Do institutional investors exacerbate managerial myopia?

This study analyzes corporate expenditures for property, plant and equipment (PP&E), and research and development (R&D) for over 2500 US firms from 1988 to 1994. We find no support for the contention that institutional investors cause corporate managers to behave myopically. Indeed, we document a positive relation between industry-adjusted expenditures for PP&E and R&D and the fraction of shares owned by institutional investors. This relation is robust to a variety of empirical tests, including those that account for endogeneity between institutional ownership and firm-level discretionary expenditures.     

The value-relevance of R&D and advertising expenditures: Evidence from Korea

This study examines the value-relevance of R&D and advertising expenditures of Korean firms, using a regression model based on the Ohlson [Contemp. Account. Res. (1995) 661] equity-valuation framework. Results indicate that R&D expenditures are positively associated with stock price, suggesting that capitalizing R&D expenditures is appropriate. The association is stronger for the portion of R&D expenditures that is capitalized, rather than expensed, suggesting that investors agree with management that the capitalized expenditures represent greater future economic benefits. Investors also appear to interpret fully expensed R&D expenditures as positive net present-value investments, however, suggesting that these expenditure should also be capitalized. Additional results indicate that advertising expenditures are negatively associated with stock price, and the magnitude of this negative association is similar to the association between other expenses and stock price. These findings suggest that investors believe the economic benefits of advertising expenditures expire in the current period, similar to other expenses.     

The impact of intangibles on firms’ financial and market performance: UK evidence

This study provides empirical evidence about the effect of intangible assets on firms’ current and future financial and market performance by utilizing a sample the UK FTSE 150 nonfinancial companies. Generally, the findings of this examination reported a strong evidence on the role of intangibles in boosting firms’ performance. In particular, the results indicate that while goodwill (GW) does have a statistically positive effect on firms’ current and future performance, research and development (R&D) is only associated with firms’ future performance. The results of the current research is consistent with the market-based and resources-based theories which posits that intangible investments are the main driving factors of wealth creation in the long-run; Specifically, R&D operations can create new technologies and products that would enhance firms’ performance and value. In addition, the results reveal that both GW and R&D can explain variations in firms’ financial performance measures suggesting that such investments can enhance firms’ earning leading to capitalization such earnings in the market value. Finally, the results of this research provide practical implication for policy makers and managers.     

Industry expertise on corporate boards

Recent surveys indicate that industry expertise is the most sought-after director qualification. Yet evidence on the value of such expertise is limited. This paper shows that firms that are difficult for non-experts to monitor and advise are more likely to appoint industry expert directors. Such appointments also depend on the supply of industry-experienced candidates in the local director labor market. Board industry expertise reduces R&D-based real earnings management and increases R&D investments. The increase in R&D spending is value-enhancing: firms with industry expert directors receive more patents for the same level of R&D, their R&D spending is associated with lower volatility of future earnings, and their value is higher. Finally, industry expertise is associated with CEO termination and pay incentives that encourage R&D investments.     

Shareholder governance, bondholder governance, and managerial risk-taking

We examine the relation between the overall corporate governance structure and managerial risk-taking behavior. We find that the overall governance structure has a significant impact on how managers make decisions on investment policy: strong bondholder governance motivates more low-risk investments such as capital expenditure and lower high-risk investments such as R&D expenditures, whereas weak shareholder governance (entrenched managers) leads to more R&D expenditures. Moreover, we find that the effects of governance on investment policy differ significantly between speculative and investment-grade firms. For speculative firms, strong bondholder or shareholder governance leads to more capital expenditures and low R&D investments. For investment-grade firms, strong bondholder or shareholder governance leads to low capital expenditures and an insignificant impact on R&D investments. Furthermore, financing and investment covenants exhibit strong binding power to deter risky investments. Finally, a more dependent (or a less independent) board is associated with low capital expenditures and high R&D investments.     

R&D investments,capital expenditures,and earnings thresholds

Prior studies find that firms cut research and development (R&D) expense in response to earnings considerations. We extend this stream of research by documenting that firms narrowly achieving an earnings threshold also report unusually high capital expenditures. In addition, these firms’ total investments (R&D expense plus capital expenditures) do not vary in response to earnings thresholds, which suggests that, on average, reductions in R&D expense are offset by concurrent increases in capital expenditures. Lastly, our research design allows us to infer that the increased capital expenditures are largely R&D investments that are capitalized instead of non-R&D capital expenditures, suggesting that overall investments in R&D are relatively unchanged.     

CEO risk incentives and firm performance following R&D increases

In this study we analyze how CEO risk incentives affect the efficiency of research and development (R&D) investments. We examine a sample of 843 cases in which firms increase their R&D investments by an economically significant amount over the period of 1995–2006. We find that firms with higher sensitivity of CEO compensation portfolio value to stock volatility (vega) are more likely to have large increases in R&D investments. More importantly, we find that high-vega firms experience lower abnormal stock returns and lower operating performance compared to their low-vega counterparts following the R&D increases. Our main results hold in a variety of robustness tests. The results are consistent with the conjecture that high-vega compensation portfolios may induce managers to overinvest in inefficient R&D projects and therefore hurt firm performance.     

The effect of R&D on future returns and earnings forecasts

Prior studies attribute the future excess returns of research and development activity (R&D) firms to either compensation for increased risk or to mispricing. We suggest a third explanation and show that neither the level of R&D investment nor the change in R&D investment explains future returns. Rather, the positive future returns that prior studies attribute to R&D investment are actually due to the component of the R&D firm??s realized return that is unrelated to R&D investment but present in R&D firms. Our results suggest that the excess returns of R&D firms are part of the larger value/growth anomaly. In addition, we show that while future earnings are positively associated with current R&D, errors in earnings expectations by investors and analysts are not related to R&D investment.     

Auditor specialization in R&D and clients’ R&D investment-q sensitivity

While research and development (R&D) activities contribute to economic growth via technological innovations, they impose significant uncertainty and agency costs. In this study, we examine the governance role of R&D specialist auditors in affecting clients’ R&D investment decisions. Using a sample of U.S. firms during 2001–2016, we find that R&D specialist auditors’ clients make more efficient investments in the form of a higher R&D investment-q sensitivity. We also find that the reduction in discretionary adjustments of R&D expenses moderates the results. Further, when clients are audited by R&D specialists, their R&D investments are more closely linked to innovative output in subsequent years. Collectively, our results suggest that an auditor’s specialized knowledge induces clients to make better economic decisions.     

The Effects of Private Investments in Public Equity on R&D Investment in Small and Medium-Size Enterprises

This paper provides evidence that small and medium-size enterprises (SMEs) use a portion of private investments in public equity (PIPEs) for current research and development (R&D) investment, hold the rest in liquidity reserves such as cash assets and working capital, and ultimately use these reserves to smooth R&D investment. That is, PIPEs may have a direct effect on R&D investment and an indirect or smoothing effect using liquidity reserves. This paper also shows that innovative SMEs such as venture businesses, inno-biz firms, and management innovative firms are more likely to use PIPEs for R&D investment than are noninnovative SMEs. The implications of this paper are that PIPEs can be used as an important source of external financing to fund R&D investment and can be particularly valuable for R&D investment in innovative SMEs.