共查询到20条相似文献,搜索用时 46 毫秒
1.
近年来,公众对证券分析师利益冲突的广泛关注促使政府及相关部门采取了组织隔离与业务分立等一系列监管措施以保护投资者利益。然而,近期的实证研究却对\"证券分析师利益冲突损害投资者利益\"这一监管前提提出了质疑。本文在对1995—2007年间相关文献进行综述的基础上,分析了实证结果与监管当局观点之间存在差异的原因,并据此提出了若干利益冲突监管政策调整思路,以期为我国证券市场监管效率的提高提供启示和借鉴。 相似文献
2.
资本市场的发展催生了证券分析师,分析师能够凭借自身的专业知识和信息渠道为投资者提供投资方案和建议,降低信息传递成本,帮助投资者了解市场。基于此,本文就证券分析师行为对投资者保护的影响进行分析。 相似文献
3.
声誉机制与证券分析师的利益冲突行为研究 总被引:2,自引:0,他引:2
理论界关于声誉机制对证券分析师利益冲突行为的影响存在两种截然不同的观点,本文通过构建证券分析师不同情况下的收益矩阵,求解其最大化的期望收益,得出了声誉机制会引发证券分析师的利益冲突行为,而且证券分析师是否选择跟风主要取决于不同情况下的收益的结论.本文认为,可通过建立声誉回报机制来影响证券分析师的收益,促使证券分析师发布独立且公正的投资建议,以消除证券分析师的利益冲突行为. 相似文献
4.
5.
证券分析师可信度与胜任能力:一个文献述评 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
本文以"公众投资者"为全新研究视角,构建证券分析师可信度指标评价体系,通过问卷调查对证券分析师可信度进行综合评价。利用平均赋权、专家赋权以及因子分析三种方法,计算出证券分析师可信度分别为2.82、2.87及2.9,语义都为"部分可信"。该研究结果说明:公众投资者认为证券分析师的投资建议只有40%~59%的可信水平。由于证券分析师的工作性质使他们常常陷入各种"利益漩涡"当中,他们所预测的股票并非都是"信得过产品",这些都影响了他们的"客观性"、"独立性"以及"准确性",使他们在公众投资者心中的可信度"大打折扣"。 相似文献
6.
7.
《中国注册会计师》2014,(9)
本文选取2007-2012年受到证监会行政处罚或卷入影响较大的财务丑闻的审计师作为声誉受损样本,通过考察证券分析师的盈余预测特征是否受到审计师声誉受损的影响,分析证券分析师是否在关注审计师的职业声誉。研究结果显示,与审计师声誉未受损的上市公司相比,证券分析师对审计师声誉受损的上市公司的盈余预测特征发生显著变化,具体表现为:盈余预测准确度下降,乐观程度显著下降,分歧度显著上升。研究结果表明,证券分析师就与证券市场相关的各种因素进行分析和研究时,对审计师声誉具有一定的认知度,并通过盈余预测特征将审计师声誉的信息传递给利益相关者,审计师声誉机制在证券分析师这一特殊行业内正在逐渐形成。 相似文献
8.
10.
本文基于我国特殊背景及国外的研究新进展,梳理了国内外关于机构投资者、证券分析师以及企业研发投入行为三者之间的利益关系,并对影响企业研发投资决策因素的未来研究方向进行了展望。 相似文献
11.
This paper formulates a two-stage model to capture the decision process of financial analysts when issuing earnings forecasts. Our model extends the model of Chen and Jiang [(2005). Analysts’ weighting of private and public information. Review of Financial Studies, 19 (1), 319–355], by allowing for a distortion of forecasts independent of whether an analyst has private information. Using quarterly earnings forecasts, we provide empirical evidence on the coexistence of overconfidence and strategic incentives. Financial analysts overweight their private information and at the same time strategically inflate their forecast. 相似文献
12.
13.
Stanimir Markov Volkan Muslu Musa Subasi 《Journal of Business Finance & Accounting》2017,44(1-2):94-115
We examine whether analysts tip investors during investor conferences. We find that conference‐day abnormal returns of a presenting company are about 0.6% higher when the conference is hosted by an analyst who will initiate coverage with a Buy recommendation than when the conference is hosted by non‐initiating analysts. Furthermore, conference‐day abnormal returns of the presenting company amount to half of the price run‐up during the 20 trading days prior to the Buy initiation. Finally, there is a statistically and economically significant price run‐up prior to a Sell initiation (by about –0.7%) when the analyst who will initiate coverage with a Sell recommendation hosts a conference but does not invite the company to present. Our findings collectively suggest that analysts, rather than companies, tip select investors about upcoming initiations during conferences. 相似文献
14.
We construct an investor-based measure of differences of opinion (DO) to investigate the different implications of DO between retail investors (DOR), institutional investors (DOI), and analysts (DOA) on asset pricing. Using Chinese stock data, we find that three DO measures (DOR, DOI, and DOI) are negatively related to future returns; DOI’s ability to predict returns can be partly explained by DOR and DOA, whereas DOR contains incremental information not available from DOI and DOA. DOR is more strongly associated with the severe overvaluation caused by retail investors’ optimism than DOI or DOA, emphasising the specific role of retail investors in China’s market. We further show that DOI and DOA are the results of the differences in their information sets, whereas DOR are the results of different interpretations of public information. 相似文献
15.
16.
17.
18.
We investigate the role of financial analysts as corporate watchdogs. We show that firms that are subject to intense analyst monitoring are more likely to be investigated by the Securities and Exchange Commission or to be the subject of a securities class action. Using cross-sectional variations in managerial entrenchment, we find that this effect is not a reflection of the “dark side of analyst coverage,” analysts pushing executives to misbehave to exceed short-term expectations. Our findings are robust to different identification strategies addressing the endogeneity of analyst coverage decisions. 相似文献
19.
Simon Bennett 《Journal of Risk Research》2013,16(5):597-616
In their paper ‘Loss of Defensive Capacity in Protective Operations: The Implications of the Überlingen and Linate Disasters’ Busby and Bennett attribute the ‘defensive capacity’ of an airspace system to the behaviour of those who constitute its production‐protection space (first‐line producers like avionics manufacturers, airlines, pilots' groups and airport authorities). This paper argues that an airspace system's defensive capacity is also a function of the behaviour of those who constitute its ‘facilitation‐regulation’ space – the rulemakers (and, to some degree, the non‐statutory bodies who seek to influence them). This elaboration recognises two aspects of regulation. First that some regulators are responsible for promoting both safety and efficiency (the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) for example). Secondly that regulators who prioritise efficiency over safety may reduce overall system safety and/or create opportunities (affordances) for unsafe behaviour. The argument is illustrated with reference to the National Transportation Safety Board's criticism of the FAA's human factors training programmes for air traffic controllers, its aircraft surface‐movement standards and procedures and its air traffic controller rostering practices following the 2006 crash of a passenger aircraft at Lexington, Kentucky and FAA's implementation of the Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System. 相似文献
20.
Evidence to date on the market value of investor relations (IR) strategies is limited. We test the market relevance of IR activity directly employing a proprietary database measuring IR quality across all firms listed on NYSE, Amex and NASDAQ. Although, in theory, ‘repackaging’ and communicating existing information should have no market impact, we find that firms with higher quality IR strategies are rewarded with significantly higher valuation multiples. In addition, increase in IR quality is associated with increases in analyst following and liquidity. Overall, our findings are generally stronger for small firms which are more likely to be ‘neglected’. Our evidence is consistent with effective IR successfully raising firm visibility leading to enhanced recognition and reduced information asymmetry in line with Merton (1987) and thus ‘fairer’ firm valuation as argued by IR professionals. 相似文献