺芬股票数据库和美国CRSP股票数据库信息,比较分析不同市场情况下预期回收率的区别.分析发现中国市场由于近几年股票波动率加强,整体预期回收率较低,而美国则相反;预期回收率与抵押率、违约概率都成负相关关系,而且预期回收率对于抵押率的变化非常敏感;60%贷款抵押率的设定在美国市场是可行的,而中国市场合理抵押率是54%左右.     

Collateral Framework: Liquidity Premia and Multiple Equilibria

Central banks normally accept debt of their own governments as collateral in liquidity operations without reservations. This gives rise to a valuable liquidity premium that reduces the cost of government finance. The ECB is an interesting exception in this respect. It relies on external assessments of the creditworthiness of its member states, such as credit ratings, to determine eligibility and the haircut it imposes on such debt. We show how such features in a central bank's collateral framework can give rise to cliff effects and multiple equilibria in bond yields and increase the vulnerability of governments to external shocks. This policy can potentially induce sovereign debt crises and defaults that would not otherwise occur. The success of the ECB's temporary suspension of these features of its collateral framework during the pandemic illustrates the practical relevance of this mechanism.