Product market competition and the cost of bank loans: Evidence from state antitakeover laws

The extant literature documents a positive relationship between a firm’s takeover vulnerability and its agency cost of debt. Using state antitakeover laws as an exogenous measure of variation in takeover vulnerability, I investigate whether product market competition has a disciplinary effect that can lower a firm’s cost of bank loans. After taking into account the industry composition of borrowers, I find that banks charge higher spreads to borrowers that are vulnerable to takeovers, but only in concentrated industries. In the absence of disciplinary competitive pressure, the effect of takeover vulnerability on the cost of bank loans is mitigated for larger firms, firms followed by analysts, firms with existing credit ratings, non-family firms, and for borrowers with shorter maturity loans or loans with covenants and collateral in place. Taken together, the results suggest that the effect of governance on the cost of financing is not homogenous across all industries, and that concentrated industry firms may need to use supplementary governance mechanisms to mitigate debt holder agency problems.     

Debt maturity dispersion and the cost of bank loans

This paper examines the relation between corporate debt maturity dispersion and the pricing and terms of bank loans. Analyzing a sample of U.S. bank loans from 2002 to 2016, we find that firms with a dispersed debt maturity structure pay a lower interest rate. The rate-reduction effect is significant only for firms without a credit rating. For these firms, spreading debt maturity dates also results in lower commitment fees, fewer covenant restrictions, and less collateral in their loan contracts. The impact of debt maturity dispersion on the pricing and structure of bank loans is stronger when borrowers have higher rollover risk or when the need for monitoring is greater. Our results suggest that dispersion in debt maturity structure mitigates the agency problem associated with shareholder–creditor conflicts by reducing rollover risk and alleviating the need for monitoring, which results in borrowers receiving more favorable terms in loan contracts.     

The impact of corporate social responsibility on the cost of bank loans

This study examines the link between corporate social responsibility (CSR) and bank debt. Our focus on banks exploits their specialized role as delegated monitors of the firm. Using a sample of 3996 loans to US firms, we find that firms with social responsibility concerns pay between 7 and 18 basis points more than firms that are more responsible. Lenders are more sensitive to CSR concerns in the absence of security. We document a mixed reaction to discretionary CSR investments. Low-quality borrowers that engage in discretionary CSR spending face higher loan spreads and shorter maturities, but lenders are indifferent to CSR investments by high-quality borrowers.     

Board quality and the cost of debt capital: The case of bank loans

We analyze the relation between comprehensive measures of board quality and the cost as well as the non-price terms of bank loans. We show that firms that have higher quality boards with a greater advisory presence borrow at lower interest rates. This relation exists even after controlling for ownership structure, CEO compensation policy, and shareholder protection, as well as the size and financial characteristics of the borrower and of the loan. We also show evidence that board quality and other governance characteristics influence the likelihood that loans have covenant requirements, but the relations differ by covenant type. When we combine the direct and indirect costs of bank loans we find that firms with large, independent, experienced, and diverse boards and lower institutional ownership borrow more cheaply. Overall, the evidence indicates that board quality impacts the cost of bank debt.     

The role of bank lenders in firm leverage adjustments

In this article we examine the impact of bank loan characteristics on firm leverage adjustments, with a special focus on the conflicts of interest between shareholders and creditors. The results show that, on average, more bank loans slow down leverage adjustments. The subsample analysis reveals that bank loans slow down leverage adjustments in underlevered firms but speed up adjustments in overlevered firms. This finding suggests that bank lenders are able to limit their risk exposure in borrowers and protect their own rights. Further evidence indicates that the effect of bank loans is more notable during the global financial crisis and when a firm is financially constrained. Bank loan concentration and maturity have a significant impact on leverage adjustments as well.     

Bank competition and the cost of bank loans

I comprehensively study the effect of bank competition on the cost of bank loans using U.S. bank loan data from 1995 to 2010. The cost of bank loans is analyzed with regard to loan spreads and covenant intensity. I show that loan spreads and covenant intensity are negatively related to bank competition. I also find that non-investment grade and financially constrained firms benefit more from bank competition than investment grade and financially unconstrained firms do. Lenders with low market power are more willing to reduce loan price than lenders with high market power in competitive lending markets. The results suggest that lenders give favorable loan terms to borrowers in competitive loan markets.     

Did quantitative easing reduce the borrowing costs of firms? The risk-taking channel

This paper examines the effect of the Federal Reserve's quantitative easing (QE) on the cost of bank loans and documents large heterogeneous effects across different firms. In QE1, the average loan spread is 22.7 percent lower compared to the non-QE period. This effect falls in QE2 and OT and then rises in QE3 and the tapering period. The rates of riskier loans are restrained more than less risky loans during QEs as banks take more risks by offering lower rates to attract risky borrowers. The Fed mortgage-backed securities purchases have a larger impact in narrowing the borrowing cost difference between riskier and safer loans than the Fed Treasury purchases. Our results are robust to borrower, year-quarter and bank fixed effects. Overall, our findings support that the risk-taking channel of QE plays a significant role in the corporate bank loan market.     

The value of relationship banking: International evidence

This paper analyses whether repeated borrowing from the same bank affects loan contract terms. We find that relationship loans pay less spread and require less collateral compared to non-relationship loans. These effects for relationship loans are not derived from differences between relationship and nonrelationship loans. The reduction of interest rate spread for relationship loans disappeared during the financial crisis. The results also reveal that borrowers paid higher interest rate spreads, had to post more collateral and the maturity was shortened during the crisis period. The reduction in interest rate spread and collateral depends on the protection of creditors’ rights. In countries where creditors’ rights are well protected, relationship loans pay less spread and are required to post less collateral than relationship loans in countries with weak protection of creditors’ rights.     

Institutional Differences and International Private Debt Markets: A Test Using Mandatory IFRS Adoption

Institutional differences between countries result in additional information risks between borrowers and lenders in cross‐border private loans. This study examines the effect of these information risks on the structure of optimal debt contracts in international (cross‐border) versus domestic private debt markets. Using mandatory IFRS adoption as an indicator for institutional changes that reduced differences between countries, I compare attributes of international versus domestic loans before and after IFRS adoption. I find that, in the pre‐IFRS period, international loans are associated with a higher credit spread, a weaker relationship between the bank and the borrower, a more diffuse loan syndicate, and less reliance on accounting‐based covenants than domestic loans. These results are consistent with incremental information risks in international debt markets that make it more costly for lenders to screen and monitor borrower credit quality, resulting in a more arm's‐length relationship between borrowers and lenders. Many of these associations attenuate after IFRS adoption, suggesting that the pre‐IFRS differences in contract terms are driven by incremental information risks related to institutional differences between countries. My findings imply that incremental information risks result in a different optimal contract in international debt contracts compared to domestic debt contracts.     

Auditor choice and information asymmetry: evidence from international syndicated loans

Analyzing a large sample of non-US public firms from 31 countries that obtain private loans, we find that loan syndicates that lend to borrowers that employ Big N auditors are larger and less concentrated and that the lead arrangers and largest investors of these syndicates are able to hold a lower proportion of the loan after issuance. Further analysis demonstrates that this effect exists only in countries with strong creditor rights and in those countries with high levels of societal trust, suggesting that both sound formal and informal institutional factors are prerequisites for lenders and borrowers to benefit from differential audit quality on loan syndicate structure efficiency. Furthermore, we find that the loan syndicate structure benefits for borrowers that employ Big N auditors are higher for borrowers with greater information asymmetry problems, but we do not find that Big N audits are able to address the information asymmetry and moral hazard issues between the lenders themselves.     

Bank Monitoring and Environmental Risk

Abstract:  Loan announcement effects for 152 Canadian companies are examined to investigate the efficiency of monitoring by banks facing lender environmental liability. Market reaction to the announcement of bank debt to 'environmental' firms is more positive and significant than for 'non-environmental' firms and, for firms in industries with a higher likelihood of experiencing spill events, is more positive and significant, reinforcing earlier results that establish a relationship between specific loan/borrower characteristics and announcement period excess returns and providing further evidence on the 'uniqueness' of bank loans by demonstrating the superior ability of banks to monitor corporate borrowers exposed to environmental liability.     

Product market relationships and cost of bank loans: Evidence from strategic alliances

This paper examines the relation between strategic alliances and non-financial firms’ bank loan financing. We construct several measures to capture firms’ alliance activities. The key finding is that borrowing firms with active alliance involvement experience lower cost of bank loans. The reduction of borrowing cost is strongest for financially unconstrained firms and firms with high G-index and intensive monitoring from institutional investors. We also relate various characteristics of alliance agreements to the cost of bank borrowing, and find evidence supporting market power hypothesis and organizational flexibility hypothesis. We further report that allying with a prestigious partner (i.e., S&P 1500 firms) provides certification effect that lowers bank loan cost. In addition, firms positioned in the center of the alliance network enjoy lower cost of bank loans. Lastly, we document that firms engaging in alliance activities expand their debt capacity and are less likely to use collaterals and covenants in their bank loan contracts.     

Hedge commitments and agency costs of debt: evidence from interest rate protection covenants and accounting conservatism

We provide large sample evidence that credible hedge commitments reduce the agency costs of debt and that accounting conservatism enhances hedge commitments. We examine 2,338 bank loans entered into by 263 mandatory derivative users that are contractually obligated by interest rate protection covenants, 709 voluntary derivative users, and 1,366 non-users. We show that loan contracts are more likely to include interest rate protection covenants when borrowers are less likely to maintain the hedge position once the financing is completed. We find that borrowers who credibly commit to hedge using these covenants significantly reduce their interest rates. While we do not find an average interest savings for voluntary derivative users, we do find a reduction in their loan rates when they practice conservative financial reporting. Our results suggest that accounting conservatism helps borrowers resolve shareholder-creditor conflicts by committing to maintain their hedge positions after completing debt financing.     

Management quality and the cost of debt: Does management matter to lenders?

This paper investigates the effect of organizational capital, typified by various management practices within a firm, on the cost of external debt financing. Using a sample of medium-sized manufacturing firms in the US, we find that better management practices enhance a firm’s external financing capacity by lowering the firm’s cost of bank loans. We do not find any evidence that the lower loan cost of a high-quality-management firm is associated with more restrictive non-price contract terms such as greater collateral requirements and stricter covenants. These results suggest that banks explicitly take into account the risk arising from poor management practices when pricing and designing debt contracts.     

Beauty is in the eye of the beholder: The effect of corporate tax avoidance on the cost of bank loans

We find that firms with greater tax avoidance incur higher spreads when obtaining bank loans. This finding is robust in a battery of sensitivity analyses and in two quasi-experimental settings including the implementation of Financial Accounting Standards Board Interpretation No. 48 and the revelation of past tax sheltering activity. Firms with greater tax avoidance also incur more stringent nonprice loan terms, incur higher at-issue bond spreads, and prefer bank loans over public bonds when obtaining debt financing. Overall, these findings indicate that banks perceive tax avoidance as engendering significant risks.     

The Effects of Corporate and Country Sustainability Characteristics on The Cost of Debt: An International Investigation

We investigate the relationship between corporate and country sustainability on the cost of bank loans. We look into 470 loan agreements signed between 2005 and 2012 with borrowers based in 28 different countries across the world and operating in all major industries. Our principal findings reveal that country sustainability, relating to both social and environmental frameworks, has a statistically and economically impactful effect on direct financing of economic activity. An increase of one unit in a country's sustainability score is associated with an average decrease in the cost of debt by 64 basis points. Our international analysis shows that the environmental dimension of a country's institutional framework is approximately twice as impactful as the social dimension, when it comes to determining the cost of corporate loans. On the other hand, we find no conclusive evidence that firm‐level sustainability influences the interest rates charged to borrowing firms by banks. Our main findings survive a battery of robustness tests and additional analyses concerning subsamples, alternative sustainability metrics and the effects of financial crisis.     

Creditor Rights, Enforcement, and Bank Loans

We examine whether differences in legal protection affect the size, maturity, and interest rate spread on loans to borrowers in 48 countries. Results show that banks respond to poor enforceability of contracts by reducing loan amounts, shortening loan maturities, and increasing loan spreads. These effects are both statistically significant and economically large. While stronger creditor rights reduce spreads, they do not seem to matter for loan size and maturity. Overall, we show that variation in enforceability of contracts matters a great deal more to how loans are structured and how they are priced.     

Institutions,banking structure and the cost of debt: new international evidence

This paper analyses the effect of institutions and the structure of the banking system on the cost of debt for a sample of firms from 37 countries. The cost of debt decreases with the rule of law, the protection of creditors’ rights and the weight of banks in the economy. Bank financing and bank concentration have a positive differential effect on the cost of debt in those countries where the financial difficulties of banks are greater. Legal enforcement, the protection of creditors’ rights and the weight of bank financing have a greater influence in countries with a lower degree of economic development.     

Bank Loan Availability and Trade Credit Demand

This paper investigates the effects of bank loan availability on the trade credit and credit card demand of small firms, using firm‐level data from the 1995 Credit, Banks, and Small Business Survey, conducted by the National Federation of Independent Business. We find that firms increase their demand for trade credit and credit card debt when facing credit constraints imposed by banks. These results provide evidence of a pecking order of debt financing, where firms increase their reliance on potentially expensive sources of funds when bank loans are not available.     

The effect of information sharing between lenders on access to credit,cost of credit,and loan performance – Evidence from a credit registry introduction

Using a rich dataset from a commercial bank in Albania, we utilize the introduction of a public credit registry by the Albanian central bank in January 2008 as a natural experiment to analyze the effect of information sharing between lenders on (1) access to credit, (2) cost of credit, and (3) loan performance. Our results suggest that information sharing by means of a credit registry does not affect access to or cost of credit, but improves loan performance. Specifically, loans granted after the introduction of the credit registry are 3% points less likely of turning problematic, representing a 35% reduction of the overall sample average arrear probability. We further find that the effect is more pronounced for repeat borrowers and in areas, where competition is weak. This indicates that information sharing among lenders improves loan performance mainly by disciplining borrowers to repay in their concern about future access to credit.