Performance Incentives within Firms: The Effect of Managerial Responsibility

We show that top management incentives vary by responsibility. For oversight executives, pay‐performance incentives are $1.22 per thousand dollar increase in shareholder wealth higher than for divisional executives. For CEOs, incentives are $5.65 higher than for divisional executives. Incentives for the median top management team are substantial at $32.32. CEOs account for 42 to 58 percent of aggregate team incentives. For divisional executives, the pay–divisional performance sensitivity is positive and increasing in the precision of divisional performance and the pay–firm performance sensitivity is decreasing in the precision of divisional performance. These results support principal–agent models with multiple signals of managerial effort.     

Tax incentives for inefficient executive pay and reward for luck

I study the economic consequences of tax deductibility limits on salaries for the design of incentive contracts. The analysis is based on an agency model in which the firm’s cash flow is a function of the agent’s effort and an observable random factor beyond the agent’s control. According to my analysis, limiting the tax deductibility of fixed wages has two consequences. The principal rewards the agent on the basis of the observable random factor and adjusts the amount of performance-based pay in the optimal incentive contract. The new contract can have weaker or stronger work incentives than without the tax. The theoretical findings have implications for empirical compensation research. First, the analysis shows that reward for luck can be the optimal response to recent tax law changes, whereas earlier empirical literature has attributed this phenomenon to managerial entrenchment. Second, I demonstrate that a simple regression analysis that fails to control for separable measures of luck is likely to find an increased pay for performance sensitivity as a response to the introduction of tax deductibility limits on salaries even if the pay for performance sensitivity has actually declined.     

Product Market Competition,Managerial Incentives and Firm Valuation

This paper contributes to the very small empirical literature on the effects of competition on managerial incentive schemes. Based on a theoretical model that incorporates both strategic interaction between firms and a principal agent relationship, we analyse the relationship between product market competition, incentive schemes and firm valuation. The model predicts a nonlinear relationship between the intensity of product market competition and the strength of managerial incentives. We test the implications of our model empirically based on a unique and hand‐collected dataset comprising over 600 observations on 200 Swiss firms over the 2002–2005 period. Our results suggest that, consistent with the implications of our model, the relation between product market competition and managerial intensive schemes is convex indicating that above a certain level of intensity in product market competition, the marginal effect of competition on the strength of the incentive schemes increases in the level of competition. Moreover, competition is associated with lower firm values. These results are robust to accounting for a potential endogeneity of managerial incentives and firm value in a simultaneous equations framework.     

Corporate Governance When Managers Set Their Own Pay

This paper presents a model of the firm in which the manager has discretion over his own compensation, constrained only by the threat of shareholder intervention. The model addresses two main questions. How does shareholder power affect managers' compensation and their incentives to maximise firm value? And what is the optimal level of shareholder power? Expectedly, the model shows that increasing shareholder power leads to lower managerial pay. Greater shareholder power, however, also weakens the manager's incentives to maximise value and may even lead to lower profits for shareholders. There might, thus, be too much, as well as too little, shareholder power. The model characterises the optimal level of shareholder power and yields predictions about the relation between shareholder power, managerial pay, performance and firm characteristics.     

A theory of delegated search for the best alternative

Searching for the best worker, a reliable supply alternative, or the most profitable investment is frequently delegated to an agent. This article develops a theory of delegated search. We show that the principal’s ability to delegate depends on the agent’s luck, her initial resources, and the contract that governs her search. With moral hazard, the optimal contract is characterized by performance deadlines with bonuses for early completion. If performance cannot be specified, the optimal search is implemented by an option‐to‐buy contract for the principal. If performance is partially specified, the optimal contract is a standard pay‐for‐performance arrangement.     

Specific knowledge and performance measurement

I examine optimal incentives and performance measurement in a model where an agent has specific knowledge (in the sense of Jensen and Meckling) about the consequences of his actions for the principal. Contracts can be based both on “input” measures related to the agent's actions and an “output” measure related to the principal's payoff. Whereas input‐based pay minimizes income risk, only output‐based pay encourages the agent to use his knowledge efficiently. In general, it is optimal to use both kinds of performance measures. The results help to explain some empirical puzzles and lead to several new predictions.     

Motivating high‐impact innovation: Evidence from managerial compensation contracts

We investigate the relationship between Chief Executive Officer (CEO) compensation and firm innovation and find that long‐term incentives in the form of options, especially unvested options, and protection from managerial termination in the form of golden parachutes are positively related to corporate innovation, and particularly to high‐impact, exploratory (new knowledge creation) invention. Conversely, non‐equity pay has a detrimental effect on the input, output and impact of innovation. Tests using the passage of an option expensing regulation (FAS 123R) as an exogenous shock to option compensation suggest a causal interpretation for the link between long‐term pay incentives, patents and citations. Furthermore, we find that the decline in option pay following the implementation of FAS 123R has led to a significant reduction in exploratory innovation and therefore had a detrimental effect on innovation output. Overall, our findings support the idea that compensation contracts that protect from early project failure and incentivize long‐term commitment are more suitable for inducing high‐impact corporate innovation.     

Dynamic Agency and the q Theory of Investment

We develop an analytically tractable model integrating dynamic investment theory with dynamic optimal incentive contracting, thereby endogenizing financing constraints. Incentive contracting generates a history‐dependent wedge between marginal and average q, and both vary over time as good (bad) performance relaxes (tightens) financing constraints. Financial slack, not cash flow, is the appropriate proxy for financing constraints. Investment decreases with idiosyncratic risk, and is positively correlated with past profits, past investment, and managerial compensation even with time‐invariant investment opportunities. Optimal contracting involves deferred compensation, possible termination, and compensation that depends on exogenous observable persistent profitability shocks, effectively paying managers for luck.     

Managerial compensation: Luck,skill or labor markets?

Luck, skill and labor markets all have empirical support as determinants of managerial compensation. We examine the relative importance of pay for luck, managerial skill and labor market opportunities in determining compensation. We measure luck as the predictable component of firm performance, measure skill using managerial fixed effects and measure labor market opportunities as the compensation of executives at matched firms. Our results imply that managerial skill is the most important determinant of managers' compensation, followed by firm size and labor market opportunities, and that luck is not an important determinant of managerial compensation.     

Auditors’ Economic Incentives and the Sensitivity of Managerial Pay to Accounting Performance

The use of managerial incentives to manage earnings in order to enhance accounting performance‐based compensation is greater when auditors have economic incentives to compromise their independence. Hence, compensation committees face more difficulties in determining cash compensation when earnings quality declines. This study investigates whether boards of directors can mitigate the agency problems between managers and shareholders by being aware of the opportunistic earnings management encouraged by auditors’ economic incentives and actively adjusting performance‐based compensation for the reduced earnings quality. To this end, it examines how auditors’ economic incentives affect the sensitivity of managerial pay to accounting performance. The findings show a negative association between the client's economic importance to the auditor and the sensitivity of managerial pay to accounting performance, with this association more pronounced for firms that opportunistically inflate earnings, suggesting that boards mitigate agency problems by actively intervening to modify performance‐based compensation schemes for the reduced earnings quality. Additional analyses show that board effectiveness in determining compensation depends on its characteristics. These results suggest the urgent need to oblige companies to establish compensation committees, particularly in countries that lack such a mandatory requirement or where few companies have such committees.     

Asymmetric benchmarking in compensation: Executives are rewarded for good luck but not penalized for bad

Principal-agent theory suggests that a manager should be paid relative to a benchmark that removes the effect of market or sector performance on the firm's own performance. Recently, it has been argued that such indexation is not observed in the data because executives can set pay in their own interests; that is, they can enjoy “pay for luck” as well as “pay for performance.” We first show that this argument is incomplete. The positive expected return on stock markets reflects compensation for bearing systematic risk. If executives’ pay is tied to market movements, they can only expect to receive the market-determined return for risk-bearing. This argument, however, assumes that executive pay is tied to bad luck as well as to good luck. If executives can truly influence the setting of their pay, they will seek to have their performance benchmarked only when it is in their interest, namely, when the benchmark has fallen. Using industry benchmarks, we find significantly less pay for luck when luck is down (in which case, pay for luck would reduce compensation) than when it is up. These empirical results are robust to a variety of alternative hypotheses and robustness checks, and they suggest that the average executive loses 25–45% less pay from bad luck than is gained from good luck.     

Delegation and incentives

This article analyzes the relation between authority and incentives. It extends the standard principal‐agent model by a project selection stage in which the principal can either delegate the choice of project to the agent or keep the authority. The agent's subsequent choice of effort depends both on monetary incentives and the selected project. We find that the consideration of effort incentives makes the principal less likely to delegate the authority over projects to the agent. In fact, if the agent is protected by limited liability, delegation is never optimal.     

Rewarding improvements: optimal dynamic contracts with subjective evaluation

We study a T‐period contracting problem where performance evaluations are subjective and private. We find that the principal should punish the agent for performing poorly in the future even when the evaluations were good in the past; at the same time, the agent should be given opportunities to make up for poor evaluations in the past with better performance in the future. Optimal incentives are thus asymmetric. Conditional on the same number of good evaluations, an agent whose performance improves over time should be better rewarded than one whose performance deteriorates.     

Optimal job design in the presence of implicit contracts

We characterize the optimal job design in a multitasking environment when the firms use implicit contracts (i.e., bonus payments). Two natural forms of job design are compared: (i) individual assignment, where each agent is assigned to a particular job and (ii) team assignment, where a group of agents share responsibility for a job and are jointly accountable for its outcome. Team assignment mitigates the multitasking problem but may weaken the implicit contracts. The optimal job design follows a cutoff rule where only the firms with high reputation concerns opt for team assignment. However, the cutoff rule need not hold if the firm can combine implicit incentives with explicit pay‐per‐performance contracts.     

The Impact of Managerial Entrenchment on Agency Costs: An Empirical Investigation Using UK Panel Data

This paper empirically investigates the relationship between managerial entrenchment and agency costs for a large sample of UK firms over the period 1999–2005. To measure managerial entrenchment, we use detailed information on ownership and board structures and managerial compensation. We develop a managerial entrenchment index, which captures the extent to which managers have the ability and incentives to expropriate wealth from shareholders. Our findings, which are based on a dynamic panel data analysis, show that there is a strong negative relationship between managerial entrenchment and our inverse proxy for agency costs, namely asset turnover ratio. There is also evidence that short‐term debt and dividend payments work as effective corporate governance devices for UK firms. Finally, our findings reveal that agency costs are persistent over time. The results are robust to a number of alternative specifications, including varying measures of managerial entrenchment and agency costs.     

Serial CEO incentives and the structure of managerial contracts

I explore CEOs’ incentives to select firm strategies and to acquire firm-specific skills when CEOs have job-hopping opportunities. Several features of managerial compensation, such as benchmarking of pay to larger and more prestigious companies, payments unrelated to past performance, unrestricted stock awards for highly paid CEOs, long-term incentives, and higher pay in companies granting long-term incentives, emerge in the optimal contract. I argue that the model can explain the change in the structure and the surge in US CEO compensation as well as differences across countries and across firms within a country.     

Why Do Firms Use Incentives That Have No Incentive Effects?

This paper illustrates why firms might choose to implement stock option plans or other pay instruments that reward “luck.” I consider a model where adjusting compensation contracts is costly and where employees' outside opportunities are correlated with their firms' performance. The model may help to explain the use and recent rise of broad‐based stock option plans, as well as other financial instruments, even when these pay plans have no effect on employees' on‐the‐job behavior. The model suggests that agency theory's often‐overlooked participation constraint may be an important determinant of some common compensation schemes, particularly for employees below the highest executive ranks.     

Bribery versus extortion: allowing the lesser of two evils

Both bribery and extortion weaken the power of incentives, but there is a trade‐off in fighting the two because rewards to prevent supervisors from accepting bribes create incentives for extortion. Which is the worse evil? A fear of inducing extortion may make it optimal to tolerate bribery, but extortion is never allowed. Extortion discourages “good behavior” because the agent suffers from it even though he has done the right thing, whereas a bribe acts as a penalty for “bad behavior.” Our analysis provides lessons to fight corruption and explanations why developed countries may have an advantage in dealing with extortion.     

Contracting for information under imperfect commitment

We study optimal contracting under imperfect commitment in a model with an uninformed principal and an informed agent. The principal can commit to pay the agent for his advice but retains decision‐making authority. Under an optimal contract, the principal should (i) never induce the agent to fully reveal what he knows—even though this is feasible—and (ii) never pay the agent for imprecise information. We compare optimal contracts under imperfect commitment to those under full commitment as well as to delegation schemes. We find that gains from contracting are greatest when the divergence in the preferences of the principal and the agent is moderate.     

Accounting Standards and Earnings Management: Evidence from China

This article examines the effect of an asset impairment–related regulatory reform on earnings management in China. Chinese Accounting Standard No. 8 (CAS No. 8), which prohibits the reversal of long‐lived asset impairments, was promulgated to constrain managerial opportunism with respect to previously recognized impairment loss reversal. CAS No. 8 forbids the reversal of long‐lived asset impairment losses only, while allowing the reversal of short‐term asset impairment losses. Based on a sample of China's A‐share listed companies on the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange during the period 2001–2008, we reveal that managers use less current asset write‐downs and more reversals in the post–CAS No. 8 period. However, such reporting practices do not appear to be influenced by managerial incentives to avoid reporting losses and/or for “big bath” accounting purposes.