论公司的债权人治理

由于环境的变化和理论的发展,债权人的公司治理角色正在发生实质性的变化,它不但参与了公司治理,而且越来越成为未来公司治理结构的重要力量。本文在介绍债权人权利和债权人参与公司治理实践的基础上,对债权人公司治理的原因和治理效应进行了较深入的探讨。     

上市公司股份回购的溢出效应——基于公司债信用利差的经验证据

立足于我国股份回购制度重大修订以及债券市场债券违约潮的现实背景，以公司债信用利差为研究视角，考察上市公司股份回购在债券市场的溢出效应。结果表明，股份回购对公司债信用利差有正向影响，说明股份回购在债券市场存在溢出效应。进一步研究发现，股份回购是通过“风险防御”效应中的信息风险传导使得公司债信用利差增大。公司治理水平越低、融资约束程度越高，这种溢出效应越明显。拓展性检验结果表明，股份回购对公司债信用利差的正向影响在《公司法》修订后更为显著。研究结论不仅为上市公司股份回购的溢出效应研究提供了债券市场的经验证据，也为监管部门制定债权人利益保护政策提供了参考。     

债权人与公司治理

在公司治理的研究中有一个共同点，就是往往忽视了债权人在公司治理中的作用。事实上，由于诸多因素的影响，债权人的角色正在发生实质性的变化，债权人不可避免地参与了公司治理，越来越成为未来公司治理结构的核心。     

浅谈公司治理结构下的债权人治理

本文突破传统的股东至上的公司治理理论,以利益相关者理论为基础,论述了债权人治理的必要性,我国公司法中债权人保护制度设计上存在的一些问题,随后就如何完善债权人治理问题进行探讨。     

相互制保险公司治理的逻辑与价值

相互制保险公司与股份制保险公司作为两种有效的保险组织形式,具有各自的制度优势。相互制保险公司以保单持有人作为公司的治理主体,将公司所有权人与公司客户或债权人合二为一,形成了有别于股份制公司的治理模式,具有化解利益冲突、降低道德风险、解决逆向选择、处理不完全合同等机制。互助是保单持有人参与公司治理的行动基础,分红是保单持有人参与公司治理的行动激励。有效率的保险市场应当是相互制与股份制共存的均衡市场。     

后金融危机时代的银行参与公司治理法律机制

在公司的内外部治理机制中,银行始终占有重要地位。随着利益相关者理论的兴起,银行作为债权人参与公司治理的观念深入人心。尤其在全球经济已然进入后金融危机时代的现今,无论旨在维护自身利益抑或为保障公众利益,银行参与公司治理均深具必要性。银行参与公司治理的法制模式主要包括美国的择机治理机制、德国的全能银行治理机制以及日本的主银行机制,它们各有优势和缺陷。影响上述机制产生的因素有许多,它们共同的发展趋势是支持银行参与治理并深化治理程度。借鉴此次金融危机的教训,我国目前有必要继受大陆法系相关制度,构建真正意义上的银行参与公司治理法律机制。     

论金融机构介入公司治理机制的探讨

金融机构作为企业的主要债权人,应参与公司治理来降低贷款风险.本文根据我国具体情况,结合国外的经验,提出了金融机构介入公司治理的设想和建议.     

公司治理对债券融资成本的影响 ——基于公司债和中期票据的实证检验

论文以2007-2016年发行公司债和中期票据的我国上市公司为样本,从公司治理绩效和治理机制两个方面检验了公司治理对债券融资成本的影响.结果表明,公司治理绩效越高,债券融资成本越低;董事会治理、经理层治理与控股股东治理对公司债和中期票据的融资成本都有显著影响.文章进一步地检验了2015年1月《公司债券发行与交易管理办法》修订前后公司治理绩效和治理机制对债券融资成本的影响.研究发现,2015年债券市场发展之后,公司治理对债券融资成本的影响更加显著.     

债权人主义视阈下商业银行大股东行为约束之完善

以利益相关者理论为基石的债权人主义是在商业银行特殊治理模式下对股东至上主义的制度修正.债权人主义下,发挥债权人的公众监督作用是强化商业银行大股东行为约束、实现债权人权益保护的重要途径.然而现行的商业银行大股东行为约束制度存在外部宏观审慎监管引发利益相关者的道德风险,内部商业银行公司治理独立董事作用难以发挥等公众监管实质缺失等问题.因此,债权人主义视阈下完善商业银行大股东行为约束,外部监管要充分发挥债权人作为重要利益相关者的公众监督作用,内部公司治理要重构董事会,发挥独立董事的"居中裁判"作用,为债权人的利益发声.     

公司债特殊条款、债券评级与会计稳健性

本文基于债券持有人利益保护视角,以手工收集的2007-2016年沪深A股上市公司发行的公司债特殊条款为样本,研究公司债特殊条款对会计稳健性的影响,以及债券评级的调节作用,并基于公司治理机制和代理冲突角度,探究公司债特殊条款影响会计稳健性的作用机理。研究发现,公司债特殊条款数量越多(约束强度越大),发债主体会计稳健性水平越高;债券评级越低,公司债特殊条款对会计稳健性的正效应越大。进一步研究发现,在国有企业、公司治理水平低以及代理冲突严重的情况下,公司债特殊条款数量对债务主体会计稳健性具有正效应。本研究为不同缔约主体以及政府监管部门防范债券违约风险、治理违约事件、提高债券契约执行效率提供理论参考与经验借鉴。     

Shareholder governance, bondholder governance, and managerial risk-taking

We examine the relation between the overall corporate governance structure and managerial risk-taking behavior. We find that the overall governance structure has a significant impact on how managers make decisions on investment policy: strong bondholder governance motivates more low-risk investments such as capital expenditure and lower high-risk investments such as R&D expenditures, whereas weak shareholder governance (entrenched managers) leads to more R&D expenditures. Moreover, we find that the effects of governance on investment policy differ significantly between speculative and investment-grade firms. For speculative firms, strong bondholder or shareholder governance leads to more capital expenditures and low R&D investments. For investment-grade firms, strong bondholder or shareholder governance leads to low capital expenditures and an insignificant impact on R&D investments. Furthermore, financing and investment covenants exhibit strong binding power to deter risky investments. Finally, a more dependent (or a less independent) board is associated with low capital expenditures and high R&D investments.     

Governance Mechanisms and Bond Prices

We investigate the effects of shareholder governance mechanismson bondholders and document two new findings. First, the impactof shareholder control (proxied by large institutional blockholders)on credit risk depends on takeover vulnerability. Shareholdercontrol is associated with higher (lower) yields if the firmis exposed to (protected from) takeovers. In the presence ofshareholder control, the difference in bond yields due to differencesin takeover vulnerability can be as high as 66 basis points.Second, event risk covenants reduce the credit risk associatedwith strong shareholder governance. Therefore, without bondcovenants, shareholder governance, and bondholder interestsdiverge.     

Cross-acceleration and the relationship between board independence and bond yield spreads

This paper investigates the mediating effect of cross-acceleration provisions in bond debt on board independence and bond yield spreads. Cross-acceleration provisions cause bond debt to accelerate if other debt (mainly bank debt) is accelerated and allows bondholders to benefit from the monitoring of fellow creditors. Board independence, while generally seen as a positive governance feature, has been viewed as detrimental to bondholder interests when bondholder-shareholder conflicts are high. Cross-acceleration works to protect bondholder interests through increased likelihood of bankruptcy court supervision (or early repayment of debt). Consistent with this view, we find that when bondholder-shareholder conflict are high bonds issued without cross-acceleration provisions have yields that increase in board independence whereas bonds issued with cross-acceleration have yields that decrease in board independence. The results suggest that cross-acceleration plays a role in mitigating the tendency of more independent boards to favor shareholders when bondholder-shareholder conflicts arise.     

Corporate Restructuring and Bondholder Wealth

This paper provides an overview of existing research on how corporate restructuring affects bondholder wealth. Restructuring is defined as any transaction which affects the firm's riskiness by changing its underlying capital structure. Thus, it reaches well beyond asset restructuring and includes transactions such as leveraged buyouts, security issues and exchanges, and the issuance of stock options. We identify significant gaps in the literature, emphasize the potential differences in bond performance between market‐ and stakeholder‐oriented corporate governance systems, and provide valuable insights into methodological advances. We find that many issues remain as the empirical evidence is often inconclusive and focuses almost exclusively on the US. Research on other countries remains constrained by the lesser development of their bond markets, but is equally imperative because the position and bargaining power of creditors vis‐à‐vis the firm differ substantially across countries and governance regimes.     

CEO turnover and bondholder wealth

We examine the impact of CEO turnover announcements on bondholder wealth, stockholder wealth, and overall firm value. Using publicly traded data for the period from 1973 to 2000, we find evidence consistent with both the wealth transfer and signaling hypotheses. Specifically, we find that CEO turnover events are associated with lower bondholder values, higher stockholder values, and that net changes in firm value are a function of turnover type (forced vs voluntary and outside vs inside firm replacements) and the riskiness of the firm’s debt (investment vs non-investment grade). Overall, the results contribute to the understanding of the effects of corporate governance mechanisms, of which CEO turnover is an extreme form, on bondholders.     

西方保险公司内部治理结构新特征与我国国有保险公司内部治理结构优化

本文揭示了我国国有保险公司治理困境,探讨了西方国家保险公司最新进展。比较研究认为,我国保险公司治理的出路是股权重构,完善委托代理制度,并推进公司上市。     

基于熵值法的上市公司融资效率研究

上市公司融资效率的高低直接关系到资本市场能否实现资源的优化配置功能,以及为投资者提供满意的回报,并关系到资本市场的健康持续发展。在借鉴国内相关研究成果基础上,构建了基于筹资效率、配置效率和治理效率三个维度的融资效率评价框架,以陕西省上市公司为样本,利用熵值法对上市公司融资效率进行了定量研究。研究发现目前上市公司融资效率整体水平较为低下、提升缓慢,建议从提高上市公司资金运营能力、调整公司资本结构和改善公司治理结构三个方面进行系统性变革,并藉此提升上市公司融资效率。     

Beyond shareholders versus stakeholders: Towards a Rawlsian concept of the firm

This paper critiques the principle of shareholder value and offers an alternative paradigm. We consider different theories describing the corporation and its relationship with shareholders, concluding that much of the modern academic discourse on corporate governance centres around the notion of the firm as a contractual arrangement. We provide a full critique of shareholder primacy from an economic as well as a moral perspective, which includes a focus on Rawls. An alternative contractarian paradigm is offered, one that is based on the concept of the corporation as a ‘social union.’ This characterisation justifies participation of a wider group of stakeholders in the governance of a corporation, and we make a distinction between electoral and moral constituents. A role for the application of the principles of deliberative democracy is also discussed.     

企业多元利益主体共同治理机制研究——基于可持续发展视角

企业要建立牢固的市场竞争力,必须走可持续发展道路,而可持续发展战略的制定、实施、控制扣调整过程是否真正有利于企业的生存与发展,要受到企业治理效率的影响.企业治理不仅影响到可持续发展战略的实施,而且是对企业整个可持续发展战略过程的管理和监督.多元利益主体共同治理机制能从各方保证企业可持续发展的要素得到良好的运行.     

Going private transactions,bondholder returns,and wealth transfer effects

We examine how buyout activity and deal characteristics drive bondholder returns and the wealth transfer effects between bondholders and stockholders in going private transactions from 1981 to 2006. We find that various deal characteristics are major determinants of the cross-sectional variation in bondholder returns. In particular, a single private equity acquirer mitigates bondholder losses. On the other hand, bondholders have larger losses when a reputable buyout firm is involved in the deal. Bondholders experience losses in the 1980s and 2000s, but enjoy gains in the 1990s. Our findings remain robust to consideration of deal financing, relative cost of credit, and level of market overheating. We find a negative and significant relationship between stockholder and bondholder wealth effects, which supports the wealth transfer hypothesis.