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1.
D&O保险的立法问题是我国司法实践中一个亟需澄清的问题,同时亦是保险法学界关注较多的基础理论问题。本文通过考察D&O保险合同在公司治理中的价值,细致分析在2019年日本第二次《公司法》修改之际学界对D&O保险规则立法与否的争论及立法演进历程,并对增设D&O保险合同规定的初衷以及在决定该保险合同内容时的决策程序进行系统阐释。研究发现,增设D&O保险合同规定、明确公司有权全额负担保险费用,有助于提高管理层的风险承担水平和管理效率,进而促进企业创新。在探讨我国《公司法》是否应当构建D&O保险规则这一问题时,应注意到公司法上的补偿制度是D&O保险存在的前提。就D&O保险合同内容的信息披露问题,一方面,为防止公司费用无限地用于提升填补限额,可采披露D&O合同信息的手段;另一方面,就具体的信息披露事项,不可盲目“照搬”美国做法。  相似文献   

2.
In the classic Rothschild-Stiglitz model of adverse selection in a competitive environment, we analyse a no-claims bonus type contract (bonus-malus). We show that, under full insurance coverage, if the insurance company applies Bayes's rule to learn about client probability types over time and uses this information in premium calculations for contract renewals, then there exist conditions under which all client types strictly prefer the Bayesian updating contract to the classic Rothschild-Stiglitz separating equilibrium.  相似文献   

3.
Insurance law has been embedded in an international context ever since. This is true not only for marine insurance and reinsurance but also for manifold other branches of the insurance sector. Against this background, the European Single Market and the intended legal harmonisation and integration are particularly important for insurance contract law. The future development of insurance law should give special attention to the question if and to what extent there is a convergence in the respective member state insurance contract laws. At the outset, the comparative analysis shows that French and German insurance contract law is governed by a “risk bearing community model” (Gefahrengemeinschaftsmodell) and that English law can be characterized as an “individual contract model” (Individualvertragsmodell). Convergence is not only found in European directives but also in reforms and reform proposals in member state law.  相似文献   

4.
The aim of this paper is to analyze the impact of mutual firms on competition in the insurance market. We distinguish two actors in this market: mutual firms, which belong to their pooled members, and traditional companies, which belong to their shareholders. Our approach differs from the literature by one crucial assumption: the expected utility of the consumers depends on the size of their insurance firm, which generates network externalities in this market. Thus, the choice of a contract results in a trade-off between the premium level and the probability of that premium being ex-post adjusted. The optimal contract offered by a mutual firm involves a systematic ex-post adjustment (negative or positive), while the contracts a company offers imply a fixed premium that is possibly negatively adjusted at the end of the contractual period. In an oligopoly game, we show that three types of configurations are possible at equilibrium: either one mutual firm or insurance company is active, or a mixed structure emerges in which two or more companies share the market with or without a mutual firm.  相似文献   

5.
Existing literature argues that corporate insurance is purchased because the insurance company produces risk management information for publicly held corporations. In this article, we address a fundamental question as to why other financial intermediaries cannot perform the same information production function as the insurance company. We argue that when the risk manager of the firm performs multiple tasks and needs consulting and investigation services from an outside agent for efficient risk management, the optimal contract with the agent has to be in the form of an insurance contract. Other types of contracts, such as flat-fee contracts, cannot be optimal. Therefore, the insurance company is ideally suited to provides these services.  相似文献   

6.
A captive is an insurance or reinsurance company established by a parent group to finance its own risks. Captives mix internal risk pooling between the business units of the parent group and risk transfer towards the reinsurance market. We analyse captives from an optimal insurance contract perspective. The paper characterises the vertical contractual chain that links firstly business units to insurance captives or to “fronters” through insurance contracts, secondly fronters to reinsurance captives through the cession of risks and thirdly insurance or reinsurance captives to reinsurers through cessions or retrocessions. In particular, the risk cession by fronters to a reinsurance captive trades off the benefits derived from recouped premiums and from the risk-sharing advantage of an “umbrella reinsurance policy”, against the risks that result from the captive liabilities.  相似文献   

7.
Abstract

This article designs and prices a new type of participating life insurance contract. Participating contracts are popular in the United States and European countries. They present many different covenants and depend on national regulations. In the present article we design a new type of participating contract very similar to the one considered in other studies, but with the guaranteed rate matching the return of a government bond. We prove that this new type of contract can be valued in closed form when interest rates are stochastic and when the company can default.  相似文献   

8.
This article deals with the question of how a ?fair risk management mix“ that does not lead to a wealth transfer between shareholders and policyholders can be achieved in a joint-stock insurance company. In our financial model of an insurer, the ?fair“ situation, it is assumed that there is no wealth transfer between shareholders and policyholders when both parties receive a net present value of zero on their investments. Taking the default risk of the insurance company into account, we first model a ?fair“ situation for the insurer’s existing portfolio. Surprisingly, closing a new insurance contract that has been priced on a fair basis and then included in the insurer’s existing portfolio leads to a disequilibrium situation because the net present value for the shareholders is no longer zero. This new net present value can be viewed as the fair price of any risk management measure the insurer must take so as to reestablish an equilibrium for both parties, the shareholders and the policyholders.  相似文献   

9.
The writing of collective pensions insurance in Norway was first taken up in 1917 by the “Norske Folk”, a life insurance company, founded by the seven oldest Norwegian life insurance companies, and a short time afterwards this kind of insurance was also taken up by the “Norske Forenede”. Finally, in 1931, the “Samvirke” which had been established a short time before by the Norwegian Cooperative Association, began to write collective pensions insurance.  相似文献   

10.
梁鹏 《保险研究》2011,(6):99-107
我国《保险法》未规定临时保险制度,本文建议,我国的临时保险制度应当分为强制临时保险与自愿临时保险两种,在保险人预收保险费的情况下,根据履行提前、对价平衡、合理期待等理论,保险人应当对临时保险事故予以赔付,此种临时保险的期间自投保人交付保险费之时起算,于正式保险生效之时或投保人收到拒保通知书并由保险人退还保险费之时终止;...  相似文献   

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