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1.
利益相关者财务论   总被引:84,自引:8,他引:84  
李心合 《会计研究》2003,(10):10-15
历史地看,公司财务的价值导向经历了从股东利益向相关者利益的演进过程。股东利益导向型公司财务的理论基础是资本强权理论和股东利益与社会利益相统一理论,而相关者利益导向型公司财务的理论基础是共同所有权理论、托管责任理论和公司社会责任理论。利益相关者公司财务模式的基本特征是:公司财务的目标是利益相关者价值最大化,公司财务实行共同治理,员工与公司保持长期稳定的财务关系,公司财务实行分层治理和管理,公司财务控制权相机配置等。  相似文献   

2.
“股东至上”和“利益相关者至上”是两种争议的代表性治理观点。“股东至上”治理主义以股东价值最大化为公司治理目标,以“资本雇用劳动”、代理理论为理论基础,以股东单边治理为主。而“利益相关者至上”治理主义以利益相关者利益最大化为公司治理目标,以利益相关者理论为基础,倡导利益相关者共同治理。本文从企业所有权、理论基础、会计上从利润的计算和分配过程、利益获得的确定性和公司运营等五个方面剖析了两种治理观点之间的关系,说明这两种观点其实并不冲突,是相容的。上市公司的治理目标应该是满足其他利益相关者利益基础上的股东财富最大化。  相似文献   

3.
崔金辉  章雁 《上海会计》2010,(10):16-18
随着社会经济的发展,企业已将财务目标由"股东利益最大化"转变为"企业价值最大化",在履行社会责任时必须考虑到利益相关者的利益,本文着重阐述了如何将利益相关者理论纳入财务治理模式,并建立共同治理机制与相应约束机制相结合的治理模式,既充分考虑各利益相关者的利益,又充分发挥其在财务治理中的作用,从而提高财务治理效率。  相似文献   

4.
财务目标:最大化还是均衡——基于利益相关者财务框架   总被引:43,自引:3,他引:43  
袁振兴 《会计研究》2004,(11):38-42
企业目标由股东利益至上发展到关注相关利益者利益 ,与之相对应财务目标也由股东利益最大化发展到利益相关者利益最大化。本文从委托代理理论和产权理论的角度对这一问题进行分析认为 ,现代企业中所有权与经营权的分离 ,委托代理关系的产生决定了股东不可能追求到利益或价值最大化 ;经营者也无实现股东或企业价值最大化的激励 ;现代企业由于产权残缺 ,这使得企业利益相关者在实现自身利益时 ,受到制约 ,也不可能追求到利益最大化。笔者认为 ,企业财务目标是相关利益者利益的均衡 ,并从市场一般均衡、团队理论和共同产权理论等几个方面对其进行了考察。  相似文献   

5.
利益相关者理论下的会计政策选择研究   总被引:11,自引:0,他引:11  
利益相关者理论是在契约理论的基础之上丰富和发展起来的,其根基并没有超脱企业契约的范畴,是环境推动的结果.企业之所以能够存在,不仅与股东和经理人员有关,而且与消费者、债权人、供应商、员工和政府等紧密相关.企业是利益相关者结成的关系契约,利益相关者的价值最大化是利益相关者理论下的会计政策选择的目标.会计政策选择权属于企业的剩余控制权,从利益相关者理论角度看,会计政策选择权应属于利益相关者.利益相关者通过不同的方式影响着企业,进而通过相应的公司治理结构和具体运行机制进行会计政策选择,并受到一定外在约束机制的制约.以利益相关者理论为基础,遵守会计政策选择的原则、在相应会计政策选择的内外约束机制下,达成利益相关者的价值最大化目标.  相似文献   

6.
由于所处的经济、社会环境不同,我国国有企业财务目标与西方企业并不完全相同;本文首先回顾了利益相关者理论,然后论证了当前我国企业特别是国有企业的财务管理应以相关者利益最大化作为目标。  相似文献   

7.
利益相关者理论下的公司财务目标研究综述   总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1  
对企业财务目标的认识很大程度上取决于企业理论的突破和发展。在主流企业理论下,企业目标被定义为“股东利益最大化”。而利益相关者理论对人力资本的重视契合了知识经济时代“人”的地位提高的趋势,对公司利益相关者的关注也符合可持续性发展的经营理念,弥补了“股东利益至上”的主流企业理论的缺陷,所以一经提出就引起了经济学界的广泛关注,并迅速被引入了公司财务领域。自此之后,利用利益相关者理论对公司财务目标进行研究成为理财学研究的一个热点,学术界提出过种种观点。本文试图在对相关资料进行详细搜集和梳理的基础上,对该领域进行…  相似文献   

8.
现代企业理论越来越重视利益相关者的利益,企业存在的目的并非就是为了股东服务,在企业的周围还存在许多关乎企业生存的利益群体。正是由于各利益相关者的共同参与,构成了企业的利益制衡机制,才使得企业健康发展。特别是随着现代企业制度的建立和知识经济的来临,传统财务管理出现了许多不适应,财务管理目标不能再唯“股东利益最大化”为目标了,必须转向“利益相关者利益最大化”为目标。  相似文献   

9.
罗国磊  石玉 《会计师》2011,(6):22-24
<正>一、引言产生于20世纪60年代的利益相关者理论,是对以股东价值最大化为目标的传统公司治理理论的颠覆。近年来,越来越多的学者对利益相关者理论进行了深入的研究,利益相关者治理理念日益普及,公司治理的目标逐渐转向利益相关者财富最大化,利益相关者理论开始成为公司治理的主流理论。然而对于利益相关者理论实际应用情况的研究并不多见。利益相关者理念在实际是否被真正地应用于公司的治理之中,公司经营的成果是否与利益相关者价值相关,是股东价值还是利益相关者价值影响企业的业绩?这些问题的解决有助于进一步指导利益相关者理论的完善。因此,我们研究利益相关者理论在实际公司治理的情况,为利益相关者理论研究提供实际经验,对利益相关者理论的进一步完善具有十分重要的意义。  相似文献   

10.
《会计师》2015,(19)
与利润最大化、股东财富最大化、企业价值最大化财务管理目标相比较,相关者利益最大化是企业财务管理目标的理性选择。本文结合沃尔玛相关案例进行系统的研究分析,探讨了在利益相关者合作模式下如何从外部和内部构建企业财务管理目标。  相似文献   

11.
This paper examines the role of the corporate objective function in increasing corporate productivity, social welfare, and the accountability of managers and directors. Because it is logically impossible to maximize in more than one dimension, purposeful behavior requires a “single-valued” objective function. Two hundred years of work in economics and finance implies that, in the absence of externalities and monopoly, social welfare is maximized when each firm in an economy aims to maximize its total market value. The main contender to value maximization is stakeholder theory, which argues that managers should attempt to balance the interests of all corporate stakeholders, including not only financial claimants, but employees, customers, communities, and governmental officials. By refusing to specify how to make the necessary tradeoffs among these competing interests, the advocates of stakeholder theory leave managers with a theory that makes it impossible for them to make purposeful decisions. With no clear way to keep score, stakeholder theory effectively makes managers unaccountable for their actions (which helps explain the theory's popularity among many managers). But if value creation is the overarching corporate goal, the process of creating value involves much more than simply holding up value maximization as the organizational objective. As a statement of corporate purpose or vision, value maximization is not likely to tap into the energy and enthusiasm of employees and managers. Thus, in addition to setting up value maximization as the corporate scorecard, top management must provide a corporate vision, strategy, and tactics that will unite all the firm's constituencies in its efforts to compete and add value for investors.  相似文献   

12.
This paper examines the role of the corporate objective function in corporate productivity and efficiency, social welfare, and the accountability of managers and directors. The author argues that because it is logically impossible to maximize in more than one dimension, purposeful behavior requires a single‐valued objective function. Two hundred years of work in economics and finance implies that, in the absence of externalities and monopoly, social welfare is maximized when each firm in an economy maximizes its total market value. The main contender to value maximization as the corporate objective is stakeholder theory, which argues that managers should make decisions so as to take account of the interests of all stakeholders in a firm, including not only financial claimants, but also employees, customers, communities, and governmental officials. Because the advocates of stakeholder theory refuse to specify how to make the necessary tradeoffs among these competing interests, they leave managers with a theory that makes it impossible for them to make purposeful decisions. With no clear way to keep score, stakeholder theory effectively makes managers unaccountable for their actions (which helps explain the theory's popularity among many managers). But if value creation is the overarching corporate goal, the process of creating value involves much more than simply holding up value maximization as the organizational objective. As a statement of corporate purpose or vision, value maximization is not likely to tap into the energy and enthusiasm of employees and managers. Thus, in addition to setting up value maximization as the corporate scorecard, top management must provide a corporate vision, strategy, and tactics that will unite all the firm's constituencies in its efforts to compete and add value for investors. In clarifying the proper relation between value maximization and stakeholder theory, the author introduces a somewhat new corporate objective called “enlightened value maximization.” Enlightened value maximization uses much of the structure of stakeholder theory—notably the need to consider the interests of all corporate stakeholders—while continuing to posit maximization of long‐run firm value as the criterion for making the necessary tradeoffs among stakeholders. The paper comes to similar conclusions about the Balanced Scorecard, which is described as the managerial equivalent of stakeholder theory. Although the Balanced Scorecard can add value by helping managers better understand the drivers of shareholder value, it should not be used as a performance measurement and incentive compensation system because it fails to provide a single valued score, a clear way of distinguishing superior from substandard performance.  相似文献   

13.
Whether firms pursue shareholder value maximization or the maximization of stakeholder welfare is a controversial issue whose outcomes seem irreconcilable. We propose that firms are likely to compensate their executives for pursuing the firm's goal be it shareholder value maximization or the maximization of stakeholder welfare. In this paper, we examine the correlation between firm value, stakeholder management, and compensation. We find that stakeholder management is positively related to firm value. However, firms do not compensate managers for having good relationships with its stakeholders. These results do not support stakeholder theory. We also find an endogenous association between compensation and firm value. Our results are consistent with Jensen's (2001) enlightened value maximization theory. Managers are compensated for achieving the firm's ultimate goal, value maximization. However, managers optimize interaction with stakeholders to accomplish this objective.  相似文献   

14.
This paper examines the role of the corporate objective function in corporate productivity and efficiency, social welfare, and the accountability of managers and directors. I argue that since it is logically impossible to maximise in more than one dimension, purposeful behaviour requires a single valued objective function. Two hundred years of work in economics and finance implies that in the absence of externalities and monopoly (and when all goods are priced), social welfare is maximised when each firm in an economy maximises its total market value. Total value is not just the value of the equity but also includes the market values of all other financial claims including debt, preferred stock, and warrants. In sharp contrast stakeholder theory, argues that managers should make decisions so as to take account of the interests of all stakeholders in a firm (including not only financial claimants, but also employees, customers, communities, governmental officials and under some interpretations the environment, terrorists and blackmailers). Because the advocates of stakeholder theory refuse to specify how to make the necessary tradeoffs among these competing interests they leave managers with a theory that makes it impossible for them to make purposeful decisions. With no way to keep score, stakeholder theory makes managers unaccountable for their actions. It seems clear that such a theory can be attractive to the self interest of managers and directors. Creating value takes more than acceptance of value maximisation as the organisational objective. As a statement of corporate purpose or vision, value maximisation is not likely to tap into the energy and enthusiasm of employees and managers to create value. Seen in this light, change in long‐term market value becomes the scorecard that managers, directors, and others use to assess success or failure of the organisation. The choice of value maximisation as the corporate scorecard must be complemented by a corporate vision, strategy and tactics that unite participants in the organisation in its struggle for dominance in its competitive arena. A firm cannot maximise value if it ignores the interest of its stakeholders. I offer a proposal to clarify what I believe is the proper relation between value maximisation and stakeholder theory. I call it enlightened value maximisation, and it is identical to what I call enlightened stakeholder theory. Enlightened value maximisation utilises much of the structure of stakeholder theory but accepts maximisation of the long run value of the firm as the criterion for making the requisite tradeoffs among its stakeholders. Managers, directors, strategists, and management scientists can benefit from enlightened stakeholder theory. Enlightened stakeholder theory specifies long‐term value maximisation or value seeking as the firm’s objective and therefore solves the problems that arise from the multiple objectives that accompany traditional stakeholder theory. I also discuss the Balanced Scorecard, the managerial equivalent of stakeholder theory. The same conclusions hold. Balanced Scorecard theory is flawed because it presents managers with a scorecard which gives no score—that is, no single‐valued measure of how they have performed. Thus managers evaluated with such a system (which can easily have two dozen measures and provides no information on the tradeoffs between them) have no way to make principled or purposeful decisions. The solution is to define a true (single dimensional) score for measuring performance for the organisation or division (and it must be consistent with the organisation’s strategy). Given this we then encourage managers to use measures of the drivers of performance to understand better how to maximise their score. And as long as their score is defined properly, (and for lower levels in the organisation it will generally not be value) this will enhance their contribution to the firm.  相似文献   

15.
This study investigates the considerations that might be made by managers when choosing between mutually exclusive stakeholder expectations and reaching and engaging in a dialogue with them. In addition, the study also examines if there are systematic differences across countries (Italy and the US) in the decision to address the concerns of various stakeholder groups. Data was collected from 244 managers and 72 companies simultaneously in two different national business contexts, Italy and the US. The results of the study provide some evidence that managerial perception of three stakeholder group characteristics – power, legitimacy, and urgency – form a parsimonious group of variables that explain the process of stakeholder prioritization. However, only limited support was found for the relationship between salience accorded to a stakeholder group and engagement efforts directed toward the group. The results of the study also show that the managerial decision as to which of the stakeholder groups’ demands to address will be influenced by society-specific expectations. The significance of this study lies in investigating the stakeholder prioritization and engagement process, as it is being practiced, which, one could argue, would help in developing guidelines for effective stakeholder management that stands a realistic chance of being adapted and followed.  相似文献   

16.
The role of innovation/new product/service development as a source of organisational growth and profitability is well recognised. Similarly, the need to build ‘quality’ into the design of new products and services is understood. Research focusing on the development of new financial services usually includes new product development models, emphasising the ‘technical quality’ of the service, while service design models emphasise process or ‘functional quality’. Additionally, while the impact of staff on service delivery at the implementation stage and the need for inter-departmental cooperation is widely discussed, many studies do not focus on the range of stakeholder interests that affect the new product development/design process. The case study presented highlights both the focus of service design and the multiple stakeholders involved in the process. In-depth interviews with managers of the new product development department of a UK bank reveal potential and actual sources of conflict.  相似文献   

17.
The policies and practices of American Electric Power (AEP) encompass a number of paradoxes in the domain of sustainability. AEP is a large electric power provider with a predominantly coal‐fired power generation portfolio, which puts the company squarely in the center of national debates about global climate change and national air quality. At the same time, AEP is also a leader on several social and environmental fronts: integrated reporting, stakeholder engagement, technology innovation, and policy solutions for climate change. In this article, the authors describe AEP's rationale for providing leadership in these areas and then explore how the company tries to balance stakeholder interests and financial, environmental, and social concerns in its capital investment decisions. Using these examples, the authors expand on and discuss the limitations of Michael Jensen's theory of “enlightened value maximization.”  相似文献   

18.
While there are broader socio-political, psychological, and structural factors that influence investment decisions (see Harris et al., 2016), in line with the critical approach, this study provides an empirical insight into the notion that financialization, specifically the tendency to prioritise economic over environmental objectives, has a strong bearing on how managers view investment trade-off decisions in relation to sustainability issues. The study empirically investigates this notion by examining the investment trade–off preferences of Australian managers in relation to three decision attributes – economic outcomes (i.e. financial returns), environmental impact (i.e. carbon emissions) and stakeholder pressure to consider environmental issues. We use the discrete choice experimental method to quantify the trade-offs between the above mentioned three attributes. In addition, we also investigate the potential effect of three contingency factors on individual's preferences. Specifically, at the organisational level, we explore the effects of financial and environmental rewards and at the individual level, we explore the effect of environmental consciousness. In line with the financialization hypotheses our results indicate that managers prioritise financial returns over carbon emissions and stakeholder pressures with the preference for financial returns found to be positively associated with rewards for financial performance. However, in line with the pragmatic approach and despite the overall dominance of financial returns, there is evidence that manager's focus on financial returns can be influenced, with the preference for financial returns negatively associated with rewards for environmental performance and environmental consciousness. In addition, while stakeholder pressure was not found to be associated with any of the three contingency factors and, manager's emphasis on carbon emissions was not associated with financial rewards, manager's emphasis on carbon emissions was found to be positively associated with both rewards for environmental performance and environmental consciousness. Therefore, our findings suggest that corporate management have an important role to play, both in respect to the design of performance rewards systems and the recruitment of environmentally conscious managers, in order to promote the sustainability agenda.  相似文献   

19.
基于利益相关者理论,本文分析了保险公司股东、保单持有人和保险行业监管机构等三个主要利益相关者对保险公司资本结构的偏好及其影响,在此基础上运用博弈论和股东收益率模型对利益相关者影响下的保险公司资本结构进行理论分析。研究结果表明:在利益相关者的影响作用下,保险公司采用较低的财务杠杆能更好地最大化各利益相关者的效用,优化公司资本结构。这一结论也得到了我国三家A股保险公司上市前后财务杠杆变化的经验数据支持。为此,本文提出降低保险公司财务杠杆、优化资本结构的政策建议。  相似文献   

20.
We propose that high‐quality corporate governance may mitigate agency costs related to value‐destroying investments in stakeholder management (SM). Using an unbalanced panel of 9,051 firm‐year observations for 1,631 firms, we find that deviations from expected stakeholder management (ESM) are increasing in chief executive officer (CEO) portfolio delta. We find, however, that deviations from ESM are negatively related to proxies for effective board monitoring. We also document that the effect of governance mechanisms varies by industry (consumer or industrial orientation) and SM dimension. The results indicate that corporations with good governance pursue shareholder value maximization while constraining unnecessary investment in stakeholders.  相似文献   

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