Investment policy in family controlled firms

We explore the relation between family ownership and corporate investment policy. Our analysis centers on two incentives, risk aversion and extended investment horizons, which potentially influence the level and type of investments that family firms undertake. We find that family firms devote less capital to long-term investments than firms with diffuse ownership structures. When dividing long-term investment into its two components of R&D and capital expenditures, we note that family firms, relative to nonfamily firms, prefer investing in physical assets relative to riskier R&D projects. Additional tests indicate that family firms receive fewer patent citations per dollar of R&D investment relative to nonfamily firms. Overall, all empirical results indicate that family preferences for lower firm risk, across all family sub-types, affects corporate R&D spending and capital expenditures.     

CEO ownership, external governance, and risk-taking

This paper shows the relation between CEO ownership and firm valuation hinges critically on the strength of external governance (EG). The relation is hump-shaped when EG is weak, but is insignificant when EG is strong. The results imply that CEO ownership and EG are substitutes for mitigating agency problems when ownership is low. However, very high levels of share ownership can reduce firm value by entrenching the CEO and discouraging him from taking risk, unless mitigated by strong EG. We identify channels through which CEO ownership affects firm value by examining R&D, which is discretionary and risky. We find CEO ownership similarly exhibits a hump-shaped relation with R&D when EG is weak, but no relation when EG is strong. Our results are robust to endogeneity issues concerning CEO ownership and EG.     

Shareholder governance, bondholder governance, and managerial risk-taking

We examine the relation between the overall corporate governance structure and managerial risk-taking behavior. We find that the overall governance structure has a significant impact on how managers make decisions on investment policy: strong bondholder governance motivates more low-risk investments such as capital expenditure and lower high-risk investments such as R&D expenditures, whereas weak shareholder governance (entrenched managers) leads to more R&D expenditures. Moreover, we find that the effects of governance on investment policy differ significantly between speculative and investment-grade firms. For speculative firms, strong bondholder or shareholder governance leads to more capital expenditures and low R&D investments. For investment-grade firms, strong bondholder or shareholder governance leads to low capital expenditures and an insignificant impact on R&D investments. Furthermore, financing and investment covenants exhibit strong binding power to deter risky investments. Finally, a more dependent (or a less independent) board is associated with low capital expenditures and high R&D investments.     

Executive risk incentives,product market competition,and R&D

Prior studies have examined the relation between product market competition (PMC) and research and development (R&D) investments, while the impact of executive risk incentives on this relation remains unexplored. In this study, we find that Vega (the sensitivity of executives’ wealth to stock return volatility) weakens the negative relation between PMC and R&D. We also find that Vega strengthens the negative relation between PMC and firm performance when R&D investments grow higher. In sum, our results suggest that high‐Vega compensation portfolios in competitive environments may induce executives to overinvest in R&D projects, therefore hurting firm performance.     

CEO risk incentives and firm performance following R&D increases

In this study we analyze how CEO risk incentives affect the efficiency of research and development (R&D) investments. We examine a sample of 843 cases in which firms increase their R&D investments by an economically significant amount over the period of 1995–2006. We find that firms with higher sensitivity of CEO compensation portfolio value to stock volatility (vega) are more likely to have large increases in R&D investments. More importantly, we find that high-vega firms experience lower abnormal stock returns and lower operating performance compared to their low-vega counterparts following the R&D increases. Our main results hold in a variety of robustness tests. The results are consistent with the conjecture that high-vega compensation portfolios may induce managers to overinvest in inefficient R&D projects and therefore hurt firm performance.     

CEO Stock Options and Equity Risk Incentives

Abstract:   We test the hypothesis that the risk incentive effects of CEO stock option grants motivate managers to take on more risk than they would otherwise. Using a sample of mergers we document that the ratio of post‐ to pre‐merger stock return variance is positively related to the risk incentive effect of CEO stock option compensation but this relationship is conditioned on firm size, with firm size having a moderating effect on the risk incentive effect of stock options. Using a broader time‐series cross‐sectional sample of firms we find a strong positive relationship between CEO risk incentive embedded in the stock options and subsequent equity return volatility. As in the case of the merger sample, this relationship is stronger for smaller firms.     

SEASONED EQUITY ISSUERS’ R&D INVESTMENTS: SIGNALING OR OVEROPTIMISM

It is well known that investors often react negatively to the announcements of seasoned equity offerings (SEOs). We posit that issuers can use positive discretionary (higher than expected) R&D investments before the SEO to signal their investment prospects to mitigate the negative announcement effect. Alternatively, positive discretionary R&D may be attributed to managerial overoptimism about future returns of R&D investments. We find strong support for the signaling hypothesis among high‐tech issuers: investors respond more favorably to the SEO announcements of high‐tech issuers with positive discretionary R&D; these issuers are more likely to use new capital in future R&D and they produce better post‐SEO operating performance. In contrast, we find some evidence of managerial overoptimism among low‐tech issuers: investors tend to penalize low‐tech firms with positive discretionary R&D at SEO announcements; they are more likely to hold new capital as cash and they fail to produce better post‐SEO operating performance.     

R&D investments,capital expenditures,and earnings thresholds

Prior studies find that firms cut research and development (R&D) expense in response to earnings considerations. We extend this stream of research by documenting that firms narrowly achieving an earnings threshold also report unusually high capital expenditures. In addition, these firms’ total investments (R&D expense plus capital expenditures) do not vary in response to earnings thresholds, which suggests that, on average, reductions in R&D expense are offset by concurrent increases in capital expenditures. Lastly, our research design allows us to infer that the increased capital expenditures are largely R&D investments that are capitalized instead of non-R&D capital expenditures, suggesting that overall investments in R&D are relatively unchanged.     

CEO Overconfidence and Long‐Term Performance Following R&D Increases

We examine the relation between Chief Executive Officer (CEO) overconfidence and significant increases in research and development (R&D) expenditures. Although prior studies reveal a significantly positive market reaction to increases in R&D expenditures in both the long and short run, we find that long‐run stock performance is positive only for firms whose CEOs are not overconfident. Our findings, which may be attributable to overinvestment and the overestimation of future cash flows, imply that R&D resulting from overconfident behavior does not provide any value to firms.     

Tournament incentives, firm risk, and corporate policies

This paper tests the proposition that higher tournament incentives will result in greater risk-taking by senior managers in order to increase their chance of promotion to the rank of CEO. Measuring tournament incentives as the pay gap between the CEO and the next layer of senior managers, we find a significantly positive relation between firm risk and tournament incentives. Further, we find that greater tournament incentives lead to higher R&D intensity, firm focus, and leverage, but lower capital expenditures intensity. Our results support the hypothesis that option-like features of intra-organizational CEO promotion tournaments provide incentives to senior executives to increase firm risk by following riskier policies. Finally, the compensation levels and structures of executives of financial institutions have received a great deal of scrutiny after the financial crisis. In a separate examination of financial firms, we again find a significantly positive relation between firm risk and tournament incentives.     

Do institutional investors exacerbate managerial myopia?

This study analyzes corporate expenditures for property, plant and equipment (PP&E), and research and development (R&D) for over 2500 US firms from 1988 to 1994. We find no support for the contention that institutional investors cause corporate managers to behave myopically. Indeed, we document a positive relation between industry-adjusted expenditures for PP&E and R&D and the fraction of shares owned by institutional investors. This relation is robust to a variety of empirical tests, including those that account for endogeneity between institutional ownership and firm-level discretionary expenditures.     

The effect of capital market pressures on the association between R&;D spending and CEO option compensation

We examine the effect of capital market pressures for meeting earnings benchmarks on the relationship between R&D spending and CEO option compensation. We consider a particular scenario when firms face small earnings declines but could opportunistically reduce R&D spending to increase reported earnings. We find that firms with income reporting concerns punish their CEOs with lower option compensation when R&D spending increases but reported earnings decreases. Further, for firms with income reporting concerns, we find that the penalty for increasing R&D is greater when the firms frequently miss quarterly earnings benchmarks in the year. Overall, our findings suggest that the adverse consequence on CEO options encourages short-run compensation-motivated actions to eliminate or postpone R&D projects with positive net present values.     

Does CEO reputation matter for capital investments?

This paper examines the association between CEO reputation and corporate capital investments. The efficient contracting hypothesis predicts a positive association between CEO reputation and wealth effects of corporate capital investments. In contrast, the rent extraction hypothesis predicts that the wealth effects of capital investments are negatively associated with CEO reputation. We find that the stock market's responses to announcements of capital investments are more favorable for firms with more reputable CEOs. Moreover, CEO reputation mitigates the negative stock price reaction associated with announcements of capital investments by firms with high free cash flow and low growth opportunities. Additional analysis indicates that firms with more reputable CEOs exhibit significantly better post-investment operating performance improvements than those with less reputable CEOs, especially in firms with high free cash flow and low growth opportunities. Collectively, our results suggest that the efficient contracting hypothesis dominates the rent extraction hypothesis in terms of net economic impact of capital investments on the investing firm.     

An Agency Analysis of Firm Diversification: The Consequences of Discretionary Cash and Managerial Risk Considerations

Firm diversification is shown to be a function of excess discretionary cash flow and managerial risk considerations. We measure firm diversification using the concentric diversification index. The index is positively related to both the number of business units in the firm and the extent to which the business firm's segments differ. Consequently, the measure provides a proxy for how firm diversification decisions impact the risk of the firm, and the measure is found to be inversely related to both total risk and unsystematic risk. Consistent with the agency arguments of discretionary cash flow, we find the level of excess discretionary funds in the firm to be a significant positive determinant of the level of firm diversification. We also find support for both a wealth transfer hypothesis over low levels of managerial ownership, and a managerial risk aversion hypothesis over high levels of managerial ownership.     

Seeking safety: The relation between CEO inside debt holdings and the riskiness of firm investment and financial policies

CEO inside debt holdings (pension benefits and deferred compensation) are generally unsecured and unfunded liabilities of the firm. Because these characteristics of inside debt expose the CEO to default risk similar to that faced by outside creditors, theory predicts that CEOs with large inside debt holdings will display lower levels of risk-seeking behavior (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Consistent with the theoretical predictions, we find a negative association between CEO inside debt holdings and the volatility of future firm stock returns, R&D expenditures, and financial leverage, and a positive association between CEO inside debt holdings and the extent of diversification and asset liquidity. Collectively, our results provide empirical evidence suggesting that CEOs with large inside debt holdings prefer investment and financial policies that are less risky.     

The valuation of R&D expenditures in Japan

The difficulty to measure the long‐term benefits of R&D expenditures and the distortions induced by R&D accounting suggest that R&D‐intensive firms could be undervalued. Using several methods commonly applied to detect the abnormal returns associated with mispricing, we find little evidence that the value of R&D investments has been underestimated in the Japanese stock market. Given that R&D accounting rules in Japan are similar to those in United States, the results appear to reject the hypothesis that accounting biases are the cause of the undervaluation of R&D investments observed in the United States.     

Corporate capital budgeting and CEO turnover

When a firm has minimal agency and informational asymmetry problems it should make efficient capital budgeting decisions. Many firms over-invest prior to CEO turnover, halt investments in the period surrounding the turnover, and then greatly increase their level of expenditures. Empirical analysis of the cross-sectional and inter-temporal variation in the quality of firms' corporate capital budgeting decision reveals that the impact of CEO turnover is asymmetric between under- and over-investing firms, and this complements the larger literature using average firm-wide performance measures. Firms are more likely to have forced turnovers when there is more over-investment prior to the turnover, and these firms make more efficient investment decisions subsequently. Board influence is largely insignificant prior to a CEO turnover but is consistently associated with higher levels of investment subsequently.     

Why Do Canadian Firms Cross‐list? The Flip Side of the Issue

We investigate the relation between managerial incentives and the decision to cross‐list by comparing Canadian firms cross‐listed on US stock exchanges to industry‐ and size‐matched control firms. After controlling for firm and ownership structure characteristics, we find a positive association between substantial holdings of vested options held by CEOs prior to cross‐listing and the decision to cross‐list. Further, firms managed by CEOs with substantial holdings of vested options exhibit positive announcement returns and negative post‐announcement long‐run returns. CEOs of cross‐listed firms seem to take advantage of the aforementioned market behaviour, because they abnormally exercise vested options and sell the proceeds during the year of listing only when their firms underperform during the subsequent year. In addition, there is a positive relation between substantial holdings of vested options and discretionary accruals during the year of listing, consistent with the view that CEOs manage earnings to keep stock prices at high levels. Overall, these results have significant implications for the cross‐listing literature, suggesting an association between cross‐listing and CEO incentives to maximize CEO private benefits.     

Earnings Variability and Disclosure of R&D: Evidence from Press Releases

This study explores press releases in the pharmaceutical industry to expand our understanding of how investments in R&D outlays influence uncertainty of future earnings. The findings make two contributions to the literature. First, they provide evidence that equal investments in different R&D ventures are associated with differential variability of future earnings. This result suggests that non‐financial information contained in press releases captures attributes of firm‐specific R&D investments that are not revealed through R&D expenditures reported in financial statements. Second, prior studies have indicated that investments in pharmaceutical R&D are associated with the highest variability of future earnings among all industries. The results, however, suggest that for a large class of low‐risk pharmaceutical R&D investments, the relative variability of future earnings is low and similar to that generated by capital expenditures. The findings hold when we control for endogeneity in voluntary disclosure of press releases.     

Narcissism is a bad sign: CEO signature size,investment, and performance

Using the size of CEO signatures in SEC filings to measure individual narcissism, we find that CEO narcissism is associated with several negative firm outcomes. We first validate signature size as a measure of narcissism but not overconfidence using two laboratory studies, and also find that our measure is correlated with employee perceptions of CEO narcissism used in prior research. We then use CEO signatures to study the relation between CEO narcissism and the firm’s investment policies and performance. CEO narcissism is associated with overinvestment, particularly in R&D and M&A expenditures (but not in capital expenditures). Firms led by narcissistic CEOs experience lower financial productivity in the form of profitability and operating cash flows. Despite this negative performance, narcissistic CEOs enjoy higher absolute and relative compensation. Our results are robust to several alternative specifications, including controlling for a popular options-based overconfidence measure used in prior research.