论我国公用事业融资模式创新

<正>随着城市发展以及城市化进程的加速,城市公用事业的发展也需要得到进一步的提高,但是传统的融资模式制约了公用事业的进一步发展。因此,我们需要积极探索多种创新的融资模式来解决这个问题。本文首先简要介绍公用事业定义、特点,然后分析我国公用事业融资现状及其中的问题,接着提出几种可行的公用事业融资的创新模式,最后提出几点保证融资模式创新顺利发展的政策建议。     

后改革时代考验政府监管智慧

公用事业的市场化改革为城市公用事业的发展注入了新的活力。在市场机制的激励下,一方面,竞争带来思想观念的深刻变化,成为推动城市公用事业发展的巨大动力,使长沙城市公用事业始终保持着持续发展的强劲态势；另一方面,在市场化运作、多元化融资和规范化管理的改革实践中,长沙城市公     

中国的BOT/PPP实践和经验

BOT／PPP的概念 特许经营项目融资是越来越流行的适用于基础设施、公用事业和自然资源开发等大中型项目的重要筹资手段，这里所说的项目融资是专指狭义项目融资，即“通过项目融资”，而非广义的“为项目融资”。     

融资平台在城镇化建设中的机遇与发展

融资平台在市政设施、公用事业项目建设中发挥了重要的投融资作用,支持了我国城镇化发展.在新形势下,过去粗放型的平台融资已不可持续,本文运用SWOT分析方法阐述了融资平台在城镇化建设中的机遇与挑战,运用市场增进理论解释了融资平台支持城镇化建设的作用,最终得出融资平台逐步完善经营,建立现代企业制度,以发展化解存量风险的结论,并提出发展路径选择.     

人物·观点

王祖继：探索优先股等方式满足基建融资需求 保监会副主席王祖继14日在接受新华社记者采访时表示,保险资金将探索项目资产支持计划、公用事业收益权证券化、优先股以及股债结合、夹层基金等新型投资工具和方式,满足基础设施建设多元化的融资需求。     

稳定现金流的非证券化融资:泰山门票和索道收费权质押案例

基于我国开展资产证券化业务的操作难度较大、门槛较高的现实,商业银行如何对可预期、有保障的未来现金流进行评价,开发适用的非证券化融资产品,代表了银行业经营的一个发展方向,也是信贷创新的一个重要领域.本文通过对泰山门票和索道收费权质押案例的研究,得出公用事业收费权符合稳定现金流的特征,以此为载体的非证券化融资能够成为缓解当前政府融资困境的有效方式.     

如果有稳定的现金流就将它证券化

根据研究公用事业行业的需要,资产证券化(Asset Backed Securities)融资方式可以理解为:将一组流动性较差的公用事业资产经过一定的组合,使这组资产能产生可预计且稳定的现金流收益,通过中介机构的信用加强,把这些资产的收益权转变为可在金融市场上流动的、信用等级较高的债券型证券的过程.     

PPP项目融资风险分担机制研究

PPP模式作为一种新型的项目融资模式在基础设施和公用事业建设领域的应用越来越广泛。然而PPP项目融资,规模大、周期长、合同关系复杂,因而也面临巨大的风险。对PPP项目风险的有效识别和选取适当的评价方法进行风险量化,以便合理采取应对措施,是PPP项目各参与方提高效益的关键。本文重点采用核对表法对PPP项目融资风险进行识别分析,就目前的PPP项目融资风险评价方法进行概述,结合现有的工程项目风险评价方法进行比较研究,得出比较适合PPP项目融资风险定量分析的方法,最后提出PPP项目融资风险在各参与方中的合理分担与关键风险的应对措施。     

地方政府投融资平台贷款风险分析

2009年以来,在国家刺激经济复苏一系列政策牵引下,各级地方政府依托政府信用,纷纷建立了众多的投融资平台,进行贷款等大量债务融资活动,用于交通、城建、水利等基础设施和公共事业项目建设,有力促进了当地基础设施和公用事业发展,     

地方政府融资平台——以北京市某区政府融资平台为例

引言所谓地方政府融资平台,就是指地方政府通过划拨土地,注入优质资产、国企股权等方式,组建一个资产规模和财务状况达到融资标准的公司。该公司以地方财政对公司的注资受益权、补贴,甚至偿债基金等作为保证,通过向银行贷款或发行企业债券等方式融入资金,并将其重点投向市政基础设施建设、公用事业、公益性项目等。此类公司名称各异,通常有城建     

政府补贴和国有参股对参与PPP企业外部融资的影响

政府补贴和国有资本参股是政府参与PPP(政府和社会资本合作)的两种主要方式。本文借助一个资本具有外部性的一般均衡模型来分析这两种方式对企业外部融资的影响机制,并进行经验验证。理论分析发现,国有参股的担保效应增加了项目公司对高杠杆的需求,提升了金融中介发放贷款的意愿,使金融中介接受更低的借款利率。政府补贴不影响项目公司与金融中介之间的借贷合约。项目公司外部融资所受影响会进一步传导至参与PPP的企业。因此,国有参股增加稳态时的企业杠杆率,降低借款利率;政府补贴则不影响杠杆率和利率。实证部分通过整合2014-2018年财政部PPP项目库数据和2010-2018年上市公司财务数据,借助PSM-DID分析发现,国有参股程度显著降低参与PPP项目的上市公司的借贷成本并提升其杠杆率,但政府补贴支出没有明显作用,印证了模型结论。此外,市场化程度更高的地区,国有参股程度对参与企业外部融资的影响程度更小。本文研究对PPP模式下如何减少政府债务风险以及控制债务风险向企业转移具有一定的参考意义。     

PPP融资模式在我国公共租赁房建设中的应用研究

我国公租房建设面临着较大的资金缺口,而由于公租房项目存在资金回报率低、回收周期长的特点,传统的融资方法无法吸引私营资本的进入。本文通过对PPP（Public—Private-Partnerships）融资管理模式的分析,结合公租房项目建设的特点,探讨了PPP融资模式在我国公租房建设项目中的应用。     

The Choice Among Long-Term Financing Instruments for Public Utilities

This study examines the decision of regulated utilities to raise new financing via common stock, debt, or preferred stock offerings. We develop several logit models to test how a set of relevant variables affects the issuing choice. These variables include the level of insider ownership, regulatory climates, measures of aggregate market conditions, bankruptcy risk, deviations from the long-and short-term target ratios, asset composition, etc. In addition, this paper tests whether the cross-sectional level of debt ratio is related to some of these same factors. Our findings indicate that U.S. electric utilities are not influenced by market timing when making a choice among long-term financing instruments. However, our results do show that ownership structure variables, such as the number of directors and officers, seem to have a significant negative influence upon the choice of common stock, thus lending support to Friend and Lang's finding. In addition, capital structure seems to matter for utilities.     

USING PROJECT FINANCE TO FUND INFRASTRUCTURE INVESTMENTS

For much of the past century, there has been an increased tendency for large infrastructure projects to be funded and operated by governments. Since the early 1980s, however, private-sector financing and management of such projects have experienced a dramatic revival. In some cases, this revival has taken the form of the "privatization" of an entire industry. But another, increasingly common, form has been the use of project finance to fund instrastructure investments. Besides being widely used in infrastructure investments like telecommunications and power generation in developing countries, the use of project finance has recently been extended by the U.K.'s Private Finance Initiative to fund public enterprises as diverse as the construction and operation of prisons, hospitals, subway cars, and the National Insurance computer system.
In a project financing, the project is managed by a separate company that is owned by a project sponsor (or sponsors) who usually takes an active role in the management of the project. The project company enters into a complex series of contracts with multiple parties, including the host government, the project's customers and suppliers, and the banks that typically provide most of the debt financing.
This paper argues that the equity investment by the project's operators works together with high debt ratios and the web of contractual arrangements to reduce "agency" problems in the management of large projects. It also shows how the contracts shift the various project risks to those parties best able to appraise and control them. Finally, it discusses why most project financing takes the form of limited recourse bank loans to the project company rather than, say, public bonds with full recourse to the sponsors.     

Assessing the Assessments

They said of the July 1997 Asian regional financial crisis that ‘…it could never happen again’. They were right. There has not been another regional crisis—just an international one! This paper owes its origins to the Asian financial crisis. The crisis sparked the development of an assessment model for the evaluation of insolvency laws. The paper reviews the considerable developments in this area, commencing with the pioneering work of the Asian Development Bank in the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis in 1997 and culminating in the, now, quite established triennial practice of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) in its assessment of the insolvency laws of its ‘countries of operation’. Along the way, mention is also made of the development and application of the World Bank ‘Principles’ and the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law Legislative Guide for Insolvency Law. All of these diagnostic tools have been variously employed in an endeavour to provide a fair and acceptable basis for evaluating an insolvency law. The paper draws comparisons from these tools and concludes that there is a considerable degree of correlation between them, such that approaches taken in 1998 have remained much the same to this time. The EBRD assessment programme is singled out for fuller analysis. It was developed with the benefit of the earlier assessment models and is consistently used as a means of tracking the development of insolvency laws. Accordingly, the paper presents the survey questionnaire on which the EBRD assessment is based, explains the methodology behind it and presents the results of the last of such assessments (2009). It invites an examination of the bases on which the EBRD assessments are undertaken and whether the approach is sufficiently broad, objective and fair and its use in possibly creating aspirations for reform. One purpose of the paper is to capture and record the historical origins and development of the assessment models before it all becomes lost in the passage of time. The paper also advances the use of the EBRD assessment model as a teaching tool in courses in comparative and international insolvency law. Copyright © 2014 INSOL International and John Wiley & Sons, Ltd     

Does financing influence the sensitivity of cash and investment to asset tangibility?

Research shows that asset tangibility substantially impacts firms’ cash levels and investment. Using the deregulation of equity issuance in the U.S. as an exogenous shock to access to equity markets, we investigate the influence of financing on the dependence of cash and investment on asset tangibility. We show that financing dampens the sensitivity of cash and investment to asset tangibility, and promotes investment and firm growth. Our results suggest that greater access to financing allows financially constrained firms to invest in productive projects that may otherwise not be taken up. This provides evidence that public firms even in well-developed financial markets such as the U.S. benefit from financial deregulation that removes barriers to external financing, shedding light on the role of financial markets in fostering growth.     

Pricing Final Indemnification Payments to Private Sponsors in Project-Financed Public-Private Partnerships: An Application of Real Options Valuation

The extraordinary global growth in the private funding of public infrastructure projects in the form of public‐private partnerships (or PPPs) is expected to have major social and economic benefits—benefits that result in large part from improving the allocation of project risks between the public and private sectors. But with the financial crisis and severe tightening of credit likely to limit the financing and delivery of new projects, both project participants and their financiers need to manage the technical, economic, legal, and political complexities of infrastructure projects more carefully, especially in less traditional infrastructure deals that involve complex operations, new assets, or emerging markets. This paper proposes and illustrates the application of the real options valuation approach to a critical feature of most PPPs: establishing the final “indemnification” amount to be paid by a public administration to private partners in the project financing of those PPPs that face substantial market risks. In demonstrating this approach, the authors use the case of the Pedemontana Lombarda toll road, a major transportation infrastructure project in Northern Italy for which financial plans have been filed and whose start is now pending. The main function of real options in this case is to capture the effects on value of the major market risk in such projects—namely, the uncertainty about volume of traffic on the new road. The authors interpret the final indemnification price as the value of a real put option sold by the awarding authority to private investors (in the case of a project that would otherwise be unprofitable and have a negative NPV). The put option takes the form of a clause in the concession contract that gives investors the right, under certain circumstances, to sell the toll road back to the government for a fixed sum (in this case, €2.9 billion). According to the authors, this valuation approach is likely to be helpful in any kind of infrastructure project that faces risk stemming from the unpredictability of market demand and future revenue streams.     

Large Infrastructure Investments: Financing Mechanisms and Incentives in Decentralised Countries*

Infrastructure services crucially affect competitiveness and efficiency. They are essential but they usually require important amounts of public funds. In decentralised countries, regional governments cannot usually afford large infrastructure projects, so co-financing with the central government is required. The aim of this paper is to demonstrate the influence of the central government financing mechanisms on the contract offered by the regional government for the construction, maintenance and operation of the infrastructure. We prove that if the central government uses certain financing mechanisms (total cost coverage), the regional government may have no incentives to offer an efficient contract to the firm.     

Overcoming Opportunism in Public‐Private Project Finance

The possibility of opportunistic behavior, whether by the private investors who operate public‐private projects or by the government agencies who oversee and administer them, can become a powerful deterrent to raising public‐private project financing, especially considering the scale of the investment in infrastructure. Nevertheless, both parties can protect themselves against the counterparty's possible opportunism by giving the investor an “exit” (or put) option and the public agent a “bail‐out” (or call) option on the private investor's shares. In describing the role and design of such puts and calls, this paper presents a mechanism for converting “natural monopolies” into competitive or contestable markets by using over‐the‐counter option contracts that combine the stability of long‐term contracts and the flexibility of short‐term contracts. In the language of economists, the exit/bail‐out option mechanisms presented here are seen as reducing barriers to entry by streamlining incomplete long‐term contracts and avoiding contractual problems related to “bounded rationality” and opportunism.     

ARE PROJECT FINANCE LOANS DIFFERENT FROM OTHER SYNDICATED CREDITS?

This paper provides the first full-length empirical analysis of project finance, which is defined as "limited or non-recourse financing of a newly to be developed project through the establishment of a vehicle company." The article compares the characteristics of a sample of 4,956 project finance loans (worth $634 billion) to comparable samples of non-project finance loans, all of which are drawn from a comprehensive sample of 90,784 syndicated loans (worth $13.2 trillion) booked on international capital markets since 1980.
The authors find that project finance (PF) loans differ significantly from non-project finance loans in that PF loans have a longer average maturity, are more likely to have third-party guarantees, and are far more likely to be extended to non-U.S. borrowers and to borrowers in riskier countries. Project finance credits also involve more participating banks, have fewer loan covenants, are more likely to use fixed-rate rather than floating-rate loan pricing, and are more likely to be extended to borrowers in tangible-asset-rich industries, such as real estate and electric utilities. Despite being nonrecourse finance, floating-rate project finance loans have lower credit spreads (over LIBOR) than do most comparable non-PF loans. The authors also report that projects funded with PF loans are heavily leveraged, with an average loan to value ratio of 67%.